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Old 03-16-2010, 02:19 PM
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Webstral Webstral is offline
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I support the use of nukes at sea as a factor in explaining how the Northern Fleet destroyed Strike Force Atlantic after the battle at the BIG Gap. Attacks on the logistical tail of the fleet may also contribute. I still support a political/command factor. Even Bush Sr., who was better than his Vietnam-era predecessors at keeping the White House at a respectable distance from the headquarters, intervened for political reasons.

At some point in the past, I posted a piece on the decision-making at the top levels in the West in early 1997. I tried to match the events of the v1 chronology to decision-making, resources, and some other good idea written by others (such as General Sir John Hackett). I'll summarize here:

Having reached their stop line along the Oder in December, 1996, NATO debates what to do next. According to canon, the war in North Korea is on by this time. I believe the war in Iran has begun as well. If one accepts my proposition that a Soviet re-armed and re-equipped Iraq invades Kuwait for a second time, then the West is faced with this issue, too. The West has a lot to do. The situation in Germany is less favorable than it looks, since the US has supplied the FRG with large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and what parts the armies had in common. This materiel was consumerd in the fighting, along with a host of high-tech items that helped win the victory but which are now in short supply. The Bundeswehr is reeling, the Luftwaffe is shattered, and Anglo-American-Canadian forces have not had the cheap victory the Coalition enjoyed in Operation Desert Storm. France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece all have dropped out of NATO. East Germany is a shambles, and West Germany has suffered considerable damage from enemy air and missile action. As SACEUR is certain to tell POTUS, these are not promising conditions for further action in Northern Europe, save rolling back the Soviets in Norway.

I think this is why we see a break in the action between December and February. The US is hoping the Soviets will call it quits. The Soviets greatly diminish their operational tempo in Northern Europe, though for different reasons. The Soviets know they have lost East Germany for now, but the Kremlin is determined not to throw in the towel. Having overthrown Danilov for failing to secure victory, Sauronski finds himself on the horns of the same dilemma. His solution is a new sitzkrieg that he intends to use to fortify Poland and build up for an offensive into southern Germany.

The February offensive by Soviet and Czechoslovak forces in southern Germany is politically motivated. Anglo-American forces remain in the DDR, along with the most combat ready of the German divisions. Security in southern Germany has been passed to the Dutch, who are still on the fence about the business of reuniting Germany but who have not dropped out of NATO. The fully mobilized Dutch Army has been reinforced by elements of the Bundeswehr and the Danish Army, but the show in the south is really a Dutch one. The Kremlin intends to inflict massive losses on Dutch forces in southern Germany, which will hopefully lead to the Netherlands also dropping out of NATO. The offensive does not go off as planned. SOUTHAG, under a Dutch general and hastily reinforced by other NATO forces, pushes the Pact back into Czechoslovakia in a two-week campaign.

This action decides the West—the US in particular—that the Soviets aren’t ready to go to the bargaining table. Choices must be made. Should the West use its superior resources to wage a war of total mobilization, or should the West attempt to force a conclusion with the forces in hand? POTUS opts for the latter.

It’s entirely possible that the Atlantic Fleet isn’t ready for a decisive incursion into the Barents Sea in June. We know from the v1 chronology that NATO emerges from the Battle of the Atlantic “badly bloodied but victorious”. How badly bloodied is badly bloodied? It seems to me that at the very least this would mean two or more carriers put out of action, although not necessarily sunk. SACLANT may tell POTUS that an attack on the Kola Peninsula in June isn’t feasible, given the correlation of forces, weapons available, and so on. POTUS directs that the action be undertaken anyway because the northern offensive fits into a bigger scheme that he isn’t willing to have derailed because the Navy is getting cold feet. (POTUS’ turn of phrase, not mine) In other words, the failure of Strike Fleet Atlantic in the north may have been foreseeable. Heck, perhaps the best admiral resigned or was removed over the argument about feasibility with the available forces and weapons and the required timeframe. Perhaps a new guy looking to make a name for himself was appointed, and he used his forces with more hubris than wisdom. If General Lee was worth 50,000 men on the battlefield, then there must be leaders who are a net loss to combat capability. Perhaps Strike Fleet Atlantic fell under the command of one of these just prior to setting off on the big adventure. The use of nuclear weapons and other options exacerbated a situation that was already bad.


Webstral
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