T2K: State of the U.S. Army in the late Twilight War

[Raellus]

Here is a little "essay" that I've been working on for a while. I thought I would take the plunge and share it here. It's a work in progress and constructive criticisms and suggestion are welcome (please be gentle). The section on Organization, IMO, is pretty weak. The rest are a collection of my thoughts on what the U.S. Army- and most other armies- would look in the later years of the Twilight War.

Introduction

After nearly three years of heavy combat, and two years removed from significant replacements of men and equipment, by 2000, the U.S. Army in Europe is a shadow of its pre-war self. Nevertheless, with no peace in sight, adjustments were made at all levels to allow the remains of the U.S. Army to continue to fight its Soviet and Warsaw Pact counterparts.

Supply

With most supply depots either destroyed by tactical nuclear strikes or emptied of their contents, keeping the troops in the field fed and clothed had become increasingly difficult by the year 2000. As early as 1998, commanders in the field received orders instructing them to live off of the land. The massive American logistics system had almost completely broken down and could keep only a handful of units supplied at mere fraction of their operational requirements. Creative, proactive commanders quickly secured food producing areas and either employed civilian farmers or tasked available troops to begin cultivation of crops for food and fuel production. Commanders that neglected matters of supply soon found their troops approaching starvation and were forced to requisition food, sometimes by force, from the local population, greatly harming the U.S. Army’s civilian relations in the affected areas.

Prepackaged combat rations and other processed foodstuffs became increasingly scarce as 2000 dawned. Although MREs and the like were still issued as emergency rations, hard-baked bread, cured meats, canned goods, and field-brewed beer had become far more familiar as combat rations as the war grinded on. Field uniforms were routinely used far past the point of viability. Civilians were frequently employed mending or even making various items of uniform. As well as weapons, helmets, and body armor, hard to make uniform items like boots and LBE were routinely stripped from the dead and reissued. Overall, a certain DIY ethos developed as field units were forced to become increasingly self-sufficient.

Transportation

By the year 2000, the means to transport the limited quantities of food, fuel, and ammunition that were available to the front line troops had also become scarce. NATO’s supplies of military trucks had been winnowed down by attrition due both to enemy action and to extended hard use. A dearth of spare parts made repairing damaged or broken down vehicles incredibly difficult. Damaged and broken down vehicles were cannibalized to provide spare parts for other vehicles. Due to their mobile role, priority in motorized transport was given to the Army’s armored and mechanized divisions. Infantry divisions had to find other means to move their supplies and equipment. Horses in occupied areas were requisitioned and simple yet functional wheeled carriages were fashioned out of truck parts. Horse-drawn wagons soon became a common sight in the rear areas of units on both sides of the conflict and they were soon tasked in hauling much of the standard infantry divisions’ artillery as well as their supplies. In this regard, as in many others, armies in the year 2000 resembled the German and Soviet armies of WWII.

Although NATO armies typically did not create horse cavalry units on anything approaching the scope or scale of the Soviet and Polish armies, smaller horse-mounted combat units were developed and deployed. Typically, horse mounted units were not encountered in NATO armies in anything larger than battalion size. More often, horse cavalry units operated at company or platoon size. These units were usually employed for reconnaissance, screening larger units during advances or withdrawals, and rear-area security operations. Although not as fast as, and more vulnerable than, wheeled vehicles, horse cavalry’s cross-country mobility was unsurpassed. An example of a horse cavalry unit in U.S. Army service is the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division’s reconnaissance battalion, the 4th squadron of the 12th cavalry, which preceded the division’s ultimately disastrous raid into northern Poland in the summer of 2000.

In order to increase the mobility of units that lacked sufficient motorized transportation, several attempts were made to reintroduce the concept of bicycle-mounted units. Some army battalions were converted to bicycle infantry. These units often served as their parent regiment’s mobile reserve.

Replacement Personnel

By late 1998, the flow of replacement troops from the United States slowed to a trickle. Those troops that did arrive in the ETO were poorly trained and marginally equipped with heavy weapons. Supply simply could not keep up with demand. Heavy combat losses could not be replaced at anything approaching a 1 for 1 basis. If fact, only about 10% of all combat losses from mid 1998 were replaced by American troops from the CONUS. Battlefield commanders were forced to find replacement combat troops from among the thousands of rear echelon soldiers already in theater. By 2000, this pool was considerably smaller than it had been in the war’s first two years. In many cases, rear echelon troops had suffered more from tactical nuclear strikes against the operational rear areas than front line combat troops had.

