Bingo! Which is why I've never been one to use the 'canon' scenarios to play and only to provide additional background info that everyone can agree on.

If you do choose to use the canon i think you should already be prepared to accept some 'wha?' moments like why the 5th would be so far south (or find a reason for them to be - like this thread is discussing).

Pick your FICTION.

A very interesting supposition. I like it. Certainly, the occupation of Poland west of the Warta would have been a high priority for the Germans. I do believe that SACEUR would have wanted the Baltic coast cleared as far east as possible for access to fishing and shipping. Nevertheless, causing the Pact forces in western Poland to withdraw east and south would have provided NATO with a lot of advantages. As an added extra-special bonus, a southward thrust oriented behind the "front line" Pact forces in western Poland would have been a far less costly means of displacing the Pact formations than frontal attacks. The light infantry actions of 1999 would have revealed that both sides were building extensive defensive works that would be expensive to break by frontal assault. All very interesting...


Webstral

Spring offensive map
 

Bon dia!

We're still working in the material of our future site and we would like to add the following map about the 3rd German Army in northern Poland:

Attachment 822



The map is based in Legbreaker's analysis about the operation and our purpose is to give only a visual help for the referees running our pre-Kalisz campaign, with only the "main lines" of the NATO plotted movements. The typical map we find in the history books without entering in many details.Take into account that it is a map about the plan and not about the development of the offensive itself. Before add it to our site I would like to know any opinion from you, guys. Do you think that anything important must be changed or added?

Of course, the initial positions are fruit of our imagination, but we have followed the clue that we know that the British Army was facing the Soviets around Frankfurt and that the 5th ID starting point was in the Chojnice/Człuchów area. So we have chosen the line between Frankfurt and Chojnice/Człuchów to distribute the starting positions for the NATO units implied in the offensive, roughly along the main road between Gorzów Wielkopolski and Gdansk.

Thanks in advance!

Mmmmm... I've just edited the map in he last post. All the units and lines seemed to be displaced to the east.

From my research for the analysis, the north end of the start line is way too far east. With a startline where you've marked, it makes much of the first few weeks of the offensive a cakewalk for NATO, totally changing the ultimate outcome. I'll try to mark out the start positions as I assessed them in the next few days.

I also envisaged the offensive as more of a fish hook in shape, III Corp pushing eastward several hundred kilometres before swinging south to cut off Pact units, or at least threaten encirclment against the mountains to the south.

The 2nd Marines were also conducting an encirclement operation, but on a much smaller scale. It was their task to take the river delta, but also push inland to cut off the northern Polish troops and allow the 8th ID an easier time of it.

Obviously almost no unit actually reached their objectives for a variety of reason. However, the 8th was probably the most sucessfull of all the NATO divisions, overshooting their objective by an embarassing distance.

Great, then I will redraw the map with your modified initial positions.

I've drawn the plotted movements of the German III Corp in south-east direction to not interfere with the path of the 5th ID as described in "Escape from Kalisz". Perhaps it would be better to make this movement a little longer and then turn them to the south or even the south-west to look for the soviet rear, with the fish hook shape you say.


One possibility is to attribute part of the success of the 8th to a quick victory over the Polish units directly in its path of advance before the other Polish units "dissoluted" in front of the III Corps (or even in front of the 5th ID) initiated their movement toward the north to harass the left flank of the NATO. Althought the 8th archieved successful deep penetration, a more slower advance could have helped to consolidate the Baltic Coast wiht the 5th Armored and the 2nd Marines once the things started to fall apart.

BTW: What about the gap between the 50th Armored and the 5th ID. Perhaps it was supposed to be covered by the Canadians and the 116th ACR?Could they delay in disengage from the British/Soviet "front" have been the cause for the dangeroulsy exposed left flank of the 5th ID?

Mmmm...I've just noticed I missed the proper symbol for the 21th Panzergrenadier Division. I will arrange it in the next version of the map.

Another possibility is that the 50th Armored was to follow the advance of the 5th ID, covering its right flank, while the Canadians and the 116 ACR must fill the gap between the 50th and the 8th. Again, the delay of these two units forced the harassing Polish units from the south could be the critical factors before the start of the Soviet counteroffensive.

Quote:
"Meanwhile amphibious landings were to be made by the 2nd MARDIV across the river estuaries of northern Poland with the 8th ID heading further east to cut lines of any hope of reinforcement from Russia. The 50th Armoured Division was to fill the gap between the 5th and 8th while 116th ACR and Can 4th Mech Bde were held in reserve.

The remainder of the 3rd Army were tasked with filling the gap between the 5th ID and the British forces. They, like the British, had barely reached the start line recently vacated by the US units before the Soviet 4th Guards Army screwed everything up."

