In Defense of MG Thomason, CG of Fort Huachuca

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Part One

Although Charles Thomason’s critics are legion, few of them seem to demonstrate more than a rudimentary understanding of the context in his he made his command decisions. Of those who claim that Thomason abrogated his duty in July, 1998 or at any point thereafter, few seem to be able to offer a well-reasoned explanation for how Thomason might have accomplished other ends, other than to claim that he had a duty. Although Thomason was by no means a brilliant wartime leader, he was capable of setting priorities and matching his planning and execution to those priorities.

Thomason’s top priority throughout his command was the defense of his cantonment. He saw the relationship between Fort Huachuca and the 111th Brigade as symbiotic: neither could exist without the other. Fort Huachuca—later the whole of SAMAD—was the basis of sustenance and support for 111th Brigade. In turn, SAMAD could not be defended without the brigade. While this symbiosis came to exist wherever military formations established cantonments, in southeastern Arizona after the start of the Second Mexican-American War the relationship took on a special closeness. The families and communities the MI troops had labored to preserve after the main nuclear exchange, the stores and food and ammunition, the new gardens and wells, the machine shops for making new weapons and ammunition—very little of it could be moved with the transport available in July, 1998. Worse, with the Mexican Army directly south of the border, any movement away from Huachuca would be made under the guns of the enemy and with the knowledge that everything left behind would fall into the enemy’s hands in short order. Thomason simply couldn’t bear to leave behind nearly a half-million American survivors, plus the food that had been intended to feed Tucson and Phoenix, the ammunition stores, and more.

Perhaps equally as important, by July the 111th Brigade was in no condition to march anywhere. Seven months of hard duty had cost the brigade more than half of its strength. Thomason’s troops were weary and demoralized. He knew that his people had given virtually their last measure of effort to hold Huachuca and Tucson against two determined attacks; asking them to pack up and move would have finished them.

The trial for the 111th Brigade began at Thanksgiving, 1997. Like many other training brigades throughout CONUS, the 111th had been practicing reorganizing itself into standard rifle companies for the purpose of providing disaster relief and security in the event the nuclear exchange caught up with the US homeland. After the bombs fell, the MI students and cadre helped organize, shelter, and care for the refugees fleeing Tucson and Phoenix. Their mission expanded into military police duties throughout southern Arizona. Refugees from Phoenix had taken control of towns throughout the area; violence was epidemic. Thomason deployed his troops in an effort to control the situation. Faced with tens of thousands of armed and desperate refugees, soldiers of the 111th died by the dozen. Dozens more committed suicide or deserted every month.

The situation began to come under control by late March. The 111th had dealt with a gang uprising in Tucson by cordoning off the area and burning it. Everywhere, municipal water supplies were brought under central control. Since the governments controlled the food and the water, the survivors began to see the wisdom of compliance. Still, the number of deaths was staggering. Worse, deaths to disease were rapidly increasing.

In April, Thomason became aware that Mexican Army activity in northern Mexico was increasing quickly. 304th MI Battalion had been monitoring radio traffic in northern Mexico since the first attacks on Mexican refugees in February. Military radio traffic indicated that units were moving north, along with supplies. In a precursor to the national movement of troops to the hot spots in the Southwest and Alaska, Thomason withdrew most of his personnel from police duties and began constructing defenses opposite the main crossing points along the border. Throughout May, as Mexican preparations picked up steam, troops from Huachuca rendered secondary roads across the border unusable insofar as this was possible.

The Mexican invasion opened on June 2, 1998. Arizona was a secondary effort. Initially, only Nogales Brigade was assigned to assault and destroy American forces at Fort Huachuca. The main effort would be made further west, passing through Yuma and into California.

By this time, the Thomason’s troops had constructed battalion strong points astride the main road north of Nogales and at Naco, near Bisbee. Further defenses had been constructed east of Bisbee to keep the Naco position from being overrun. Nogales Brigade attacked at Naco, sending its motorized elements up the main road while pushing dismounts across the border west of Naco to cut Highway 92 and delay the movement of reinforcements to Naco. The main effort at Naco foundered in the face of determined opposition. The blocking effort managed to stop American reinforcements, which were moving along Highway 92. However, the reinforcing troops launched a spirited, if clumsy, counterattack that pushed the Mexicans back across the border. By nightfall, the Mexicans pulled back from Naco.

