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Along the coast of northern New England, the US Coast Guard struggles to maintain order. By early 2001, the so-called “tridents” (1) have managed to safeguard the fishing fleets that feed the coastal enclaves and defeat both the bands of marauders from the interior looking for prey along the shoreline and pirates looking to ply their trade of pillage. Their greatest challenge lies ahead, though. The surviving governments of New England are city-states, petty dictatorships, and shabby mercantile empires which are often hostile to one another and to the federal government represented by the Coast Guard enclave. A new menace is gathering in the north, ready to sweep over the fragile remnants of pre-war civilization—a menace the tridents do not have the means to meet alone.

701st Maritime Rifle Regiment
A pre-war United States Coast Guard Reserve formation, the 301st Port Security Unit was mobilized on 10/07/96 and sent to Western Europe to provide port security in the Netherlands in anticipation of the deployment of US forces to Europe by sea. Following the entrance of the United States into the war in Germany in December, the 301st PSU suffered attrition to rioting by Dutch anti-war elements and attacks by Soviet commandoes. A highly successful cruise missile attack in February, 1997 caused sufficient losses to warrant rotating the 301st back to CONUS to absorb replacements.

Initially assigned to Cape May in New Jersey, the 301st was moved north to Boston in June, 1997 following the discovery of a Communist cell working to sabotage port facilities in Massachusetts. The personnel and assets were dispersed throughout coastal New England to aid forces in place in their efforts to provide security for ports and other critical facilities. The intent was to complete the training of the new PSU personnel with on the job experience before sending the 301st to Korea. The nuclear exchange began before the 301st was sent, and the unit’s move orders were frozen.

With the breakdown of order in New England, the 301st found itself overtaxed. Following an unexplained accident at Camp Edwards on Cape Cod and the very substantial loss of facilities and equipment, the 301st moved its base of operations to Portsmouth, NH. In April, 1998 the 301st was completely reorganized and absorbed a large number of personnel from other services, as well as police and federal agents. The new 701st Maritime Rifle Regiment was flagged on 04/21/98. Initially tasked as a waterborne military police formation, by early 2001 the 701st Maritime Rifles have incorporated functions of Marines and reconnaissance into their capabilities.

Subordination: First District, USCG (None)
Location: Portsmouth, NH (headquarters and logistics base)
Manpower: 800
AFV: 0

Rear Admiral Scott MacDowell was the Commandant of the USCG First District when the United States entered World War Three in December 1996. Although USCG assets were mobilized for combat duty at that time, it wasn’t until mid-1997 that Coast Guard cutters and personnel were absorbed directly into the Navy. MacDowell continued to perform his pre-war duty from First District Headquarters in Boston, MA with a somewhat reduced but essentially intact base of Coast Guard personnel and smaller cutters. After some changes in personnel and resources, MacDowell was in charge of coastal defense from Rhode Island to the Maine border by Thanksgiving 1997.

Following the nuclear strikes, Boston fell apart. MacDowell relocated his headquarters to Camp Edwards on Cape Cod. The situation in New England rapidly spiraled downwards, even though no targets in New England were struck by nuclear fire. MacDowell concentrated his very limited assets on supporting the fishing fleets and defending critical assets along the New England coastline. At the end of a brutal winter that killed as much as a third of the New England population (four million people), disease spread by unburied bodies and poor sanitation practices promptly carried off another two million.

“After Washington and Annapolis were hit by nuclear strikes, the Naval Academy briefly relocated to Newport, Rhode Island, home of the Naval War College and OCS program. With its combat-ready resources already stretched thin, the navy assigned HoIsgirder the duty of providing local security and defense for the new Naval Academy. HoIsgirder welcomed the assignment; Newport was a perfect base of operations and very likely to last through the dark ages he saw on the horizon. He began shifting his assets out of bases on Cape Cod and Maine, and reorganizing them into a full-time fighting force at Newport.” (Rifle River)

At the time, Coast Guard Commandant Holsgirder commanded only USCG assets that were not operating under the direct command of the US Navy. He and MacDowell traded hard words over the movement of Coast Guard ships, crews, and equipment from northern New England to the southern New England coastline. MacDowell believed firmly that the fishing fleets were the key to keeping the coastal population of New England from starving and turning into the kinds of rioting masses that had driven him out of Boston. These fleets needed Coast Guard protection and succor. Although MacDowell commanded a force with US Coast Guard on its uniforms and ships, he was acting under Navy orders. Already, his force had been tapped to provide replacements and to escort Army units (including a recently-raised brigade of New Hampshire Army National Guard troops) to reinforce Europe. MacDowell believed it was necessary to keep every USCG asset possible in northern New England to protect shipping and fishing in the event the Navy decided to move more of MacDowell’s assets. Holsgirder flatly disagreed.

