Conscript Armies

[Mohoender]

I don't recall that we ever discussed this except for US. Then, most US members saw draft (extended one at least) as almost impossible under the condition of T2K. I don't doubt what they say and I'm sure they are right.

However, things would be entirely different for European armies fighting in the twilight war as most were using conscription (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Austria still rely on it).

For UK, I don't remember and let our well active UK members do the talking. I'll do the same for people from the Norsern countries.

For several more countries I don't know (or I'm not very accurate) and I would like to see your insight (Many among us might know) before I try to find out.

Then, I have more than a clue for at least three countries: France, Belgium and Portugal.

Portugal had military service until the mid-1990's but several portuguese could avoid it (paying someone to replace them). A well educated portuguese man in his 20's and 30's would have had a good chance to have avoided military training. However, many portuguese in their mid-30's and 40's would add active military training as many among them had fought in Colonial wars up to 1975.

France and Belgium also had military training up to the mid-1990's: 1996 for France (with an official end of conscription in 2001) and slightly earlier for Belgium. Both countries had similar systems and, therefore, you'll find similar skills within their population. Military service was to be done between 18 and 25. It certainly concerned 2/3 of the population.

Young people (18-30) would have gone through more limited training (generally 10 month) and would know more of the basics (learn driving, to use an assault rifle and grenades). Then, several among them would have chosen long term service (10-15%). Those would have received full training in two ways: two terms of full military training or one term of training and one term of active duty (in UN mission, or in petty wars abroad). Those who had undergone long term service would have had two experiences: 1 term in home service and 1 abraod (French Dom-Tom or Brazil).

Older people (30-40) would have received better training (12 month) and would now more. However, they would have had forgotten part of it. Among them, several would have chosen long term military service as well.

Then the oldest people drafted (40+) would now even more as they would have undergone at least 16 month of military service that were much more pushy.

In addition, several people would have done officer training (also long term) and these guys were pretty good, serving in the reserve.

A consequences of this, is that most men in Europe are not simple civilians as described in the game. Most went through some kind of military training and many had fighting experiences. Of course, they would not be as good as professional soliders but they were far from being wild turkeys. In addition (at least in the West), you find a fair amount of weapons in the various villages.

I know we can go much deeper into this but I have not enough time at the moment. Give us your opinion.:)

[TiggerCCW UK]

The current British Army is a volunteer army, but during the second world war there was widespread conscription, although not in Northern Ireland. National service continued 1960 iirc. I can see a draft coming in again, and I seem to remember the UK survivors guide mentioning it, both on the mainland and in Northern Ireland, although (again iirc) I think the recruitment in Northern Ireland was purely for local service.

[headquarters]

Although the numbers dwindle every year due to budget cuts, we still conscript thousands to serve in all arms -and have done so since the 1820s in the modern sense of the word.

Typically men get the call up at 19 and serve 12 months or 6 months with regular call ups for reservist training .

Also we have a largish national guard that is more and more volunteers .

In the heyday of the late 70s and early 80s combined numbers of all arms was app 180 000 personell counting everything from cooks to commandos.Service length has varied with political climate and at one time it was 18 months army and 24 months in the navy .( Between the world wars it was as low as 3 months )

It dropped of since then and today it numbers around 50 000 national guard and around 10 000 regular army/navy/airforce.

I would say the typical training is fair in quality and that conscripts are fairly motivated -many units will only take conscripts that actually volunteer for their service to be in that unit .

That being said we are in no way a very fierce people ...but on our home turf I guess we would fight more tenaciously .

Today our whole military has been scaled down from the cold war doctrines of large pitched battles to the modern assymetrical warfare and " operations " style army .(Meaning that it does more policing actions and enforcing sovereignity issues than train for an actual large scale war )

[Fusilier]

I would say the typical training is fair in quality and that conscripts are fairly motivated...

IMO a conscript army doesn't always imply low morale and a substandard level of training. While that may be common, its not always the case. The British for example still had conscription during the Korea and Malayan campaigns in the 50s - where conscripts have been noted to have performed very well.

[Canadian Army]

Canada has had Conscription only once; during World War II, and then it limited to homeland defence; at first, but, then expanded it overseas service. I recently finished article about Canadian Conscription in Twilight 2000; I will post it after this weekend.

[Marc]

The Spanish Army is today full professional army, since 2001, I think. When I left the Batallón de Instruccion Paracaidista (Basic Parachute/Legion training) and joined the Parachute Brigade in December 1998, the last conscripts were still serving in the Spanish Army. They were only performing basic tasks (kitchen service, cleaning, administrative tasks) releasing the professional soldiers from these works. These conscripts of the last years before the transition to a professional army, were probably the worst trained soldiers in the history of the Spanish Army. Not only they were unable to avoid the conscription (an easy thing if you had a job or if you were studying), but the army has reserved for them all the non-military duties once they finished the basic training.

