Rainbow, your ideas do make sense. In the real world, there is supposed to be a Gulf Coalition force for the purpose of reinforcing Kuwait in the event of a new Iraq. Obviously, events have moved far beyond where they would have been in Twilight: 2000 in January 1997. However, I think it's useful to ask whether Gulf forces would have moved in support of Kuwait.
If the United States has a heavy brigade in place in Kuwait in 1997, a move by Hussein's Iraq is a move towards war with the West. I'm inclined to believe that the Kremlin would want this for the reasons you and others have indicated. I think the West would then place very heavy pressure on the Gulf States to make good on their commitment of arms. What do the Gulf States do?
Surely Saudi mobilizes and sends forces to the border, at the very minimum. Their oil is just too vulnerable for them to sit on their hands. Whether they send troops into Kuwait or undertake air missions against Iraqi forces in Kuwait or even Iraqi forces in southen Iraq is another question. I can't say for certain what the answer is, but I'm inclined to argue that the Saudis will throw their collective hat in the ring with the US in Kuwait. They are obliged by formal agreement, and they are obliged by self-interest. The Saudi oil fields are just too tempting a target for an aggressive Iraq for the Saudis to believe that Hussein would quit after seizing Kuwait, regardless of what the Kremlin and Baghdad may say on the subject. If there's going to be war with Iraq, from Riyadh's point of view that war is better fought north of the Saudi border. The early and energetic introduction of Saudi forces multiplies existing US strength to a greater degree than a tardy and/or limited introduction of Saudi forces. Following this chain of logic, then, I believe the Saudis will commit themselves decisively to supporting the US and Kuwait once Iraqi forces cross the border.
The other Gulf States will probably find themselves obliged to follow suit, to one degree or another. A victorious Iraq, backed by Soviet resupply, will be a bugbear to deal with. If Iraq defeats Kuwait and seizes the Saudi oil fields along the Gulf Coast, then Iraq might be inclined to go further. Failure to act might well be seen as more dangerous than action. Although we should proceed on a case-by-case basis, I think there's some grounds for believing that the Gulf States would send forces to Saudi and Kuwait--if only to protect their own interests.
Another key question is what happens in Kuwait. There are lots of variables here. If Hussein uses the Republican Guard again, how many divisions does he use? How well do they fare against US and Kuwaiti forces in Kuwait? How much does the arrival of Saudi forces (assuming such arrival occurs) affect things? How much does the arrival of other Gulf States forces (assuming such arrival occurs) affect things? To what degree does the threat to Gulf oil affect the US global airlift prioritization scheme? If Hussein bogs down in Kuwait, then he may not have a chance to threaten Saudi oil.
From a dramatic point of view, I like the idea of US/Kuwaiti forces being pushed back to Kuwait City in furious fighting. An intended withdrawal of US forces to the south is foiled by a powerful flanking attack by the Republican Guard. A valiant and perilous airlift effort brings a brigade of the 82nd into Kuwait City. Saudi and Gulf States forces assemble in northeastern Saudi Arabia to Coalition forces fight without the kind of quantitative and qualitative superiority they enjoyed in Operation Desert Storm. Again, though, this scenario is at least as much drama as cold realism.
Webstral
|