“On 19 May [1998], President Munson suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be relieved. His successor (the former Secretary of State) soon succumbed to heart failure, and his successor (the former Secretary of Energy) was so overwhelmed by the enormity of the job that she committed suicide. There was no longer an operating CLS to locate a successor, and the military assumed de facto control of all federal functions.” (Howling Wilderness)

The Secretary of Energy-cum-President of the United States was named June R. Flaherty. She was first cousin of Scott MacDowell. As soon as he heard the news about his cousins’s assumption of the presidency, MacDowell contacted her. For some time, he had been developing a plan to use his remaining forces to maintain control of two facilities he believed absolutely critical to the future of the Navy and Coast Guard: Portsmouth Naval Yard and Bath Iron Works. At the same time, MacDowell intended to provide security and support for the fishing fleets operating out of Maine, New Hampshire, and northern Massachusetts. Holsbirger could take care of the fishing fleets operating out of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and points south with his own ships and people. MacDowell presented his plan to the new President. Flaherty already was completely overwhelmed by the enormity of the job. She signed off on MacDowell’s scheme after a few cursory questions and without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Specifically, MacDowell’s plan was to recreate USCG First District with a new boundary running from Woods Hole to the border with Canada. All Navy assets within that zone—former USCG, Navy personnel, and Navy installations—would come under the command of First District. MacDowell provided President Flaherty with specific verbiage that would enable him to escape control by any authority short of the Joint Chiefs, if he so chose. Flaherty’s staff wrote the orders, and she signed them.

MacDowell wasted no time consolidating his new command. He abandoned Cape Cod wholesale, taking everything and everyone of value from the Massachusetts Military Reserve. MacDowell even managed to scoop up a number of Coast Guard Auxiliary and Coast Guard Reservists who had been operating under Holsbirger’s orders. Holsbirger was furious, but there was nothing he could do except hang onto everything he had left after MacDowell had made his grab.

“On June 2 [1998], the Mexican government, in order to protect its citizens, sent its army (including the Soviet “Division Cuba”) across the Rio Grande [and into New Mexico, Arizona, and California]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (who were now governing the country) sent Army units in response.” (Howling Wilderness)

The Joint Chiefs, who had plenty to do from the moment they took charge, were not even aware of the new orders concerning First District until June 1. Flaherty hadn’t consulted them. Eventually, minutes of the day revealed that the President, who by then had committed suicide, had executed some sort of orders regarding the Coast Guard and Navy chains of command in New England. By the time the Joint Chiefs began to look into the matter, the Mexican Army was crossing the border. Eventually, of course, the Joint Chiefs learned the sordid details of MacDowell’s coup. However, the Joint Chiefs had far bigger fish to fry. In any event, MacDowell still obeyed orders (albeit not always from the Commandant of the Coast Guard or Atlantic Fleet Headquarters) and was maintaining control of a useful cantonment where so many others had simply melted away or turned warlord. The orders granting MacDowell his unique command were never altered.

At the time of the events of Rifle River, Commandant Holsbirger despises Admiral MacDowell, whom he views as a naked opportunist. From the Commandant’s point of view, MacDowell had built his own little empire along the northern New England coast when more heavily populated southern New England needed to manpower, equipment, and ships more. The almost fraternal relationship between First District and the United Brotherhood of Fishermen galls the Commandant, who views the UBF as a dangerous gang of thugs.

MacDowell sees Holsbirger as the agent of the split. If Holsbirger hadn’t pulled out of every station north of Fall River, MacDowell might not have been forced to create his own solution. Obviously, MacDowell is full of fertilizer, but he doesn’t see things that way. Ironically, MacDowell and Holsbirger see a number of things the same way. Both believe that the UBF will come to constitute a real problem as Carlucci becomes more paranoid and reactionary. Both leaders have used their older hands to train a new generation of seamen. Both leaders have created somewhat stable cantonments that have the critical ingredients of success.

First District’s comparative success is based on fish and the naval facilities at Portsmouth and Bath. The tridents have vigorously defended the fishing fleets operating in the Gulf of Maine and even as far afield as George’s Bank. The availability of seafood in First District gave the local population the opportunity to start growing their own food. The high level of destruction visited upon Canada’s Atlantic Provinces by the Soviet nuclear strikes has reduced Canadian competition for fish all along the coast—a fact that First District has exploited to the hilt.