Of course things didn't work in that way when the Spanish Army was based in conscription. Then all the units were integrated for conscript soldiers an they assume any the available roles (below NCO rank). The best and hardest units, like the Spanish Legion,the Parachute Brigade, and the COE (Special Forces), were formed by volunteer conscripts. It was usual that, in the first days of his military service, the conscript received in his assigned unit,the visit of a delegation from the Legion, the COE and the Paras, each of them trying to recruit him.

[Mohoender]

I'm already seeing some interesting things people. Thanks and keep it coming, interesting peaces of information.:) I agree that conscript armies are often performing very well and that is exactly my point, especially if you follow the v1.0 timeline (even if you follow the v2.2). IMO, most soldiers in Europe (outside the few professional armies: Canada, UK, US) will have civilian background with a time of military instruction taking place at some point in their personnal history. Several will have gone back to their civilian life before being drafted for the war while the most dedicated ones will be skilled professionnals who are following civilian carreers sometime and at the same time.

Back in the mid-80's my computer teacher was a staff sergeant in one of the french parachutist regiment. When he was not teaching us, he had been stationned in Chad and in Beyrouth.

Tigger, if I understand you well, the British army during the cold war was already a professional one?

Marc, from what I read from you, it seems that Spain followed exactly the same path than France.

[Targan]

The last time the Australian military had conscription was during the Vietnam War, but its been volunteer-only since then. Australian conscripts have done very well in war though. IIRC most of the Australian soldiers that fought in the Battle of Long Tan were conscripts and that battle resulted in one company of Australian infantry (with artillery support) defeating a Viet Cong regiment plus elements of an NVA battalion. The Australians lost 18 dead and the Vietnamese lost at least 245 dead, probably more. A very good kill ratio IMO.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Long_Tan

[pmulcahy11b]

I'm kind of mixed on this. The US has used the draft for much of its modern history -- most of the Greatest Generation were draftees.

But when I was in the Army, the general consensus among us was that we didn't want to be fighting alongside draftees. We didn't want someone backing us up who hadn't paid proper attention to his training because he had no wish to be there. We felt they were more likely to panic due to that lesser attention to detail. We generally felt that modern draftees, with the difference in work ethic and national spirit felt in our day, might even be dangerous to have around.

Hell, you have a hard enough time with troops who join the Army and then find out that they really aren't cut out for it.

[pmulcahy11b]

The last time the Australian military had conscription was during the Vietnam War, but its been volunteer-only since then. Australian conscripts have done very well in war though. IIRC most of the Australian soldiers that fought in the Battle of Long Tan were conscripts and that battle resulted in one company of Australian infantry (with artillery support) defeating a Viet Cong regiment plus elements of an NVA battalion. The Australians lost 18 dead and the Vietnamese lost at least 245 dead, probably more. A very good kill ratio IMO.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Long_Tan

My stepmonster told me of a time that his unit was ordered in to back up and clean up after an attack on a Viet Cong village by ROK Rangers. Turned out that the US Marines weren't necessary -- there wasn't anything left to clean up. Even the Marines were astounded at the devastation.

[TiggerCCW UK]

Tigger, if I understand you well, the British army during the cold war was already a professional one?


Yeah, national service/conscription ended in the British army in 1960 (I think, certainly not much later than that).

[Legbreaker]

Conscripts can be some of the most effective troops also. In some instances, they've not received enough training to know a hopeless situation when they see on so keep on fighting. Later, after the dust settles, they're still sitting in place, the enemy dead piled up all around them....

Japan's advance over the Kokoda track in Papua New Ginea in 1942 was met in the intial weeks by only an extremely poorly trained militia battalion. Facing them were over 10,000 of Japan's soldiers.

In WWII the Australian militia weren't even supposed to be outside Australia - New Guinea however was at the time under Australian administration, so the rules were bent and the division was sent. Initially they were used solely for construction works and not given any time for training. After reports of Japanese landings on the northern coastline however, they were the only unit in position to do anything about them.

If they'd not held, it's almost certain Port Moresby would have fallen, and a fair bet Australia would have suffered invasion.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/39th_Battalion_(Australia)#Kokoda_Track

While not exactly factual, this movie is definately worth watching. It's a fairly accurate depiction of just how bad the conditions were (although the actual duration of the fighting withdrawal across the mountains was MUCH longer and tougher).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokoda_(film)

[Adm.Lee]

I can't recall it being mentioned, but I'd always assumed the US would have resurrected Selective Service in 1996 or 1997. After all, it was kept around through the 1980s and 1990s for "the big one," and I think a conventional war with the Soviet Union sure counted for that.