During the night, Nogales Brigade shifted westward and renewed its attack through Nogales. Here again, Mexican forces were held up by dug-in defenders. Dismounts were capable of bypassing the American defensive position, but the Americans controlled the high ground and the roads north and northeast along which Mexican traffic would have to move. Again, Mexican infantry ambushed American reinforcements moving towards Nogales. Again, the Americans fought their way through the ambush and pushed the enemy back across the border in heavy fighting.

Virtually everywhere else along the border, the Mexicans appeared to have taken the Americans by surprise. In San Diego, advancing Mexican forces were only stopped at the outskirts of US Navy facilities. Further inland, Mexican forces crushed American militia in the Imperial Valley within hours of crossing the border. At Yuma, the remaining Marines at Yuma MCAS offered spirited resistance but were overwhelmed by superior numbers and firepower within three days. In Texas, only Fort Bliss held out against the initial assault. Further east, Mexican forces crossed the border virtually at will and drove north.

In southeastern Arizona, Nogales Brigade pulled back to recoup. In order to keep up the pressure on the Americans at Fort Huachuca, the commander of Nogales Brigade sent company-sized elements of dismounts across the border to harass the Americans, set mines and booby traps, and conduct ambushes. Moving at night, the Mexican infantry conducted a number of successful infiltrations despite the presence of American listening posts along the border between Nogales and Naco. One Mexican platoon actually managed to cross the Huachuca Mountains and, with a medium mortar, shell the headquarters of Fort Huachuca from a nearby north-facing slope.

For the next week, American infantry patrols combed the US side of the border, occasionally flushing Mexican troops out of their patrol bases in daylight. The Americans also ran afoul of booby traps and mines laid by the Mexicans. Several more Americans died, and more than a dozen were wounded.


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Part Two

On 10 June, the CG of Fort Huachuca received new orders. The 111th MI Brigade was to attack and take Yuma, which had fallen to Second Mexican Army less than a week before. 6th US Army anticipated that this threat to the Mexican lines of communication into California would blunt the Mexican drive up the coast and into the Central Valley, giving other US forces time to redeploy to meet the threat. Thomason requested authorization to take AZSTAG 3rd Brigade, then operating in Tucson and Cochise County, under command while the 111th struck west. The Joint Chiefs contacted Governor Symington in Phoenix with the firm request that the two battalions of 3rd Brigade be placed at Huachuca’s disposal to secure Arizona against the threat from the south. Despite the growing unrest in Phoenix, Symington authorized “temporary deputization” of the troops of 3rd Brigade.

The AZSTAG troops replaced the troops of the 111th Brigade at the strong points overlooking Nogales, Naco, and Douglas. The State Guard commander noted with anxiety that he was replacing the 111th battalions with formations half their size and with a fraction of the firepower. Pickets were established along the border in an effort to control infiltration.

The 111th Brigade moved west along Interstate 8 to Yuma two days later. They were met east of the city by a small number of Marines who had withdrawn to the hills overlooking Yuma after being pushed out of the city. The Marines reported that most of the Mexican units had crossed the Colorado River and moved into California. Only a small garrison remained. The lead elements of the 111th promptly assaulted Yuma, led by Marines familiar with the territory. Inspired by the heroics of a handful of junior officers and NCOs (many of whom became casualties), the 111th recaptured Yuma and the Marine Corps Air Station in a two-day fight. The presence of a number of Ridgway light tanks proved decisive.

Further east, the departure of the 111th Brigade had not gone unnoticed. Hermosillo Brigade, which was initially assigned as a follow-on formation for Second Mexican Army, was instead sent to Nogales to support Nogales Brigade in a renewed offensive against Fort Huachuca and Tucson. In California, Second Armored Cavalry Regiment and Ensenada Brigade were turned around to secure the rear area. Having concluded that 111th Brigade offered a genuine threat to his lines of communication, CINC Second Mexican Army moved what he judged to be sufficient forces into place to overwhelm the 111th and capture Fort Huachuca and Yuma in a timely fashion.