XI Corp were to be the spearhead with the German Divisions following along behind. It would have been up to the Germans to protect the southern flank allowing the Americans to remain on the offensive.

Unfortunately the Pact forces moved before the Germans could really get moving and so the US 50th AD, 116 ACR and Canadian 4th Mechanised Brigade had to be pulled form the offensive and retasked to flank and supply line protection. After the dust settled, the Germans (and British) had barely moved from the cantonments they'd been occupying for the previous year or two. Ultimately this was a good thing (or as good as could be hoped for) as only the US 5th and 8th ID were lost instead of most of an army...

Okay just a query... with all the unrest happening in Canada... what the heck were the troops still doing over in Europe?

But great information folks...

I would still love to see more of what happened in the Austria, Hungary, Italy region and anything on the importance of the Danube River in the war.

Why are there US troops still in Iraq even though the US is apparently having "cash flow" issues?

Politics has to play a big part both there and in T2K.

More impportantly perhaps, at least on a day to day level, is the severe lack of available transportation to take them home again.

So true. After the US governmental scism both MilGov and CivGov continued to send troops to Europe despite those troops being desperately needed at home. That seems to me to have been mostly politically motivated (and perhaps a case of "one upmanship").

It's so completely [expletive deleted] up that it rings true. I abhor the idea, therefore I love it.

Webstral

I meant the CANADIAN troops only...lol.

Okay heres something that I am curious about... what happened in Europe after the American troops came home?

I think I read something about it in one of the DC group papers but wasn't sure.

Going Home module has some insight to this.

http://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?p=9184#post9184 should give you an idea or two.
Basically the Canadians, along with the rest of what's left of the XI Corp (less the 8th ID), are stuck. They're not technically behind enemy lines, but to withdraw back into Germany requires movement into and through Pact controlled areas.

I'm still having trouble reconciling 3rd Army's failed offensive with the Soviet/WTO forces present in northern Poland.

What Soviet and WTO units are involved in attempting to cut off the 3rd Army spearheads along the Baltic Coast? The map in the v2.2 rulebook and the unit location listings in the U.S., Soviet, and NATO vehicle guides don't place any powerful Soviet/WTO units in the north. For the most part, the only WTO listed near the Baltic coast are weak horse cavalry and BG units. The Polish 9th MRD is the only WTO unit in the region with any significant armor/heavy weapons.

5th ID's destruction makes plenty of sense considering the correlation of forces in the Lodz-Kalisz area. Based on the mauling the 5th ID gave most of the Soviet and WTO units involved in its destruction, it doesn't seem like those units could have turned north to stop significant NATO 3rd Army forces or even threaten its right flank enough to halt operations along the Baltic Coast.

As Leg pointed out, 3rd Army contains two tank divisions, five mechanized infantry/panzergrenadier divisions, one Marine division, and an ACR. It shouldn't have had any trouble clearing the coast and sending additional units south to support 5th ID.

If it's a case of halting units due to a larger Soviet counteroffensive to the south, why are the units of the 3rd Army still listed as being in northern Poland and Germany? One would assume that if they were stopped due to pressure on the UK forces in west-central Poland, at least a few of the units (probably the 3 German divisions) would be shifted south to shore up the British or attempt to retake ground lost to the Reds. From looking at the correlation of forces in the UK area of responsibility, it looks like the Soviet and WTO units could pretty easily take Berlin if they wanted too. Yet canon shies away from even mentioning a broader Soviet or NATO offensive. They make it sound like the 3rd Army's offensive is the only show in town.

I don't know what the game designers were thinking to make NATO so much more powerful in the north and the Soviets significantly more powerful in the south. The situation as of late July 2000 would make much more sense if the forces were more evenly matched along the front.

And then there's the status report for the 2nd Marine Div. in the U.S. Army Vehicle Guide. It says that the location and status of the division is unkown after its amphib assaults along the Baltic Coast. This suggests that it is in a state of distress. If the 8th Mech. ID's location in LATVIA (I still don't know what the designers were thinking there) is known, then something must be wrong with the Marines. Trouble is, I just don't see a bunch of relatively small Polish horse cavalry and BG units being able to crush a Marine division. Wouldn't the 8th ID and Marines have operated together for at least part of the duration of the 8th drive to Latvia? What about other follow-on 3rd Army units? Besides the 5th ID, what are the German armored and PZGr units doing? Or the Canadians, Danes, and U.S. TD and ACR? More than 75% of the 3rd Army is unaccounted for during its offensive. If the Germans aren't participating, why is an American Corps subordinated to them? That doesn't make a whole lot of sense.

I'm really trying to explain the offensive's failure. 5th ID's part in it is clear cut but the rest is a muddled mess. Are there any Challenge articles about the rest of the summer offensive?

