[Raellus]

Originally Posted by RN7

The situation of Berlin in 1996 is unique, but there are other examples of flights into war zones or through hostile territory. The original Berlin Airlift itself in 1948. Operation Frequent Wind which evacuated Americans and South Vietnamese from Saigon, the evacuation of one million Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique in the 1970's, and the 1990 airlift of 110,000 Indians from Kuwait City during the First Gulf War.

1948 didn't involve any shooting. The other examples that you cited (barring Kuwait) are mismatches where the forces controlling the ground were unable to significantly impede operations; those mounting the evacuations had air superiority (or supremacy even). Neither of those caveats would apply in East Germany, c. '95.

Originally Posted by RN7

The political and strategic position of Berlin in German Reunification is obviously quite different to those airlifts, but West Berlin is under the administration of three nuclear powers who if they intervene on the side of Germany will radically change the Soviets defence position for the worst. The Soviets quite frankly do not have the resources and manpower to take on so many powerful countries in Europe and also fight a war in China. The Soviet Union would be reckless in the extreme to provoke the US, Britain and France by issuing ultimatums.

Quite right. I don't contest the validity of these points, I just disagree about how the Soviets would approach the situation.

Originally Posted by RN7

The West is not pushing a pro-West German agenda in Europe, they like the Soviets are shell shocked by events in Germany. But its also quite clear that German Reunification is not solely a West German affair as the East Germans are also in on it. So we have a situation from October until the beginning of December were the both NATO and the Soviet Union are trying to contain the issue of German reunification without being dragged into a general war in Central Europe over it.

A very valid point. In fact, this argument swayed me a little.

Originally Posted by RN7

But its also clear that their are divisions within Germany, NATO and the Warsaw Pact strategy. All sides seem to want to avoid a war in Central Europe, but certain actions by all concerned indicate that some do not want to compromise and want a war.

And this is what I was contending in my previous post. The more hawkish elements in the Soviet high command would likely oppose any airlift or resupply missions, fearing such operations were actually Trojan Horse-style ruses to reinforce the W. Berlin garrison or facilitate the W. German offensive in E. Germany.

Originally Posted by RN7

NATO continues to defend West German territory and airspace despite the Germans fighting the Soviets in East Germany, and by November they start to shoot down incoming Soviet raids on West German territory.
Strategies all over the place and reckless to the extreme. But in regards to West Berlin some aid flights into early November before it all starts going to hell and then nothing until NATO takes Berlin at the end of December.

Right. So if NATO is willing to shoot down Soviet combat aircraft over W. Germany, the Soviets wouldn't respond in kind? That's a really big reach, in my opinion.

I agree that the Soviets wouldn't want to provoke the rest of NATO into joining the fracas, but would they be willing to project weakness by allowing NATO aircraft to operate over E. Germany? What's the realpolitik response? Once again, it depends on leadership. If you see the Soviets as cautious, prudent, and pragmatic, then I guess it makes sense for them to allow NATO continued access to W. Berlin. I see the Soviets taking the opposite tack, though, trying to convey strength and resolve. It's essentially a game of double-bluff.

In my T2KU, the Soviets were tired of losing these tests of will- Berlin '48, the October Crisis (what we call the Cuban Missile Crisis). In fact, as I see it, the hawks in the Politburo are arguing that it's precisely the Soviet responses to those past crises that have emboldened the W. Germans, and that further displays of weakness will only worsen the situation.

Originally Posted by RN7

They didn't use nukes until the late summer of 1997, and that was firstly in China when the could see the writing was on the wall.

I know this, and actually I think canon says that they used them in Europe first, albeit sparingly, then far more liberally in China. I could be wrong, though (I'm on my 30 min lunch break at work and can't access my rulebook). Either way, the Soviets were willing to use tac-nukes. "When" does matter, but they clearly had the will. It's the difference between pointing a gun at someone and actually pulling the trigger. The Soviets pulled the trigger first, so to speak. They had the will, as well as the way. That suggests to me a mindset where defeat/surrender were not an option- a more hawkish mindset, if you will.

I think that you're presupposing a very rational Soviet leadership. I see quite a bit of evidence in canon that the Soviet gov't. and military were not thinking or acting in a particularly rational way (launching a full scale invasion of China, for example). Given that, my views on Berlin make sense.

I respect your opinions- they're rational and well-supported- and I'm not trying to impose mine on anyone. That said, I wouldn't argue this if I didn't think that my POV was justified by the available evidence. I'm totally cool with continuing a cordial, respectful debate here, and I'm equally cool with just agreeing to disagree.