Upon receiving authority over the reformed First District, MacDowell appropriated men and materials from a number of surviving military and law enforcement bodies operating within First District boundaries. Thus by early 2001, 701st Maritime Rifles includes personnel from the active duty and reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, along with numbers of law enforcement personnel. The Marines have proven invaluable in formulating the tactics and techniques employed by the Maritime Rifle Regiment.

As of January 2001, the USCG First District controls an area extending roughly from Rye, NH along the Maine coast to Bar Harbor. By road, this is a distance of nearly 240 miles—an impressive area to control in early 2001. However, not all is as it appears. The District, as both locals and the USCG call the Coast Guard realm, holds sway no more than ten miles inland in any location. In most areas, the District controls the hinterland to a depth of less than five miles. Thus the District controls a sliver of territory clinging to the sea. In many areas, control is nominal—there isn’t anybody along certain stretches of coast to contest the Coast Guard. In most other areas, control really rests in the hands of local militias who receive training and support from the Coast Guard and who conduct coastal trade under the protection of USCG cutters and boats. The Coast Guard maintains order throughout its slender domain with its manpower and materiel stationed predominantly at four bases: Portsmouth Naval Yard in New Hampshire, the City of Portland in Maine, Brunswick Naval Air Station in Maine, and the City of Bar Harbor in Maine.

Life in the District is in many ways typical of American life in 2001. The luxuries of the late 20th Century are long gone. Modern life is about the struggle to produce enough food and to survive the hard winters. Violence, starvation, and disease have carried off more than half the population; everyone has lost someone. The old economy has collapsed. In the new economy, the most valuable asset is productive farmland—or, the case of the District, a working fishing boat and the ability to harvest the bounty of the sea. The next most valuable commodity is the rifle and the ability to use it to defend the productive farmland and the fishing vessels. Those who have weapons and who are ready to use them to take what other survivors have are ever-present wolves lurking beyond the borders of towns and cities struggling to survive in the harsh world that is post-attack America. In this regard, the District is like any other place in the United States of 2001.

In other regards, however, the District is completely unique. The area retains a surprisingly large percentage of its pre-war population. Although many of the original residents of coastal southern Maine have died, they have been replaced by refugees from inland areas. The harsher winters of inland Maine, coupled with the rising tide of marauders and bandits, drove survivors towards the coast by the tens of thousands. The produce of the sea kept them alive—as well as keeping the local governments and the District itself in control of the situation. Without the sea, with its fish, lobsters, shellfish, and seaweed, the whole region might have collapsed in 1998. However, with control over a reliable food source, the District had control over the local population. This gave the District its opportunity to sow crops and reorganize southern coastal Maine for self-sufficiency. At the same time, the disparate armed units throughout the area—from Coast Guard personnel to active duty and reserve personnel from every branch of the armed forces to law enforcement of every stripe—were welded into a cohesive force by never-ending small unit actions against the inland bandits seeking to encroach on the coastal enclaves.

By late 2001, life in the District has stabilized considerably. Food is reliably available—so much so that the District can consider trading some to other cantonments in New England. Corn and fish are the staples of the District diet, supplemented by beans, potatoes, tomatoes, squash (including pumpkin), carrots, beets, various garden greens, chives and garlic, and small game. Local farms and garden shops provided the seed for 1998’s planting season. Local farmers and agricultural experts provided the know-how. The Coast Guard and its supporting militias provided the security.

Food is still rationed, except for what is grown in gardens. Fishing boats are required to operate out of USCG-controlled facilities, to which they are required to return with their catch. The boat crew can keep a certain percentage of the catch. The rest goes into the general supply and is distributed through the ration system. The same is true of the produce of farms and greenhouses. Local governments handle the rationing under the watchful eye of USCG officials.

Living conditions are cramped. Houses with many people in them are much warmer in the winter. Tightly-packed communities are safer, given the limits on manpower and the ever-present threat of marauders from inland. Many homes have been lost to fires over the past three years, and there has been limited new construction. However, those who have made it to 2001 are generally safe in the District. Public health is not quite what it used to be, but neither are people greatly at risk from disease.

Pirates, who represent a major threat to many other coastal communities throughout 2001 America, are no longer a significant threat to the District. The District has fought a vigorous anti-pirate campaign from 1998 until the present. Some have excoriated the District for its failure to reach any appreciable distance inland in its security efforts. Instead of securing the Maine hinterlands, the District has hunted along the Maine coast and even into Canada for all pirate bases. Using the 701st Maritime Rifles as marines, the Coast Guard has attacked pirates in their own bases, sinking or capturing scores of ships, killing or capturing thousands of maritime bandits, and forcibly relocating their dependent populations to prevent further outbreaks of piracy. Thus while Augusta is outside the District security zone, District-based fishermen can operate throughout the Gulf of Maine without escort.