It just doesn't make any sense.

After a little more research, it's clear that there are a couple more relatively powerful Polish divisions in the Baltic region that could have helped blunt 3rd Army's offensive. In particular, the 1st MRD (2500/7), the 9th MRD (2500/10), and the 5th TD (3500/16). There's also the 17th CD (2000), 12th CD (1500), 3rd CD (1000), and 7th MarDiv (only 600 men but presumably "elite" troops).

I also went looking for Soviet units in the Baltic states that could have been sent to deal with 3rd Army. Most of the units listed as being in the Ukraine are either in full revolt or engaged in attempting to suppress it so I figure they would be busy and unavailable. A couple of units in Belarus are also listed as being engaged fighting the Ukranian separatists so that eliminates them.

The following units are posted in Belarus and apparently unengaged during 3rd Army's offensive and could therefore have participated in a counterattack. Units marked with an asterix are the ones I see as being most likely to be involved.

22nd TD (2000)
3rd MRD (2000/10)*
138th MRD (4000/20)*
83rd AAB (600)*

The following units are posted in Latvia. One issue here is the 26th GMRD's (4000/28) mutiny (they are garrisoning the newly free city of Riga). I would assume, therefore, that the other, loyal Soviet units listed in Riga are probably going to be busy dealing with the 26th. On the other hand, maybe the Soviets have assessed the threat posed by 3rd Army's offensive as being much greater and have decided to deal with it first. That could free up the following units for a counterattack against the 3rd Army.

40th GMRD (500/4)
40th MRD (500/4) -an odd coincidence but that's what the v1.0 SVG says.
107th MRD (4000/36)*

If the above units- or just a few of them- were involved in a counterattack against 3rd Army's offensive, it would explain a lot.

Yes, the 3rd does appear to be very strong on the face of it, but they also have a terrible weakness - fuel.
In my assessment of the offensive written a while back, I came to the conclusion that the 2nd Marines had to have suffered some sort of catasrophy and the units following along behind the 5th and 8th had to have been held up.

The most appropriate event I could think of for the marines was the sinking of their supply ship and almost total loss of fuel reserves. This meant their mobility and firepower suddenly became a lead weight around their necks as they were reduced to rationing what little was left in vehicle tanks and operating on foot.

The poor state of units in northern Poland as shown in Canon are after the offensive - they'd been battered and torn apart by the 5th, 8th, 2nd marines and then 50th AD and assorted smaller units. While not particularly strong or capable of significant offensive action on their own, they were still a thorn in the side of XI Corp and needed to be hedged in. Therefore, until the following German units could be brought up, the 50th AD, 116 ACR and the Canadians had to pause their forward movement and secure the flanks.

Unfortunately, the Pact forces in the south took offensive action of their own shortly after Nato began it's eastward move. I've had them apply pressure to the southern areas as well as drive northward towards the Baltic Sea to cut off the XI Corps. With the pressure placed upon the British, the Germans had little option but to reinforce Southern Germany instead of following the US XI Corp, or risk the Soviets breaking through into some of their most important lands.

The Pact forces did not act in response to the Nato offensive - they had planned the attack months, if not a year or more ahead. I envisiage they intended to place the bulk of their effort into the south, however Nato moved first. To prevent the Pact offensive being cut off they had two options - withdraw as was hoped by Nato command, or modify their plans. They chose the latter and took a chance - this of course was to redirect their reinforcement units nortward to cut of the XI Corp, much like Nato was trying to do to the Soviets.

Neither side suceeded, or at least not as well as they'd hoped. The Pact forces battered themselves to exhaustion against the British, Germans and US units in Western Poland but did manage to fix the XI Corp in position in north west Poland where they still were in November. The units around Kalisz were rushed in from Russia and the Ukraine using fuel from Romania. I'm certain this move had not been intended as part of their offensive, but was prompted by a very strong US infantry division wandering about in central Poland causing no end of trouble. If these units had been intended to take part in the offensive, they would have been brought up much slower in the months beforehand, thereby saving the hundreds of thousands of litres of petroleum based fuels.

Nato managed to halt the Pact offensive, however lost the two US divisions who had made it to their objective areas (5th and 8th). They also ended up with the rest of XI Corp effectively cut off from Nato lines (although otherwise in reasonable shape). Nato probably gained more ground than the Pact overall, but only because they moved first (the area XI Corp is squatting on). Nato's offensive also spoiled what would have been a devastating Pact offensive in that it caused Pact reinforcements to be redeployed, easing pressure in the south and allowing those Nato units to survive.

I hope that rambling makes sense.

A really severe, unforseen storm would do the job nicely. Entirely plausible too.