Once the 111th Brigade had consolidated its position at Yuma, the commander, a full colonel named Williams, decided to push a raiding party along the Colorado River to San Luis Colorado to blow the highway bridges there. The delay while the 111th reorganized itself in Yuma was critical. Motorized troops of Ensenada Brigade quickly arrived from California to reinforce the small garrison. Williams’ attack ran into a hasty Mexican defense three miles north of the target. While the 111th Brigade probed for a bypass for a flanking attack, Second Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived on the right bank of the Colorado opposite Yuma. On the advice of his chief engineer, a veteran from Europe who had lost an arm in combat, Williams had arranged for the Yuma bridges to be rigged for demolition. With the appearance of the Mexican armor on the California side of the river, Williams dropped the Colorado River spans.

While 111th Brigade was fighting at Yuma, Hermosillo and Nogales Brigades launched a renewed offensive west of Fort Huachuca. Now possessed of decisive fire superiority, the Mexican forces launched a two-pronged infantry assault on the American strong point north of Nogales. 105mm howitzers pounded the understrength troops of 3rd AZSTAG Brigade, who could not reply with their medium mortars. The infantry assault carried the strong point in twelve hours.

Even before the dismount attack was complete, Mexican engineers breached the American obstacles along Interstate 19 west of the main defensive position. Motorized units of Hermosillo Brigade rolled north. Their objective was to cut Interstate 10 west of Tucson, which would cut the lifeline between Huachuca and the 111th. Once the American strong point had been mopped up, Nogales Brigade pushed up Highway 82 to launch a holding attack against the remaining American forces at Fort Huachuca. Once 111th Brigade was either defeated outright or withered on the vine at Yuma, Hermosillo Brigade and Nogales Brigade would concentrate on Fort Huachuca and end the threat to the right flank of Second Mexican Army.

Once the attack at Nogales began, Williams realized immediately what the Mexicans were attempting. His Operations Officer (S-3), who was a veteran of the fighting in the Gulf, recommended immediate withdrawal and quickly formulated a plan to bloody the nose of Ensenada Brigade to keep them from pursuing 111th Brigade down Interstate 8 as the American forces withdrew to Tucson. Williams agreed.

In an effort to coordinate with the attacks at Nogales, Ensenada Brigade launched its own drive towards Yuma. The Americans fell back in apparent disorder. Mexican scouts reported that supporting units were already east out of Yuma. Under pressure from CINC Second Mexican Army to finish the job quickly, the commander of Ensenada Brigade pushed his forward battalion forward against the better judgment of the battalion commander. The first echelon of the battalion drove into a hastily-created fire sack near the ruins of Yuma MCAS. The Americans blocked the follow-on forces briefly with judicious placement of demolitions and 105mm fire. Inside the fire sack, the Mexicans were treated to all of the anti-armor fire the former MI troops could give. Those who did not surrender or escape on foot were wiped out in less than fifteen minutes.

Here the American decision to transport their few Ridgway light tanks on flatbed trucks paid an expected dividend. Though under pressure from the remainder of Ensenada Brigade, the Americans nevertheless doggedly loaded a number of the least-damaged Lynx armored cars and VAB armored personnel carriers onto flatbed trucks or towed them behind standard tow trucks. It was a major coup.

Once clear of the city, Williams allowed his S-3 to organize a rear guard of Ridgways and infantry in APC. The initial pursuit by Ensenada Brigade ran into the rear guard on upward-sloping ground east of the Yuma city limits, where the superior range of the platoon of Ridgways proved decisive. The American rear guard was defending at a draw where Interstate 8 passed through a line of small, sharp hills east of the city. After losing several AFV, the Mexicans withdrew. Once darkness fell, they moved infantry forward, using the terrain to cover their movements so they could launch a flanking attack on the Americans. By the time the infantry arrived, the Americans had withdrawn.


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Part Three

The rest of the brigade, in the meantime, rolled east during daylight hours. Hermosillo Brigade had pushed north a reinforced company to hold the junction of I-8 and I-10 at Casa Grande, fifty miles northwest of Tucson. The advanced elements of 111th Brigade, forewarned that the Mexican Army was in Casa Grande, made contact with the Mexicans in the early afternoon. The Mexican company, faced with overwhelming force, attempted to withdraw. However, in a move that was to set the pattern for the rest of the larger battle, a small detachment of motorcycle scouts (led, perhaps not coincidentally, by a 10th Mountain Division veteran who had been badly wounded in Norway and who had spent several months recuperating at a hospital in Sierra Vista) with LAWs and claymore mines, had already bypassed Casa Grande by riding through dusty, abandoned agricultural land to set up an anti-armor ambush alongside I-10 in Arizona City. When the Mexican rifle company rolled down the highway in its mix of VAB and trucks, the motorcycle scouts initiated a deadly ambush. Undamaged vehicles simply rolled through the ambush, since the scouts had not been able to block the road in the available time and with the available resources. Nevertheless, the ambush claimed one VAB, two trucks, and number of dead and injured among the trucks that continued to move. It was a heartening victory.

