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Old 11-05-2009, 04:25 PM
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Part Four

In Tucson, the Mexicans developed their attack on Davis-Monthan during the early afternoon. Hermosillo Cavalry, which had swapped some of its AFV for infantry from 1st Hermosillo Infantry at the position in Casa Adobes, and 2nd Hermosillo Infantry initially attempted to bull through the southern gate of Davis-Monthan. This failed because the USAF SF had constructed concrete serpentines, earthen bulwarks, and machine gun positions around the openings to post. The entire perimeter was protected by a rough wall of rubble which was effectively impassible to vehicles, although infantry could cross the wall. The Mexicans blasted the machine gun towers with fire from the 90mm main guns of their Lynxes, then attempted to send engineers forward to reduce the concrete barriers of the serpentine. Brave airmen and police officers huddled within the serpentine discouraged the Mexican sappers with grenades. The Mexicans decided instead to blast a hole in the serpentine, expending many 90mm rounds to do so. However, the defending airmen covered the resulting gap with small arms fire. When the Mexicans attempted to push a Lynx through to cover the infantry, the defenders of 355th Wing revealed that they had emplaced an immobile V-150 with a 20mm gun to cover the gate. When the Lynx moved through the open end of the serpentine, the American airmen knocked it out, blocking the serpentine again.

Frustrated, the commander of Hermosillo Brigade decided to attack over the wall where the base housing came closest to the wall in the northeast corner of the base. There he could use his superior numbers of infantry to best effect. After systematically knocking out machine gun positions along the northeastern lengths of the wall with fire from his Lynxes (the Americans wisely abandoned their exposed positions), the Mexican commander unleashed his dismounted attack. As expected, the Americans conducted a reverse slope defense from inside the perimeter. The Mexicans attempted to suppress the defense by shelling the houses nearest the wall, killing or injuring many of the defenders. After suffering some losses, 1st Hermosillo Infantry established a foothold inside the base housing area. They planned to move towards the nearest gate, seize it, and bring in their AFV.

The defenders had two working light AFV and a handful of Hum-Vee gun trucks. They knew it was critical to keep the Mexican armor outside the walls.

As evening began to descend into twilight, 111th Brigade attacked 2nd Hermosillo Infantry at Casa Adobes. The defenders had chosen a good position north of the dense housing belt. Two small, sharp hills on the south side of the highway ran north-south and came within a kilometer of the highway. The hills would be impassable to vehicles. The area between the northernmost spur and the highway was open, having been agricultural land before the war. North, northwest, and northeast of the position was more open ground—either untilled desert or pre-war agricultural land. The ground was also open for a kilometer to the south and for several kilometers to the east. Bypasses were possible; it was, after all, basically urban area. However, the highway was the most convenient way of moving the heavy military trucks and civilian commercial trucks that were hauling so much of the materiel belonging to 111th Brigade. COL Williams decided the position had to be cleared and cleared quickly. Ensenada Brigade might pick up the pursuit from the west at any time.

The 111th launched a hammer-and-anvil assault. 309th Battalion, in soft-skinned trucks but with a handful of APCs for fire support, moved through a housing development west of the Mexican position. Braving mortar fire from the north hill, the 309th drove up a single road splitting the two hills (called West Twin Peaks Road) and assaulted a Mexican platoon guarding the road virtually on the run. Although casualties were heavy, the 309th took the position in short order and drove through. Once on the east side of the hills, 309th was in a housing development that approached the main Mexican position from the south.

While 309th was moving, 326th Battalion moved into another housing development a kilometer west of the main Mexican position. 305th Battalion remained mounted in reserve. The remaining operational Ridgway light tanks were moved into position to support the 326th.

Once 326th and 309th were in position and about to cross the open ground around the Mexican position, Williams opened up with his artillery. Here the Americans enjoyed fire superiority, for the Mexican commander had declined to parcel out his guns. Indirect fire was critical for keeping the heads of the Mexican defenders down. Timely and reasonably accurate American mortar fire helped the Americans close in the gathering gloom for a close-in assault on the Mexican position. As the defending Lynxes revealed their positions by firing on the advancing American infantry, the American Ridgways knocked them out one by one. Williams threw 305th in behind 326th once the initial assault reached the outermost Mexican fighting positions. As night fell, a nearly full moon illuminated the Americans as they reached and overwhelmed the Mexican defenders. Large numbers surrendered, and more than a handful managed to escape.