I think I had a couple of Soviet coastal patrol boats or similar torpedo the largest of the cargo ships right after the bulk of the combat vehicles had been offloaded. Left the 2nd with plenty of firepower for the intial landing, but once the fuel in the tanks ran out...

This is a good solution for the 2nd Marines. I also like Targan's idea of a fierce summer storm on the Baltic. It happened shortly after D-Day during the Normandy campaign in '44 and I would argue that the weather is even more unpredictable with all of the particulates from nuclear explosions hanging around in the upper atmosphere.

I do think that you may be overstating the fuel situation somewhat- not insofar as the shortage thereof, but in the impact fuel shortages would have on division-sized units during offensive operations c. 2000. In Escape from Kalisz, it is written that the 3rd Army spent the spring brewing fuel. It also mentions the 5th ID, or significant elements thereof, stopping several times on its long right hook to brew up more. It looks like armies in 2000 are used to this sort of stop and go thing.

As you also mentioned, it may be more a matter of 2nd MarDiv losing its resupply of ammunition more than running out of fuel.

This is a really good point that I hadn't fully considered. My question about final unit placements still stands, though. With the WTO forces in northern Poland no longer able to mount significant offensive operations (as of 7/00), why is the entire NATO 3rd Army still posted opposite them? Especially since, glancing at the situation map in the back of the v2.2 rulebook, there are numerous, relatively powerful Soviet forces (mostly MRDs and TDs) further south, facing just a handful of NATO units. As I mentioned before, the correlation of forces displayed on the map is remarkably uneven, with NATO more powerful in northern Poland, and the Soviets more powerful in the south. It seriously looks like 3rd Army could brush aside the various small CDs facing them and drive all the way to Moscow through northern Poland and the rebellious Baltic states. It also looks like the Red Army in west-central Poland could easily capture Berlin and drive on to the Rhine. One would think that if Soviet reinforcements were sent north to stop 3rd Army, they would remain opposite once the fighting died down. Shifting them all back south after the hypothetical counterattacks doesn't make a lot of operational or strategic sense.

I like your analysis/explanation of the failure of 3rd Army's offensive but not all of it squares with the final unit locations given in canon.

Also, on a more selfish note, I need a way to strand small German, Canadian, and Danish forces along the Baltic coast east of Gdansk, and not just SF. Stranding elements of U.S. units are no problem due to the situation with the 2nd MarDiv and the 8th ID's bizzare drive into Latvia.

In Going Home, it's stated the 2nd Marines have equipment and personnel from seven different nationalites amongst it's ranks and it's implied these were picked up during or after the offensive.
I believe the 2nd was tasked with the area from Gdansk eastward almost to Elblag (their orders were to launch amphibious assault onthe Polish Baltic Coast and across the Vistula estuary). It is conceivable that small numbers of Germans, Canadians, and Danes were attached to the division as liason units (likely Intelligence, MP, that sort of thing), and absorbed into the division once it was realised the XI Corp was cut off and they couldn't return to the home units.

A lack of ammunition doesn't ring true to me as one of the factors of the 2nd Marine situation. It is stated in Going Home that this division actualy gained strength as a result of the offensive. Whatever it was that caused them to be so crippled as to withdraw back westward, had to have been relatively big, but temporary in nature - fuel seems to be the only thing that fits.

In addition to the loss of the actual fuel carried aboard the ship(s), perhaps the bulk of the divisions stills were also lost? This would allow them to regain some measure of mobility once replacements have been constructed, a process which is likely to have taken several weeks since they would need to acquire the necessary materials first.

As for the rest of your comments, I'll post something on them in the next day or two. They're good points and need some serious thought...

True, losing its stills would be a serious blow to the 2nd MarDiv and would all but halt its offensive operations. It raises a problem, though. Without any fuel, how would it get back to northern Germany? It would presumably have to abandon almost all of its vehicles. This would certainly not make it "more powerful" as Going Home implies (I haven't looked at it myself, so I'm taking your word for it). If anything, it would make the division less powerful.

EDIT: Leg, I just reread your post and absorbed the bit about scavenging/building new stills. That might work. It would strand the 2nd MarDiv for a while (explaining the comment about "its location and status are unknown" in the U.S.A.V.G.) yet allow them to get back to N. Germany eventually, as the GH module says it does.

In my mind, I too have the 2nd MarDiv landing between Gdansk and Elblag, then pushing south, southeast to cover the 8th ID's right flank as it pushes west on its end-run along the Baltic Coast. I would also like to include the Danish Jutland division, the Canadian mechanized brigade (and/or para regiment) and at least one of the German units in the operations on or near the Baltic coast to account for stragglers of each nationality in the region after the failure of the offensive.