By early evening, the 111th had made contact with a battalion-strong blocking position of Hermosillo Brigade at Casa Adobes on the northwest edge of metropolitan Tucson. The Mexicans had selected good firing positions to cover the road, which was blocked by rubble and damaged cars, and to defend the roadblock all around. The Americans were forewarned by friendly civilians and did not drive into the Mexican fields of fire.

At this point, the Mexicans might have dealt the 111th a decisive defeat, but Mexican strength was divided. Hermosillo Brigadewas operating according to plan: one battalion had established a strong blocking position at the western end of the I-10 path through Tucson in order to keep American logistical support from reaching the 111th or units sliced from the 111th from reaching Tucson (especially Davis-Monthan AFB) or Fort Huachuca. Two batttalions assigned to assault and destroy the Americans at Davis-Monthan AFB, where the personnel of 355th Wing had been joined by a number of reservists and police in establishing a logistical and operations base for managing and defending Tucson. Most of the armor was deployed against Davis-Monthan.

Further south, Nogales Brigade had been deployed against Fort Huachuca. The post’s principal defenders were absent, but the post was not without the means of defending itself. Since January, work crews had been constructing a thin network of fortified firing positions. Open ground on the north and east sides of post was broken with anti-tank ditches and long lines of wire. The few mines that were available had been placed to canalize movement near the main access roads. Minor (unpaved) roads crossing the defensive perimeter of the post had been cut in most locations. Aware of the basic defensive plan of the post, the commander of Nogales Brigade chose to move up Highway 82, then south along Highway 83 to strike at the west gate of the post. He had brought bulldozers to clear a lane through the obstacles with the intent of covering the bulldozers with fire from artillery, mortars, and direct fire. The attackers reached the west gate without incident, but they had been observed moving along their march route. Waiting for them at the west gate was a scratch team of Military Police, signal troops, and State Guardsmen.

The Mexicans initiated a good attack, covered by bombardment from their 105mm howitzers, light mortars, and machine gun fire. The Americans had no artillery available, having sent their own 105mm guns and all of their mortars with 111th Brigade. However, the MPs had available a handful of Mk-19 automatic grenade launchers mounted on Hum-Vee carriers. The MPs sited these on reverse slopes behind and to either side of the west gate. They lacked the range to attack the Mexican guns, but with forward observer support they could bring down indirect fire on the Mexican obstacle breaching operation. This the MPs did, quickly disabling most of the Mexican bulldozers and their crews.

The Mexican artillery chief, correctly assessing the nature of the MP-led defense, attempted to suppress the American grenade launchers by directing fire against the most likely enemy firing positions. The Americans responded by shifting positions in staggered rotation. Mexican fire knocked out two of the three MP gun trucks, but they were unable to completely suppress the American defensive indirect fire.

In an attempt to stick to the original plan, the Mexicans made a large-scale dismounted engineer attack against the west gate. The engineer attack bogged down with heavy losses just short of its objective. Despite considerable losses to Mexican artillery fire, American riflemen covering the gate obstacle from positions along ridges to either side held their ground and compelled the surviving Mexican engineers to withdraw.

Changing tactics, the Mexican commander ordered dismounted attacks to flank the west gate to either side. Open xeriphytic forest, characterized by moderately-spaced mesquite trees and tall grass, covered both slopes of the ridgeline through which the west gate road cut. A number of shallow draws promised cover. The attacks went in, each with a company in the lead and the remainder of their battalions in follow-on. On the American left, the dismount attack stalled when it ran into American pickets set out to guard against just such a possibility. The draws here were blocked with concertina wire, which forced the attackers to move onto the spurs leading up to the ridge. State Guardsmen with high-powered hunting rifles and well-chosen positions forced the Mexican infantry back down into the draws and pinned them there. On their other flank, though, the Mexicans found a gap in the defenders’ observation, pierced a flimsy barbed wire fence, crossed the ridgeline, and swung south to roll up the American flank. The Americans withdrew in some disorder, having taken heavy casualties.

