kato13
01-21-2010, 09:33 PM
Webstral 01-10-2004, 03:47 AM No sooner had the first Soviet troops and aircraft crossed the Sino-Soviet border in August 1995 than the diplomats and propaganda machines of both countries launched into a global public relations war second in intensity only to the actual fighting. For the Soviets, the effort was to keep international opinion from swinging in favor of China. The Chinese, of course, spared no effort to make exactly that happen.
The USSR had a more difficult job, relatively speaking. The Soviets were the aggressors, and there was a limit to how far they could minimize the impact of this naked fact. World opinion tends to favor the defender when one nation invades another, and the Sino-Soviet War proved no exception.
The Soviets had given considerable thought to how they would approach the international propaganda effort, though naturally the final application of their strategy would depend a good deal on the circumstances surrounding the actual start of hostilities. In essence, the Soviet strategy was to make the world believe that China had brought the war on herself through a series of border provocations and other acts. That the Chinese did not appear to be well-prepared for an all-out war could be explained away with the logic that the Beijing Communists were playing high-stakes poker, betting that Moscow would back down before China's supposedly superior manpower and political will. Instead, the Soviet Union had called the Chinese bluff and exposed it as such.
Inside the Kremlin, existing tensions between the various factions of the Soviet leadership became more pronounced after the start of the war. Since the coup in 1989, the highest echelon of Soviet leadership had begun to split into two groups: the Danilovians and the Sauronskiites. The former group, led by Premier Dmitri Danilov, had allied themselves with the latter, led by Defense Minister Ivan Sauronski, for the purpose of deposing and replacing the Gorbachev government. However, the alliance between the two groups was always a shaky one. The Danilov group, smaller and less powerful than the Sauronski cabal, was made up of true reformers. The Sauronskiites were arch-conservative Communists whose principal goal was to hold onto power. The Danilovians needed the Sauronskiites for their control of the military, much of the security apparatus, and the economy. The Sauronskiites needed the Danilovians because Danilov was the only rival to Sauronskiite power in the KGB and because Danilov was much more palatable to the mid-level Communist Party officials and to the international community than any of the Sauronskiites. From the start, the intent of the Sauronskiites had been to use Danilov as a front man while Sauronski and his cohorts wielded the real power in the USSR.
Danilov proved to be a master power-broker, however. He spoke the Sauronskiite language fluently. He reminded the Sauronskiites, together and separately, that unless the Soviet economy were fixed, there could easily be another coup attempt. Worse, there might be open revolution. Even a successful counter-revolution on the part of the Soviet security apparatus would further erode the Soviet economy. Grudgingly, the Sauronskiites empowered Danilov to enact most of the reforms he sought.
The first real test of Danilov's ability as leader of the Soviet Union came in 1990, when Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Within days of the August 2 invasion, United States airborne troops were on their way to Saudi Arabia. The Western Allies quickly rallied to the American banner.
Defense Minister Sauronski advocated immediate and whole-hearted support for Iraq. Though it was infuriating that Hussein had invaded Kuwait without either seeking permission or consultation, the fact remained that a major Soviet client had scored an impressive victory over Western interests. Kuwait was conquered in little more than three days, leaving the victorious Iraqi Republican Guard standing on the northeastern border of Saudi Arabia. The Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia was the major oil-producing zone of the country, and it was one of the richest areas in the world. On the order of a quarter of the world's proven oil reserves lay between the border of Kuwait and the border of Qatar, and all Hussein had to do was reach out and take it. The Saudi armed forces were still mobilizing, and the only forces the United States could deploy in time to be of any worth were airmobile infantry units and a few Air Force squadrons. With a Soviet nuclear guarantee, the Iraqis would be free to use their tremendous conventional superiority. It was entirely possible for Iraq to capture the northeast portion of Saudi Arabia, thereby denying the enormous Saudi oil wealth to the West. With some Soviet support and a little luck, the Iraqis might capture the western shore of the Gulf south to Oman.
This was a winning position, Sauronski argued. The West would not accept Iraq's control of so much of the world's oil. Even with the loss of her expeditionary force in northeastern Saudi Arabia, the United States and her allies would not sit idly by while Hussein's Iraq controlled the lion's share of the Gulf oil. By herself, Iraq could not hope to win a long-term war against the United States, her Western allies, and whatever Third World participants the US could bring into the picture. Iraq would have to have Soviet backing. That backing would give the Soviets de facto control over Iraq, which would give the USSR de facto control over a critical share of the world's oil. The West then could be made to dance to the Soviet tune.