First to be pulled for front line duty were the pilots and ground crew of air force and army units who, due to aircraft losses and the scarcity of fuel and spare parts for what few aircraft remained, found themselves surplus to requirements. Then dedicated air defense troops who, by mid 1998, had largely lost their raison de etre, were drafted into Army units. Finally beached navy personnel, their ships destroyed or damaged beyond repair in the fierce fleet and small unit actions of 1997 and ’98, were called upon to serve in ground combat formations (when local circumstances permitted, navy personnel were usually assigned as replacements for Marine infantry units). Although some naval infantry and Air Force field units were formed during the Twilight War’s later years, these units were usually relatively small. The majority of surplus Air Force and Navy personnel were integrated into existing Army units. By early 2000 around 35% of all divisional personnel were former Air Force, Navy, and Army aviation and air defense troops.

Another method for increasing the fighting strength of American ground combat units was reducing the amount of time wounded servicemen (and women) spent convalescing before returning to active duty. Soldiers who in previous wars would have been sent home with a “million dollar wound� were cycled back into combat units. Soldiers with more serious wounds- those missing limbs, for example- were often assigned to logistics services.

After 1997, it became increasingly common to encounter troops from allied militaries serving in American combat units. Field commanders, desperate for experienced manpower, often made little or no effort to return stranded allied personnel (often wounded troops returning to duty after receiving treatment in American medical facilities) to their original units. Although many of these men deserted and returned to their own forces when the opportunity presented itself, hundreds (if not thousands) of allied troops elected to remain in their assigned American units after developing strong bonds with their new American comrades in arms. Therefore, it was not uncommon to meet British and German soldiers serving in American units (and vice-versa). Less common, but also present in American fighting units by 2000, were Canadians, Danes, Dutch, and even Australian troops.

In addition to allied troops, some former enemy troops were also eventually incorporated into U.S. army units. Enemy defectors were often employed as translators and guides. POW camps throughout the ETO were canvassed for enemy combat personnel deemed safe/stable enough to be employed as laborers or supply troops. As time wore on, many of these defectors and former prisoners found their way into combat formations. By 2000, it was not unusual to encounter former enemy combatants serving in U.S. Army line infantry units. Although there were some notable exceptions, for the most part, former enemy soldiers were assimilated piecemeal into existing American units rather than being organized wholesale into nationally homogenous “foreign legions�.

This fresh infusion of military personnel, a large proportion of which was relatively untrained and inexperienced in ground combat, was still not nearly enough to replace the devastating losses suffered by combat units. In order to free up more American soldiers for combat duty, rear echelon troops had to be culled for combat replacements. More and more duties traditionally fulfilled by rear-echelon troops were turned over to local civilian volunteers. Most supply production and distribution duties were entrusted to local civilian “contactors�. In some cases where volunteers were not forthcoming, civilians were “conscripted�. Field commanders who were able to recruit and employ willing civilian workers in these essential noncombat tasks were able to significantly increase the fighting ability of their units.

Organization

By 2000, most United States army and Marine divisions were operating at around a third of their authorized operational strengths, oftentimes much less. This posed numerous organizational and operational complications for field commanders. In many cases, shattered brigades were disbanded and their surviving personnel used as replacements for other units. The number of maneuver battalions in each brigade was often reduced. Infantry companies routinely operated at around pre-war TOE platoon strength. Most armored brigades contained only enough functional MBTs to equip a single tank battalion. Due to heavy losses in IFVs and APCs, mechanized infantry divisions were often forced to reequip at least one of their brigades with trucks, some of which were lightly armored by field depots. Wherever possible, captured enemy vehicles were used to supplement the dwindling supplies of domestically manufactured vehicles and were often organized into separate units. For example, a mechanized infantry battalion might contain one company mounted in M2 Bradley IFVs, another in M113 APCs, and a third equipped with captured BMP-2s. As with combat personnel, allied AFVs were often claimed by American units. For example, in July of 2000, the U.S. 2nd Marine Division listed a former Bundeswher Leopard III on its rolls.

In order to mislead enemy military intelligence as to NATO units’ actual strengths, and to provide whatever morale boost divisional identity and tradition may have given its members, divisional designations were maintained.

Late in the Twilight War, Divisional, brigade, and regimental HQs routinely operated with reduced staffs. Battalions, companies, and platoons were often commanded officers of lower grade than their established TOEs called for. Many platoons were commanded by NCOs. Field commissions were granted in abundance but the Army bureaucracy was so broken down that many of those commissions were never officially recognized.

[Webstral]

Very nice. You've summed up some of the material being discussed on the board quite tidily. The reorganization of divisions that nevertheless retain their original designations is a good thing to have addressed.

The fact that battlefield commissions sometimes aren't reported/recognized raises an interesting question. With such a widespread breakdown in record-keeping, a straggler could claim to be just about anybody. I wonder how many soldiers have fake ranks.

Good work!

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

Very good and right on the money in most respects. The organisation section doesn't seem as weak as you think either.

On that note, back in the day my unit conducted an exercise with only about 1/3rd strength. What has stuck in my mind the most is the "company" attack we put in on a relatively weak emeny of about 12 men (I think - it was 15+ years ago).

