kato13
01-21-2010, 09:47 PM
Webstral 03-12-2004, 12:46 AM I have been thinking lately about some of the advantages/disadvantages of the Western military system versus the Soviet system when it comes to keeping forces in being after the exchanges of 1997. Just a warning: for those who are interested predominantly in the worlds of military aviation and navies, little of what I have to say will apply. What follows applies principally to ground troops.
Western armies have a significant advantage over Soviet-style armies in that the military skills are much more decentralized within the system. Whereas in the Soviet system the officers are the ones who have all the knowledge and all the power, in the Western system the NCOs share the knowledge and power with the officers. The realms of concern are different, but there is significant overlap. Also, one could easily argue that the total quality of the force is significantly greater among Western armies, in addition to the skill-holders being more broadly distributed across the force.
As a result, Western forces are going to be much better at absorbing new personnel than their Soviet counterparts. All things being equal, a 3,000-man brigade in a Western army is going to be able to make better use of 500 new recruits in 1998 than a numerically equal force of Soviets. All things being equal, by 2000 there should be an even greater disparity in force quality between Western and Soviet armies than there was in 1996. [Even given that the total quality of both forces probably will be somewhat lower, though the infantry may benefit from regular practice under unforgiving conditions.]
Of course, not all things will be equal. For one thing, Soviet equipment and Western equipment have fundamental differences. Soviet equipment isn't designed to last as long as Western equipment. Based on their WW2 experience, the Soviets believe that fighting vehicles don't last long in combat, so why build them to last? Western armies use their equipment regularly in peacetime, so they (we) are obliged to make stuff that lasts if only so we can practice with it and use the same item. Also, Westerners are more optimistic about survivability and battlefield recovery than the Soviets, also based on experience.
Much is made of the fact that Soviet equipment is cruder and simpler than Western counterparts. The downside to this is that there is a fairly low ceiling for the best performance you can get out of the system even with lavish maintenance. If you put a lot of attention into Western systems, you will get splendid results. The other side of the coin, however, is that Soviet systems can get by longer on little or no maintenance.
All this makes a big difference form 1998 onwards. Western armies are going to be hard-pressed to provide the kind of maintenance their systems demand. The Soviets aren't going to be in a great spot in terms of maintenance, either, but at least their stuff doesn't demand the same kind of attention. Also, they have a lot more vehicles to cannibalize.
As a result, the Soviets may have a better ratio of systems still working in 2000. Of course, there are about a thousand variables to enter into the equation, so one will see huge disparities within both types of armies. If the Western has better-educated people and a superior ability to train new people within the units, then the maintenance capability of the surviving Western forces should have an advantage over their Soviet counterparts. What exactly this will mean is anybody's guess.
I have been thinking about the Pact equipment that falls into Allied hands during 1997. The NATO drive across Poland, the counteroffensive in Norway, the Allied drive on the Yalu, and the Coalition counterattack in the Gulf should yield massive quantities of Pact equipment. Where does all this equipment go? Surely some of it would be available over the course of time...
Webstral
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Matt Wiser 03-12-2004, 03:48 AM Using captured equipment has been practiced pretty often: the Israelis use captured T-55s and T-62s that have been reengined, new 105 guns, air conditioning, etc; and the Whermacht often put captured Allied and Soviet equipment to use-even going as far as to have ammunition for Allied and Soviet artillery pieces manufactured in Germany! The Das Reich Division at Kursk had a company of captured T-34s, and the SS tankers put those T-34s to use against the Soviets, and Ivan didn't know about the captured T-34s until it was too late.
I'd say that NATO did put captured tanks, APCs, guns, etc,. to use after '97. The v.1 Soviet Vehicle guide has several illustrations of captured Pact vehicles being used by U.S. forces in Iran and in Europe-the US and NATO vehicle guides ORBATS don't usually mention using captured enemy tanks in force strengths, though.
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Abbott Shaull 03-24-2004, 12:06 PM Yes, I think you would see NATO and China having a rapid turn around on the use of capture equipment. Especially during the retreat from Eastern Poland in 1997. Since there would no doubtly be large number of capture Pact arms from AKs to a number of MBTs that could be put into the field.
The AKs, RPKs, PKs would be in the hands of almost everyone from cooks and clerks who have found themselves at the 'front' to Tank crews who fell a little bit better having a long arm when they have to go out of their tanks. Probably several Infantry, Combat Engineer, and Combat MPs units will have various Pact weaponary intermix with NATO weapons since Ammo is ready and not knowing where the next NATO supply point may be at when they get there. Next there is the problem that former East German Army is still a Pact equipped units.