Danilov disagreed with the Sauronski interpretation of the situation. If the oil really were so critical to the economies of the West, they would fight to regain control of it. The Iraqi Army might be able to get control of the Gulf Coast as far south as Oman in the short term, but how could the Iraqis reasonably be expected to control the whole Saudi Peninsula? Nothing less would do, Danilov opined, since the Western Allies would build up for a counteroffensive wherever they could. If the United States could build her forces in Dhahran, she would. If she were forced to build in Doha or Abu Dhabi or Muscat or Jiddah or Mocha, she would. The only way for the Iraqis to prevent an Allied build-up on the Saudi Peninsula would be for the Iraqis to secure the entire perimeter of the Peninsula--or at least all the ports and all the potential beachheads. Could it really be supposed that the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force were equal to this task? It was highly doubtful that the Iraqis could secure Dhahran and Riyadh simultaneously, much less march the whole length of the Peninsula against the opposition of the Saudi, Qatari, UAE, and Omani militaries, supplemented as they would be by US naval air assets and arriving Army, Marines, and Air Force assets. And even if they actually captured the Peninsula, the Iraqi Navy was completely incapable of securing the coastline against the US Navy and the Allied navies. By the same token, the Iraqi Air Force could not hope to stand against Allied air power operating off US Navy and Allied carriers in the Arabian Sea and Red Sea and Allied air power flying out of Israel and bases in the Horn of Africa. Without control of the air or sea around Saudi Arabia, there was no way for Iraq to secure the Saudi Peninsula in the long term.
Sauronski countered that this was where Soviet support would come in. Soviet Air Force (SAF) regiments could be moved into Saudi Arabia to support the Iraqis. The Soviet Navy possessed the world's largest fleet of submarines. Surely this force would come in handy in preventing Allied landings along the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.
Such overt support for the Iraqis was tantamount to war with the West, Danilov countered. Was the Soviet Union really ready for this? Such a war could drag on for a year or two while the West built the necessary combat power in the areas adjacent to the Saudi Peninsula. While it might be hoped that the loss of Persian Gulf oil might bring the Western economies to their knees, the fact remained that the West had access to oil from several other sources: Mexico, Venezuela, Norway, Nigeria, and other nations. Some belt-tightening, rationing, and stepped-up production in other oil-producing countries could very well keep the Western economies on their feet--enough so to wage war in the Middle East, at any rate.
There was also the uncomfortable fact that the Soviet Union was highly dependent upon the West for grain. Danilov was openly scornful of the notion that the West could be extorted into selling food to the Soviet Union. Soviet forces might get control of the Persian Gulf, but what would the Soviet people eat during the victory celebration?
Danilov proposed instead that Hussein be left to his own devices. He had invited war with the West without consulting with Moscow. Now the Soviet Union could reverse some of the damage done during the Black Winter by allowing the West to liberate Kuwait. Western grain and loans would continue to come in, and the Soviet Union could set about improving her position for the next time such an opportunity presented itself.
This last argument settled the matter for most of the Sauronskiites, if not Sauronski himself. The Kremlin might be willing to chance defeat on the Saudi Peninsula a year or two down the road, but short-term starvation for the Soviet people would jeopardize the position of the new regime. The change of power was still too fresh in the minds of the Soviet people.
Danilov's deal with George Bush of the United States worked out splendidly for the Soviet Union. Kuwait was liberated, the Iraqi military was savaged, and Hussein remained in power. Hussein was forced back into the arms of the Soviet Union, who quickly undertook to re-arm the Iraqi dictator. The Soviets got a front-row seat to the show, from which they learned that US capabilities were even more advanced than the Soviets had supposed. Danilov's restraint appeared even wiser. Western grain continued to flow to the USSR, as did Western credits. In the end, Danilov gained immeasurably in the eyes of the Party and of the international community.
By 1995, Danilov appeared to Sauronski to be getting out of control. Danilov's economic reforms were showing real progress. Relations with the West were as warm as they had been at any time in the history of the Soviet Union. Industrial productivity was up, and for the first time in her history the Soviet Union was feeding herself. Many luke-warm Sauronskiites were converting to Danilovism. The Soviet people were enjoying more liberties than they had in a generation--more so even than under Gorbachev. And they were demanding more. Just as it had been under Gorbechev, the very existence of the Soviet state as Stalin and Khrushchev had known it was threatened.