We had three plattoons of three sections each with 3 men (usually 9-10) plus company HQ. Each section had an M60 machinegun, an M16/M203 and an L1A1 SLR armed rifleman who also carried an M72 LAW.

The terrain was light woods with a fair amount of fallen timber. Ground cover was tall grass of up to waist high (but averaging knee high). Everyone was equiped with EWIS gear (lasers and sensors similar to the US MILES).

The attack went very badly from the start. With so few men available, the frontage to be covered and tall vegetation meant it was extremely difficult to maintain contact with those either side of you. Within the first few minutes the entire left flank was wiped out to a man. The reserve plattoon was pushed up to replace them and also wiped out.

Over on the right flank (where I was) all I could see was our section gunner trying to dash across a narrow dirt track of maybe 3-4 metres - they didn't make it. The M16 was killed a few moments later leaving just me digging a hole into the dirt with my eyeballs. I was able to reach and recover the M16 at which time the withdrawal order was given. A rifle in each hand I crawled back to the start line while providing my own cover fire.

The whole encounter had lasted no more than 15 minutes from leaving the line of departure to returning to it. Besides company HQ which had not been directly engaged only myself and one of the other section commanders remained "alive".

The enemy, which had been given about an hour to dig in, suffered no casualties.

I feel this scenario accurately highlights issues which would be faced by T2K commanders. The lack of manpower will be absolutely disasterous for any offensive actions at less than battalion level (or don't at least include fire support from mortars or artillery). Defense on the other hand, even with limited numbers, is likely to become the normal method of operation besides the odd raid which will aim not to destroy the enemy but sneak in and steal supplies.

[Marc]

Good work, Raellus.

A nice and clear summary. I think that, for active referees, it is a good reading to introduce a group of players with US characters in the Twilight background.
Right now I'm refeering two groups running the same campaign in Poland. Your little essay would had been useful in the first session of each group.

[kato13]

Right now I'm refeering two groups running the same campaign in Poland. Your little essay would had been useful in the first session of each group.

I agree, maybe we should make a list of the most useful threads for GMs to give players unfamiliar with the game.

[Abbott Shaull]

This is the first thread I have seen where the overall picture of things have been simplified enough without going too simple. Especially on the re-organization of large units. Uhm Legbreaker, you seem to answer why many units commanders simply chose to ignore their orders than to join any attack. For most operation they units would be so spread out, that the defenders would enjoy the advantage. Part of the reason even Krakow with it large ORMO wouldn't go out actively hunt bandits, until they had became such a pain they had to do something about them. Most of the leaders understood there was very little they could do.

[Rainbow Six]

Raellus, this is a really good piece of work - well done. I really like this...

[Targan]

Very nice Raellus. A fine summation.

[Raellus]

Thanks for the kudos, guys. I'm really pleased that you like it.

Feel free to use this essay as a resource for your games. I would be thrilled if you do.

I plan on expanding it a bit and I'll be sure to post the final product when it's complete.

[Jason Weiser]

It definitely works as an essay. Not to mention, some word about the mental state of the Army at this point. The survivors of the first two years of the war are going to be on the ragged edge, to put it mildly. I can see all sorts of problems with that, suicide, drug and alcohol abuse and other behavior one finds with troops in action for far too long.

Now, put into the mix a bunch of barely trained replacements who are scared, far from home and have NO idea what to do. Your MP detachments are going to be busy. I could see the size of these units increasing somewhat. Punishments are going to need to get creative...I wonder if a return to some Civil War methods might return, as the threat of sanctions under UCMJ aren't going to have the same force they used to have.

Another interesting idea, developing the DIY idea to it's logical extent. The cantonments aren't just going to have farms or cottage industries, but factories (in the 2000 sense of the term) making everything from primers for reloads, to new bicycles...how one's going to get rubber for tires and boots is going to be interesting....

[Raellus]

Good points, Jason. I will be sure to address them in the next draft. Stay tuned.

[Legbreaker]

Legbreaker, you seem to answer why many units commanders simply chose to ignore their orders than to join any attack.
I rather doubt it actually. Once one or two actions with organisations such as this failed miserably, companies would have to be consolidated into just one platoon. To least small units at such appalling low strength and expect them to fight would at best be absolutely criminal.
As can be seen in my RL example, using under strength units at the levels of T2K is nothing short of suicidal.

This is not to say prewar unit designations aren't still being used, just that infantry companies for example now consist of only one platoon, or perhaps two very weak ones rather than the three of prewar. Likewise, prewar company operations would now require the full strength of the battalion to expect any measure of success.

[Marc]

Continuing with what Jason has pointed, I think that morale status should be added when looking to the state of any army. I’m very interested in your opinions of the fellow posters about this and I think it will help to complete the picture presented by Raellus.

