Soviet Naval Strategy

[kato13]

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chico20854

Soviet Naval Strategy

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I've finally finished it! Attached is my take on the Soviet Navy's strategy and some of the tactics they used worldwide during the Twilight War. Please read and think about it and let me know your thoughts! (I've really outdone myself on this one in terms of size! Oops but it hopefully has some valid concepts in it)
Attached Files Pact Maritime Strategy during the Twilight War.doc (85.0 KB, 48 views)



chico20854

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thefusilier

Hey thats really great Chico. Very interesting. I did note that you said "US troops were able to deploy unhindered to Korea and Iran". I don't have my US Veh Guide but didn't some units (a Marine Division I think as well as another unit) get smashed up crossing to Korea?


thefusilier

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chico20854

You're right... the 6th Marine Division was savaged by Soviet air attack and commerce raiders in February/March 1998. Nice find, I'll have to revise that bit. Thanks!


chico20854

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Matt Wiser

Great work, Chico! One thing, though: the Yak-38 Forger was on its way out when the wall came down: the Yak-41 was its intended replacement, and would have replaced the Forger by 1995. I take it the commerce raiders are the old Sverdlov-class CLs (most of them, anyway)? They're as expendable a ship for such a mission as one could get. Though sending a Slava out into the shipping lanes would no doubt make NATO and NATO-allied naval planners be very, very concerned.


Matt Wiser

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pmulcahy

Quote:
Originally Posted by Matt Wiser
Great work, Chico! One thing, though: the Yak-38 Forger was on its way out when the wall came down: the Yak-41 was its intended replacement, and would have replaced the Forger by 1995.



I agree there: the Forger was reportedly not only a bitch to take off and land in V/STOL mode, V/STOL mode was downright dangerous in the Forger, and over a dozen Russian pilots died doing so, with more pilots being forced to abandon their aircraft during V/STOL flight. The Forger is also incapable of VIFFing (where you use your lift nozzles to increase your maneuverability while in normal flight), and VIFFing is a key dogfighting tactic among Harrier pilots and will also be a key tactic to F-35 JSF pilots. Basically, the Forger is underpowered, and the poorly-conceived configuration of the lift nozzles just makes this worse.


pmulcahy



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Stilleto69

Excellent work Chico! Thanks for helping to flesh out what the various naval actions that occurred during the war (i.e. what happened to the Kennedy, Ranger, Lincoln, etc.) I have never been happy with how cannon treated the naval side of the Twilight War.

Your work & the others are why I'm glad that I found this forum. Keep up the good work.


Stilleto69

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chico20854

Thanks for catching the Forger. It's just another one of the details that slipped my mind! Another change for version 2 of this document.

For the Tblisi class carriers, Harpoon lists an air wing of 18 Su-27K, 28 Mig-29K, 8 Ka-27 ASW, 4 Ka-27 AEW and 2 Ka-27 utility. I'll probably use something similar for the Ulyanovsk. There was also a fixed wing AEW under development, and a navalized Su-25 for training purposes. Kievs had 12 Yak-38/41s, 14 Ka-27 ASW and 3 Ka-25B targeting helos. Given the stress of the war in China and the rapid growth in Soviet naval aviation in the years leading up to the war, I may lighten the air groups up a little... not enough pilots or aircraft to fill out the air wings.

For the commerce raiders, I figured that following the Battle of the Norwegian Sea the VMF would throw anything with the range and anti-surface capability that it could find out as raiders in the North Atlantic. The Kirovs, with nuclear propulsion and a decent weapons load (especially compared to the rest of the Soviet fleet) make ideal raiders and are the only class specifically mentioned in canon as raiders (in Gateway to the Spanish Main). Risky, but maybe it would work (and NATO didn't move on the Kola for 6 months, so maybe it did. Or maybe NATO held back for political reasons...)

Paul, I assume you have the Yak-41 on your site?


chico20854

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pmulcahy

Quote:
Originally Posted by chico20854
Paul, I assume you have the Yak-41 on your site?