In the deepening shadows at Davis-Monthan, Mexican infantry pressed forward towards the northernmost gate. Determined fire by the defenders prevented the Mexican infantry from moving quickly along the interior of the defensive wall. Instead, the Mexicans worked their way through the housing development in close-quarters combat. Losses on both sides mounted rapidly. The Mexicans were not shy about calling in mortar or howitzer fire to help blast a path, and by 2200 hours they had reached the gate and had killed or captured its defenders.

At Fort Huachuca, the Mexican armor rolled through the western part of the main post, machine-gunning targets of opportunity. They turned up the main road to the western gate to take Smith’s task force in rear. By the time they arrived, however, they discovered that Smith’s people had been forewarned. A near miss from a LAW convinced the Mexicans that a mounted charge into the American position would not bear fruit. As darkness descended, the Mexican infantry in VAB dismounted and established firing positions behind the Americans. They were too few to assault the Americans directly, but they could act as anvil when the rest of the brigade’s infantry came up to hammer the Americans from the west. The armored vehicles, lacking night vision, set up a bonnegruppa to cover potential withdrawal routes with machine gun fire.

The main infantry attack of Nogales Brigade was running behind schedule, however. Although the Americans at the west gate had suffered significant losses and had been scattered by the advancing Mexican armor, handfuls had stopped evading and had taken up firing positions along the side of the road. As the main body of 2nd Nogales Infantry advanced down the road, they came under fire from riflemen among the mesquite and tall grass on either side of the road. Detachments split off to eliminate or pursue the Americans, but the march was slowed considerably thereby. Two brave State Guardsmen held up the advance for nearly an hour with highly accurate fire with bolt action rifles from a position atop a spur on the south side of the road. They continued fighting despite the efforts of the Mexicans to put them out of action with fire from mortars. Darkness put an end to their action and allowed the Mexicans to advance once again. By this time, 1st Nogales Infantry, which had been mopping up around the west gate, had closed up with 2nd Nogales Infantry. 2nd Nogales Infantry detached a company of rifles as its sister battalion passed through to continue the attack.

In Casa Adobes, Williams whipped his troops back into their trucks and APCs. He left support troops and a company of riflemen to sort through the EPW. The main body of the weary brigade raced through Tucson to relieve Davis-Monthan. Although most of the combat power of the force in Tucson had been at Davis-Monthan when the battle began, a number of police and airmen were scattered throughout the city on various security duties. A number arrived in the vicinity of Davis-Monthan after the fight began. Notably, a handful of police snipers took up positions in nearby buildings and made themselves a decided nuisance while there was enough light for long-range rifle fire. Others made contact with the 111th and provided intelligence regarding the disposition of the main body of Hermosillo Brigade, including the direction of the main attack, size of the units involved, and the location of the brigade headquarters, support troops, and artillery.

At the same time, the commander of Hermosillo Brigade was aware that 2nd Hermosillo Infantry had been defeated in a surprisingly short battle. He could only conclude that 111th Brigade was would move to relieve Davis-Monthan AFB shortly. He decided that the best course of action was to capture the walled complex as quickly as possible, then move his own headquarters, artillery, and support units inside. Once Nogales Brigade mopped up Fort Huachuca, troops could be dispatched north to assist in Tucson. Provided Mexican forces in Tucson could achieve at least a stalemate while holding Davis-Monthan and Huachuca, Ensenada Brigade could be brought east from Yuma to crush the 111th once and for all. At the very least, with Mexican forces in possession of the food, fuel, and ammunition stores at Huachuca and Davis-Monthan, the 111th would be unable to continue the fight for long.

This last fact concerned Williams deeply. His brigade had carried enough ammunition for three days of intensive operations. He was now nearing the end of the second day. Already, some of the infantry had fired twice their basic load. Mortar, howitzer, and machine gun rounds were running out. He was going to have to strike hard and strike fast.

Fortune favored the Americans. Several key elements were moving in the vicinity of Davis-Monthan at the same time. 1st Hermosillo Infantry had seized the gate and serpentine at East Golf Links Road in the northeast quadrant of the Davis-Monthan walled complex. The battalion also had been able to set up machine gun positions to isolate the remaining American defenders in the northeastern housing complex. Although there were still defenders inside the base, including a platoon of gun trucks, the Mexicans had taken the upper hand. With the northeast gate in their possession, the Mexicans began moving the AFV of Hermosillo Cavalry into the complex. Once inside, they could easily dominate the open spaces inside the walls and systematically eliminate the American defenders. Their first job would be to cross to the southern gate and let the headquarters, support units, and artillery in. Once Hermosillo Cavalry reported that they were inside the complex, the commander of Hermosillo Brigade began moving towards the south gate.