For the British, I'd think the same would be in order.

I agree that European characters should have had some military half-term under the v2 chargen rules.

[Graebarde]

I can't recall it being mentioned, but I'd always assumed the US would have resurrected Selective Service in 1996 or 1997. After all, it was kept around through the 1980s and 1990s for "the big one," and I think a conventional war with the Soviet Union sure counted for that.

For the British, I'd think the same would be in order.

I agree that European characters should have had some military half-term under the v2 chargen rules.

I agree that the US would reinstate the draft in '97. Those training divisions that are activated would be running the training for the draftees.

As for quality of troops, I served in both the draft era and volar (what they called the 'new' all volunteer army back at the start). For the most part, the draftees were more indepth education wise, contrary to some popular belief, and they were dedicated soldiers IMO for the most part. Better IMO than the guy who enlisted at the judges option of three years in the army or three in the pen... one in a hundred of them took the break they got and kept straight/out of trouble I think.

[Legbreaker]

I started out in a reserve unit, and man for man, I'd say they were a damn fine unit.
While not perhaps the most skilled combat soldiers (they were only part timers after all), their civilian occupations brought in a whole new range of skills and experiences to the mix. In a Post Halocaust situation such as T2K, this is definately the type of unit I'd want to be in.
Farmers, carpenters, electricians, mechanics, barbers, computer programers, you name it, just about every occupation you could want was represented.

[Littlearmies]

I'm kind of mixed on this. The US has used the draft for much of its modern history -- most of the Greatest Generation were draftees.

But when I was in the Army, the general consensus among us was that we didn't want to be fighting alongside draftees. We didn't want someone backing us up who hadn't paid proper attention to his training because he had no wish to be there. We felt they were more likely to panic due to that lesser attention to detail. We generally felt that modern draftees, with the difference in work ethic and national spirit felt in our day, might even be dangerous to have around.

Hell, you have a hard enough time with troops who join the Army and then find out that they really aren't cut out for it.

While I can see this POV I can't help thinking that while I wouldn't be wild about being called up if I were one of the draftees in 1996, on the assumption that someone was going to be shooting at me soon I'd be pretty keen to learn everything I could. If you add that to the points made esewhere, that draftees had a higher level of education in the main, and that as you would be getting an older, more experienced (in terms of civilian life) recruit there would be a wider range of practical experience then I can see how a unit of draftees in T2K might be more useful than a pre-war unit.

After all, most units in T2K, whether a "frontline" infantry organisation or a rear area maintenance outfit, are going to need to be able to fight and
do reconstruction work.

Thinking about it a little more, wouldn't the draftees be fed into those units that needed replacements rather than form new units? So wouldn't most units be a mixed back of old timers and draftees (who probably don't entirely gel together in the rear until they've been shot at a few times)?

[Legbreaker]

Yes, it makes most sense for replacements to be sent into existing units rather than form new ones.
However, Nazi Germany let existing units fall apart and simply raised whole new divisions - part of Hitlers madness I think. Although they only had a few dozen divisions (or whatever it was) actually capable of any type of combat, on paper they had hundreds!

In the initial 2-3 years of the war, I'm fairly certain draftees would be looked down upon by the volunteers. After late 1997 however, this view would be bound to change. As we've established, draftees often posess civilian skills, which would become more and more valuable within a unit. In the long term, a unit that can look after it's own needs even if it's got a lower number of combat types, is a stronger unit than one solely made up of combat experts.

By the last year or two of the war, this fact is undoubtably recognised by even the most hidebound of old soldiers.

[Graebarde]

From my experience, the replacement (FNG) was looked on as an individual who had to 'prove' himself, whether he was a regular or draftee, reguardless of race or creed. On the front lines you all bleed red and when your covered in mud and grime all look the same. The man to your left and right you trust to save your life, and he looks to you to save him. There develops a bonding at the front you don't find in peace time units or REMF elements. When you face death with a man, share your food and water with him and he with you, it gives a whole new perspective. You become closer than kin bonded by blood. This is NOT to say there is not good natured teasing about the fact they had to hunt you down to join the game, but in general I stand by my comments.

I really do not see the general perspective of draftee's being ostrachised once the war is going full bore. And yes, the US policy for replacements would send draftees to existing units to replace losses, at least as long as that is possible. Of course when it is NOT possible, NOBODY is getting replacements and reorganization/amalgmation of units occurs if the commanders are responsible and smart.

New units would be formed from a cadre of veterans, probably many just out of convalesence, and draftee/volunteers just out of basic training. This is generally how it has occured in the past, so I doubt the trend would change until such time as situations force it.