I hate to admit this, but I don't remember! I'll have to check...yes, it's there under Russian Fighter-Bombers. For some reason, I have it down as the Yak-141; I'll have to check why I called it that, and see if I need to change it (I probably do; "Yak-141" looks more like an advanced prototype designation rather than an operational designation. The Russians generally put a "1" in front of an advanced prototype's designation, in the same way that the US puts a "Y" in the designation of advanced prototypes.)


pmulcahy


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Matt Wiser

The AEW aircraft under development was the Yak-44: it was essentially a clone of the E-2 Hawkeye. It had only progressed as far as wind tunnel tests when the wall came tumbling down.

The Kirovs make better sense being used as force flags or Task Force AAW ships: Freunze was fulfilling the latter role when she was sunk in the lead-up to the Battle of Kamchatka. It'd be easier for Soviet Naval Staff to arrange for ammo and fuel supply for cruisers that may or may not make it back, and keep the Northern Fleet's two Kirovs back. A Slava makes a good possiblity as a raider; but keep in mind, where are spare SS-N-12 Sandbox and SA-N-6 missiles going to be picked up in some Third World backwater? A Sverdlov makes a better raider: range, decent gun armament, and she can refuel from captured ships-you're more likely to find fuel for a cruiser on the high seas powering a freighter or tanker, than fuel for gas turbines; even though the Kirovs have a nuclear power plant, they get supplemental power from a steam power plant-the term used is CONAS (Combined Nuclear And Steam). Using a Kirov as a diversion to get a few Sverdlovs out into the shipping lanes might be a better idea.


Matt Wiser

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thefusilier

Is there then any more probable reason why a Kirov was sunk off Grenada? Just to say, keep it as close to the books as possible?


thefusilier

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chico20854

Paul, you're right the Yak-141 was the developmental version of the Yak-41.

Maybe deploy the Yak-44 only on the Ulyanovsk, as advanced prototypes, and have the rest of the carrier fleet with Ka-27 AEWs. They're supposed to operate under cover of (or with support from) land-based AEW anyways.

On the Kirovs, I agree on their use as Task force flags and the anchor of AAW defense. I think we need to get more details worked out on the Battle of the Norwegian Sea to see what's still afloat to serve as raiders. Given that they and the carriers were the USN's concern #1 (on the surface at least), I can see a lot of attention paid to them. Sverdlovs work great, there isn't much other role for them after the SNI operation in North Norway is broken up. I also have thought about a Q-ship type raider, similar to the German Atlantis and British armed merchant cruisers of WWII. Containerization makes this even easier, as you can drop in modular weapons systems.

As for resupply of raiders, as part of Operation Primus I envision a sortie of merchantmen loaded with ordnance such as SS-N-12s to hide locations in remote areas. Another idea is for them to be ferried by Echo II SSGNs (is there a different version for sub launch? I'll have to check), which might be reluctant to attack due to their noiseiness and lack of targeting capability (beyond a satcom link).

Maybe the fuel and CONAS provides a reason for the Grenada battle: the Kiev had broken out to cover other raiders (surface and submarine) but used up its fuel oil in the breakout and in raiding the central Atlantic (US Gulf coast to Mediterranean convoy traffic). It was headed to Cuba for a refuel when it was located by NATO forces (maybe USCG maritime patrol aircraft operating in the West Indies) and the New Jersey battlegroup, operating in an anti-raider role in the Caribbean and Central Atlantic (also pressuring Cuba to stay neutral) was vectored in. A chase ensued and the New Jersey, sans escorts which were out of fuel from the chase, was able to catch up to the Kirov, which had its speed limited by empty fuel oil tanks, limiting it to 24 knots.

And with as little as was mentioned in canon on the naval action, I'm reluctant to toss out any of it!


chico20854

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Matt Wiser

Actually, the Cubans do have a way around letting a raider dock in Cienfuegos and not get pounded in reprisal by the USAF. There's the 72-hour rule for belligerent warships in neutral ports or waters. Any belligerent warship may dock in a neutral port for up to 72 hours, however, she may not conduct repairs to weapons systems or reload ordinance. And she may only take on fuel sufficient to take her to the nearest friendly or her home port. Only repairs essential to seaworthiness or crew habitability may be performed. Though CINCLANT might want to have an SSN or two put a few mines in the approaches to Cienfeugos outside Cuban territorial waters to discourage raiders from using Cuban ports or waters to hide....I would. And ditto for such ports as Conakry in Guinea, Aden, or in Angola.


