[Webstral]

One should bear in mind that the Soviet leadership preferred an Army of first-rate loyalty (obedience) and second-rate combat effectiveness to the inverse. The political officers were there to ensure obedience to the State. Some of the political officers no doubt gained some military savvy during their tenure, but their promotion and even survival weren’t based on military competence. They survived and prospered based on their rigid adherence to doctrine, both political and military. Doctrine demanded that units go forward until sent to the rear under orders. No doubt, the political officer in question considered the awful consequences for himself if his own superiors got wind of a unit under his supervision moving to the rear without orders to withdraw in accordance with established doctrine. At that point, it’s either the commissar or the artillery chief. Not a hard choice to make, really.

The grip of the political officers loosened considerably when the poor performance of the Red Army threatened the existence of the State in WW2. As soon as the war was won, the power of the political officers was restored. At the beginning of WW3, the political officers still would have great power.

Now an interesting question is how strong the commissars would be in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) in late 1996. I’m willing to accept as a tautology that the influence of the zampolit on the performance of the Army in China would be almost entirely negative. After a year of fighting in China, how much would the grip of the commissars be loosened, if at all. How much would any loosening transfer to Eastern Europe? If the commissars are in control in the DDR, then we should expect that the West Germans would have taken a terrible toll of the Soviets, who would have won by sheer force of numbers.