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Old 07-24-2009, 08:12 PM
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I'm inclined to see a somewhat greater advance for the Soviets, but overall I like your interpretation of events, Jason. I do see Harbin in Soviet hands prior to the mid-1997 strategic withdrawal, but that's a quibble for another occasion. I especially like the idea that the Chinese prepare for a massive rear-area operation to coincide with the Pact offensive. This is very much in keeping with Chinese thinking and their strong suit in this war.

I see the 1996 Pact offensive as providing a sort of repeat of the WW1 problem. China prepares massive defenses in depth all along the practical avenues of advance. Although it is impossible for China to cover the entire front with trenches the way that the combatants on the Western Front did, a new equivalent is possible. Well-sited ATGM (am I overusing this phrase) with interlocking fields of fire go a long way towards creating a solid front of defenses for the Chinese. Mines and water obstacles constrain mechanized attack to a degree that was unthinkable during the 1995 action. Although the Soviets vigorously seek a breakthrough, what they get is much more reminiscent of Verdun. Both sides suffer horrible losses, but the Chinese manage to prevent a breakthrough.

China loses huge amounts of men and materiel halting the Pact offensive something the official v1 chronology doesn't mention. Pact forces have the initiative, firepower, and weight of numbers (in chosen areas) required to force a breakthrough if the Chinese strictly rely on static defense. The Soviets know this, so they continue to throw men and machines in to the fight even as their leading echelons bog down. Under the sheer weight of firepower and numbers, the Pact forces begin to crack the Chinese defenses at selected points. This is not maneuver warfare. It's nothing more than a straightforward slugging match.

The PLA has anticipated that even with sophisticated Western systems, the best they can do is canalize the Pact attackers and inflict heavy attrition. The keystone of the defense is the mobile reserves, which they move forward as needed. The reserves are needed frequently. In fact, by the time the Soviets call it quits, the PLA has committed three-quarters of its reserves. Losses have been nearly as high for the Chinese as they have been for the Pact forces. A conventional counterattack is out of the question. Consequently, for the rest of the summer Chinese operations focus on inflicting casualties on the Pact troops while establishing favorable conditions for an eventual counteroffensive. Army (corps) level operations are the largest seen during this time.

Why do the Chinese defend themselves so far forward, thus exposing themselves to such tremendous losses? After all, the traditional Chinese method of defense has been to trade space for time. Now, though, the Chinese leadership feels that its collective neck is on the line. The Politburo has indebted China up to her eyeballs. The damage from the Soviet air offensive over the winter has barely begun to be repaired. Chinese prestige around the world hangs by a thread. The Politburo can survive having Beijing bombed into rubble from the air. They don't believe they can survive having Beijing occupied by Soviet troops. If the Soviets achieve a breakthrough in Manchuria or northwest of Beijing, the capital may very well be forfeit along with the lives of the Politburo. Therefore, the Chinese supreme leadership sacrifices hundreds of thousands of lives and untold treasure in a forward defense.

At least it works.

For the rest of the summer, China rebuilds. After blocking the Pact advance earlier in the year, China has some time. The PLA and the Politburo want to use the advantages China possesses, such as being on the defensive in their own country and a deep well of manpower, to best advantage. Weapons continue to come in from the West. Factories continue to retool and be constructed from scratch in the southern part of the country, where an increasingly capable PLAAF is capable of making Soviet air attacks too costly to contemplate. The Army continues to grow.

The Soviets are well aware of the Chinese intent. This is one reason why there is such a sense of urgency about getting more Pact troops to the Far East irrespective of readiness come Autumn 1996. The Kremlin feels that victory must be achieved soon if it is to be achieved at all.

The war in Europe obviously changes the whole game. On the surface, it might appear that this is China's opportunity to launch an offensive that might drive the Soviets out of the country. However, the Chinese leadership decides that the Soviets might withdraw on their own. If the Germans do well enough, the Soviets might throw in the towel in the Far East to concentrate resources in Europe. Accordingly, Chinese operations actually slacken.

Once the fighting spreads to Europe, American and European arms shipments to China virtually cease. Europeans and Americans alike hold their breath as they wait to see what will come of the German-Soviet contest. Beijing uses the halt in arms shipments to justify slowing the pace of Chinese operations.