Matt Wiser

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BnF95

Just a thought, considering the sizes of freighters nowadays, the Soviet fleet doesn't really have to sink that many to put a crimp on transport do they?


BnF95

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Matt Wiser

It would be interesting to see if Ivan had ever thought about using Armed Merchant Raiders a la the Germans in both World Wars I and II; It was a viable tactic up until the 1960s and everybody thought a war in Europe would go nuclear pretty quickly. The usual weapon load was 6 5.9" guns in single mounts, with them situated so that a broadside of four could be fired; several had a 3" on the bow to fire warning shots, all had at least four 21" TTs, and at least two had submerged TTs (one firing to each side), plus 37-mm and 20-mm AA guns, and heavy machine guns. All but one carried mines (80 to 360),
and two (Kormoran and Michel) had small MTBs (Kormoran's was never used). The WW II raiders all carried seaplanes, and several times those planes were used to attack ships. One thing they all had in common was that prisoners were treated not as POWs, but as fellow seamen, and any civilian passengers were also treated very well, with any women and children being housed in an officer's cabin or in the ship's sick bay. None of the raiders survived WW II. And these ships could be dangerous: the duel between HMAS Sydney and KMS Kormoran is legendary. To this day, the Sydney-Kormoran encounter is still discussed in naval schools as how NOT to deal with a raider or blockade-runner. Whether sloppiness, negligence, or overconfidence, Sydney should have disposed of Kormoran. Instead, both ships suffered fatal damage, and while 328 German sailors survived the loss of their ship, no surviviors from Sydney's crew of 645 were ever found. The final resting place of both ships is still yet to be found.

BTW Atlantis was the most known, with 22 ships sunk or captured, and she had the most tonnage sunk, but Pinguin holds the raider record for ships sunk or taken with 28 (14 of which were Norweigan whalers and their factory ships).


Matt Wiser
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Targan

We Australians still feel very strongly about the WWII battle fought between HMAS Sydney and KMS Kormoran, and I think some of the wounds over the Sydney's destruction with all hands will not heal until the last of the friends and relatives of those lost finally pass on. Where I live, Perth, is located on the edge of the Indian Ocean, and would have been the closest Australian city to the Sydney when she was lost. The Sydney was a heavy cruiser, the pride of the RAN at the time, and it just beggars belief that she could have been so utterly outclassed by the Kormoran, but there is the benefit of total surprise for you. As Matt said previously, the actual resting place of the Sydney has never been determined; the German survivors of the battle told Australian interrogators that they had last seen the Sydney fully ablaze and steaming over the horizon away from the scene of the battle. A very sad tale.


Targan

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ReHerakhte

Having a vested interest in the HMAS Sydney - KMS Komoran battle (my father's father was one of the officers onboard the Sydney and my mother's mother was one of the people living in Carnarvon who went to assist the survivors when the German survivors were brought ashore), I am only adding to Targan's comments that we feel quite strongly about the incident.
I would say also however, that sloppiness was not one of the Sydney's faults and even though the case might be argued perhaps for negligence, I doubt it simply because her service record was very good.

It's more the case that the Komoran, not suited to fighting actual warships, kept her bluff up that she was an innocent freighter until she could get the Sydney to leave. The captain of the Sydney was suspicious of the Komoran but as the Sydney was drawing closer and in optimum range for the Komoran's weapons and the Komoran could not provide the appropriate codes to fake her identity, the German captain opened fire.
The first salvo to hit the Sydney hit her bridge and weapons direction tower making her effectively commanderless for a few moments allowing the Germans time to reload etc. The Sydney did retaliate though and the Komoran was severely damaged but not enough to prevent her from launching torpedoes, one of which hit the Australian ship near her forward turrets and she began taking water. The Komoran also used her 75 and 37mm AA guns to rake the Sydney.