Thomason’s deputy, BG Smith, took command of the defensive operation. By this time, it was obvious that virtually the entire combat strength of Nogales Brigade had been committed to the attack at the west gate. Smith led a small task force of reinforcements, including troops from 304th MI Battalion, USAR truck drivers, AZ ARNG engineers, headquarters troops, and civilian volunteers, to establish a new defensive position closer to post. No sooner had they arrived, dripping with sweat under the setting sun, and started to dig in than they heard the ugly sound of machine gun fire from the road to the west. Having broken through the last of the barrier at the west gate, the Mexicans pushed several VAB and Lynx through. They caught a number of fleeing Americans on the road and machine-gunned them. Most of the rest scattered.

The Mexican armor pushed rapidly towards post. At the new defensive position, within artillery range of the main post, the Mexicans were halted by a hastily-emplaced road block. Inside the post perimeter, however, there were numerous bypasses available. Throughout the southern part of the post, where the north slope of the Huachucas rose above valley, every large spur had an unpaved road leading towards the top of the range. Many of these roads were connected at some point—some near the base of the spurs, others near the top or at saddles. Even more accessible were unpaved roads cutting through the arroyos leading off the base of the mountains. The Mexican armor turned off the main road and rolled along an unimproved dirt road leading to Libby Army Airfield, which was located on the north side of the main post.

The Mexican AFV, numbering about a dozen Lynxes and VAB, rolled unchallenged onto the airfield. They felt so confident of victory at this point that they declined to destroy facilities and vehicles (including aircraft) they felt they might be able to use later. Instead, leaving a mixed platoon of Lynxes and VAB to secure the field, the remainder of the Mexican armor set off through the main post to take from the rear the new American position along the western approach to post. Once the rest of the brigade’s infantry arrived at the blocking position, Nogales Brigade could finish the fight and take the rest of the post in an orderly fashion.



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Author's Note

As I re-read this first relatively complete draft of the Battle of Southern Arizona, I can see things that looked good in the notes and sketches but which don't work. I'm going to remove capturing damaged vehicles during the fight with Ensenada Brigade in Yuma--it just doesn't play out. I'm going to have to name people and organizations earlier, I think. There are some other changes I'll make next time around, too. I need to give more consideration to aircraft. Though I doubt I'll include any fighter-bomber missions by either side (AZ is a secondary front, after all), light observation aircraft might not be out of place.

The bad news is that you gentlemen must endure a rough-hewn product. The good news is that constructive feedback is particularly welcome at this stage. Observations about tactics, organizations, and conflicts with canon have a good chance of being incorporated into the next draft.

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Part Four

In Tucson, the Mexicans developed their attack on Davis-Monthan during the early afternoon. Hermosillo Cavalry, which had swapped some of its AFV for infantry from 1st Hermosillo Infantry at the position in Casa Adobes, and 2nd Hermosillo Infantry initially attempted to bull through the southern gate of Davis-Monthan. This failed because the USAF SF had constructed concrete serpentines, earthen bulwarks, and machine gun positions around the openings to post. The entire perimeter was protected by a rough wall of rubble which was effectively impassible to vehicles, although infantry could cross the wall. The Mexicans blasted the machine gun towers with fire from the 90mm main guns of their Lynxes, then attempted to send engineers forward to reduce the concrete barriers of the serpentine. Brave airmen and police officers huddled within the serpentine discouraged the Mexican sappers with grenades. The Mexicans decided instead to blast a hole in the serpentine, expending many 90mm rounds to do so. However, the defending airmen covered the resulting gap with small arms fire. When the Mexicans attempted to push a Lynx through to cover the infantry, the defenders of 355th Wing revealed that they had emplaced an immobile V-150 with a 20mm gun to cover the gate. When the Lynx moved through the open end of the serpentine, the American airmen knocked it out, blocking the serpentine again.