[Mohoender]

Yes, it makes most sense for replacements to be sent into existing units rather than form new ones.
However, Nazi Germany let existing units fall apart and simply raised whole new divisions - part of Hitlers madness I think. Although they only had a few dozen divisions (or whatever it was) actually capable of any type of combat, on paper they had hundreds!



I don't want to start another discussion here, but that is not explained by Hitler's madness. The intension was to confuse the foreign intelligence services which had the worse difficulties to identify and locate German units. It worked very well until 1942 at least and still works today as it remains fairly hard to accurately identify the components of several German units. In addition, that situation evolved with the situation at war: France also had several paper units while it started to face defeat in 1940.

[Graebarde]

I don't want to start another discussion here, but that is not explained by Hitler's madness. The intension was to confuse the foreign intelligence services which had the worse difficulties to identify and locate German units. It worked very well until 1942 at least and still works today as it remains fairly hard to accurately identify the components of several German units. In addition, that situation evolved with the situation at war: France also had several paper units while it started to face defeat in 1940.

Talk about paper divisions... How about the 'ghost army' that Patton 'commanded' prior to Overlord? It was a deception tactic that worked marvelously for the time it needed to.

[Legbreaker]

Now that was sheer brilliance.
Beyond a (relative) handful of personell, the entire army consisted of little more than radio traffic.
My understanding is that Patton was less than impressed at this particular assignment and like many at the time, couldn't understand the need for such levels of deception.
Of course one has to remember that barely a generation before, military intelligence had very few tools - reports from the front, spies and occasional balloon observers. Airborne recon, radio intercepts, even radar was still cutting edge and virtually unknown to the average person.

Today's militaries are spoilt by comparison with all the sattelittes, planes, radio, radar, internet, etc, etc, etc. Take just wiki for an example. Even though much of the information there is not classified, or could be inaccurate, how much intel can be gained from just half an hour there? How long would it have taken to gather the same info 100 years ago?

The intension was to confuse the foreign intelligence services which had the worse difficulties to identify and locate German units.
While this may or may not be true, the creation of new units while allowing existing ones to fade away is madness. Existing units have exisiting support netowrks, command structures, etc. A new unit needs all those things created.
In my opinion, it's probably about ten times harder to create a new division than to simply assign the same personnel to exisiting units as replacements.

If the Germans had the manpower to do both, then the idea has some serious merit. Alternatively, simply renaming exisiting units would have a similar confusing effect without many of the associated problems.

[Mohoender]

While this may or may not be true, the creation of new units while allowing existing ones to fade away is madness. Existing units have exisiting support netowrks, command structures, etc. A new unit needs all those things created.
In my opinion, it's probably about ten times harder to create a new division than to simply assign the same personnel to exisiting units as replacements.

If the Germans had the manpower to do both, then the idea has some serious merit. Alternatively, simply renaming exisiting units would have a similar confusing effect without many of the associated problems.

About Germany in WW2, the organization was much more complicated that what you describe.

1) Several of the core units were never allowed to fade away and remained in action through the entire war (the 7th Panzer, for exemple).

2) Others were allowed to fade away and were recreated later. In fact, that essentially occured when a unit was entirely destroyed. I think that was the case for the 15 Panzer which was lost in Africa and rebuilt in France later.

3) Several were paper division that never existed really, sometimes with no personnel assigned at all. Many of these units were rear area units with little combat capability.

4) Other units were changing name as they were upgraded. going from infantry to motorized, then to panzergrenadier and eventually to panzer. These units had a tendancy to keep the same number assigned to a different denomination.

5) Units truly fading away appeared only during the last stage of the war (late 1944-1945). Then, this occured only at the division level. Surviving elements of the previous division (Regiments, Battalions...) Were simply taken from the previous division and reassigned to the new one. As a result, the 233 Division became the 233 reserve panzer in late 1943 (about that) to finally become the Holstein Panzer in 1945. Regiments that had not been destroyed being reassinged to the Holstein Panzer. In addition (since 1943), when it was needed, some elements were assigned to a kampfgruppe for some times (I think that the first ones appeared in Africa in 1943).

Here is an excellent site on German Panzer Division. Sorry it's in french but for once, a frenchman has been better than anyone in making a site (too bad he never made a translation of it). Nevertheless, hit "Unités" on the oppening page, then chose between "Heer, Waffen SS or Herman Goering". At last, chose any unit and you'll find its composition with changes made overtime (you might not understand the comments but you should be able to find your way around).

http://pagesperso-orange.fr/did.panzer/depart.html

Here is another excellent site but it is not focused on the German army. It includes elements on every country participating in the war.

http://www.orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/

[B.T.]