The entire fight lasted less than ten minutes with the Komoran suffering uncontrollable fires below decks but still firing on the Sydney and the Sydney taking in water, suffering a major loss of her senior officers and also suffering significant fires and internal explosions.

I've read comments from people who have claimed that the Sydney's sinking was a disgrace and the captain was 'obviously' ripe for being relieved of his command - these people haven't bothered to research the story. The Sydney was caught by surprise and a 'fate of war' relieved her of much of her combat control in the opening seconds of the fight. The Komoran fought hard and well and her victory should not be denegrated by claiming that the captain of the Sydney was incapable.

All this just goes to illustrate just how successful the merchant raider concept can be.

Cheers,
Kevin

P.S. for those interested, the Australian War Memorial has a reasonably good section detailing the events http://www.awm.gov.au/Encyclopedia/hmas_sydney/index.htm
and the most informative book to date is 'Bitter Victory; the death of HMAS Sydney' by W.J. Olson, published in 2000 by UWA Press, Perth. ISBN 1-59114-066-8


ReHerakhte

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TiggerCCW UK

Its an often repeated tale - a better equipped force is ambushed by a smaller one, suffers heavy losses and the commanders are blamed. Its the standard response over the years - blame those in charge regardless of the circumstances, whether its enemy action or an accident, particularly if they aren't around to defend themselves. It was true 94 years ago when Titanic went down and Captain Smith was blamed, it was true in this case and it was true in the case of ZD576 crash on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994. Its always easier to blame the dead.
__________________
Its 106 miles to friendly lines, we've a full tank of meth, half a box of AP ammo, its dark and we're wearing 1st generation NVG's - hit it!

TiggerCCW UK


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Matt Wiser

Or Lt. Kara Hultgreen's F-14 crash in '93....There are still guys who feel she wasn't qualed in the F-14, yet her flight record says otherwise; she was just the victim of an engine valve malfunctioning at the worst possible moment-final approach to a carrier landing. The accident was replayed in the sim at NAS Miramar, with pilots ranging from newbies to a Squadron CO. Only the squadron CO was able to recognize the problem, compensate for it, and land the plane on the carrier; everyone else crashed.

One thing raider supply ships (and actual raiders, whether disguised raiders or actual warships) would have in the T2K environment up until the nukes fell, (and for some time after) would be the incredible corruption that goes on in a lot of Third World Countries, especially in Africa and SE Asia (Indonesia and Burma are good examples in the latter area). Corrupt officials would be easily found by the GRU and paid off to overlook a raider's supply ship, if not the actual raider itself. Though U.S., British, and German agents would no doubt be keeping an eye on raider activities and any front companies set up to procure supplies for raiders (food and fuel, especially: not many third world nations would have 6" shells for a Sverdlov or 130mm shells for a Sovremmeny or Slava), and the usual covert activities would then be launched to put said front company (and any ships ostensibly owned by the front company) out of business....for good. It also wouldn't look good for a country to be a raider hangout and have a USN or RAN ship arrive and notice
SS-N-2 missiles, gun ammo, SA-14 SAMs, being loaded or offloaded.....Can you say "punitive action," anyone? This might make a good adventure idea for those interested in pre-nuclear campaigns.


Matt Wiser

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ReHerakhte

Would sure make for an intense game if the PCs were asked to go into some third world nation and locate/destroy such a front company or indeed even the supplies themselves. Maybe even capture the supplies as an alternative scenario.
Or perhaps monitor the front company for signs of enemy warships coming in to resupply so that higher command can call in some sort of strike.

Cheers,
Kevin


ReHerakhte

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chico20854

The corruption in those sort of places is the sort of thing that Operation Primus is designed to exploit. And it makes for a lot of exciting actions in out of the way places. I've got the sailing directions for most of the world (from pollux.nss.nga.mil/sdr/ ) which lists tons of out of the way islands, small ports, etc around the world. Add in some front companies and the massive Soviet merchant and fishing fleets and there's a lot of potential for supplying raiders. In the polar regions, obsolete ships loaded with cargoes of fuel, munitions and spares can be abandoned amid the icebergs with some sort of covert homing device (along the lines of a Radio Frequency I.D. tag).

