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In mid-June 1998, the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade had about 1800 surviving troops organized into three ad hoc infantry battalions, an ad hoc field artillery battalion, plus a grab bag of support units and troops.

On June 21, MG Thomason issued orders redesignating the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade the 111th Infantry Brigade (Provisional). The surviving military personnel and units under the command of Fort Huachuca were almost completely reorganized. The improvised organizational solutions were transformed into an established, if provisional, Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).

305th, 309th, and 326th MI Battalions became 305th 309th, and 326th Infantry Battalions (Provisional), respectively. USAF 355th Wing, based at Davis-Monthan AFB, is reflagged 355th Infantry Battalion (Provisional). The TO&E for these battalions reflected the intent of the command to use the rifle battalion as the principal independent maneuver force; consequently, the platoons were large enough to have both combat and staying power, while each battalion headquarters & headquarters company contained enough specialized troops to provide adequate support for the battalion for independent operations. At full strength, each battalion would have more than 750 soldiers in five companies (including the headquarters & headquarters company). The four light infantry battalions, disposing 3000 troops at full strength, would be the fighting heart of 111th Brigade.

The colors of the 344th MI Battalion, which had been assigned to the 111th MI Brigade but which had been based at Lackland AFB in Texas, would be used for a new purpose. All of the field artillery of the 111th Brigade would be organized along traditional lines into the new 344th Field Artillery Battalion (Provisional). With the addition of captured Mexican 105mm howitzers, Fort Huachuca could field a large battalion of guns to provide fire support for the 111th. All of the mortars held in various ad hoc arrangements would be moved out of 344th Battalion and distributed to the infantry battalions.

After much heated debate with his subordinates, Thomason decided to consolidate the remaining AFV into a single battalion under the command of 111th Brigade. The infantry battalion commanders were loathe to lose the combat power of the APC which had previously belonged to the rifle battalions. Thomason heeded the argument from his tankers that the striking power of the surviving AFV would best be used if consolidated for concentrated deployment. The Wehrmacht had succeeded in France by concentrating its available tanks into mobile formations. Fort Huachuca would be better served, the tankers argued, by a single strong battalion capable of rapid movement and decisive action than by small packages of armor distributed throughout the infantry units. Thomason agreed, although his hedged his bet by writing into the new doctrine the need for the mechanized battalion to detach company teams of light tanks and APC to augment infantry battalions during the independent operations he foresaw. The new battalion controlling virtually all of the surviving armored fighting vehicles under the control of Fort Huachuca would be flagged 367th Infantry Battalion (Heavy Motorized, Provisional).

Specialized support services still would be required by 111th Brigade. All of them (field medical, maintenance, quartermaster, and so on) would be consolidated into a single support battalion. The 306th MI Battalion would be reflagged as 306th Support Battalion (Composite, Provisional) under the command of 111th Brigade but available to the Fort Huachuca command as needed.

Engineering assets would also be consolidated into a single battalion. Like the armored assets, company teams of engineers—including sappers, heavy equipment, construction, and other specialties—would be tasked out to battalion task forces for specific missions. The new organization would be flagged as 322nd Engineer Battalion (Composite, Provisional).

Battlefield surveillance, interrogation, and other MI support for 111th would be provided by another new unit: G/304th MI.

111th MI Brigade
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment
305th Bn (light infantry)
306th Bn (composite support battalion)
309th Bn (light infantry)
322nd Bn (engineers, composite)
326th Bn (light infantry)
344th Bn (field artillery, composite)
355th Bn (light infantry)
367th Bn (heavy motorized infantry)
G/304 (MI company team)

Having created a new TO&E for 111th Brigade, Thomason and his staff were faced with the enormous challenge of filling the slots with warm bodies.

Thomason had decided to consolidate all of the remaining military commands into a handful of formations: 111th Brigade, 304th Military Intelligence Battalion, the newly-flagged 1012th Military Police Battalion, 3rd Arizona State Guard Brigade, and the newly-flagged 317th Schools Battalion. The 111th would be the primary combat force of the Huachuca command; 304th MI Battalion would continue in its job of collecting intelligence at all levels with a primary emphasis on preparing Fort Huachuca to continue fighting in the Second Mexican-American War; the new 1012th Military Police Battalion would focus on internal security and policing missions within Cochise, Pima, and Santa Cruz Counties; 3rd AZSTAG Brigade would continue to support 111th and would serve as a reserve force over the long term; and all training would be conducted under the auspices of the new 317th Schools Battalion.