For all intents and purposes, the District is divided into two parts—North District and South District. In South District, the security zone is a more-or-less continuous belt running from just south of Portsmouth, NH to Newcastle, ME. Patrols by local militia and Coast Guard troops are frequent throughout this area. Although only the unwise travel unarmed outside the urban areas, lawless elements are generally small groups of individuals who survive by being unobtrusive. Large groups of marauders who move into this area have met untimely ends so frequently over the past few years that they generally stay away from the District.

North District, running from Newcastle to Bar Harbor, is a different story. Here, District control is limited to easily-defended areas. Islands and isolated peninsulas in Muscongus Bay, Penobscot Bay, and Blue Hill Bay have been turned into cantonments. Thanks to persistent patrols by the Coast Guard, offshore islands generally are safe from marauders. Small groups using one or two boats generally are discovered and dealt with by the island militia. Larger groups requiring multiple boats simply never get the chance to assemble. The Coast Guard has fought several one-sided engagements in the area, smashing every attempt to land a sizeable force on any of the islands.

The peninsula enclaves typically are defended at the necks of the land bridge. The forest is cleared to create a wide barrier of open space. Fixed fighting positions are supplemented by patrols and LP/OPs manned by local militia and/or Coast Guard personnel. Infiltration here is much easier for bandits, although the use of dogs at the barriers makes this a real challenge nonetheless. The largest of these peninsula enclaves is Mount Desert Island which, though technically an island, is joined to the mainland by the Bar Harbor Road/Rte. 3 Bridge at the northwestern tip of the island. The bridge crossing is heavily fortified and manned at all times.

The situation is sufficiently stable for the existence of local politics. Municipalities elect their own officials, who have some leeway in how to use municipal resources. However, final say in all matters remains with the Coast Guard. Thus far, there have been few complaints about the situation. More than half of the population of the District has come from elsewhere in Maine, New Hampshire, or Massachusetts. A steady stream of refugees keeps the local population aware of how good they have it relative to many parts of New England. The occasional sound of small arms fire from the perimeter of the District reminds the population that they are under the protection of the Coast Guard and their local auxiliaries. For now, at least, there is no real restiveness among the natives.

The District maintains a force of 1600 tridents under arms, including all boat and cutter crews, all harpoons (as the troops of the 701st Maritime Rifles have come to be called) and command and support personnel. About a third of this number were originally USCG, USCG Reserve, or USCG Auxiliary. Around a quarter are military personnel originally from other services (principally Navy personnel from Brunswick NAS and National Guard from Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire), while the last portion are former police and local recruits. The equipment of the Coast Guard is good, if worn, and the ammunition is adequate if not bountiful. Many pre-war gunsmiths have been relocated to the four main bases, where they keep the Coast Guard’s weapons in good repair.

Approximately 5000 militia are scattered throughout the District. One fifth of this number is active duty/cadre troops, almost all of whom were military or police before the war. The remainder is reservists who serve, on average, one week in every four. Their level of training is generally modest, although most can give a good account of themselves in a fight. The equipment of the militia forces in the District is virtually all small arms. As the Coast Guard has claimed almost all the assault rifles and machine guns, the militia uses hunting rifles, shotguns, handguns, and a sprinkling of older military rifles. Ammunition is not as abundant as anyone would like, but the militia is better-supplied than the marauders who have been testing them for the past year.

Although the exact number is unknown, the most reliable estimate of the population of the District is 150,000. The single largest economic activity is farming, whether on regular farms, in labor-intensive gardens, or in greenhouses. Fishing is the next most prominent economic activity, followed by manufacturing of all kinds and military activity. Having solved the basic problems of food and security, the District finds itself at a crossroads. Further industrial recovery will require more labor, more expertise, more energy, more tools and fixtures, and more raw materials. Expansion of the District’s territory will meet some of these needs but not all. Machine shops, which are fairly common throughout eastern and southern New England, can solve some of the District’s problems. However, the issues of energy, skilled labor, and raw materials will continue to plague the District for the foreseeable future.

1) After our earlier exchange about names, I decided to keep both “tridents” and “harpoons”. Any Coastie or militiaman in First District is now a trident. Only the maritime infantry get to call themselves “harpoons”. As an aside, I’m on the fence about whether these guys should be “tridents” or “Tridents.” The latter is a proper noun, and it would seem that the uniformed servicemen should get a proper noun. On the other hand, I’m looking for something generic, like soldier, seaman, and airman.

I'll cover the growing menace in The Blood Cross.

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