Boomers were generally seen as second strike platforms...designed to survive the initial exchange so that when the silo and airborne systems are either depleted or destroyed there remained a further way to retaliate. Perhaps the Soviets would modify this if they believed the safety of their SSBNs was in doubt. If they knew they were being followed by US SSNs than their utility as second strike weapons would be extremely limited. This might prompt them to use them as first strike weapons to decrease warning times, especially if they felt that any US efforts at retaliation would be hindered by the successful destruction of US command and control.
Soviet policy was to keep its Boomers in safe havens north of the GIUK Gap as they were well aware that they would be relatively easy targets for US SSNs. This is why the Soviets put so much effort into under ice / ice breaking abilities for their boats. Thus, I can't see any of them launching from near Bermuda or the Pacific equivalent. That being said, I'm guessing the US would have had about 15-20 minutes of warning given a first strike conducted by Soviet SSBNs. But again it is almost certain that the first strike would have been by silo based ICBMs and perhaps a few aircraft (UK targets I would guess).
Conversely, US and UK boats were always seen as second strike weapons. and after the TDM they almost certainly would have been used in the counterattack.
While it possible that some of these doctrines would have been modified during the course of the conflict, I think the general rules pertaining to strategic nuclear warfare would have held true. The real question is...would either side risked going after these nuclear assets during the conventional phase of the fighting. I willing to bet that as attrition rates grew during the air war both sides would have been tempted to make use of aircraft original slated for strategic strike. Also, it seems highly unlikely that an SSN captain would pass up sinking an enemy boomer if given the chance. Thus by late 1997 it may be very likely that the Soviets find themselves with limited strategic nuclear strike capability beyond their silo based weapons. And once the Soviet first strike hits the US will find itself relying on its SSBNs to return the favor.
Benjamin
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