At the end of November, the PLA steps up its activity dramatically. By this point, it is clear that the FRG is not going to win on its own. Few Pact units have been withdrawn from the Far East. Certain voices in the liberalizing PLA claim that if China had stepped up the pressure in October, the Soviets would have come under greater pressure. Fewer troops airlifted to Germany as a result of Chinese action might have resulted in a German victory, the critics claim. In the long run, a German victory might have been the key to removing Pact troops from China. Instead, the Soviets have established a new equilibrium, thanks to Chinese inactivity. The state security apparatus find itself unable to completely suppress such opinion.

By this point, the PLA is ready to employ new tactics on a large scale. The new tactics combine the action of light infantry with mechanized forces operating against semi-static defensive positions. Pact forces also have dug in all along the front in the Far East. Although the Pact possesses greater weight of mechanization and firepower, the PLA has markedly superior light infantry. The Chinese intend to precede offensive action with infiltration by light units equipped with machine guns, anti-tank weapons, and engineering equipment. Well-trained light fighters infiltrate the target zone in depth and in numbers, giving the PLA a superior tactical intelligence capability in the area. When the offensive begins, the light fighters attack targets throughout the enemyĆ¢€™s position to a depth of ten kilometers or more. Forward observers call in accurate artillery strikes. Engineers demolish bridges and crater roads. Anti-armor ambushes delay the movement of reinforcements. Grenadiers knock out machine gun nests and bunkers covering the engineers assaults on defensive obstacles. In effect, the forward edge of the battle area is isolated through effective light infantry action, mimicking the Soviet tactic of vertical envelopment through infiltration.

The new tactics pose a particular problem for the Soviets. The enormity of the front and depth of occupied area makes it extremely difficult for Pact troops to defend themselves. Superior firepower and mobility are neutralized by the sheer area to be defended and Chinese skill at infiltration. Although detection of an upsurge in infiltration activity sometimes indicates preparation for a tactical or operational level action, by late 1996 the PLA has mastered using such activity for deception and misdirection. Pact efforts to counter Chinese infiltration in depth encounter the twin pillars of a relative shortage of manpower and skill among the Pact infantry and the traditional Soviet reluctance to allow junior leaders to exercise initiative. Although junior leaders in the Far East have far more freedom to operate than anywhere else in the Soviet sphere, the KGB continues to keep its hand on the leash of the average rifle platoon, company, or battalion commander. The Chinese, who are fighting for their lives, enjoy far greater freedom to exercise initiative.

Infiltration envelopment results in shallow breakthroughs for Chinese mechanized forces in localized actions. With infantry on the ground throughout the breakthrough area, the Chinese are well-appraised of the movement of Soviet forces in response to breakthroughs. Mines and anti-armor ambushes help create circumstances favorable to the Chinese attackers. Chinese mechanized units punch into the rear areas of defending divisions, inflicting enormous losses. At greater depth, guerillas and special operations troops attack key communications nodes to delay large-scale movements of relief forces.

However, the Soviets use the opportunity to attack Chinese mechanized forces in the open with air power. Pact fighter-bombers with stand-off munitions attack Chinese AFV and soft-skinned transport on the roads near the breakthroughs. The PLAAF seldom is able to establish air superiority for long over the contested zones. As a consequence, the Chinese infiltration envelopment tactics do not yield major breakthroughs or the creation of major crises for the Pact defenders. Incessant air attacks and long-range artillery attacks by Pact units serve to steal the momentum from Chinese mechanized units at the point of breakthrough. Typically, the Chinese attackers either withdraw after inflicting their damage or establish a new line of defense after a relatively shallow penetration of Pact lines.

In this fashion, the front lines in Manchuria became increasingly fluid, although in general they moved north. Occasionally, Pact forces would counterattack in great strength, driving through the hasty defenses of the Chinese and recapturing lost ground. On other occasions, Pact formations adjacent to the one infiltrated and overwhelmed would withdraw to better positions. The overall effect was a steady drain on the manpower and materiel of both sides. Unnervingly for the Soviets, the exchange rate became more and more even as the winter of 1996-1997 progressed.

Author's Note: That's about it for now. At some point, I changed tenses while writing. You guys are being subjected to a rough draft.


Webstral

Last edited by kato13; 03-16-2010 at 04:15 PM.
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