Given my current campaign I’m most interested about the battered US units fighting in Europe. They are far away from home and possibly without clear news about their relatives... Any place near my home has been nuked? The news about the political situation in their home country would be confusing and, perhaps, deliberately filtered or manipulated. Anyway, rumors of all colors will be circulating and evolving with astonishing speed. Any poster who have been served in any army know this. The idea that the war in Europe is in a firm stalemate and that the continuous lost of lives in a foreign country is useless would have gained followers. Some of them will be convinced that the military in high echelons are aware of this and rumors about a possible evacuation will be in the mouth of everyone long before operation Omega will become a reality. Perhaps this hope would act as a cohesive fact and will prevent a good number of desertions.

As an example, in our pre-Kalisz campaign and following my own personal criteria, I considered that the announcement of the new offensive in northern Poland is a strong strike to the morale of some of the soldiers of the units implied. “One more time...? They are asking us to do it one more time… “This could be the dominating thought in the mind of these soldiers before this last military effort. Letting apart the reasons behind the offensive, the individual soldier thinks in their own personal micro-world. He/she has managed to stay alive all these years in the worst conditions. Now, when that situation seemed somewhat stable, with only minor skirmishes and when all the efforts must be directed towards the day to day fight to obtain food… now with all these rumors about returning home…�they are asking us to do it one more time�.

[Raellus]

As an example, in our pre-Kalisz campaign and following my own personal criteria, I considered that the announcement of the new offensive in northern Poland is a strong strike to the morale of some of the soldiers of the units implied. “One more time...? They are asking us to do it one more time…"

This is a very interesting question and one that I must ponder a bit. I will definitely address the topic of morale in my next revision.

I'm interested in what others think about the issue of morale (or lack thereof) in the late Twilight War. Thoughts?

[Legbreaker]

A quick look at the units just before the offensive shows us that they were still capable at least as far as armoured strength and numbers. The situation wasn't great, but when the enemy strengths were also considered, it would have been a fair assumption by commanders that they were all still effective.

This feeling would have been passed down the chain of command through briefings of officers if not through propaganda, etc

[Webstral]

Propagandizing one's own troops would have been a priority mission during the Twilight War. I think we will have a very difficult time imagining the mindset of the troops in mid-2000, or later. Most of their frames of reference are gone. The survivors have endured a trauma unlike anything seen in the Western world since perhaps the big outbreak of the Black Plague or maybe the fall of Rome. Survivors of the 1941-1942 winter fighting on the Eastern Front might be able to give us some idea. Perhaps the Germans in May of 1945 could tell us something of what is going on in the heads of the troops of 2000. The survivors of the Tokyo firebombing or in Horishima or Nagasaki might have some idea. Obviously, there is going to be tremendous variability.

What are the troops of XI Corps thinking as they receive orders to move out from their cantonments in 2000? We may conjecture; but I think the men and women who have made it that far will have been on such an emotional roller coaster that even those of us who have been in combat probably can't identify with them, except in the most rudimentary of ways. Simply to be alive is to suffer from PTSD.

I'll bet the churches of Europe are full.

Webstral

[Marc]

What are the troops of XI Corps thinking as they receive orders to move out from their cantonments in 2000? We may conjecture; but I think the men and women who have made it that far will have been on such an emotional roller coaster that even those of us who have been in combat probably can't identify with them, except in the most rudimentary of ways. Simply to be alive is to suffer from PTSD.

I'll bet the churches of Europe are full.

Webstral

I would think the same if the war in Europe has continued without pause in 1999. I’m following v2.2 timeline, so I do not know if the same pause exists in the v1 timeline. But in 1999 the main activity seems to turn around marauding raids and protective measures against them. So, most units remain static through this year and no important military movement is mentioned until the NATO offensive in 2000. This interruption, although not a total pause, could create some hope of an end of hostilities in soldiers of both sides.

Some units will establish or consolidate their own cantonments. German units seems to have advanced more in the cantonment systems that their allies in Europe. It seems reasonable given that they are in their own land. Probably NATO and US high command will try to discourage their units to do the same. Establishing a cantonment not only implies that you are taking a defensive role, trying to control enough land to keep your unit fed. It implies a certain degree of resignation to take any important offensive action in the short term. And it means a change in the mentality and the role developed by your soldiers. In any case, something resembling to a cantonment must be established. An entire year to recover oneself or suffer the sequels due to all the lived experiences. And an entire year to listen and expand rumors in a limited conflict environment, but with a safe base, ties with the local population and occupations related to guard duties, maintenance, farming or recovery. And the sensation that everything will be over because both sides are exhausted and have suffered terrible loses with little or no gain. Change this way of live to adjust your mentality to launch yourself another time to the offensive could be a hard process.

[Abbott Shaull]

It also means that units and their commanders are moving from the mentality of one in Armor/Mechanized Force that you should always be on move and only stay in place long enough to get resupply if you have to wait for them to catch up. It also implies that your supply chain is failing, which it has.

