[chico20854]

We ran the numbers out when we worked up the US Army orbat...

Our methodology:

1) Determine inventories at the beginning of the war, based on historical documents as to numbers of systems procured plus projected production at late 1980s actual or projected 1990s rates (since IRL most production slowed down in the 1990s), going to full wartime production in September 1995 (a theoretical response to Chinese export orders).

2) Determine number of systems available for issue to troop units. We used the same methodology as the Congressional Budget Office did when determining how many systems to order: a 5% allocation to the training base (MOS schools, test & evaluation units, draw equipment at NTC, etc.), a 17% allocation to the maintenance float (in transit to units, undergoing depot-level overhaul or refit), the rest to troop units, with a war reserve of 51%(!) of the number assigned to troop units. For units in CONUS, we expanded the POMCUS effort so that there was a full unit set of identical equipment overseas for EVERY unit in CONUS - for those units without a REFORGER mission we are assuming that there was a similar equipment set overseas in Korea or CENTCOM. We figured this was implemented in the 1990s as a reaction to the continued Cold War. Unit equipment was identical, based on the concept of train with what you fight with.

3) Divide the equipment up into units, using the appropriate TOEs from the late 80s. First priority for modern equipment is units in Europe, those with POMCUS missions, then the rest of the active units in CONUS, then the National Guard and Reserve. Guard roundout units are equipped the same or one level below their active-duty counterparts. Extra equipment goes to form new units or export.

Given the large scale (to any reasonable review) of the war reserve, at 51% of what is assigned to troop units, it is hard to equip a heck of a lot of units with modern gear. To make it more reasonable, we double counted the POMCUS sets, essentially assigning all that equipment left behind when units deploy to war reserve.

As a check on the reasonableness of these assumptions, Fighting Flamingo ran a loss and recovery simulation. With weekly loss rates of between 4% and 15% during non-nuclear offensive ops (and 25%-30% weekly during a tactical nuclear exchange), recovery/repair rates based on Yom Kippur War numbers and production gradually increasing beyond 1980s full-scale mobilization rates, US forces become doctrinally ineffective with regard to M1s in Novermber 1997 (after over 9700 lost beyond repair), Bradleys in August 1997 and M113s in September 1997. It makes a chilling point as to the military effectiveness of the NATO armies prior to the TDM.

For the units that are forming during the war, they enter the field after the TDM with vehicles from the training base and maintenance float, basically assigned at random (except for the units that were at NTC, JRTC and other large unit training sites - they go to the field with the equipment maintained there for rotating units).

Pirating the war reserves left behind in CONUS by REFORGER units would, however, be a disaster for units in contact. (War reserves increase until the beginning of Advent Crown and are depleted by mid-September 1997). As units need replacement equipment to stave off the oncoming rush of Russians backed by tactical nukes, they get M-60s and the knowledge that there is a green unit sitting in the rear somewhere training with the M-1s they trained with in CONUS. Not acceptable to most generals IMHO.

If you want, I can email you the spreadsheets that lay out all the production, inventory, assignment and loss figures. It's a lot of number crunching...