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Originally Posted by Raellus
What accounts for the dearth of trucks in the Red Army? Just to clarify, is this a problem that the Soviet army had, IRL (as of the late '80s, when the alternate history of the Twilight World diverges from our own) or is this shortate something that you've established as part of your game world?
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In real life (in the 1990's) the Soviets don't have enough trucks to support their existing forces. They have a tremendous number of trucks, but they are insufficient for the task of supporting their enormous forces. No one has enough trucks to keep up with the demands of a mechanized army for very long, although the US Army has as favorable a truck-to-fighting vehicle ratio as any army in the world.
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Originally Posted by Raellus
This strikes me as somewhere where the WTO nations could really help out. I can see Soviet calls for an increase in military truck production from Tatra (Cz) and STAR (Poland) as a way of supporting the war effort in China (before PACT troops were "requested") and thereafter.
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A keen observation!
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Originally Posted by Raellus
You've gotten me thinking seriously about NATO's logistics issues. With France uncooperative (and Belgium, to a degree), all war shipping would have to come in through ports in Holland and Germany, which would be incredibly vulnerable to bombing (conventional and later, nuclear) and mining. With only a couple of major ports in operation, supply problems for the NATO armies would become greater and greater as their operations headed closer to the Soviet Union and further from those ports.
There's a direct historical parallel here. Part of the Western Allies' difficulty in advancing across western Europe during WWII was logistical. Before Antwerp was liberated and cleared, supplies could only come in through a couple of damaged ports in France. Since Allied bombing had wrecked most of the rail system in France, most of the supplies had to be trucked. Even with the American's considerable stock of trucks, there was an incredible strain on operations and some Allied armies had to be held back so that vital supplies could be delivered to others. There was a constant struggle between Montgomery and the American generals over whose army/corps would get supply precedence and therefore be able to continue its advance. Ike almost sacked Monty a couple of times because of his incessant and sometimes insubordinate calls for supply precedence.
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The v1 chronology has long pauses in the action which I believe can be explained by the logistical and manpower problems of both sides. Anglo-American forces reach the Oder within a short period of time after crossing the Inter-German Border in early December, 1996. Granted, the offensive doesn't take on the drive-by qualities of Operation Desert Storm, but four fresh Anglo-American mechanized corps slashing across northern East Germany is too great a force for the battle-weary Pact forces to hold back for long. We can explain away the pause from January to April politically: the NATO civilian leadership wanted to give the Soviets a chance to come to their senses and the bargaining table. However, it's quite likely as well that SACEUR and his subordinates were obliged to report to the US President that USAEUR and its corresponding Allied formations were incapable of continuing the offensive into Poland right away.
The NATO offensive into Poland "gains momentum" in April. Warsaw isn't surrounded until June. This is not a lightning operation. I believe the combination of logistical pinch and well-prepared Soviet-doctrine obstacles employed in the greatest depth explain the apparent plodding nature of the NATO drive across Poland.
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Originally Posted by Raellus
This problem also existed, to a degree, on the Eastern Front. The Soviets were bound by some of the same limitations. The Soviets were still able to conduct sustained operations across a very broad front and over much greater distances than the Western Allies, though. Of course, there were seasonal limitations on offensive operations and some offensives did have to be stopped due to supply issues but, at least later in the war, the Soviets did a better job, on the whole, managing logistical problems than did the Western Allies. It helped that the Soviet soldier required much less in the way of supply tonage to operate than the British or American soldier did. This is one area in which the Twilight Red Army would have a distinct advantage over NATO armies.
It seems strange that the USSR would have forgotten these lessons from the past.
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I'm not sure the Soviets have forgotten the lessons of the past as much as they find themselves obliged to work within certain limitations. The degree of mechanization of the Red Army in 1944 is a mere fraction of the level of mechanization of the Soviet Army in 1996. At every level of the fighting, the ability of the troops to consume ammunition, fuel, and spare parts has grown geometrically in fifty years. Even in a command economy, it's hard to sell the purchase/manufacture of trucks versus tanks, artillery, and APC to civilian leaders. Soviet doctrine has acknowledgement of this problem built into it: all available support goes to the most successful command. Everyone else goes hungry.
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