And that brings us back to the question of why the 3rd Army's offensive failed and/or was stopped and why all of its constituent units remain in northern Germany despite significant threats on other sectors of the "front".

I still have a problem with the 3rd Army just stopping its offensive and pulling back to its start lines in northern Poland. Why doesn't it detach units to follow the 5th ID south and hit its antagonists in their flank? Why are no additional units sent to support the 8th ID's mission? Why doesn't it at least shift units south, southwest to face the newly discovered Soviet units responsible for the 5th ID's destruction? What about the imbalance in the correlation of forces in west central Poland? Why aren't those addressed at all?

Canon doesn't seem to give any clues. The writers made a mess of it and, instead of addressing the inconsistencies, they just gloss over them. They put a lot of time and effort into explaining/describing the destruction of the 5th ID and apparenty none to how the rest of 3rd Army's missions played out and, ultimately failed. Unless someone finds a canonical explanation somewhere (Challenge, maybe?), that leaves it up to us.

What about a nuke? Even if it didn't hit any of the 3rd Army's units, it could conceivably stop them in their tracks.

What about a mutiny? Did one or more of the 3rd Army's constituent units refuse orders to advance?

It doesn't seem like any of the national governments involved would have the power in mid 2000 to stop a large scale offensive in its tracks. Why would they want to anyway?

What about Soviet reinforcements from Belarus and/or Latvia? AFAIK, canon makes no mention of this, but it could explain the blunting of 3rd Army's drive and also why the entirety of 3rd Army remained in N. Germany (as opposed to shifting south to face the much stronger Soviet forces shown as present in west central Poland and east Germany).

I had the 2nd crawl very slowly west to link up with the following units of the XI Corp. One of the conrtibuting reasons why the 3rd army did not follow on was that the vehicle heavy 2nd, which at the time was in a stragegically advanced position, soaked up most of the available fuel stocks. This both made them semi-mobile once more while also impacting heavily on the unit which had to give up their reserves.
This drain was particularly heavy on the 50th AD - the nearest allied unit to the Marines.

You could explain the Canadians and Danish being in the area by assigning them the duty of escorting the gathered fuel. They then took up covering positions while the Marines refueled and reorganised (the crawl westward would have sevrely disorganised them as some component units were able to move quicker than others).
There is no real need for all of the Canadian and Danish strength to be shifted though, the bulk could well remain where they were facing the Poles and Soviets.

Why didn't the Germans leapfrog the XI Corp? I'm guessing fuel once again (as well as increasing pressure on the British). With the Marines requiring something like several million litres, every unit needed to give up subtantial percentages of their reserve or risk the Marines being attack while immobile and destroyed. Note this was before the 5th even got close to Lodz.
I feel there is a strong chance that at this relatively early stage, the 5th and 8th were probably still in physical contact with the XI Corp and therefore would also have lost fuel reserves to the Marines. This may help expain why a division which had spent a year or more in preperation had needed to stoip and brew more fuel along the way.

Here's a thought, perhaps the naval assets which landed the Marines were also carrying the III German Armies fuel supply for the second phase of the offensive? With that on the bottom of the sea, it would have been suicide to continue an eastward movement.
The 5th and 8th were already well underway with specific objectives which we felt could still be reached, or communications were so bad (or disrupted by the enemy) they didn't get confirmation of the general halt of the advance?

A couple of wild ideas that need more work, but conceivable I think....

An interesting idea but I just don't see 3rd Army putting all of its eggs (or fuel) in one basket like that. One unswept mine, one errant diesel boat, one airstrike, one shore-launched SSM, and all of that fuel goes up in flames. I definitely can see the 2nd MarDiv losing nearly all of its own fuel in this way, but the entire army's? The rest of the 3rd Army would need that fuel, at the very least, just to break through to the 2nd MarDiv. Otherwise, it could become stranded all alone (with way too much fuel) and reduced at the enemy forces' leisure. The 8th ID clearly has plenty of fuel as they somehow managed to drive all the way to Latvia, apparently before figuring out how far they'd just gone (this notion really bothers me).

I'm still thinking on your first post in this latest couplet. I think this is a really interesting discussion.

You're probably right about not putting it all in the one basket, however by mid 2000, maybe they didn't have a choice? Perhaps they had only one large fuel carrier left plus a few smaller vessels converted from other uses. The main ship went down even though it was protected by every available asset the combine Nato navies had and "poof", the whole operation was in serious jeopardy.

Pre, or even early war, such a risky gamble might not have been considered, but by the time of 2000, there's not a lot of choice left...

I'm not as switched on as you guys when it comes to having all of the unit names and locations in my head but hear me out. What if the reasons behind the German 3rd Army's failure to push forward were psychological? Specifically, panic induced by the apparance of Soviet units at their front which their intel said just should not have been there. Actually, COULD NOT have been there (until it was realised that the Soviet units were running on diesel and had vastly increased mobility compared to NATO's units facing them).

