Thread: AT Guns
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Old 06-28-2009, 11:49 PM
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It's true that an AT gun lacks the distinctive firing signature of the ATGM. It’s not true that there is no muzzle flash. (I realize you didn’t say so, but I feel it worthwhile to point out that we’re not talking about a choice between a highly revealing weapon and a stealthy weapon. A large caliber gun firing near the surface of the earth will reveal itself.) Also, it’s a lot easier to prepare a fighting position for a TOW team than it is for a large-caliber gun. Neither crew can operate their weapon completely under cover, but given comparable amounts of man hours and equipment to prepare a fighting position, the TOW has significantly lesser requirements.

For better or for worse, the Western powers decided that on a fast-moving battlefield on which they would be on the defensive against much superior numbers of Soviet tanks, time and manpower would be commodities in short supply. As Paul pointed out, mobility becomes an issue. Compounding the problem are issues like crew survivability, the length of time required to prepare a proper fighting position, the number of shots on can expect to fire from the time the enemy tanks enter the defenders’ effective range, the percentage of shots one can expect to hit, and the percentage of hits one can expect to cause a kill.

Compared to an AT gun, a TOW crew can be put in place by an APC, light wheeled vehicle, light helicopter, or just about any form of transport with a fair amount of ease. An AT gun requires a prime mover of some sort to have any sort of tactical mobility. Either the AT gun has a dedicated prime mover, the cost of which begs the question of why the gun wasn’t simply mounted on a light armored chassis and turned into an assault gun or tank destroyer, or the AT gun relies on a mover which is tasked between a number of guns. If the AT gun needs to be moved while the prime mover is moving another gun (perhaps with another unit), the gun loses a great deal of its utility. The TOW team at least can move their system some distance through restrictive terrain.

The TOW team has only a fraction of the reloads normally moved with the AT gun. Ammunition supply is one of the biggest drawbacks of the ATGM vis-ÃÂ*-vis the AT gun. However, it is possible at least to move a TOW team with a handful of reloads into a new position far more easily than it would be to move an AT gun with a similar number of rounds.

TOW can be operated by two men, although I wouldn’t care to be one of them lugging it long distances. AT guns require larger crews. Crews cost money. Although the cost of the crew is not the only consideration in the West (note that the US hasn’t adopted an autoloader for the M1 series, despite the potential cost savings), the number of crew a system requires certainly does go into the equation.

An AT gun has a dramatically higher rate of fire than TOW. Theoretically, the most common Soviet-manufactured AT guns can fire 14 rounds per minute. Realistically, the number is between 6 and 10. Still, this is a big advantage over TOW, which can manage 2-4 rounds depending on range, etc.

TOW has a range of over 3500 meters. Soviet AT guns don’t have that kind of range. When comparing these two systems as defensive weapons, range is a crucial factor. For one thing, a TOW crew can start engaging a Soviet attacker long before that attacker can engage the TOW crew. Ergo, although the AT gun has a much greater rate of fire, the TOW team has a much longer opportunity to engage the attacking tanks. More importantly, if the TOW is defending an obstacle, it can engage the enemy tanks with relative impunity (provided the TOW team is well-sited).

Preparing a fighting position for a TOW team is much easier than preparing a fighting position for an AT gun and crew. On the battlefield of North Central Europe, time and manpower were expected to be of the essence.

Killing power also matters. An AT gun is essentially a dismounted tank main gun. A 115mm gun simply lacks the killing power of even the early models of TOW. Scoring any hit on an enemy tank is better than scoring no hit. Any hit can cause damage to systems the crew would rather have operational. But a hit that does not result in armor penetration is not of much utility. All things being equal, TOW has better killing power than even the largest-caliber AT gun in use today.

Taken together, the relative advantages of ATGM like TOW (or HOT) were seen to outweigh the advantages of the AT gun for the war NATO expected to fight in Europe. Due to the Soviet numerical superiority, it was deemed critical to be able to shift anti-tank systems rapidly to counter developing threats. TOW (and HOT and Milan) promised this better than any towed AT system. Due to the highly mechanized nature of the Soviet attack, it was deemed necessary to use long-range anti-tank systems operating from difficult terrain (such as wooded hills or built-up areas along an MSR). Although a towed AT gun can be used this way, a TOW team is more responsive and offers more options in a more timely fashion. Air mobility was another deciding factor. Any utility helicopter can transport a TOW crew who can in turn expect to kill a T-72 at long range from wherever they set up. The same cannot be (completely) said of an AT gun and crew. Also, the development of FASCAM further supported the high degree of mobility that could be imparted to the TOW crew. A FASCAM minefield can be laid literally in minutes. A handful of TOW teams can be moved in to defend the minefield from beyond the main gun range of the Soviets the minefield was established to canalize or block. If necessary, these teams can be dug in fairly easily to give them some protection against the weight of Soviet artillery. A TOW team can take its weapon under cover during the enemy’s preparatory bombardment, then emerge when it comes time to fire. The same amount of survivability effort will not yield comparable results with an AT gun and crew. Time and manpower being of the essence, NATO opted for weapons that were highly mobile, possessed of long range, and possessed of a high degree of accuracy and killing power. An AT gun that possesses all of these qualities is not an AT gun—it’s a light tank, tank destroyer, or assault gun.

In answer to your question about why tanks aren’t armed with missiles, Legbreaker, some tanks indeed are armed with missiles. The problem is that no one has worked out the bugs of combining a missile launcher with a main tank gun, although the Russians have been working on it diligently. They may yet come up with a solution.

“Why? As stated above, tanks don't dodge supersonic projectiles very well. As long as the gunner knows what they're doing and leads the target, there shouldn't be any need for high tech electronic sighting systems, although they would certainly reduce the burden on the crew.”

If this were anything like as easily done as said, there would be no need for computers in the turrets of main battle tanks. Unfortunately, very few crews can engage fast-moving tanks at ranges of 3000+ meters using only optical sights. By referring to fast-moving tanks, I’m not suggesting that the tanks actually dodge incoming rounds. I’m suggesting that hitting a moving target is difficult. If anybody could do it, SACLOS and the targeting systems of Western tanks never would have been invented.

As far as the utility of an AT gun goes, I think it would have a value on a different battlefield than the one NATO anticipated for Germany. Properly sited and dug-in, an AT gun can be a superb system. In WW2, the exchange rate of tanks to AT guns sometimes was as high as 6-to-1 in favor of the AT guns. However, increasing numbers of tanks (and their supporting fighting vehicles) and the firepower, mobility, and survivability of tanks have changed the equation. I still believe AT guns have their uses, but they are out of their element on a fast-moving battlefield.

One more note: I do believe the Soviets made extensive use of AT guns in Poland in 1997. They had several months to prepare obstacles and fighting positions. Under these conditions, AT guns almost certainly took a fearful toll of NATO IFV and APC, as well as poorly-handled or unlucky MBT.


Webstral

Last edited by Webstral; 06-29-2009 at 01:03 AM.
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