When I look back to my time in the Bundeswehr, I have to point out, that the standards and the store of knowlegde varied a lot.
The basic training was the same for everyone: 3 months of infantry training (how to march and shoot, learn the ranks, learn about life in barracks, learn to crawl through the mud and stuff like this). Exception from this rule were the drivers: they had a shortened basic training of 6 weeks and then made their "military driving license" in another 6 weeks.
But after basic training?

Several units were trained in a "Kampfkompanie" (= Fighting unit). These were trained for the rest of their time in the military. In an ordinary week we were on the training area for 3 days and spent one day at the firing range. For 12 month.
But the majority of the troops were stationed in some barracks far (from a young Germans point of view!) from home and they had not really something to do. Many young Germans hung in there, waiting for the end of their time in and spent their payment on alcohol and cigarettes!
So: Some conscripts were fine and had a quite good training, others did not know anything. (A lot of the guys from my school never had to shoot with the MG3 or the Uzi:confused:. The guys in my unit were familiar with both after 6 weeks.:cool:)

On the other hand: The two most inspiring leaders I got to know, joined as conscripts and stayed later on. Both were officers and both taught us a lot about democracy. This, in my mind, is the strongest argument for a conscript army. People join the army as officers, who had never before even wanted to join. And some of them are excellent teachers and leaders.

[dragoon500ly]

In a WWIII setup, I feel that the US would activate Selective Service in the 1995-1997 time frame.

The down side of the US Army replacement system is that the soldier is treated as just another "spare part" to plug into the logistics system. During WWII this resulted in fresh replacements being assignd to a combat unit, in all too many cases, right before the unit returned to combat, and in some cases (Normandy and Hurtgen Forest), the replacements would be assigned to the front line, during pauses in the fighting. Any reading of any of the regimental histories tell of new replacements reporting for duty in the morning, and being wounded or dead that same afternoon.

[Webstral]

The handling of replacements is an important issue. It seems that the US Arrmy has learned that unit integrity is important, if Iraq and Afghanstan are indicators. However, we received some augmentees about 2/3 of the way through the tour. They just showed up and were distributed. (A California National Guard unit that had not been mobilized for OIF 3 was mobilized for 120 days and parceled out among the components of 29th Infantry Brigade).

During the Battle of Poland, there would be enormously strong pressure to send the fresh meat right to the front. Canon indicates that NATO losses were heavy during the drive across Poland. It's hard to imagine that losses were not extraordinary during the withdrawal. I wonder what guidance SACEUR would have given on the subject.

Much the same is probably true of the fighting in Korea during the same timeframe. The drive to the Yalu would have resulted in massive casualties. Senior commanders, anxious to keep up the momentum, would have wanted their fresh privates commmitted ASAP. They would be aware of the "model" formula that says a unit should be in hard action for a week, followed by rest, refit, and retraining for two weeks. No one ever seems to follow that rule, though.


Webstral

[dragoon500ly]

It really is a commander's worst nightmare, you get a influx of green-as-grass replacements, your brigade is committed to heavy fighting an the line units have taken a mauling...do you use the replacements to bring the reserve up to strength and then rotate a mauled battalion out of the line, or do you parcel out the FNGs, knowing that most of them won't make it their first week.

When I was still in service, my time was split in between tanks and scouts, I know that tank crews were trained to operate with a minimum of three men, but the effectiveness of the crew in that case was down almost 30%. Toss in a brand new loader and the average crew as down to 50%. The scouts could operate short 2-3 men in the sections and were a lot more effective.

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

[Adm.Lee]

I'd like to mount a small historical defense of the oft-maligned Army replacement system. In WW2, the individual replacements often were casualties within 24 hours of arriving, often after spending many boring days or weeks in a replacement depot with little or no training. The defense of the system is that the US Army was able to keep its divisions in the line constantly at an effective (not full) strength, hardly ever having to withdraw them for replenishment. [Which was good, since Ike almost never had any reserve divisions to replace shot-out ones on the line.]

What most divisions and regiments learned was to hold their replacements for some refresher training, and to cycle them in when a company came off the line for a week or so. When things got too hot, then this got tossed out the window.

In short, it worked well enough, but only from the higher command's point of view.

Anyway, back to the '90s. SACEUR's going to have even fewer divisions to rotate then Ike did, but with at least as high a casualty rate. Towards the latter half of the Battle for Poland in '97, both sides are going to need a lot of replacements, really quickly.