Unfortunately, there was only so much Sauronski could do about it. Danilov was terribly popular among the people, the KGB, and most of the Party. His reforms were working, and everybody seemed to be doing better. Simply doing away with him wasn't an option. Sauronski had to find a way to discredit Danilov before replacing him.
War with China seemed the perfect way. By the mid-1990's, it was apparent that China would have to be put in her place sooner or later anyway. A war that dragged out a bit longer than it should have would fit the bill nicely. China would be set back, while much of the economic progress Danilov had made would evaporate. With Danilov out of favor, Sauronski could move to replace him or at least strip him of much of his power. Through a series of carefully-orchestrated maneuvers, Sauronski brought the Soviet Union and China to the edge of war, then let mutual mistrust and the situation on the border take their natural courses.
Exactly how and why Danilov allowed things to evolve as they did is still a mystery. He had much better control over events earlier in his career, when he was technically weaker. It has been suggested that he didn't really believe war would start. It has been suggested that Danilov believed a last-minute deal with Chinese Premier Zhu would head off a war and bring even greater prestige to himself. Whatever the reason, by the end of August 1995, Dmitri Danilov found himself in a war he had never wanted.
Selling this war was a painful exercise for Danilov. There was very little he could say to the West that had any meaning beyond the usual propaganda, though he dutifully made his effort at the UN and in Western capitals. For the most part, Danilov was forced to trade in much of the good will he had built in the West to keep economic credits flowing.
Since there was little the Soviets could do to justify the war in world opinion, it was important that they convince the world that the USSR was winning the war. Superiority of Soviet arms and soldiery would be its own justification in the end. As a result, Soviet propaganda efforts initially focused on the excellent progress being enjoyed by Soviet armed forces in Manchuria. Never mind who was right--the Soviets were winning.
By contrast, China found it quite easy to portray herself as the innocent victim. Though the Western media were never given the free reign on the Manchurian battlefields they would have liked, images of smashed Chinese villages and dead and injured Chinese civilians poured back to Western television virtually from the outset of the war. The Chinese Communist Party strove to play up two key images: the suffering of the Chinese people and the heroic resistance of the People's Liberation Army. In this effort they were largely successful.
Beijing quickly moved to exploit the swell of sympathy among Westerners--particularly among Americans. The large Chinese-American community was solicited to provide financial support, political support, and propaganda support for China. Though not successful everywhere, Chinese-Americans answered the call of the motherland in large numbers. Though many conservative Americans were delighted to see the two great Communist powers at war, at least as many Americans were telling pollsters that the gallant Chinese people deserved the support of the United States against the Soviet aggressors. Washington took notice.
Throughout the Western political circles, the initial reaction was one of muted relief. Despite the warming of Soviet-Western relations during the first half of the 1990's, NATO remained ready to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Many were concerned that Danilov's Soviet Union was a more dangerous Soviet Union because her core strength was greater. A Soviet Union with a healthy economy and the ability to feed herself might come under the control of an aggressive militarist. At the same time, the growing economic power of China was causing concern in the West. How long would it be before China's burgeoning economic power translated itself into military power? Already the mid-1990's, the People's Liberation Army was undergoing a significant modernization. With the Soviet Union and China at war, the West appeared to have killed two birds without actually having to throw its own stone.
Naturally, there was some concern about the war going nuclear. This fear was at its most intense during the first few days of the war, when chemical weapons were used on a large scale both on the front lines and in the rear areas. Some Western military analysts feared that whoever got the worst of the chemical exchange might go nuclear as a means of rectifying the situation. Fortunately, the chemical exchange died down without the use of nuclear weapons; however, there were several very tense days at the UN as Western mediators attempted to get both sides to pledge to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. (Despite the fact that both parties to the war already had pledged as much.)
In Europe, there was some alarm over the rapid rate of advance of Soviet ground forces in the opening weeks of the campaign. If the Soviets could make such short work of the PLA, how would they fare against the much-less-numerous Western European ground forces? Speculation was rife that NATO would be incapable of stopping a sudden Soviet sweep to the English Channel. As the Soviet advance ground to a halt, such irresponsible talk died down, though.
World opinion elsewhere varied. India gleefully watched one of her two principal rivals stagger under the heavy Soviet blows. Pakistan issued belligerent statements in support of China, one of her chief benefactors. Without China to counterbalance India, the Pakistani security situation was far more tenuous.