Frustrated, the commander of Hermosillo Brigade decided to attack over the wall where the base housing came closest to the wall in the northeast corner of the base. There he could use his superior numbers of infantry to best effect. After systematically knocking out machine gun positions along the northeastern lengths of the wall with fire from his Lynxes (the Americans wisely abandoned their exposed positions), the Mexican commander unleashed his dismounted attack. As expected, the Americans conducted a reverse slope defense from inside the perimeter. The Mexicans attempted to suppress the defense by shelling the houses nearest the wall, killing or injuring many of the defenders. After suffering some losses, 1st Hermosillo Infantry established a foothold inside the base housing area. They planned to move towards the nearest gate, seize it, and bring in their AFV.

The defenders had two working light AFV and a handful of Hum-Vee gun trucks. They knew it was critical to keep the Mexican armor outside the walls.

As evening began to descend into twilight, 111th Brigade attacked 2nd Hermosillo Infantry at Casa Adobes. The defenders had chosen a good position north of the dense housing belt. Two small, sharp hills on the south side of the highway ran north-south and came within a kilometer of the highway. The hills would be impassable to vehicles. The area between the northernmost spur and the highway was open, having been agricultural land before the war. North, northwest, and northeast of the position was more open ground—either untilled desert or pre-war agricultural land. The ground was also open for a kilometer to the south and for several kilometers to the east. Bypasses were possible; it was, after all, basically urban area. However, the highway was the most convenient way of moving the heavy military trucks and civilian commercial trucks that were hauling so much of the materiel belonging to 111th Brigade. COL Williams decided the position had to be cleared and cleared quickly. Ensenada Brigade might pick up the pursuit from the west at any time.

The 111th launched a hammer-and-anvil assault. 309th Battalion, in soft-skinned trucks but with a handful of APCs for fire support, moved through a housing development west of the Mexican position. Braving mortar fire from the north hill, the 309th drove up a single road splitting the two hills (called West Twin Peaks Road) and assaulted a Mexican platoon guarding the road virtually on the run. Although casualties were heavy, the 309th took the position in short order and drove through. Once on the east side of the hills, 309th was in a housing development that approached the main Mexican position from the south.

While 309th was moving, 326th Battalion moved into another housing development a kilometer west of the main Mexican position. 305th Battalion remained mounted in reserve. The remaining operational Ridgway light tanks were moved into position to support the 326th.

Once 326th and 309th were in position and about to cross the open ground around the Mexican position, Williams opened up with his artillery. Here the Americans enjoyed fire superiority, for the Mexican commander had declined to parcel out his guns. Indirect fire was critical for keeping the heads of the Mexican defenders down. Timely and reasonably accurate American mortar fire helped the Americans close in the gathering gloom for a close-in assault on the Mexican position. As the defending Lynxes revealed their positions by firing on the advancing American infantry, the American Ridgways knocked them out one by one. Williams threw 305th in behind 326th once the initial assault reached the outermost Mexican fighting positions. As night fell, a nearly full moon illuminated the Americans as they reached and overwhelmed the Mexican defenders. Large numbers surrendered, and more than a handful managed to escape.

In the deepening shadows at Davis-Monthan, Mexican infantry pressed forward towards the northernmost gate. Determined fire by the defenders prevented the Mexican infantry from moving quickly along the interior of the defensive wall. Instead, the Mexicans worked their way through the housing development in close-quarters combat. Losses on both sides mounted rapidly. The Mexicans were not shy about calling in mortar or howitzer fire to help blast a path, and by 2200 hours they had reached the gate and had killed or captured its defenders.

At Fort Huachuca, the Mexican armor rolled through the western part of the main post, machine-gunning targets of opportunity. They turned up the main road to the western gate to take Smith’s task force in rear. By the time they arrived, however, they discovered that Smith’s people had been forewarned. A near miss from a LAW convinced the Mexicans that a mounted charge into the American position would not bear fruit. As darkness descended, the Mexican infantry in VAB dismounted and established firing positions behind the Americans. They were too few to assault the Americans directly, but they could act as anvil when the rest of the brigade’s infantry came up to hammer the Americans from the west. The armored vehicles, lacking night vision, set up a bonnegruppa to cover potential withdrawal routes with machine gun fire.