Keep in mind that NATO's forces had not seen more than a trickle of diesel for a couple of years. It would have been a major blow to morale for the German brass to discover that not only are their troops suddenly facing many, many more Soviet tanks and other AFVs than they had expected (with unit designations that should be 1000km away) but also they could smell their diesel exhaust and see with their own eyes that their enemies' vehicles are zooming around at full power.

I think that NATO's commanders would have had certain expectations of their enemy (reinforced by the way things had been for the last couple of years) and a whole bunch of Soviet armour running on diesel just turning up out of no where would have shocked them (not to mention throwing a year of planning into disarray). Maybe the German 3rd Army's commanders were shocked and panicked into a defensive frame of mind (and ignored the Americans' commanders who were no doubt screaming for their German counterparts to continue with the offensive).

And now my second point. I believe it has been said previously in this thread that NATO forces in the north of Poland were facing a lot of cavalry (some Soviet, some Polish) and the strongest armour/MRD forces they were facing were Polish. In the south the Germans and the US 5th ID were facing a greater proportion of Soviet units. I suspect that the Soviets would have kept most or all of their diesel for their own units. The Poles would still have been running on alcohol (in just as limited supply as NATO forces). This means that while the US 8th ID and 2nd MarDiv might have been facing numerically strong opposition, both sides would have similar mobility constraints. Also the WarPac units in the north of the country would have tended to be roughly where NATO's intelligence suggested they would be. The NATO operations in the north would therefore be expected to go roughly as planned (or as it turned out better than planned in some ways).

In the south of Poland the situation would have been completely different. There were a higher proportion of Soviet units in the south and while initially only the Soviet units being rushed from the east would have been running on diesel, as the offensive wore on more and more of the local Soviet units would start to receive diesel supplies as well. That would have created a confused situation for NATO and WarPac units in the south. You've got unexpected Soviet units from the east suddenly appearing in southern Poland. You've got Soviet units already in southern Poland suddenly having many more options than before because they have reinforcements and diesel, thus allowing them to leave their cantonments for the first time in a couple of years. Local Polish units would be expected in many cases to take over those cantonments (they didn't have diesel or reinforcements and in many cases would have been very happy to see their Soviet counterparts move out).

Canon shows that following all that confusion and the destruction of the US 5th ID there was a great deal of Soviet movement. Some Soviet units stayed in western Poland, facing the German 3rd Army. Some were so badly mauled by NATO that they couldn't even return to their cantonments (which were probably now being garrisoned by Poles anyway) and went marauder. Some went into wholesale mutiny and decided to use their last remaining diesel reserves to strike out east towards home.

I am hoping that some of the above points will prove useful to the ongoing discussion (which I am finding to be very interesting thank you).

Thanks, Targan. You raise a very important consideration that I think the rest of us (or I, at least) have missed. I think your psychological impact explanation works pretty well. It would explain the relatively bloodless failure of the offensive and the mostly intact conditions of most of the NATO units of 3rd Army when they end up back in their cantonments.

I think we still need to explain why none of them were shifted south, though, since that's where the Soviets had done most of their damage. Perhaps the numerous small, but mobile Polish and Soviet cavalry units gave NATO military intel the impression that the WTO forces were way more powerful than they actually were, kind of like the finale in the film Three Amigos. (Yes, I've just connected a broad '80s comedy set in 1920s Mexico with Twilight 2000 :o) It was all the 3rd could do to turn around under pressure and return to its cantonments in northern Germany.

In fact, I will go one up on you and theorize that the cavalry units would actually have been even more mobile, in the long run, at least, than motorized units since cavalry wouldn't have to stop as often to brew more fuel (and they're not as reliant on roads).

Just to reassure you that I'm not super anal-retentive, the reason I'm being so detail oriented when it comes to the units involved in 3rd Army's offensive (and where they are when) is I'm working on a campaign setting revolving around the Baltic city of Elblag. I want to be able to convincingly explain why cut-off elements of American units (easy), German (not too hard), Canadian (getting tougher), and Danish units (the real challenge) are congregating there.

I think you may have gotten me most of the way there, Targan.

@Legbreaker: I still don't think 3rd army would detach most of its hard-earned fuel (almost 6 division's worth, not counting the U.S. 5th or 8th Mech IDs) and send it in a wide, amphibious flanking manouver with the hope of meeting up with it later. That's not just daring, it's plain rash. Plus, I think that most units would be used to hauling around most of its own fuel and the equipment to brew more. It would be routine by 2000. Canon implies this time and again. I will use your idea for the 2nd MarDiv's fuel quandry, though. One division losing almost all of its fuel in one fell swoop works for me. Thanks for that.