Generally, Soviet clients gave their support for the USSR, while Western clients decried the invasion. Many countries in trouble spots around the globe heightened their military readiness, and some even mobilized additional troops. However, for the most part things settled down in the countries not directly affected by the fighting. Notable exceptions were the two Koreas, Vietnam, and Pakistan.
Webstral
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The USSR had a more difficult job, relatively speaking. The Soviets were the aggressors, and there was a limit to how far they could minimize the impact of this naked fact. World opinion tends to favor the defender when one nation invades another, and the Sino-Soviet War proved no exception.
The Soviets had given considerable thought to how they would approach the international propaganda effort, though naturally the final application of their strategy would depend a good deal on the circumstances surrounding the actual start of hostilities. In essence, the Soviet strategy was to make the world believe that China had brought the war on herself through a series of border provocations and other acts. That the Chinese did not appear to be well-prepared for an all-out war could be explained away with the logic that the Beijing Communists were playing high-stakes poker, betting that Moscow would back down before China's supposedly superior manpower and political will. Instead, the Soviet Union had called the Chinese bluff and exposed it as such.
Inside the Kremlin, existing tensions between the various factions of the Soviet leadership became more pronounced after the start of the war. Since the coup in 1989, the highest echelon of Soviet leadership had begun to split into two groups: the Danilovians and the Sauronskiites. The former group, led by Premier Dmitri Danilov, had allied themselves with the latter, led by Defense Minister Ivan Sauronski, for the purpose of deposing and replacing the Gorbachev government. However, the alliance between the two groups was always a shaky one. The Danilov group, smaller and less powerful than the Sauronski cabal, was made up of true reformers. The Sauronskiites were arch-conservative Communists whose principal goal was to hold onto power. The Danilovians needed the Sauronskiites for their control of the military, much of the security apparatus, and the economy. The Sauronskiites needed the Danilovians because Danilov was the only rival to Sauronskiite power in the KGB and because Danilov was much more palatable to the mid-level Communist Party officials and to the international community than any of the Sauronskiites. From the start, the intent of the Sauronskiites had been to use Danilov as a front man while Sauronski and his cohorts wielded the real power in the USSR.
Danilov proved to be a master power-broker, however. He spoke the Sauronskiite language fluently. He reminded the Sauronskiites, together and separately, that unless the Soviet economy were fixed, there could easily be another coup attempt. Worse, there might be open revolution. Even a successful counter-revolution on the part of the Soviet security apparatus would further erode the Soviet economy. Grudgingly, the Sauronskiites empowered Danilov to enact most of the reforms he sought.
The first real test of Danilov's ability as leader of the Soviet Union came in 1990, when Iraqi president Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Within days of the August 2 invasion, United States airborne troops were on their way to Saudi Arabia. The Western Allies quickly rallied to the American banner.
Defense Minister Sauronski advocated immediate and whole-hearted support for Iraq. Though it was infuriating that Hussein had invaded Kuwait without either seeking permission or consultation, the fact remained that a major Soviet client had scored an impressive victory over Western interests. Kuwait was conquered in little more than three days, leaving the victorious Iraqi Republican Guard standing on the northeastern border of Saudi Arabia. The Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia was the major oil-producing zone of the country, and it was one of the richest areas in the world. On the order of a quarter of the world's proven oil reserves lay between the border of Kuwait and the border of Qatar, and all Hussein had to do was reach out and take it. The Saudi armed forces were still mobilizing, and the only forces the United States could deploy in time to be of any worth were airmobile infantry units and a few Air Force squadrons. With a Soviet nuclear guarantee, the Iraqis would be free to use their tremendous conventional superiority. It was entirely possible for Iraq to capture the northeast portion of Saudi Arabia, thereby denying the enormous Saudi oil wealth to the West. With some Soviet support and a little luck, the Iraqis might capture the western shore of the Gulf south to Oman.
This was a winning position, Sauronski argued. The West would not accept Iraq's control of so much of the world's oil. Even with the loss of her expeditionary force in northeastern Saudi Arabia, the United States and her allies would not sit idly by while Hussein's Iraq controlled the lion's share of the Gulf oil. By herself, Iraq could not hope to win a long-term war against the United States, her Western allies, and whatever Third World participants the US could bring into the picture. Iraq would have to have Soviet backing. That backing would give the Soviets de facto control over Iraq, which would give the USSR de facto control over a critical share of the world's oil. The West then could be made to dance to the Soviet tune.