The main infantry attack of Nogales Brigade was running behind schedule, however. Although the Americans at the west gate had suffered significant losses and had been scattered by the advancing Mexican armor, handfuls had stopped evading and had taken up firing positions along the side of the road. As the main body of 2nd Nogales Infantry advanced down the road, they came under fire from riflemen among the mesquite and tall grass on either side of the road. Detachments split off to eliminate or pursue the Americans, but the march was slowed considerably thereby. Two brave State Guardsmen held up the advance for nearly an hour with highly accurate fire with bolt action rifles from a position atop a spur on the south side of the road. They continued fighting despite the efforts of the Mexicans to put them out of action with fire from mortars. Darkness put an end to their action and allowed the Mexicans to advance once again. By this time, 1st Nogales Infantry, which had been mopping up around the west gate, had closed up with 2nd Nogales Infantry. 2nd Nogales Infantry detached a company of rifles as its sister battalion passed through to continue the attack.

In Casa Adobes, Williams whipped his troops back into their trucks and APCs. He left support troops and a company of riflemen to sort through the EPW. The main body of the weary brigade raced through Tucson to relieve Davis-Monthan. Although most of the combat power of the force in Tucson had been at Davis-Monthan when the battle began, a number of police and airmen were scattered throughout the city on various security duties. A number arrived in the vicinity of Davis-Monthan after the fight began. Notably, a handful of police snipers took up positions in nearby buildings and made themselves a decided nuisance while there was enough light for long-range rifle fire. Others made contact with the 111th and provided intelligence regarding the disposition of the main body of Hermosillo Brigade, including the direction of the main attack, size of the units involved, and the location of the brigade headquarters, support troops, and artillery.

At the same time, the commander of Hermosillo Brigade was aware that 2nd Hermosillo Infantry had been defeated in a surprisingly short battle. He could only conclude that 111th Brigade was would move to relieve Davis-Monthan AFB shortly. He decided that the best course of action was to capture the walled complex as quickly as possible, then move his own headquarters, artillery, and support units inside. Once Nogales Brigade mopped up Fort Huachuca, troops could be dispatched north to assist in Tucson. Provided Mexican forces in Tucson could achieve at least a stalemate while holding Davis-Monthan and Huachuca, Ensenada Brigade could be brought east from Yuma to crush the 111th once and for all. At the very least, with Mexican forces in possession of the food, fuel, and ammunition stores at Huachuca and Davis-Monthan, the 111th would be unable to continue the fight for long.

This last fact concerned Williams deeply. His brigade had carried enough ammunition for three days of intensive operations. He was now nearing the end of the second day. Already, some of the infantry had fired twice their basic load. Mortar, howitzer, and machine gun rounds were running out. He was going to have to strike hard and strike fast.

Fortune favored the Americans. Several key elements were moving in the vicinity of Davis-Monthan at the same time. 1st Hermosillo Infantry had seized the gate and serpentine at East Golf Links Road in the northeast quadrant of the Davis-Monthan walled complex. The battalion also had been able to set up machine gun positions to isolate the remaining American defenders in the northeastern housing complex. Although there were still defenders inside the base, including a platoon of gun trucks, the Mexicans had taken the upper hand. With the northeast gate in their possession, the Mexicans began moving the AFV of Hermosillo Cavalry into the complex. Once inside, they could easily dominate the open spaces inside the walls and systematically eliminate the American defenders. Their first job would be to cross to the southern gate and let the headquarters, support units, and artillery in. Once Hermosillo Cavalry reported that they were inside the complex, the commander of Hermosillo Brigade began moving towards the south gate.

Much faster than had been anticipated, though, the lead elements of 111th Brigade appeared on Interstate 10 virtually overlooking the command and support elements of Hermosillo Brigade. Brushing aside Mexican pickets, two platoons of Ridgway tanks rapidly formed a firing line along the right shoulder of the highway and opened up on the Mexicans below them. Truck-mounted infantry descended the offramp and, covered by fire from the tanks, rolled practically into the teeth of the enemy before dismounting. The Mexicans disintegrated. Some, including the commander and most of his staff, managed to survive the initial onslaught, find alternate transport, and drive away. Others escaped on foot. However, the Americans took a considerable bag of prisoners and hardware, including the intact howitzers of the brigade.

Command and control of Hermosillo Brigade was lost within the first minute. Although the commander survived, he lost contact with Hermosillo Cavalry and 1st Hermosillo Infantry. Aware that something was happening outside the walled complex, both Mexican battalion commanders ordered a temporary pause so they could assess. It soon became apparent that the two battalions were on their own. The cavalry commander ordered a general retreat. Hermosillo Cavalry hurriedly filed out through the northeast gate, while 1st Hermosillo Infantry withdrew they way they had entered the complex and linked up with their motor transport in a neighborhood just to the east of the air base.