BnF95, as far as the increasing size of freighters yes and no. Since WWII, an increasing share of maritime trade has been composed of consumer commodities and the raw materials to manufacture and operate them. The NATO study I referenced in the doctrine piece asserts that the demand for merchant shipping goes through three phases. During a period of tension before the outbreak of war (late summer 1996 - December 1, 1996 in the T2k timeline) demand is above normal as manufacturers around the world try build stockpiles before the conflict starts at the same time as NATO is trying to get ships to deploy troops from North America. During the early phase of the war (first few months) demand peaks due to the chaos imposed by war (neutral ships refusing to sail into the war zone, enemy attacks, understaffed and disorganized shipping authorities). As the war continues, use of shipping is controlled by NATO or national staffs, which assign priority to essentials. In general, a conversion to a war economy would cut back on the consumer sector, freeing many more ships than are needed for essentials. (In wartime, the NATO study estimates 45% of peacetime demand for bulk food, 12% for processed food, 69% for raw materials, 42% of manufactured goods, 62% of crude oil, 102% of refined petroleum and 81% of LNG).

For example, roll-on roll-off ships would be in high demand prior to an outbreak of war as the military wants to ship vehicles on them to Europe, Korea and the Persian Gulf. At the same time, auto dealers in the US want to stock up on new BMWs and Toyotas while they are still being made. Once war breaks out, the auto dealers want the last of their cars shipped but are unable to get insurance for them (leaving the loaded ships in port), the ships that are available for loading are in Germany and Japan and the reservists that man the shipping control center are trying to find the phone numbers for the owners. Eventually, the ships are insured, sail with the last load of BMWs (the factory now hurridly converting to turn out G-wagens for the Bundeswehr), and load up with HMMWVs and are off to the battlefields. Of course, after Ft. Hood, Ft. Polk and the other bases in the US are emptied of the vehicles left behind by units that drew prepositioned equipment in Europe, there are more ro-ros available than the US industry has the ability to fill (and making the USSR's job of sinking enough ships to really make it hurt more difficult). In addition, if all the NATO-controlled ro-ros were sunk, neutral ships could be brought in (at a price, although they might not have much other employment since the global car manufacturing trade has converted to war production) or vehicles could be shipped on other types of ship which are less efficient.

The only major type of ship that this dynamic does not occur (according to the NATO study) is petroleum product tankers. Prior to the outbreak of war demand is high as stockpiling occurs and goes even higher after the shooting starts, as the armies gulp down fuel but rationing in the civilian sector hasn't been organized yet (allocations and tracking systems developed etc). Demand remains high as additional troops enter the fray and peacetime stockpiles are run down. Refineries in Northern Europe are damaged, so petroleum must be imported from North America and the Caribbean. As war continues, demand remains high but civilian consumption is cut back as rationing becomes more severe, living standards fall and spare parts for cars become harder to obtain. Meanwhile, neutral shipowners deploy ships on trades that NATO-owned ships are withdrawn from by national shipping authorities and some permit their ships to be chartered to NATO nations. Finally, "cargo shifting" takes place. Combination carriers (ships that can carry dry bulk cargo such as ore or act as tankers) shift to carrying crude oil. Smaller crude oil tankers have their tanks cleaned (a task that can take a week) and are loaded with refined products. Once they reach European harbors, they may have to remain at anchor to be partially unloaded by barges until they can fit into the shallower berths. Less efficient, yes, but the cargo is still shipped.

Kevin, you're right. The naval war in out of the way places during the war is a wild experience. Raids, covert actions, treachery, espionage and shocking violence. It could be a blast to play!

-Chico


chico20854

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thefusilier

Quote:
Originally Posted by BnF95
Just a thought, considering the sizes of freighters nowadays, the Soviet fleet doesn't really have to sink that many to put a crimp on transport do they?



