Policy probably would change from place to place and as time went on. The Department of Defense probably would have an official policy regarding transferring ranks of every type to the Army. Variables would include USAF/USN rank and MOS, new MOS, etc. By 1999, we should expect to find considerable latitude given the lower echelons of command. By 2000, division or even brigade commanders might be on their own to determine how to handle Air Force personnel entering the unit.
The idea that a commission is somehow sacrosanct is a pre-Exchange concept, I believe. Like everything else in the post-nuke world, rank is only what the others in the group and/or the chain of command are willing to give it. Officers are likely to try to support others in the brotherhood, but an infantry unit with good esprit de corps isn’t likely to embrace an Air Force captain from the supply services as a captain until he has paid his dues with a rifle.
I know I keep referring back to my own work, but I feel like specific instances are the best for outlining general philosophies as well as the specifics of circumstance. Fort Huachuca and the 111th MI Brigade is forced to deal with the problem of having too many officers and too few rifle platoon leaders from the Thanksgiving Day Massacre (TDM) forward. In the real world in 1997, 326th MI Battalion is the training unit for all MI company grade and warrant officers. A/326th handled captains, B/326th handled lieutenants, and C/326th handled warrants. At any time, there were three or four classes of thirty-five to forty lieutenants in B/326th. This is a minimum of 105 lieutenants on-post. In Twilight: 2000, this number might be much larger by the time the nukes hit CONUS. There might be 170 lieutenants at the MI Officer Basic Course. There aren’t 170 platoons needing platoon leaders, although the number of MI students available to be formed into rifle platoons will be much greater in November 1997 than in November 1996.
Compounding the problem is the presence of as many MI captains going through the MI Officer Advanced Course. Unlike the combat arms, MI has more slots for captains than for lieutenants. A large number of infantry, armor, artillery, and air defense lieutenants are switched to MI when they are promoted to captain. In some ways, this is a real blessing for Huachuca. There are captains with the requisite training and experience. Unfortunately, there aren’t very many company commands in the 111th MI Brigade when the brigade is turned into light infantry. The brigade starts with three battalions, which adds up to a maximum of fifteen company commands. Staff jobs need filling, but there is only so much additional room here—to say nothing of the fact that the staff jobs and the company commands already were filled. Throw in a seventy to one hundred warrant officers, and you have a lot of people looking for work. Then there is the little matter of the NCO Academy, which is full of MI NCOs going through their respective schools.
Huachuca solves this problem by a variety of means. Promising former combat arms candidates from MIOAC are placed into the XO slots of all of the new rifle companies of 305th, 309th, and 326th MI Battalions. The intent is to replace the MI captains in those positions once the new captains have become familiarized with the companies. Lieutenants go into the platoon leader positions that were previously occupied by drill sergeants. NCOs come out of the NCO Academy to fill team leader and squad leader slots. There are still leftover lieutenants, plus plenty of captains and warrant officers.
The staffs of the battalions in 111th MI Brigade are filled with fairly junior people. 111th MI isn’t a maneuver brigade, after all. The junior people are rotated out, while warrant officers and captains are rotated in.
Still, there are lots of company grade officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs who find themselves without proper slots to fill. As the refugee problem builds, Huachuca organizes the refugees into company-sized groups that have a captain to oversee them. The captain gets a warrant officer and a senior NCO as a staff. This solution isn’t a favorite among the officers and NCOs assigned to them, but it’s a useful and necessary function. At this point, Huachuca isn’t ready to mess with rank.
At the end of the Summer 1998 campaign, Huachuca is face with rebuilding its forces. There is a hodge-podge of units that have to be re-aligned and reorganized into a single cohesive command. 355th Wing (USAF) at Davis-Monthan AFB is absorbed wholesale into the 111th Brigade and reflagged 355th Battalion. The Wing really is only the Air Force SPs and support personnel at the base who were not deployed overseas with the rest of the Wing. There are a lot of NCOs who are needed as riflemen. Huachuca makes the painful choice of temporary reduction in grade for many airmen who will be used as replacements in other battalions. Their files are earmarked; if the former USAF NCO in question shows promise, he is fast-tracked to team leadership and so on.
The EPW who volunteer for service also are uniformly reduced in rank. Huachuca simply isn’t about to turn a squad or a platoon over to a foreign national, regardless of that national’s prior rank. All of the EPW restart life as privates. The ones who know what they are doing and who serve well rise quickly. Obviously, the officers are going to have the biggest problem with this. Huachuca handles this by starting its own OCS program. Many of the lieutenants who are available for service are duds, to be frank. Huachuca wants combat leaders, not ROTC graduates who are paying off their college tuition with grudging service.
In short, combat troops keep their rank. Marines from the MarDet at Huachuca and Yuma Marine Corps Air Station join the brigade without a problem. Air Force Detachment personnel initially are sent to Davis-Monthan AFB, then integrated into the Huachuca structure as befits their skills. The Security Police become riflemen of the same rank. The junior NCOs are demoted until they can prove their worth on the battlefield. The same applies to the Navy. The officers are kept in reserve by managing refugee populations. The good ones are rotated into the system as needed; the bad ones are rotated off the line and into refugee management.
The USCG First District handles things slightly differently. Combat arms soldiers (Marines, airmen, etc.) are integrated into the tridents. Support personnel with the appropriate skills are integrated appropriately. People without needed skills are put into an apprenticeship program. Essentially, a captain who can’t do anything First District needs is assigned a berth as an acting ensign learning the ropes from someone who knows how to do things. Sorry about that rank, pal. Needs of the service.
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