[dragoon500ly]

While I agree that the WWII Army was able to keep its divisions at effective strength, the cost, physically and mentally was excessive. While the Army Air Forces were able to rotate bomber crews home after 25 missions, the infantryman was never allowed that, his lot was to endure from the beginning to the end of the war, unless he suffered a crippling injury, or had earned a high enough decoration to be be shipped home to help drum up the war effort. The replacement system that was used was a complete and utter waste of manpower, instead of the replacements being used as labor to load/unload supplies, or left twiddling their thumbs in some repple-depot, they should have been run through a training program to teach them how to survive and fight on a battlefield. Then sent to their division and introduced into the infantry regiments, allowing time for them to enter their platoons and become part of the units. That the US Army used the replacement system in the manner that they did, was a utter disgrace. And nothing was learned. The same system was used again in Korea and again in Vietnam.

Just for a historical trivia, a single rifle company of the 3rd Infantry Division, during the period from 1942-1945 suffered a 200% turnover in personnel, of the 1942 grunts, only two were left on VE-day, the supply sergeant and Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of WWII.

[HorseSoldier]

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

My understanding is that is 70% wasn't unusual for US infantry units in Vietnam, going out on operations. Armor and ground cavalry units did not necessarily do a whole lot better -- I can recall reading something David Drake (the sci-fi author) wrote about his Vietnam service where three man crews were typical on their M48s and two man crews weren't unheard of at all.

[copeab]

Just for a historical trivia, a single rifle company of the 3rd Infantry Division, during the period from 1942-1945 suffered a 200% turnover in personnel, of the 1942 grunts, only two were left on VE-day, the supply sergeant and Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of WWII.

I see you have some James Dunnigan books too ;)

[copeab]

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

Units in 2000 seem to be more like 80-90% understrength ...

[dragoon500ly]

But of course, Dunnigan and Dupoy are the starting points for any student of how wars are fought.

[helbent4]

Canada has had Conscription only once; during World War II, and then it limited to homeland defence; at first, but, then expanded it overseas service. I recently finished article about Canadian Conscription in Twilight 2000; I will post it after this weekend.

"Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription."

I tend to downplay conscription in Canada prior to the direct involvement in the European war in mid-'97 and the later nuclear strikes (which were staggered over several months time).

Needless to say, while I greatly respect Legion McRae, (and am running a version of his campaign/adventure "The River" from Adventurer's Quarterly) I don't take everything he says as gospel, or at least put my own spin on it!

Tony

[HorseSoldier]

Yes, it makes most sense for replacements to be sent into existing units rather than form new ones.

Up to a point, yes. Beyond a certain level of rough handling and casualties, you'd get better results skimming experienced leaders from units that had been in the line and using them as the backbone for a new unit. Once a unit is bloodied enough, you're talking about a thin core of experienced troops and a mass of replacements. Being able to put that together far from the front under more controlled conditions may be a lot better than feeding raw meat into the grinder.

More generally, you want both, though -- a battle casaulty replacement stream and a new unit stream of incoming personnel.

In the initial 2-3 years of the war, I'm fairly certain draftees would be looked down upon by the volunteers. After late 1997 however, this view would be bound to change.

Honestly, I can definitely relate to Paul's earlier comments about being anti-draftee since I came up in the same era and all. On the other hand, though, draftees can't be any dumber and screwed up than some of the volunteer entry-level Joes I have to deal with. I think NCOs down at the platoon/company level wouldn't care so much about draft status as they would about whether the individual brought his A game and learned fast.

The potential for valuable civilians skills would be a definite plus, but let's remember that in a post-industrial service economy you're at least as likely to get guys whose resume is limited to fast food jobs or pursuing a philosophy degree as a guy who was a trained welder or who'd grown up helping his dad run the family farm. Especially if Selective Service or other conscript scheme was pulling from the 18-22 age cohorts rather than something like 26-30 (and to be fair, in a total war, your skilled workers are more valuable doing their job rather than toting a rifle -- one of my grandfathers was working in a ship yard in December '41 and he and his coworkers were banned from enlisting by the government since their work was wartime essential).

[HorseSoldier]

I'd like to mount a small historical defense of the oft-maligned Army replacement system. In WW2, the individual replacements often were casualties within 24 hours of arriving, often after spending many boring days or weeks in a replacement depot with little or no training. The defense of the system is that the US Army was able to keep its divisions in the line constantly at an effective (not full) strength, hardly ever having to withdraw them for replenishment. [Which was good, since Ike almost never had any reserve divisions to replace shot-out ones on the line.]


The system used in Vietnam is usually critiqued even more vigorously -- the individual replacement system on 12 month rotations undermined unit cohesion, fostered an every man for himself angle, and so on and so forth.