Abbott
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Western armies have a significant advantage over Soviet-style armies in that the military skills are much more decentralized within the system. Whereas in the Soviet system the officers are the ones who have all the knowledge and all the power, in the Western system the NCOs share the knowledge and power with the officers. The realms of concern are different, but there is significant overlap. Also, one could easily argue that the total quality of the force is significantly greater among Western armies, in addition to the skill-holders being more broadly distributed across the force.
As a result, Western forces are going to be much better at absorbing new personnel than their Soviet counterparts. All things being equal, a 3,000-man brigade in a Western army is going to be able to make better use of 500 new recruits in 1998 than a numerically equal force of Soviets. All things being equal, by 2000 there should be an even greater disparity in force quality between Western and Soviet armies than there was in 1996. [Even given that the total quality of both forces probably will be somewhat lower, though the infantry may benefit from regular practice under unforgiving conditions.]
Of course, not all things will be equal. For one thing, Soviet equipment and Western equipment have fundamental differences. Soviet equipment isn't designed to last as long as Western equipment. Based on their WW2 experience, the Soviets believe that fighting vehicles don't last long in combat, so why build them to last? Western armies use their equipment regularly in peacetime, so they (we) are obliged to make stuff that lasts if only so we can practice with it and use the same item. Also, Westerners are more optimistic about survivability and battlefield recovery than the Soviets, also based on experience.
Much is made of the fact that Soviet equipment is cruder and simpler than Western counterparts. The downside to this is that there is a fairly low ceiling for the best performance you can get out of the system even with lavish maintenance. If you put a lot of attention into Western systems, you will get splendid results. The other side of the coin, however, is that Soviet systems can get by longer on little or no maintenance.
All this makes a big difference form 1998 onwards. Western armies are going to be hard-pressed to provide the kind of maintenance their systems demand. The Soviets aren't going to be in a great spot in terms of maintenance, either, but at least their stuff doesn't demand the same kind of attention. Also, they have a lot more vehicles to cannibalize.
As a result, the Soviets may have a better ratio of systems still working in 2000. Of course, there are about a thousand variables to enter into the equation, so one will see huge disparities within both types of armies. If the Western has better-educated people and a superior ability to train new people within the units, then the maintenance capability of the surviving Western forces should have an advantage over their Soviet counterparts. What exactly this will mean is anybody's guess.
I have been thinking about the Pact equipment that falls into Allied hands during 1997. The NATO drive across Poland, the counteroffensive in Norway, the Allied drive on the Yalu, and the Coalition counterattack in the Gulf should yield massive quantities of Pact equipment. Where does all this equipment go? Surely some of it would be available over the course of time...
Webstral
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Matt Wiser 03-12-2004, 03:48 AM Using captured equipment has been practiced pretty often: the Israelis use captured T-55s and T-62s that have been reengined, new 105 guns, air conditioning, etc; and the Whermacht often put captured Allied and Soviet equipment to use-even going as far as to have ammunition for Allied and Soviet artillery pieces manufactured in Germany! The Das Reich Division at Kursk had a company of captured T-34s, and the SS tankers put those T-34s to use against the Soviets, and Ivan didn't know about the captured T-34s until it was too late.
I'd say that NATO did put captured tanks, APCs, guns, etc,. to use after '97. The v.1 Soviet Vehicle guide has several illustrations of captured Pact vehicles being used by U.S. forces in Iran and in Europe-the US and NATO vehicle guides ORBATS don't usually mention using captured enemy tanks in force strengths, though.
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Abbott Shaull 03-24-2004, 12:06 PM Yes, I think you would see NATO and China having a rapid turn around on the use of capture equipment. Especially during the retreat from Eastern Poland in 1997. Since there would no doubtly be large number of capture Pact arms from AKs to a number of MBTs that could be put into the field.
The AKs, RPKs, PKs would be in the hands of almost everyone from cooks and clerks who have found themselves at the 'front' to Tank crews who fell a little bit better having a long arm when they have to go out of their tanks. Probably several Infantry, Combat Engineer, and Combat MPs units will have various Pact weaponary intermix with NATO weapons since Ammo is ready and not knowing where the next NATO supply point may be at when they get there. Next there is the problem that former East German Army is still a Pact equipped units.
Abbott
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