Danilov disagreed with the Sauronski interpretation of the situation. If the oil really were so critical to the economies of the West, they would fight to regain control of it. The Iraqi Army might be able to get control of the Gulf Coast as far south as Oman in the short term, but how could the Iraqis reasonably be expected to control the whole Saudi Peninsula? Nothing less would do, Danilov opined, since the Western Allies would build up for a counteroffensive wherever they could. If the United States could build her forces in Dhahran, she would. If she were forced to build in Doha or Abu Dhabi or Muscat or Jiddah or Mocha, she would. The only way for the Iraqis to prevent an Allied build-up on the Saudi Peninsula would be for the Iraqis to secure the entire perimeter of the Peninsula--or at least all the ports and all the potential beachheads. Could it really be supposed that the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force were equal to this task? It was highly doubtful that the Iraqis could secure Dhahran and Riyadh simultaneously, much less march the whole length of the Peninsula against the opposition of the Saudi, Qatari, UAE, and Omani militaries, supplemented as they would be by US naval air assets and arriving Army, Marines, and Air Force assets. And even if they actually captured the Peninsula, the Iraqi Navy was completely incapable of securing the coastline against the US Navy and the Allied navies. By the same token, the Iraqi Air Force could not hope to stand against Allied air power operating off US Navy and Allied carriers in the Arabian Sea and Red Sea and Allied air power flying out of Israel and bases in the Horn of Africa. Without control of the air or sea around Saudi Arabia, there was no way for Iraq to secure the Saudi Peninsula in the long term.
Sauronski countered that this was where Soviet support would come in. Soviet Air Force (SAF) regiments could be moved into Saudi Arabia to support the Iraqis. The Soviet Navy possessed the world's largest fleet of submarines. Surely this force would come in handy in preventing Allied landings along the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.
Such overt support for the Iraqis was tantamount to war with the West, Danilov countered. Was the Soviet Union really ready for this? Such a war could drag on for a year or two while the West built the necessary combat power in the areas adjacent to the Saudi Peninsula. While it might be hoped that the loss of Persian Gulf oil might bring the Western economies to their knees, the fact remained that the West had access to oil from several other sources: Mexico, Venezuela, Norway, Nigeria, and other nations. Some belt-tightening, rationing, and stepped-up production in other oil-producing countries could very well keep the Western economies on their feet--enough so to wage war in the Middle East, at any rate.
There was also the uncomfortable fact that the Soviet Union was highly dependent upon the West for grain. Danilov was openly scornful of the notion that the West could be extorted into selling food to the Soviet Union. Soviet forces might get control of the Persian Gulf, but what would the Soviet people eat during the victory celebration?
Danilov proposed instead that Hussein be left to his own devices. He had invited war with the West without consulting with Moscow. Now the Soviet Union could reverse some of the damage done during the Black Winter by allowing the West to liberate Kuwait. Western grain and loans would continue to come in, and the Soviet Union could set about improving her position for the next time such an opportunity presented itself.
This last argument settled the matter for most of the Sauronskiites, if not Sauronski himself. The Kremlin might be willing to chance defeat on the Saudi Peninsula a year or two down the road, but short-term starvation for the Soviet people would jeopardize the position of the new regime. The change of power was still too fresh in the minds of the Soviet people.
Danilov's deal with George Bush of the United States worked out splendidly for the Soviet Union. Kuwait was liberated, the Iraqi military was savaged, and Hussein remained in power. Hussein was forced back into the arms of the Soviet Union, who quickly undertook to re-arm the Iraqi dictator. The Soviets got a front-row seat to the show, from which they learned that US capabilities were even more advanced than the Soviets had supposed. Danilov's restraint appeared even wiser. Western grain continued to flow to the USSR, as did Western credits. In the end, Danilov gained immeasurably in the eyes of the Party and of the international community.
By 1995, Danilov appeared to Sauronski to be getting out of control. Danilov's economic reforms were showing real progress. Relations with the West were as warm as they had been at any time in the history of the Soviet Union. Industrial productivity was up, and for the first time in her history the Soviet Union was feeding herself. Many luke-warm Sauronskiites were converting to Danilovism. The Soviet people were enjoying more liberties than they had in a generation--more so even than under Gorbachev. And they were demanding more. Just as it had been under Gorbechev, the very existence of the Soviet state as Stalin and Khrushchev had known it was threatened.
Unfortunately, there was only so much Sauronski could do about it. Danilov was terribly popular among the people, the KGB, and most of the Party. His reforms were working, and everybody seemed to be doing better. Simply doing away with him wasn't an option. Sauronski had to find a way to discredit Danilov before replacing him.