Granted Germans would have the advantage to building up their cantonments since they are in their own country, where allied units, there will be those in the area looking at the units as just another occupation force much like the Polish would look at the Soviets in cantonments in their country.

Honest, I don't see the Soviet High Command being too thrilled with any Division of theirs or allies setting up cantonments for it means the unit doesn't plan on moving for awhile and the Soviets much like NATO relied on units being highly mobile.

Legbreak in theory the unit would be consolidated, but there are plenty examples where Company/Troop size units were still operating under the previous system and no one seem to say, "Hey we have only an oversize platoon here, let reorganize it as such." Company Commanders still wanted to have all the resource they could get, and in some cases it meant keeping old organization even though they were in many case down to platoon level or less.

[Raellus]

Here is a rough draft of the "chapter" on morale.

Your suggestions are welcome. I could use your help since I don't know what the official U.S. Army designations/equivalents are for morale and/or propaganda officers. I'm not real happy with the CRC acronym either.

The next chapter will be on health, mental and physical.


Morale

Following years of nearly constant fighting, reduced supplies, and little to no contact with the folks back home, morale in the U.S. Army of 2000 was understandably low. Efforts were made to boost the troops’ morale, increase their fighting spirit, and discourage desertion.

After the nuclear exchanges, USO shows and other official morale-boosting entertainments all but ceased. Enterprising morale officers took stock of local talent and recruited musicians, actors, comedians, and other performers from among the troops to stage improvised shows for the their comrades.

After the TDM, leaves were by and large dispensed with. Most major leave centers had been destroyed by nuclear strikes and small groups of unarmed troops were no longer safe travelling the roads between surviving population centers. This removal of even the temporary respite of a hard-earned leave no doubt led to a widespread decrease in morale. Morale officers had to get creative. Modest leave centers offering bathing facilities, clean sheets, food, drink, games, and other entertainments were set up in cantonment rear areas to provide some relief for exhausted, battle-weary troops. Whenever possible, troops were rotated through these cantonment recreation centers (CRCs) in an attempt to improve their morale.

American propaganda officers made great use of the fact that dozens of American cities had been destroyed, and millions of civilians killed, by Soviet nuclear strikes. “Remember the TDM” (Thanksgiving Day Massacre) became a slogan frequently employed to demonize the communist enemy and rouse American troops’ fighting spirits. To a lesser extent, the idea that soldiers were fighting for freedom and democracy- the “American Way of Life”- against a godless, totalitarian regime bent on world domination also motivated many of the more idealistic troops to fight on.

The cantonment, with its strong sense of community involvement and belonging, also acted as a pull-factor to keep soldiers from deserting. Many soldiers continued to fight more to defend their local cantonment than to defend their distant homeland.

Despite the Army’s best efforts, desertion became an increasing problem and field commanders were given extended latitude in dealing with deserters. Desertion was discouraged to some extent by geography. Outside CONUS, most American troops were unfamiliar with the language and culture of their surroundings. The sense of being a stranger in a strange land probably went a long way in maintaining unit cohesion. The cantonment offered a tangible sense of community and belonging to the troops who lived, worked, and fought there. Tales of cutthroat marauders* roaming the areas outside most cantonments also discouraged some would-be deserters.

*In nearly all cases, marauders were said to have been enemy deserters or local bandits. Reports of American or NATO marauder bands were generally suppressed as much as possible.

Nonetheless, officers had to contend with the slow but steady loss of fighting manpower to desertion. Over time, the Army developed a carrot- and-stick approach to discourage desertion. From time to time, amnesties were offered to deserters (the message being delivered by air-dropped leaflets and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers). Floggings and firing squads acted as the stick. Many units saw a return to corporal and capital punishment for a range of offenses, desertion foremost among them. Discipline was usually left up to the division commander and some deservedly earned a reputation for strict and sometimes brutal enforcement.

In most cases, however, soldiers kept fighting for the same reason soldiers have continued to fight under miserable circumstances for millennia- they fought for their buddies.

[chico20854]

Here is a rough draft of the "chapter" on morale.

Your suggestions are welcome. I could use your help since I don't know what the official U.S. Army designations/equivalents are for morale and/or propaganda officers. I'm not real happy with the CRC acronym either.


The term you'd use is MWR, Morale, Welfare and Recreation. There would be a MWR center or MWR tent on larger posts, smaller units (company size) have a recreation room referred to as the "dayroom". While there were European-level MWR facilities (including entire resort complexes), MWR follows the troops fairly closely.

As to who's responsible, there are two options. At the battalion and brigade level (peacetime, maybe brigade and division in 2000), the chaplain plays a significant role in maintaining the morale of the troops.