I recently reread The 13th Valley by John DelVecchio which, though fiction, is based on his service with the 101st late in the war (70 or 71). One of the characters in the book talks or thinks about the strength of the Vietnam era system, since cherries coming into a unit are always guaranteed to be surrounded by experienced guys, and get the benefit of in country finishing school sort of training programs run by their divisions. Same character contrasts this with units that deployed in country as new units and collectively suffered higher casualties because so few knew the basics of survival on the battlefield in SVN.

Anyway, interesting different point of view to encounter compared to the conventional wisdom all of us got fed during the volunteer army era. Makes me wonder if a bigger issue weren't other aspects of military personnel policy back then that undermined small unit leadership (shake and bake NCO academies, rotating officers from the line to staff jobs halfway through their tours).

[HorseSoldier]

In a WWIII setup, I feel that the US would activate Selective Service in the 1995-1997 time frame.

I can't see the US activating the Selective Service system at any point before the Bundeswehr crossed the Inter-German Border.

Prior to that you've got the PRC-Soviet fight going full tilt, and the US and other NATO nations pouring support into the PRC. Political leadership, in my opinion, is not going to risk a huge gesture like a return to the draft that might make the Soviets fear that they are about to be on the receiving end of a two front war. Too much aggression (or actions that a paranoid authoritarian regime might consider aggressive) could easily be taken the wrong way and possibly provoke a nuclear response from the Soviets. And not a tit-for-tat T2K nuclear attack, but possibly the nation-wiper first strike that both sides feared during the Cold War.

My guess/personal take is that once the Sino-Soviet War goes hot, the US government boosts spending on all sorts of military programs, with some of that going to the PRC and some of it going into bringing the reserve component more up to date. Additionally, more money would get pumped into recruiting and bonus programs, etc., to encourage voluntary enlistment in the active and reserve components. The reserve component would likely get additional money for training and (maybe/god willing) some of that would translate into identifying and trying to correct the problems that came to light IRL when the Nat'l Guard round out brigades fumbled their Desert Storm mobilization.

Much lower profile, Selective Service gets dusted off and looked at, ready to be put into play, but the government doesn't take that step until after the European war starts. Even then, they might not immediately put it into play, potentially waiting to see if the war will be a quick German reunification and then a peace settlement. Again, I don't think anyone would want to send the Soviets the message that it's war to the knife and the panzer columns are heading for the gates of Moscow again (even if that's exactly what it started turning into as the war developed).

[Legbreaker]

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

Considering one exercise I was on our company was at only 25% strength - 10 man plattoons (x3), plt HQ of 2 men, plus Company HQ, 30% down isn't too bad (that was normal for us).
Naturally we got totally creamed when we assaulted an enemy position numbering barely a dozen men who'd had no more than 30mins to prepare their position. Besides CHQ, there was only one survivor - me, and that was more through sheer luck than anything.

[Dog 6]

Considering one exercise I was on our company was at only 25% strength - 10 man plattoons (x3), plt HQ of 2 men, plus Company HQ, 30% down isn't too bad (that was normal for us).
Naturally we got totally creamed when we assaulted an enemy position numbering barely a dozen men who'd had no more than 30mins to prepare their position. Besides CHQ, there was only one survivor - me, and that was more through sheer luck than anything.

lol crunchy..... :D

[Adm.Lee]

I forgot: I recommend The GI Offensive by Col. Peter Mansoor to look at how under-rated the US infantry may have been in the ETO.

The system used in Vietnam is usually critiqued even more vigorously -- the individual replacement system on 12 month rotations undermined unit cohesion, fostered an every man for himself angle, and so on and so forth.
...

Anyway, interesting different point of view to encounter compared to the conventional wisdom all of us got fed during the volunteer army era. Makes me wonder if a bigger issue weren't other aspects of military personnel policy back then that undermined small unit leadership (shake and bake NCO academies, rotating officers from the line to staff jobs halfway through their tours).

Again, we're talking late-war vs. early-war situations. As I said earlier, in the WW2 ETO, most divisions and regiments learned that they had to acclimate their replacements themselves, and were doing so after the winter of 1944-45. In Vietnam, this was done regularly, but by late in the war, the leadership cadre was exhausted, and reduced to undertrained and underexperienced leaders. I recommend Death of an American Army by Shelby Stanton, to address this.

Both of which have led to the current system, which tries to keep whole units together for a rotation. That, of course, brings up its own criticisms, which I'm going to avoid.

While the Army Air Forces were able to rotate bomber crews home after 25 missions,

Which was raised to 35, and then 50 missions in 1944, BTW. And it wasn't whole crews, it was done on an individual basis, too. The crew of the "Memphis Belle" was celebrated because they were the first complete crew to finish a 25-mission tour. And those crewmen, once returned, often were given a training tour, followed by a second combat tour.