Much faster than had been anticipated, though, the lead elements of 111th Brigade appeared on Interstate 10 virtually overlooking the command and support elements of Hermosillo Brigade. Brushing aside Mexican pickets, two platoons of Ridgway tanks rapidly formed a firing line along the right shoulder of the highway and opened up on the Mexicans below them. Truck-mounted infantry descended the offramp and, covered by fire from the tanks, rolled practically into the teeth of the enemy before dismounting. The Mexicans disintegrated. Some, including the commander and most of his staff, managed to survive the initial onslaught, find alternate transport, and drive away. Others escaped on foot. However, the Americans took a considerable bag of prisoners and hardware, including the intact howitzers of the brigade.

Command and control of Hermosillo Brigade was lost within the first minute. Although the commander survived, he lost contact with Hermosillo Cavalry and 1st Hermosillo Infantry. Aware that something was happening outside the walled complex, both Mexican battalion commanders ordered a temporary pause so they could assess. It soon became apparent that the two battalions were on their own. The cavalry commander ordered a general retreat. Hermosillo Cavalry hurriedly filed out through the northeast gate, while 1st Hermosillo Infantry withdrew they way they had entered the complex and linked up with their motor transport in a neighborhood just to the east of the air base.

Williams knew that the withdrawing Mexicans would have to cross the line of Interstate 10 somewhere. He guessed correctly that they would make for Interstate 19, which would provide them with the quickest route south. They were unlikely to try to move west through Tucson to I-19, given that the 111th had come from that direction and might have secured all of the onramps. Williams decided that the Mexican commander would head east to a major north-south expressway, turn south and cross I-10 east of the city limits, then head west across the southern edge of metropolitan Tucson to I-19. This was exactly what the commander of Hermosillo Cavalry did.

In the event, 309th Battalion did not arrive at S Houghton Road in time to block the egress of the remainder of Hermosillo Brigade. The Mexicans had arrived at the overpass first and had positioned Lynxes at either end of the overpass. These took the approaching trucks of 309th Battalion under fire, forcing the infantry to dismount as their trucks attempted to back out of the killing zone. Williams promptly brought his artillery into play, causing considerable losses among the infantry and their soft-skinned transport.

Drawing on his last strength, Williams sent a small force of infantry, backed by a platoon of light tanks, south to block East Suharita Road, which would lead the Mexicans west and back to Interstate 19. Instead of going this way, the Mexicans turned east on East Suharita and took Highway 83 south to Sonoita.

At Fort Huachuca, General Thomason personally led a last-ditch effort to defend the post. Almost every remaining man or woman in uniform, along with several hundred civilians, assembled to attack the Mexicans who had set up firing positions behind General Smith’s force. Thomason’s force was armed with Molotov cocktails, handguns, and the desperation of people who had nowhere to run. Covered by darkness, Thomason’s mob made contact with the security element of the Mexican armor at almost exactly the same moment that 1st Nogales Infantry attacked Smith’s force from the west. The battle was chaotic. Thomason’s civilians charged in to heave their Molotovs and attack the Mexican infantry with the zeal of fanatics. The Mexicans shot them down by the dozen, and yet still they came on. Although the Molotovs destroyed very few of the Mexican AFV, the burning mixture suffocated the engines of the armored vehicles and tended to panic the crews. The dismounted infantry were gradually cut apart by close-range fusillades from revolvers and pistols. One by one, the surviving Mexican AFV began to bolt—if they could get their engines to start. Those who were stranded began to surrender.

Less than 500 meters to the west, the commander of Nogales Brigade concluded that his chance to capture Fort Huachuca was gone. His brigade had fought hard and endured heavy casualties since the start of the war. It was time to save the rest of his men and equipment before 111th Brigade cut off his avenue of escape. 1st and 2nd Nogales Infantry broke contact and conducted a forced march back to their motor transport near the west gate. They mounted up, drove to Sonoita to link up with Hermosillo Brigade, and crossed the Mexican-American border at Nogales.

A handful of AFV from Nogales Cavalry had survived the nighttime attack by driving away. These troops managed to link up. Rather than attempt to flee through the west gate, the crews boldly (and desperately) drove across Fort Huachuca, captured Buffalo Soldier Gate on the east side of post just long enough to drive through it, and raced down Highway 92 towards the border. Rather than attempt to cross at Naco or further east, the crews opted to attempt to drive cross-country, making use of some of the dirt roads the Americans had not yet destroyed south of Highway 92. At one point, the small convoy was obliged to enter an arroyo and move along it in single file. The lead APC broke an axle, blocking the arroyo. The Mexican troops were still trying to move the damaged vehicle when the Americans found them.

Webstral
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