He's the only officer, in general terms, that plays a direct role in morale, other than the obvious good leader = dedicated troops in garrison and combat, poor leader = lead from the rear, so none of your own troops can lodge a bullet in your back. But the day to day little things that keep morale up is the purview of the NCO corps, often a mid-grade NCO (E-5 to E-7). Any higher rank makes the effort suspect, as GI's have a tendency to hate "mandatory fun" imposed from on high. In a company, its the first sergeant and platoon sergeant's jobs to monitor and maintain morale, while the actual duties (mail clerk, getting videos, maintaining the weight room, organizing a softball or football game, grabbing some newspapers or magazines from somewhere else) is performed by a lower rank soldier, usually somebody from the company headquarters like the commander's or first sergeants' driver, the supply clerk/armorer or the commo specialist. At battalion level, the sergeant major monitors morale, in addition to the chaplain (if any).

And with the chaplain, he plays a critical role. In addition to his spiritual duties, he's considered a neutral or friendly advocate that is to a large extent exempt from the chain of command. His duties extend well beyond conducting religious services and counseling individual soldiers... he frequently lobbies the commander on the troops' behalf to maintain/improve living conditions. And chaplains also maintain a "spiritual neutrality" in that they generally don't proselytize their particular religion - it doesn't matter if a soldier is Lutheran and the battalion has a rabbi, the soldier will receive the same treatment from his chaplain. (Chaplains in a command will work together to arrange the appropriate services - in Desert Storm, where non-Moslem services were prohibited by Saudi law, units held "Morale Meeting C", "Morale Meeting P" and "Morale Meeting J" at various times.)

And the chaplain may have to "look the other way" as far as the other means of relieving tension... camp followers. We've had a number of discussions over the years of this seedy underside of morale; even if the command (rightly) tries to suppress it, it'll probably happen anyhow, starting with the same civilian "contractors" you mentioned. (There were constant rumors about the various young ladies that worked the mess halls, barber shops and laundries on posts in Bosnia).

MWR facilities in an operational zone usually include movie tents, workout facilities, dry bars (non-alcoholic, or a 2-beer limit), American-style restaurants (in Desert Shield some units received McDonalds, hours old and cold, for Thanksgiving dinner and were overjoyed to do so!) and sports.

On top of that, living facilities make a big difference day to day. You mentioned hot showers and clean sheets. Having a solid roof rather than a tent, not living in mud and filth, hot food at least once a day, being able to clean uniforms, not being overcrowded and having a place to relax (segregated by rank - lower enlisted, junior NCOs, senior NCOs & officers) all come into play too.

So that's kind of the day-to-day morale issues in the US Army, somewhat different from the morale that makes soldiers hard chargers willing to follow their PL into the teeth of Soviet troops. Its the kind that makes soldiers attentive on guard, not desert, take care of their gear and so on.

As for what makes soldiers act and fight hard, I'll let one the paratroopers and marines talk about that kind of esprit de corps. Infantry units in general tend to be filled with pretty aggressive guys, and many a MWR facility has been seriously damaged before the MPs arrive. The next morning the senior NCOs administer the usual ass-chewing, but then follow it up with: "Did you beat their asses or get beat yourself? You better have given better than you took!" And in inter-unit fights, it's us against them, at whatever the convenient level: NATO vs Pact, Americans vs Turks, Army vs Air Force, 1st Bde vs Divarty, 1st Bn vs 2nd Bn, C Co. vs A. Co., and so on...

Hope this helps! Looking forward to more of this quality piece!

[Legbreaker]

Legbreaker in theory the unit would be consolidated, but there are plenty examples where Company/Troop size units were still operating under the previous system and no one seem to say, "Hey we have only an oversize platoon here, let reorganize it as such." Company Commanders still wanted to have all the resource they could get, and in some cases it meant keeping old organization even though they were in many case down to platoon level or less.
Keeping the pre-war standard of three infantry platoons per company, three companies (plus mortars, etc) per battalion (or however each nationality handles it) and so on requires sufficient officers to be available to command the units.

It is usual for officers (and NCOs) to suffer a higher casualty rate in combat than privates and similarly low ranks. This is because their role requires them to take more risks, leading by example and poking their heads up out of cover so they can maintain some idea of the overall situation. Therefore, there would not be enough command personnel available to keep the pre-war structure and so consolidation would be vital (or you end up with leaderless units, or units run by Corporals or even Privates).

As shown in the R/L exercise, a seriously understrength unit is completely ineffective. Because of this (and going from memory), units today are withdrawn from front line service if they suffer around 30-40% casualties, rebuilt with reinforcements and then sent back. Even the strongest T2K units have suffered in the order of 50-70% casualties.

Without reinforcements, there would be little to no choice but to consolidate smaller units while hoping to be able to reincorporate the other elements once reinforcements arrived.

Tanks and other AFVs have been proven over the past century to be extremely vulnerable when operating alone and without infantry support. Therefore a Divisions armour assets are likely to be amongst the first to be consolidated. I would expect a similar situation with aircraft and artillery - a single 105mm gun isn't anywhere near as effective a battery as 3-4 of them even if they have a near endless supply of ammunition.