I was thinking that the first few weeks work of fuel wold be carried within the divisions but fuel for after then would be supplied by sea. With transportation of bulk good so difficult in 2000, there wouldn't be too many other options available for them.
Perhaps all the fuel was not lost, but instead it was the capacity to move it to where it would be needed? Every last available truck was required in the effort to get the marines mobile again, thereby effectively halting the rest of Nato until the job was done. This allows for millions of tonnes of fuel to be stockpiled in Germany, probably located around port facilities, but unable to be moved to the units that needed it until mid July.

Targan, your idea is good, however petroleum based fuels were only in evidence with Soviet units around Kalisz - only the 3rd shock army (?) was supplied with it while everyone else, Soviet and Pole, had to rely on alternate fuels. Even the Polish units involved in the destruction of the 5th were not trusted with deisel, etc.

With regard to the Danes in Elblag, I find that a bit hard to believe. The Nato Vehicle Guide (both editions) place all Danish units in their home country although some did take part in the offensive. It also appears according to the available canon info that only the XI Corp (which the Danes were not part of) took a truely offensive role. The Canadians however were part of the XI Corp.

2nd Mar Div;

As much as I am one to agree they suck! And they do!

Naval vessel would be a means of providing so much fuel. The engines of the ship need to be moving, so now, turn the heat from the steam condenser to a heating tank for the mash which could hold tens of thousands of gallons which would result in eh, a thousand or two gallons a day. The issue would be to getting the mash to the tanks. So that wouldn't be an issue.

As for gaining the strength, eh, yeah growing in number as small units from whatever join us. But are they truly Marines? And the enemy, eh, would they be that comitted to it? Comittment verses the cost of taking on a Marine Divsion? Would they hold? Sure, would they stand until ordered off, or until the men they could gather could be withdrawn, yep! As for losing a section of their force, yep, they could, some could be cut off as well which would account for several elements of Marines roaming around, or even some making contact with the 5th Divsion or wandering up the Vistula in their AAMTRAKS!

As for withdrawing with a larger force, as I said, they could have picked up alot of troops who had managed to make it to their beachhead before pulling out, as well as a few PACT units who changed loyaltys when they did withdrawl. <Think of the Marines as they finished the fighting withdrawl from the Chosin, and Hungham> when they did up anchor and sail away.

So, those are things to consider.

As Leg has said, most Danish units are in Denmark, so it'd be hard to have coherent units with vehicles/artillery in Elbag. It might be possible to have Danish troops there if you hand wave a little.

The Danish Navy is probably little more than a distant memory at this point, but it is possible that Danish Merchant ships, if any survive might be part of the 2nd Marine's supply train. Such ships might have Danish troops on board as security.

Now, if any of those ships were lost, grounded, wore out, the security and crew might form an infantry unit that ended up stranded in Elbag. There is a precedent in the Naval Divisions that the British sometimes fielded in the colonial wars. Hey Presto, Danes in Poland.

No matter what anyone may say, US marines are just ordinary men like any other, soldiers who have similar training as many other military arms of many other nations.

Why are US marines , especially only 2000 of them effectively cut off behind enemy lines and immobile, such a scary concept?

Although the sourcebooks place the Danes at home, the unit description shows that they took part in the III German Army spring offensive but not as part of XI Corp. Therefore, it is probable they spent their time in north eastern Germany/north west Poland before finding their way back home in the aftermath.

That makes more sense.

But NATO would not necessarily know this for certain, even when they captured vehicles and troops that indicated otherwise. They would probably feel like all of their intel was suspect after several petrol burning Soviet divisions that were supposed to be back in Russia/Ukraine suddenly smashed the 5ht ID. And then, like I mentioned before, the numerous, highly mobile cavalry units in northern Poland could have led 3rd Army to believe that they were facing far more powerful forces than they were expecting. Combine this with the news that Soviet forces to the south were running on diesel and a sense of panic could very well set in.

In the NATO vehi guide, they are listed as being part of 3rd Army and described as having participating in the the summer offensive into northern Poland. As for which corps of 3rd Army did what, what is your source? I haven't come across this and I'd love to have a look at it.

The unit location in the NVG is POST offensive, as are all the other U.S./NATO and Soviet/WTO unit locations given in the rules and the various vehi-guides.

Because of their tenacity for starters. It is about the same as having a unit of paratroopers in your rear. They tend to be agressive and will continue to go on the offensive rather than hole up where they can be contained and made impotent. Think about it. Would you want 1000 or 2000 troops in your rear who will be conducting platoon sized raids, or even company and BN sized assaults?

