World War II

[Legbreaker]

I thought the discussion in the "Historical Kalisz-type Scenarios" deserved it's own thread and since Kato isn't about....
Modern tank use was theorized by the General Jean-Baptiste Eugène Estienne. This time a Frenchman, colonel at the time, father of the french aviation, of the modernization of our artillery and of the tanks. He was read and taken into account by Liddle Hart (UK), Heinz Guderian (Germany), Toukhatchevsky (Soviet Union) and probably Patton (US, who had met him in 1917). However, these theories were refused by most high commands (except Soviet Union until the Stalin's purges) including Germany (Hitler ruled over the Generals on that matter, including the Blitzkrieg into a much wider classical plan)
That's my point. Some individuals certain knew, or at least theorised (since they couldn't have put it into practise beforehand), but those higher than them were operating on incorrect principles.
No matter how many Majors, Lt Colonels, and other "lesser" ranks believed, it was the Generals, etc who dictated "how things were". A shame, and one that wasn't corrected until the war was nearly won by the Germans (in other words, around late 1940 to 1941).

There always has been, and always will be brilliant tacticians and strategists, but unfortunately because they think "outside of the box" they aren't listened to until hindsight shows them to be correct.

Flawed wargames carried out in the 20's and 30's caused the British (and numerous other nations) to implement flawed tactics, strategy and equipment. The Germans (and a few other individuals) basically took a gamble on unproven theories and got it right when it mattered. If the allies had been working from the same book as the Germans, the war may well have been over almost before it started (or possibly turned into another bloodbath as two decades before, something EVERYONE wanted to avoid).

[Targan]

Nice work. That WWII talk in the other thread was getting really dominant. If it stays in this thread at least I'll know where to avoid :D

[Mohoender]

I agree with both of you. Got your point Leg.:)

[Webstral]

It happens to today. In 2005, I read about a wargame set in the Gulf in which a maverick Marine general controlled Iranian forces against a US carrier battlegroup. He managed to coordinate a massive missile attack and sink the carrier. His tactics? Decentralized control. What did the US team learn? Hit the reset button when it all goes bad.

Webstral

[ChalkLine]

It happens to today. In 2005, I read about a wargame set in the Gulf in which a maverick Marine general controlled Iranian forces against a US carrier battlegroup. He managed to coordinate a massive missile attack and sink the carrier. His tactics? Decentralized control. What did the US team learn? Hit the reset button when it all goes bad.

Webstral

Was that the one where the OPFOR used artillery launched EMP devices?

[Webstral]

Was that the one where the OPFOR used artillery launched EMP devices?

I don't think so, but I can't say for certain. I believe the attack was conducted by conventional missiles launched from fast attack boats emerging from a number of points along the Iranian coast. However, it would make sense to cover the attack with shore-based arty and EMP, wouldn't it?

Webstral

[Raellus]

It happens to today. In 2005, I read about a wargame set in the Gulf in which a maverick Marine general controlled Iranian forces against a US carrier battlegroup. He managed to coordinate a massive missile attack and sink the carrier. His tactics? Decentralized control. What did the US team learn? Hit the reset button when it all goes bad.

Webstral

The results of this wargame, and another in the early '00s in which a Chilean diesel sub "sank" a couple of U.S. cruisers, has convinced me that the U.S.N. wouldn't dominate the T2K seas quite as much as others around here seem to believe.

But that's a matter for another thread.

Back to the original point, it seems that "fixing" wargame results is one of the worst things military commanders can do. It troubles me that it still happens today.

[Legbreaker]

An Australian diesel powered sub, all by itself managed to sneak in, sink a US carrier and sneak out again completely undetected (besides the big BOOM and the umpires declaring the carrier sunk) in a wargame in the early 90's.
I think a number of the escort vessels were also "sunk".

Makes you wonder how the US can claim to be so superior and unbeatable doesn't it?

[cavtroop]

I used to have a part (a small part, I was just a private!) in Brigade and Divisional level war games (was attached to a Brigade HQ for a while). Let me tell you - from what I saw, those things are damn near scripted. It's more an exercise to make sure all commanders are playing by the rulebook, than it is to test out and try new tactics, or to really try to beat the Bluefor.

I like what that 'maverick' Marine general did - this is the first I've heard of it. Our Armed Forces need to think like that guy does :)

Anyone have any links to more info about this? I'd love to read about it.

[ChalkLine]

I don't think so, but I can't say for certain. I believe the attack was conducted by conventional missiles launched from fast attack boats emerging from a number of points along the Iranian coast. However, it would make sense to cover the attack with shore-based arty and EMP, wouldn't it?

Webstral

There was a scenario where a (I'm fairly sure) marine officer gave himself a low budget and extrapolated asymmetrical warfare techniques into the technological area. One of the nasty things he pulled was 155mm rocket assisted conventionally activated EMP projectiles taking out satellites, and smaller charges fired into the air during air strikes and helicopter insertions. His side was doing without a lot of electronics, so he just made everyone do without. I think this was another 'reset' win.

[Targan]

Makes you wonder how the US can claim to be so superior and unbeatable doesn't it?

Well I guess having the biggest aircraft carriers in the world and having more aircraft carriers than the rest of the world put together would tend to inspire a great deal of self confidence. Not to mention the fact that if all else fails the USA has enough nukes to ensure that if it can't win neither can anyone else.

It has a pleasant sort of symetry to it - the EMP means the street lights don't work but you don't need street lighting when you have Cherenkov radiation.