War with China seemed the perfect way. By the mid-1990's, it was apparent that China would have to be put in her place sooner or later anyway. A war that dragged out a bit longer than it should have would fit the bill nicely. China would be set back, while much of the economic progress Danilov had made would evaporate. With Danilov out of favor, Sauronski could move to replace him or at least strip him of much of his power. Through a series of carefully-orchestrated maneuvers, Sauronski brought the Soviet Union and China to the edge of war, then let mutual mistrust and the situation on the border take their natural courses.
Exactly how and why Danilov allowed things to evolve as they did is still a mystery. He had much better control over events earlier in his career, when he was technically weaker. It has been suggested that he didn't really believe war would start. It has been suggested that Danilov believed a last-minute deal with Chinese Premier Zhu would head off a war and bring even greater prestige to himself. Whatever the reason, by the end of August 1995, Dmitri Danilov found himself in a war he had never wanted.
Selling this war was a painful exercise for Danilov. There was very little he could say to the West that had any meaning beyond the usual propaganda, though he dutifully made his effort at the UN and in Western capitals. For the most part, Danilov was forced to trade in much of the good will he had built in the West to keep economic credits flowing.
Since there was little the Soviets could do to justify the war in world opinion, it was important that they convince the world that the USSR was winning the war. Superiority of Soviet arms and soldiery would be its own justification in the end. As a result, Soviet propaganda efforts initially focused on the excellent progress being enjoyed by Soviet armed forces in Manchuria. Never mind who was right--the Soviets were winning.
By contrast, China found it quite easy to portray herself as the innocent victim. Though the Western media were never given the free reign on the Manchurian battlefields they would have liked, images of smashed Chinese villages and dead and injured Chinese civilians poured back to Western television virtually from the outset of the war. The Chinese Communist Party strove to play up two key images: the suffering of the Chinese people and the heroic resistance of the People's Liberation Army. In this effort they were largely successful.
Beijing quickly moved to exploit the swell of sympathy among Westerners--particularly among Americans. The large Chinese-American community was solicited to provide financial support, political support, and propaganda support for China. Though not successful everywhere, Chinese-Americans answered the call of the motherland in large numbers. Though many conservative Americans were delighted to see the two great Communist powers at war, at least as many Americans were telling pollsters that the gallant Chinese people deserved the support of the United States against the Soviet aggressors. Washington took notice.
Throughout the Western political circles, the initial reaction was one of muted relief. Despite the warming of Soviet-Western relations during the first half of the 1990's, NATO remained ready to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Many were concerned that Danilov's Soviet Union was a more dangerous Soviet Union because her core strength was greater. A Soviet Union with a healthy economy and the ability to feed herself might come under the control of an aggressive militarist. At the same time, the growing economic power of China was causing concern in the West. How long would it be before China's burgeoning economic power translated itself into military power? Already the mid-1990's, the People's Liberation Army was undergoing a significant modernization. With the Soviet Union and China at war, the West appeared to have killed two birds without actually having to throw its own stone.
Naturally, there was some concern about the war going nuclear. This fear was at its most intense during the first few days of the war, when chemical weapons were used on a large scale both on the front lines and in the rear areas. Some Western military analysts feared that whoever got the worst of the chemical exchange might go nuclear as a means of rectifying the situation. Fortunately, the chemical exchange died down without the use of nuclear weapons; however, there were several very tense days at the UN as Western mediators attempted to get both sides to pledge to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. (Despite the fact that both parties to the war already had pledged as much.)
In Europe, there was some alarm over the rapid rate of advance of Soviet ground forces in the opening weeks of the campaign. If the Soviets could make such short work of the PLA, how would they fare against the much-less-numerous Western European ground forces? Speculation was rife that NATO would be incapable of stopping a sudden Soviet sweep to the English Channel. As the Soviet advance ground to a halt, such irresponsible talk died down, though.
World opinion elsewhere varied. India gleefully watched one of her two principal rivals stagger under the heavy Soviet blows. Pakistan issued belligerent statements in support of China, one of her chief benefactors. Without China to counterbalance India, the Pakistani security situation was far more tenuous.
Generally, Soviet clients gave their support for the USSR, while Western clients decried the invasion. Many countries in trouble spots around the globe heightened their military readiness, and some even mobilized additional troops. However, for the most part things settled down in the countries not directly affected by the fighting. Notable exceptions were the two Koreas, Vietnam, and Pakistan.
Webstral
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