Williams knew that the withdrawing Mexicans would have to cross the line of Interstate 10 somewhere. He guessed correctly that they would make for Interstate 19, which would provide them with the quickest route south. They were unlikely to try to move west through Tucson to I-19, given that the 111th had come from that direction and might have secured all of the onramps. Williams decided that the Mexican commander would head east to a major north-south expressway, turn south and cross I-10 east of the city limits, then head west across the southern edge of metropolitan Tucson to I-19. This was exactly what the commander of Hermosillo Cavalry did.

In the event, 309th Battalion did not arrive at S Houghton Road in time to block the egress of the remainder of Hermosillo Brigade. The Mexicans had arrived at the overpass first and had positioned Lynxes at either end of the overpass. These took the approaching trucks of 309th Battalion under fire, forcing the infantry to dismount as their trucks attempted to back out of the killing zone. Williams promptly brought his artillery into play, causing considerable losses among the infantry and their soft-skinned transport.

Drawing on his last strength, Williams sent a small force of infantry, backed by a platoon of light tanks, south to block East Suharita Road, which would lead the Mexicans west and back to Interstate 19. Instead of going this way, the Mexicans turned east on East Suharita and took Highway 83 south to Sonoita.

At Fort Huachuca, General Thomason personally led a last-ditch effort to defend the post. Almost every remaining man or woman in uniform, along with several hundred civilians, assembled to attack the Mexicans who had set up firing positions behind General Smith’s force. Thomason’s force was armed with Molotov cocktails, handguns, and the desperation of people who had nowhere to run. Covered by darkness, Thomason’s mob made contact with the security element of the Mexican armor at almost exactly the same moment that 1st Nogales Infantry attacked Smith’s force from the west. The battle was chaotic. Thomason’s civilians charged in to heave their Molotovs and attack the Mexican infantry with the zeal of fanatics. The Mexicans shot them down by the dozen, and yet still they came on. Although the Molotovs destroyed very few of the Mexican AFV, the burning mixture suffocated the engines of the armored vehicles and tended to panic the crews. The dismounted infantry were gradually cut apart by close-range fusillades from revolvers and pistols. One by one, the surviving Mexican AFV began to bolt—if they could get their engines to start. Those who were stranded began to surrender.

Less than 500 meters to the west, the commander of Nogales Brigade concluded that his chance to capture Fort Huachuca was gone. His brigade had fought hard and endured heavy casualties since the start of the war. It was time to save the rest of his men and equipment before 111th Brigade cut off his avenue of escape. 1st and 2nd Nogales Infantry broke contact and conducted a forced march back to their motor transport near the west gate. They mounted up, drove to Sonoita to link up with Hermosillo Brigade, and crossed the Mexican-American border at Nogales.

A handful of AFV from Nogales Cavalry had survived the nighttime attack by driving away. These troops managed to link up. Rather than attempt to flee through the west gate, the crews boldly (and desperately) drove across Fort Huachuca, captured Buffalo Soldier Gate on the east side of post just long enough to drive through it, and raced down Highway 92 towards the border. Rather than attempt to cross at Naco or further east, the crews opted to attempt to drive cross-country, making use of some of the dirt roads the Americans had not yet destroyed south of Highway 92. At one point, the small convoy was obliged to enter an arroyo and move along it in single file. The lead APC broke an axle, blocking the arroyo. The Mexican troops were still trying to move the damaged vehicle when the Americans found them.

Webstral

[cavtroop]

Raw or not, this stuff is awesome. I had two browsers open while reading this - one open here so I could read it, and one open to Google Maps, so I could follow along on the map. Great stuff!

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Part Four
The 111th launched a hammer-and-anvil assault. 309th Battalion, in soft-skinned trucks but with a handful of APCs for fire support, moved through a housing development west of the Mexican position. Braving mortar fire from the north hill, the 309th drove up a single road splitting the two hills (called West Twin Peaks Road) and assaulted a Mexican platoon guarding the road virtually on the run.

Trippy, man! I frequently drive Twin Peaks road on my way from work to pick up my son from his school. It's weird/cool to think of the place I live as a battleground.