A large number of US Army units would have their colors furled and cased for the foreseeable future. Their soldiers would be reassigned to the five remaining major commands. Among the units being deactivated were all 11th Signal Brigade rear detachments, all Arizona National Guard units, all Army Reserve units operating under Huachuca command, and all tenant units at Fort Huachuca not directly attached to 304th MI Battalion. Furthermore, Thomason incorporated all troops and commands from the sister services into the remaining commands at Huachuca. Most prominent among them was the USAF 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan AFB, which became 355th Infantry Battalion. However, the non-Army military personnel who became soldiers overnight included the USMC, USN, and USAF detachments at Fort Huachuca, the Marines from Yuma Marine Corps Air Station who had survived to join the 111th Brigade, plus sister service stragglers from southern California, Phoenix, and New Mexico. All were reassigned to the new commands. In the wake of the fighting at Yuma, Tucson, and Fort Huachuca, Thomason had concluded that he had failed to respond properly to the post-Exchange circumstances. He had allowed separate commands to persist long after there was any good reason for them to exist. Having reached that conclusion, Thomason quickly silenced voices of dissent among the former Army commands and the sister services. Uniformity of service was all that mattered.

Thomason’s first concern was filling the rifle battalions of the 111th with warm bodies. 304th MI Battalion would not lose anyone, but the only people sent to the battalion in June, July, or August were senior specialists—principally senior NCOs and warrant officers—whose skills were simply too valuable to be risked in the field. 1012th MP Battalion would retain most of the MPs under Huachuca command; however, the former USAF Security Forces personnel all would go into the line. The MPs would have to wait some time to have filled their authorized slots in the new 1012th Battalion. 3rd Brigade would receive no new personnel. In fact, the surviving units would be tapped to provide a modest number of replacements for the 111th. The Schools Battalion was another matter entirely, though.

Altogether, Thomason was able to scrounge nearly 800 troops from dissolved commands, including the former 355th Wing. Despite his insistence that the rifles came first, Thomason allowed himself to be convinced by his G-1 (post adjutant, or personnel officer) that a quarter of the scrounged troops had to be sent to key jobs in the 322nd Engineers, 306th Support, 317th Schools, and 367th Motorized. Nevertheless, the new troops represented a very welcome addition to the rolls of 111th Brigade.

With 3000 slots to fill in the four light infantry battalions, Thomason opted to distribute his remaining personnel equally among the battalions. By the end of July, returning wounded very nearly filled the rifle battalions to their new authorized strength.

The Huachuca command was keenly aware, though, that simply filling the rifle battalions with able-bodied men and women was a far cry from establishing a force that would be able to meet and defeat the next Mexican offensive. Although all of the services included rifle marksmanship in their basic training, this hardly represented the kind of training required to build effective infantry. Included among the new replacements filling the rifle companies of 111th Brigade were Army combat service support personnel who hadn’t fired a shot since their own basic training, as well as former Navy and Air Force personnel who were completely new to Army organization and the infantry. The new troops would have to be trained, and the more seasoned (former MI) troops would have to be retrained. Additionally, the past six months had revealed that many of the leaders had to be removed while others needed to be advanced.

Thomason, uncomfortably aware that his command was now the southernmost salient of American-controlled territory in the Southwest as well as the only area where US forces still controlled the US-Mexico border, knew that Mexico still possessed comparatively huge resources. By the end of June, he had decided that he was going to refuse all orders to relocate 111th Brigade. He knew that this action would effectively cut off his command from whatever support might still be had from 6th US Army in California or 5th US Army in Texas. The Joint Chiefs, who were effectively running the United States by this point, were unlikely to send supplies or replacements to what amounted to a renegade command in southern Arizona. Having made up his mind, Thomason was now faced with the fact that he would have to defend his command with local resources. Given the potentially overwhelming numerical superiority of the Mexicans, Thomason would have to balance the scales with superior quality while putting as many soldiers into the field as the local economy would sustain.

Bearing in mind the qualitative challenge, Thomason had consolidated all of the schoolhouse functions at Fort Huachuca into the new 317th Schools Battalion. With his eye on ensuring that all new soldiers were trained to a high standard, Thomason directed the former Marines under his command to establish a new basic training program. Additionally, he established a new Infantry School within the 317th. Included among the cadre of the new school were former Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and AZSTAG instructors from the pre-nuclear period, disabled veterans of the pre-nuclear and post-nuclear period, former Marines, and several of the foreign exchange staff who had been stranded at Huachuca as a result of the nuclear exchange. Of particular utility were the handful of Chinese soldiers, whose doctrine and experience as light infantry more closely matched the current circumstances than pre-Exchange American doctrine.

The 326th was the first of the rifle battalions to be subjected to the tender mercies of the Chinese and former Marine instructors. Having been brought very nearly up to its authorized strength (more than 750) by the end of July, the 326th was taken off the line for a period of intensive retraining while 305th, 309th, and 355th Battalions either manned the fortifications, conducted patrols, or engaged in task force missions with the available forces. Cadre of the 317th broke the companies of the 326th down to squad level for intensive re-training that emphasized the basics: rifle marksmanship, movement, close quarters combat drills, and physical fitness. As the squads were recombined into platoons and then companies, additional skills were re-taught and reinforced. While the troops were training, the officers and senior NCOs received their own training. The entire process took almost two months. At the end of this time, 326th returned to the field and 305th Battalion was rotated off the line and into the schoolhouse.

