From my research for the analysis, the north end of the start line is way too far east. With a startline where you've marked, it makes much of the first few weeks of the offensive a cakewalk for NATO, totally changing the ultimate outcome. I'll try to mark out the start positions as I assessed them in the next few days.
I also envisaged the offensive as more of a fish hook in shape, III Corp pushing eastward several hundred kilometres before swinging south to cut off Pact units, or at least threaten encirclment against the mountains to the south.
The 2nd Marines were also conducting an encirclement operation, but on a much smaller scale. It was their task to take the river delta, but also push inland to cut off the northern Polish troops and allow the 8th ID an easier time of it.
Obviously almost no unit actually reached their objectives for a variety of reason. However, the 8th was probably the most sucessfull of all the NATO divisions, overshooting their objective by an embarassing distance.
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If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives.
Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect"
Mors ante pudorem
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