[Webstral]

You might see authorized brothels appear in the cantonments. The surviving American officers might be forced by events to relax their puritanical standards and provide women for the sake of morale. The alternatives are continuing to lose men to STDs or making a self-defeating effort to completely control to movements of every private. Since it's the Ladies' Church Muffin Club types of America that keep us quite immature in the area of soldiers and sexuality, it might be fairly easy to convince post-Exchange leaders that each cantonment needs a brothel with its own medical personnel to check the women regularly.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

US soldiers in a sexually liberated Europe. Now there's a scary thought (and one that's likely to result in many "unplanned families" once the contraceptives run out).

[Webstral]

It's got to be better than the alternative. The way young American servicemembers behave in Amsterdam is just embarrassing.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

Despite the Army’s best efforts, desertion became an increasing problem and field commanders were given extended latitude in dealing with deserters.
As you've mentioned, desertion would most certainly be more of a problem in English speaking areas than in Europe, the Middle East or Korea. The language barrier would be a huge impediment to small groups or individuals trying to make it on their own.
Also, desertion when overseas could be seen by many as admitting all hope of returning home was gone. While ever at least some mail got through from time to time, soldiers would probably hang on to the hope that the military (and whatever was left of the government) might be able to scrape up enough transportation to get them all home again. I imagine great effort would be made to maintain at least minimal contact with the US, propaganda units going to far as to print fake copies of newspapers and magazines from home to distribute amongst the troops.

The reality might well be all hope was gone, but the illusion would have to be maintained at all costs.
It's got to be better than the alternative. The way young American servicemembers behave in Amsterdam is just embarrassing.
It's bad enough when they're over here in Australia. I don't even want to think about how they'd be in a country where prostitution and marijuana are legal! :O

[Ironside]

Thank you Raellus for your interesting and thought provoking essays. Thanks for your permission to borrow your ideas, I intend to do so extensively :) I look forward to reading more.

In my campaign, the locations of nuclear strikes are highly classified info due to the morale implications. My players have to decide for themselves if they still receive letters from home or not. Fortunately I don't think we have the slightest idea what would be the mindset of T2k military survivors (although being role-players we try); many of my NPCs would be considered stark, staring mad today, but I reckon it has survival value in T2k.

[Raellus]

Thanks, Ironside.

I will use MWR. I'll also add a section on chaplains, another on brothels, and another on espirit de corps.

I wonder how much espirit de corps some units would have. Those kicked around and/or nuked before being reconstituted would probably not have much. Other, more successful/storied units likely would.

Another idea I had for maintaining unit cohesion and morale is to have recuperated wounded return to their parent unit instead of to a general replacement pool. I know that the Marines and Airborne units did this in WWII whereas the regular army did not.

[Targan]

I will use MWR. I'll also add a section on chaplains, another on brothels, and another on espirit de corps.

Great work as always Rae. Hopefully you'll be able to fit in a sentence or two on the espirit de corps of brothel chaplains. A niche occupation I know but very valuable!

[pmulcahy11b]

A group of soldiers is standing outside such a brothel with their Chaplain, he turns to them and says, "Go, and do god's work this day..."

Did I go too far with that one?:D

[Webstral]

Surely not. "Be fruitful and mutliply." As I can tell you from my experience at the head of the classroom, any skills you want your people to master requires practice. This goes for multiplication in particular and math in general.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

Did I go too far with that one?:D

Well as our one and only confirmed female resident has disappeared and the trousers have come off a few members, I don't think so.

:D

[headquarters]

A group of soldiers is standing outside such a brothel with their Chaplain, he turns to them and says, "Go, and do god's work this day..."

Did I go too far with that one?:D



wouldnt the Chaplain rather exploit the red faced ,embarassed "caught outside the brothel with money in hand by a clergy man" moment to deftly sidestep the line and cut in before the squad ?

of course-half turning and crossing fingers in air towards the guys while saying " God bless you child"

[headquarters]

You could argue that what is said of the US army here could be true for other militaries too - especially if operating in foreign countries with long supply lines etc .

I believe that the lack of supplies,manpower, fuel and the poor communication would make everything slow down to a hybrid of 19th century ,20th century and 21st century warfare ,tactics and strategies.


Thus the camp followers need a detailed explanation too imho.

One definition of such :

1.A civilian who follows a military unit from place to place, especially as a vendor of supplies or as a prostitute.
2.One who follows but does not belong to a main body or group.

At some point the commanders will realize that a group of camp followers tagging along can be a benefit -for instance to outsource tasks to .Not all skills or professions will be present in their own unit and someone to do these will possibly trudge along just far enough behind that they never get there until after the fight is over .

Even today you will see stalls outside military camps selling stuff to the troops,or small businesses springing up around the camps.They do all sorts ,dig a draintrench or garbage dump,pick garbage,wash and clean vehicles,collect the brass at the range,sell ,barter,deliver,run errands,fix little or big things.