New soldiers would be needed to complete Thomason’s long-term goals, the first of which was the rebuilding of 111th Brigade into a tough and effective infantry brigade capable of fighting and winning anywhere in the Southwest. The heavy fighting in June had taught the Huachuca command that if the 111th was to conduct operations away from Huachuca and Tucson, the cantonment area would need forces to protect it. Thomason had kept 3rd AZSTAG Brigade in existence for precisely this reason. Once 111th Brigade was fully operational, Thomason would rebuild 3rd Brigade into a well-drilled reserve force that could defend the Huachuca-Tucson cantonment when the 111th was operating elsewhere. Thousands of new troops would be needed to realize these goals. Turning new recruits into soldiers would be the job of 317th Schools Battalion.

The first well of untapped manpower Thomason turned to in July, 1998 was the large population of EPW on-post. The Enemy Prisoners of War, who numbered nearly seven thousand at that point, represented a vast pool of military experience. Excluding Mexican prisoners, more than ninety percent of the EPW had willingly participated in Thomason’s citizenship program, by which EPW who volunteered for work crews could earn their US citizenship. Now Thomason solicited them for volunteers to go through the brand-new boot camp system and take their place in 111th Brigade or one of the other commands. The response was overwhelming. More than half of the EPW volunteered for the first class. The 317th and the G-1 had the luxury of combing through the volunteers for those who had a solid command of English, a desirable base of skills, and a willingness to join as privates regardless of previous rank. A surprising number of NCOs and even junior officers among the EPW volunteered, despite the prospect of being at the bottom of the so-called totem pole. One Armenian sergeant remarked that being an American private on the free side of the fence was better than being a sergeant on the other side.

The general populace was solicited as well. Again, the response was overwhelming. Small numbers of recruits had been inducted since the TDM. With a formal system in place, recruiting offices were opened in Tucson, Bisbee, and a few other locations. The bottleneck quickly became the number of recruits who could be trained by the 317th. The excess of volunteers gave the 317th an unexpected luxury: they could refuse some potential recruits and wash out others. The drill sergeants of the Schools Battalion observed with satisfaction that sending a volunteer back to the EPW work crews or the fields powerfully motivated his peers in the new boot camp or in the new Infantry School.

For all that thing seemed to be going well in terms of manpower and training by the end of August, Thomason still was presented with enormous problems. With a two-month training rotation for each of the four light infantry battalions, 111th Brigade would not have retrained all of its task forces until March, 1999. Training of new medics, engineers, artillery crews, and all of the other non-infantry specialists was an additional burden that would have to be managed concurrently with the retraining of the rifle battalions and new soldiers. Given the priority of training the light infantry, Thomason decided to operate 367th more as an armored cavalry outfit than a heavy motorized infantry formation until resources could be diverted to train motorized infantry. Essentially, then, the armored personnel carriers of 367th would be operated as armored cars or light tanks in the near term. This decision was enormously unpopular with many among Thomason’s command and staff. In time, the battalion commanders would find ways around Thomason’s decision.

The greatest challenge to rebuilding 111th Brigade, though, remained the ongoing conflict. Although Nogales and Hermosillo Brigades had withdrawn across the border, Sonora Army (now semi-autonomous in relation to Second Mexican Army) continued to keep pressure on the Huachuca-Tucson cantonment with small-scale actions. Combat patrols, raids, planting of booby traps, and the like continued along the border and would soon build to larger-scale actions. More importantly, the Mexican Army possessed a number of uncommitted brigades in the interior of Mexico. These could be tapped for reinforcement for the brigades of Sonora Army or even brought up whole scale in short order. Thomason needed to keep strong forces in position to defend the cantonment, even as his people labored to rebuild 111th Brigade. 305th and 309th Battalions initially were positioned in Bisbee and north of Nogales initially, with regular strong patrols moving all along the southern roots of the Huachuca Mountains and the San Pedro River Valley. In June and July, both of these formations found themselves in the unenviable position of receiving large numbers of replacements who were not trained to operate as infantry. Grumbling about the favoritism some felt was being shown to the 326th, whose soldiers were sleeping in barracks and getting the chance to train together before being put into the field, the 305th and 309th Battalions went about incorporating the replacements into their new units in as rational a manner as possible. To the credit of the commands and staffs at the battalion and company levels in both battalions, the leaders seemed to understand the necessity of Thomason’s directives, even if they weren’t particularly happy.

Fortunately for the Huachuca command, Sonora Army was in no position to conduct operations on a scale larger than that of a company until mid-September. In Mexico City, Arizona was considered a secondary front. Ensenada Brigade was ordered to extend its area of control upriver from Yuma such that the water control infrastructure at the head of the All-American Canal was secured. The Imperial Valley, irrigated by water diverted from the Colorado through the All-American Canal, was a rich prize. Beyond that, Arizona was far less important than California in the eyes of the senior Mexican leadership. Moreover, by late August 6th US Army in central California was gaining strength. The available support had to go to California. Arizona could wait. Consequently, 305th, 309th, and 355th Battalions had time to break in their new troops and give them at least some infantry training and experience before the scale and tempo of combat in southern Arizona picked up again.

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