[Mohoender]

An Australian diesel powered sub, all by itself managed to sneak in, sink a US carrier and sneak out again completely undetected (besides the big BOOM and the umpires declaring the carrier sunk) in a wargame in the early 90's.
I think a number of the escort vessels were also "sunk".

Makes you wonder how the US can claim to be so superior and unbeatable doesn't it?

That's not so surprising from what I read on diesel power subs (also I'm no specialist: I'll ask my neighbor's son in two years when he will be operating on our nuclear submarines but that's 2 years to wait:D). According to most reports, diesel subs are supposed to be much quieter and hard to detect that the nuclears ones (that might have been matched by the seawolf, however).

From what I read, the old UK Oberon-class had been the quietest of all.

[Kellhound]

I used to have a part (a small part, I was just a private!) in Brigade and Divisional level war games (was attached to a Brigade HQ for a while). Let me tell you - from what I saw, those things are damn near scripted. It's more an exercise to make sure all commanders are playing by the rulebook, than it is to test out and try new tactics, or to really try to beat the Bluefor.

...


Yes, I have seen this many times. Even more in multinational exercises (so as not creating bad blood between allies, I suppose).


Sadly, I cannot elaborate on the issue, but sometimes a lowly private (holding the radio) can have more impact in one of these things, not cancelling or redirecting an air support mission (hipotetically speaking, of course :rolleyes: ), than a clueless regimental commander.
:D

[ChalkLine]

. . . From what I read, the old UK Oberon-class had been the quietest of all.

Which is what the old Australian subs were.

[Mohoender]

Which is what the old Australian subs were.

I didn't know for that particular exemple. Since, Australia changed them for an oversize swedish design.

[Webstral]

One reason the USN traditionally has been so confident is that the Navy is structured to lose a few carriers and keep fighting. Bad things are going to happen--especially as the Navy projects its power into the territorial waters of foreign nations. Enemy diesel subs have the advantage of waiting for noisier US nuke boats and surface fleets to come to them. This gives the defending diesel boats a significant advantage, which may be something the Australian skipper in question exploited.

On the plus side, results like an Australian diesel boat getting one or more fish into the hull of a USN carrier gives spectacular feedback. We should want our allies, with their generally more limited means, to show us up from time to time. Better a notional Aussie fish than a real Chinese, Russian, or other potential enemy fish.

As I see it, the problem with getting one's fourth point of contact handed to one in a training exercise is that those who were taken to the mat spend more energy defending their pride than learning the appropriate lessons. When I was active duty, my brigade got waxed at NTC. Almost everyone does. Rather than discuss what we could do to improve ourselves, the officers hung out and b*****d about all the unfair advantages the OPFOR enjoyed. When all of those advantages were added up, how could we be expected to anything but get our tails kicked? Since the result was virtually pre-determined, the best thing to do was to hunker down, fold our arms across our chests, and show contempt for the whole process.

My JRTC experience was the same. We learned nothing except how to generate excuses to save our pride. Had we not been thoroughly destroyed in most of our encounters, we might actually have applied some analysis and learned something useful. Instead, we learned that a rotation to JRTC sucks and nothing can be done about it. Worse, the whole experienced subjected the leadership to serious embarrassment. Leaders made to look like fools take strong steps to demonstrate to their troops that said leaders are still in charge. I believe this is called backlash. The heroes of the exercise (often rather junior leaders and individual soldiers) are the villains of the organization after the After Action Review is complete.

Of course, it all goes back to command climate. If the battalion commander is the sort who can take a blow his pride publicly and with professionalism, the company commanders and staff are likely to follow suit. If the battalion commander is crapping himself because his rapid ascension to full bull has just come to a screaming halt, there will be a lot more finger-pointing and denials. Sadly, I've served under a lot more of the latter than the former.

Webstral

[Adm.Lee]

Wasn't this a thread created to prevent the threadjacking of a different thread?

Jes' sayin'.

BTW, I recommend the book "Battle for Hunger Hill" by COL (MG by now?) Dan Bolger to see how a battalion can learn from getting beat up at JRTC. His battalion of the 101st went there in '93, got embarrassed, and lucked into a second go-round the next year. They cleaned up!

FWIW, some exercises are scripted, some are not. The ones with troops involved are often the unscripted command-post exercises or wargames. NTC and JRTC are supposed to be the big exceptions to that rule.

As far as WW2 goes, I'm reading a lot on the Pacific this past few weeks, gaming the East Front, and thinking about the West Front for a future game.

[Mohoender]

Wasn't this a thread created to prevent the threadjacking of a different thread?



You must believe in Santa Klauss.:D

[ChalkLine]

I didn't know for that particular exemple. Since, Australia changed them for an oversize swedish design.

Yup, the Collins haven't been a particularly scintillating success.

[ChalkLine]

Probably the best fight ever for bringing home the sheer pathos of combat would be The Battle of Seelow Heights, April 1945.

[Raellus]

Some of the fighting at Stalingrad would also fall into this category. I'm currently reading a book about the Cherkassy-Korsun pocket battle and it too was incredibly brutal and intense.

[Webstral]

Okinawa was hard on some folks, too.

[Raellus]

That's quite an understatement. How about Tarawa and Iwo Jima. In fact, any battle involving significant numbers of dug in Japanese troops could be described as brutal and intense. Omaha Beach, Pointe Du Hoc, Hurtgen Forest [sic] and some of the Ardennes fighting come close in the ETO.

[Graebarde]

Bloody Omaha comes to mind as well, though the whole Normandy landing was a blood bath. Amphib landings on well defended beaches are bitches.