I've been thinking more on the lines of not the ships being sunk, but what is in them. Sure they Soviets can't sink all the merchant shipping but the US can't produce mass amounts of Abrams, bradleys, etc in a really short time frame. The number of replacement vehicles and for units being deployed overseas has got to be hard felt when just a few ships get sunk.


thefusilier

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ReHerakhte

Quote:
Originally Posted by thefusilier
I've been thinking more on the lines of not the ships being sunk, but what is in them. Sure they Soviets can't sink all the merchant shipping but the US can't produce mass amounts of Abrams, bradleys, etc in a really short time frame. The number of replacement vehicles and for units being deployed overseas has got to be hard felt when just a few ships get sunk.



Yeah, especially when you considered that the mass convoy tactics used in WW2 to defeat submarines/maritime attack aircraft/commerce raiders etc. would make for a very tempting target for even small nukes.
Obviously maritime strategy would evolve to deal with both concepts (enemy action against single cargo ships and against groups of cargo ships) but towards the end of the war, I wonder if naval command would veto supply ships crossing to Europe until they were happy there were no enemy along the route? Meaning that supplies to Europe would be even harder to get from USA to the units needing them.

Cheers,
Kevin


ReHerakhte

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chico20854

I agree that the limited quantity of vehicles and replacement equipment and supplies is a tempting target for the Soviet navy.

The problem is one of target identification and targeting. Total military requirements in the 1990 NATO study are about 10 percent of total war essential shipping (about 600 ships out of 6000). Some of this military cargo is deploying units, the rest is replacements & supplies for units already deployed. NATO has two options for protecting shipping - to escort a random sample (essentially) of shipping or escorting only military cargo (or only a portion) and letting the economic cargo fend for itself. (A full escort of all 6000 ships would be impossible with the number of escorts available). If all military cargo is sent via convoy the Soviet Navy has only to attack it to sink something of definite military value. If only a portion of the ships in convoy have military cargo then the targeting problem becomes how to ID those vessels and target them - hard to do with recon assets of RORSAT satellites, Radar recon or a sonar contact to target a SSM with a 250 nm range. If the supplies and replacement supplies (at most 600 ships, many of the same type as carrying commercial cargo) go unescorted, along with over 5500 ships carrying economic targets, the targeting problem for the Soviet commander becomes even harder - how to identify which ships are carrying the replacement Bradleys, etc vs bauxite vs grain. All are important targets but if you are concentrating on disrupting that specific aspect of NATO shipping you have to ID which ships to hit and which to ignore. (Plus every ship a Soviet sub commander hits is likely a signal to NATO hunter-killer groups and ASW aircraft that there's a sub in the area).

A further countermeasure NATO can adopt for the replacement equipment and supplies is to spread it out among the remaining 90 percent of shipping rather than sent on dedicated ships. This is probably more efficient (how long would a large ro-ro ship have to wait in port for industry to produce enough vehicles to fill it?) and also protects that stream of supplies by not concentrating it in one ship. Coordination may be a little more difficult though. The war emergency cargo ship that the US produces (details on my site) have a limited ro-ro cabability, maybe a mech inf or tank company and a truck company's worth of vehicles, with a lot of general cargo & container space. Not that useful for deploying units overseas (although HMMWVs and a suprising amount of equipment will fit in a container for shipping), but perfect for shipping replacement and sustainment supplies.

NATO standard convoy tactics for dealing with a nuclear threat is to spread out, with at least 3 nm between ships. That's really hard to protect a formation of that size, but if the war has gone nuclear then sub contacts are easier to neutralize by dropping a nuclear depth charge in the general vicinity rather than getting a hard contact location.

Post-TDM I could easily see the supplies being cut back as you describe Kevin. Assembling enough resources to fill a ship (and it's fuel tanks and crew and supplies) would be a difficult task with the chaos in the US after the nucelar strike. For the ship to get sunk along the way would be a difficult situation for a commander to face. Sending supplies might be extremely controversial among commanders in the US - why are we sending off thousands of tons of food, fuel, vehicles & equipment when the troops guarding the ports are overwhelmed with providing relief. Professionalism and dedication to units deep in it overseas will prevail for a while, but as the situation becomes more desperate the flow of supplies slows to a trickle and eventually almost stops.