And, the fear of their reputation will also pose a factor as well when dealing with locals, 2nd and 3rd line troops. Weather it is real or imagined the psychological factor is there and it will be exploited to its best effect.

The tradition of their offense and defense are well known as well which would give any foe reason to pause. Again if it is real or imagined the idea is in the enemy which is a factor.

Another factor is that an enemy commander would not want to leave such a force in their rear. So, they would most likely do what they could to eliminate these dangerous forces. As well as the propoganda value of defeating a large organization of US Marines which hasn't been done. I can see a strugle akin to a mini Stalingrade, where it is really a test of wills between the two forces as to who can defeat whom rather than a major statiegic objective.

Leg, seriously name three defeats of US Marines. <and M is capitalized as it is a proper name>

I feel the issues you're overlooking is that the 2nd Marine were in a unique situation - almost cut off from support and virtually immobile.

There were no airlifts of fuel, no supply ships (they were all on the bottom of the ocean, along with their hopes of continued operations) etc for them, and they were stuck in the lowland deltas and esturies of Poland with next to no fuel to use in their VERY heavy tanks, APCs, SP artillery, trucks, motorcycles, etc.

At best they were able to conduct foot patrols as light infantry against an enemy which, while numerically and argueably technically weaker, could run rings around them in their old T-55s, T-62s, horseborne cavalry, etc. Basically, what makes the marines strong was little more than a lodestone around their necks, and virtually eliminated any offensive capabilty they possessed until several weeks later when replacement fuel stocks reached them (and the overall situation in Europe was turning nasty). In my opinion, they would have been lucky to survive if they faced decent opposition.

In my assessment, I also had them strung out along the coastline between Gdansk and Elblag in units of approximately 4-500 men. With no way of regrouping, each unit could have been easily picked off by Pact forces. This deployment was because they were intended to take and hold the area and act as a sor tof carpet for the 8th as they advanced quickly through the region. The 2nd Marines were also to have supplied engineering support for the crossing of the numerous watercourses in the area.

Hmm, this is dangerously close to territorial pissings.
The USMC have had just as many setbacks and failures as any other military force but the US generally tends to gloss over their failures, for example you can find textbooks that mention the failure of USMC to achieve their objectives at Belleau Woods but very few mention the fact that some of them broke and ran (I have read that the USMC are taught that they have never fled from a battle, something even the drill instructors teaching that myth know is a lie). Whether you want to call them failures to meet objectives, defeats, withdrawals or not is largely a matter of semantics but this article is worth reading http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O126-Defeat.html

I did a little digging last night and found that there had indeed been a general Pact offensive into Germany in the summer of 2000. There's next to no info on it though, just a single line in Going Home (I think, I'm at work) in the unit description for the HQ of the 22nd Soviet Army (I think that's the unit). Initially I had thought this to be relating only to the destruction of the 5th, but it's just not worded that way.

There are also references to a number of Nato units not connected to the III German army being involved in action around that time.

It also appears to be implied when looking at all the tidbits of info, that the Pact forces made some impressive gains in the south, which would explain the poor state of defences in that area on the western side of the lines.

I also found that in January and February 2000, UK forces were shifted to the north of the country to consolidate. This may have contributed to the losses in the south.

This offensive, along with the shift of UK forces northward may explain why there is such strength in the north and barely a thin screen of units in the south.

Hmmm, looks like I've made myself more work...

I was under this impression too but I can't remember where I read this.

:confused: That would have created an even more lopsided correlation of forces in both northern and southern Poland.

No UK forces are shown in the north on the map in the v2.2 rulebook. They're all down around Berlin. Now you've got me really confused.

Regarding Marines, lets make sure to keep any debate civil (or maybe start another thread).

Legbreaker, it's your fault I want Danes in my Baltic campaign setting!:p Way back in the day, you had a couple of Danish PCs in your RPoL PbP and I've always thought that was really cool.

My guess is that Nato wasn't expecting a Soviet offensive, or that they felt their own offensive would blunt any drive in the south. It's fairly obvious from the unit descriptions in the books, especially the Pact units, that they'd been well and truely put through the wringer in the last few months after sitting in cantonments for the prior year or two. Up until mid 2000, it looks like the war could still have been "won" by either side but the summer 2000 campaigns drained every last resource either side had left.

The way I see it, the vast majority of units were still in good order up until late summer (a few rogue units behind the lines the rare exception). PCs therefore would still be very used to operating within a structured military environment with an active and relatively capable higher command.

By 2000, almost any nationality can be found almost anywhere with just a little thought and creativity. However, I can't see units larger than individual Plattoons being "out of area" for their nations main units. Take B Coy of the 116th ACR for example. Numbering just a handful of members with maybe a dozen vehicles all told, they are specifically mentioned in several books as a unique situation.