That the US Army used the replacement system in the manner that they did, was a utter disgrace. And nothing was learned. The same system was used again in Korea and again in Vietnam.

I contend that things were learned, and elements of the system that did not work were addressed for 1945, as well as during Korea and Vietnam. There were processes to integrate replacements into platoons and companies during time off the line, unless there was some emergency.

Going back to the original issue, I suspect the US (as well as the Germanies and many others) started conscription to generate replacements in the winter of '96-97, and continued into '98. After that, replacements for the NATO front line would have to come from comb-outs of the rear. IMC, I think there should be a major "Blue to Green" initiative, drafting or asking for volunteers from the Navy and AF to support the Army.

[Canadian Army]

Here is what I came up with:


Canadian Zombies during the Twilight War

ZOM·BIE; A derogatory nickname used by Canadian volunteers during the Twilight War to describe Conscripts.

When Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced on October 10, 1996, that Canada had declared war on USSR, he also took care to say, “The government did not believe conscription (a draft of men and woman) for the Canadian Armed Forces would not be necessary. No such conscription or draft will be enacted by this government.”

There was an initial surge of volunteers; within six months, over 20,000 men and women had joined the Canadian Armed Forces, and the 1st Canadian Division [Mechanized] embarked for West Germany to aid its defence. One month later, in November, 1996, the Warsaw Pact forces counterattack against Germany, and there was a real possibility Netherlands would also be overwhelmed. NATO demanded that Ottawa should demonstrate a fuller wartime commitment. But imposing military conscription would create serious domestic problems for the Liberal Party. It had been elected in 1993 and election time was fast approaching. Any conscription laws could hamper the re-election of the Liberal Party. After NATO’s General mobilization was declared, Canada was the only country in NATO that did not enact conscript laws, and relied solely on volunteers. The same policy had built an army during World War I, World War II, and the Korea War; while violent opposition to conscription had created a huge political problem during World War I and World War II for the Liberal Party. Chrétien knew something had to be devised that would both address the concerns of NATO and mollify Canadians reluctance to be conscription into Military Service.

As an experience parliamentarian, Chrétien help drafted the National Mobilization Act which gave the government “special emergency powers to mobilize all human resources for the defence of Canada”. He made a dramatic speech to the Commons when introducing the bill on 18 December, 1996 during a special session, saying, "The National Mobilization Act will relate solely and exclusively to the defence of Canada on our own soil and in our own territorial waters” Chrétien added that national service registration would be held and that this registration will have nothing to do with recruiting citizens for overseas service.” About 100,000 draftees were summoned for training in camps all across the country.

In 1997, after North Korea invaded South Korea, PM Chrétien called a special House of Commons vote on whether to amend the NMA in order to send NMA men overseas. The House of Commons voted 235 in favour, with 65 against. Though this majority vote gave Chrétien clear permission to order “Zombies” off to join the fighting, Chrétien like his predecessors was still reluctant to alienate Quebec voters, and simply shelved issue until the next session.

In 1997, United States forces began engaging Soviet forces in the Bering Straits of Alaska. As the territory was part of North America, within the designated "home defence area," a two divisions of NMA soldiers were directed to support ‘Operation Artic Thunder’ – US X Corps in Alaska. Though there were scores of temporary desertions, most NMA troops embarked to CFB Chilliwhack without incident in August, 1997, bound for a combat zone after all. The Canadians suffered over 15,000 dead during the fight for Alaska, and later British Columbia, before Soviet forces were contained.

By 1997, during final stages of the war, Canadians fighting in Europe felt a severe lack of trained replacements for their heavy casualties. Complaints by NATO mounted, increasing demands that “Zombies” be sent into combat. Jean Chrétien at long last reluctantly decided to order 5,000 NMA conscripts overseas. The first conscript infantrymen sent overseas arrived in Europe on February 23, 2000. About 2,500 of them took part in 3rd German Army’s; with the XI US Corps assisting, offensive into northern Poland, to clear the Baltic coast as far as the mouth of the Wisla River. Ninety-nine NMA were killed in action before the all Canadian soldiers were order evacuated form the European continent on September 28, 2000.

Upon returning to Canada and until 2008; at which point the National Mobilization Act was repealed; “Zombies” performed more mundane duties, such as Internal Security, Border Patrol, and Aid to Civil Power and left the all of fighting in Quebec and West to regular and volunteer forces, and never again saw an active combat role.

[HorseSoldier]

Looks pretty good to me.

[helbent4]

CA,

That's an awesome write-up. I'd like to borrow from that to flesh out the background of my ongoing campaign (based loosely on "The River") and set in the Lower Mainland.

Tony