Thanks!
-Chico


chico20854





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ReHerakhte

Hey Chico,
Thanks for the level of info you're providing, maritime warfare (and transport etc.) has never been my strong point. I was not aware that there would be about 6000 ships available (but then I never went and looked for that info either because it wasn't something that I ever thought about!)

Your last post has made a number of aspects of the maritime situation much clearer. Your comment about how much equipment will fit into a shipping container reminds me of the WW2 situation were a large number of vehicles were shipped in KD (i.e. KnockDown) configuration. There were two types, partial knockdown and complete knockdown.
For partial KD, they reduced the bodywork to its smallest size but left wheels on. For complete knockdown (CKD) they removed all the wheels, doors etc. reducing the body to it's lowest possible size and even removed such items as steering wheels/columns if necessary.

It meant some assembly at the destination but you could ship two small trucks per cargo crate and something like four jeeps to a crate in partial KD form and IIRC three trucks and six jeeps in CKD configuration.
So you could have two (or more) vehicles in the same cargo space as it takes for one fully assembled vehicle and with modern shipping containers, this number could even be larger. This sort of thing is still done for some shipping today but for wartime its benefits obviously need to be weighed against the reassembly hassles at the delivery point.
One benefit found during WW2 with the knockdown kits was that localization modifications could be made at the reassembly area during the course of reassembling the vehicles.

There was a page or two on the net showing some CKD kits of jeeps and the like being delivered to North Africa I think, but I can't find the damned thing now.

Cheers,
Kevin


ReHerakhte





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Targan

I, too, have little detailed knowledge of large scale cargo shipping, but I wonder whether it would at any point become practical or desirable for Soviet maritime commanders to start attempting to capture cargo vessels rather than sinking them, especially for cargos of much sought after miltary hardware. I'm talking late in the war of course, when both sides are struggling to produce high tech, industry-heavy equipment and the Soviets are operating significant amounts of captured NATO equipment anyway. Thoughts?


Targan


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thefusilier

Yeah I have to say well done on the naval info Chico. The bit about ID'ing the ships was good info (as the rest is as well). Use up your last torpedo on a ore shipment or replacement bradleys... and how do you know.

The bit about sending supplies to Europe (post Nov 97) is also sorta along the lines of sending the corps to Yugoslavia when their is chaos at home.
__________________
The Fusilier


thefusilier


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chico20854

I've been kind of hoarding naval info for about 15 years now, never really pulling it all together in a coherent manner until recently. My house is a mess though, as the naval war project is taking over a second room and computer.

In the mid 90s I worked on sealift planning for the US Dept of Transportation. It was a great job! One of the projects I worked on was the containerization initiative. The goal was to get all the dry sustainment supplies - ammo, spares, food and general equipment - into containers and ship it commercially. We ran into a lot of detail problems - like the military preferred 20' containers (which fit on PLS system trucks, see http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/PDFDocs/1996sep_oct/artp14_96so.pdf and http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/Sep97/1997sep_oct/artp3_97so.pdf ) while industry was moving to 40' containers (so the military was worried about sufficient numbers of 20'-ers being available, and then there were issues of limited spaces aboard container ships being designed for 20', and when you're hauling explosive ammo there are all sorts of other complications!).

There was also a lot of work into deploying whole units in containers, without having to do the knockdown (which requires extra time and work at the ports). In 1995 they shipped a signal battalion from the US West Coast to Korea via container ship. The HMMWVs and trailers (most of the vehicles in a signal bn) in 40' containers, while the few larger vehicles were shipped on flatracks (containers with no side walls or roof) or lifted onto multiple flatracks placed in the hold of the container ship. It helps to make up for a limited supply of ro-ros.

Post-TDM, the Soviets have lots of incentive to capture rather than sink ships. Many of the ones carrying military cargo would be less useful than the economic cargo, as NATO-standard replacement vehicles, ammo and spares would be of some use (for captured equipment the Pact operated), but the food, raw materials etc would be more useful in a reconstruction effort.


chico20854