In that way the camp followers are still there.

having an efficient group of camp followers could be important to a commander in the longer run.

[Raellus]

Good point, HQ. I will add something about camp followers.

[Marc]

Having an efficient group of camp followers could be important to a commander in the longer run.

And a source of possible problems, quarrels and misunderstandings with the local population. It could generate some interesting plots for a game.

[kota1342000]

Sorry for not being around, getting net service when youre driving truck can be iffy.
I agree with the initial assessments Raellus, Outstanding. I think Ill print it off as a summary for new players.

[Raellus]

Sorry for not being around, getting net service when youre driving truck can be iffy.
I agree with the initial assessments Raellus, Outstanding. I think Ill print it off as a summary for new players.

Welcome back and thank you.

I'm working on adding some material based on the discussion here. I hope to have it up soon. Stay posted.

[Raellus]

Here's the updated version of my essay in full. I added sections on morale, supply (field factories), and communications. Feedback is still welcome. Feel free to use the essay in full or in part.


After nearly three years of heavy combat, and two years removed from significant replacements of men and equipment, by 2000, the U.S. Army in Europe is a shadow of its pre-war self. Nevertheless, with no peace in sight, adjustments were made at all levels to allow the remains of the U.S. Army to continue to fight its Soviet and Warsaw Pact counterparts.

Supply

With most supply depots either destroyed by tactical nuclear strikes or emptied of their contents, keeping the troops in the field fed and clothed had become increasingly difficult by the year 2000. As early as 1998, commanders in the field received orders instructing them to live off of the land. The massive American logistics system had almost completely broken down and could keep only a handful of units supplied at mere fraction of their operational requirements. Creative, proactive commanders quickly secured food producing areas and either employed civilian farmers or tasked available troops to begin cultivation of crops for food and fuel production. Commanders that neglected matters of supply soon found their troops approaching starvation and were forced to requisition food, sometimes by force, from the local population, greatly harming the U.S. Army’s civilian relations in the affected areas.

Prepackaged combat rations and other processed foodstuffs became increasingly scarce as 2000 dawned. Although MREs and the like were still issued as emergency rations, hard-baked bread, cured meats, canned goods, and field-brewed beer had become far more familiar as combat rations as the war grinded on. Field uniforms were routinely used far past the point of viability. Civilians were frequently employed mending or even making various items of uniform. As well as weapons, helmets, and body armor, hard to make uniform items like boots and LBE were routinely stripped from the dead and reissued. Overall, a certain DIY ethos developed as field units were forced to become increasingly self-sufficient.

Field factories- usually small workshops staffed by a couple dozen local civilian workers under U.S. military supervision- sprang up in most forward cantonments. Such factories produced all manner of military equipment and supplies. The foremost and battlefield industry was small arms ammunition reloading. Spent brass was collected, and when primers and high grade power were available, reloaded with cast lead bullets (sometimes copper jacketed). Some cantonments had the capacity to manufacture simple mortar tubes and explosive and smoke bombs (60-82mm)- the most famous example of post-exchange mortars was the WOJO multi-caliber mortar manufactured in the Free City of Krakow. Larger caliber ammunition (all types of explosive, canon, and artillery rounds) was much more difficult to manufacture with the limited resources at hand in most forward cantonments. A very limited supply of common caliber heavy weapons ammunition was produced in cities with the surviving industrial capacity to produce it. Rudimentary uniforms, boots, LBE, and other relatively simple equipment were also produced by field factories.

Transportation

By the year 2000, the means to transport the limited quantities of food, fuel, and ammunition that were available to the front line troops had also become scarce. NATO’s supplies of military trucks had been winnowed down by attrition due both to enemy action and to extended hard use. A dearth of spare parts made repairing damaged or broken down vehicles incredibly difficult. Damaged and broken down vehicles were cannibalized to provide spare parts for other vehicles. Due to their mobile role, priority in motorized transport was given to the Army’s armored and mechanized divisions. Infantry divisions had to find other means to move their supplies and equipment.

Horses in occupied areas were requisitioned and simple yet functional wheeled carriages were fashioned out of truck parts. Horse-drawn wagons soon became a common sight in the rear areas of units on both sides of the conflict and they were soon tasked in hauling much of the standard infantry divisions’ artillery as well as their supplies. In this regard, as in many others, armies in the year 2000 resembled the German and Soviet armies of WWII.

Although NATO armies typically did not create horse cavalry units on anything approaching the scope or scale of the Soviet and Polish armies, smaller horse-mounted combat units were developed and deployed. Typically, horse mounted units were not encountered in NATO armies in anything larger than battalion size. More often, horse cavalry units operated at company or platoon size. These units were usually employed for reconnaissance, screening larger units during advances or withdrawals, and rear-area security operations. Although not as fast as, and more vulnerable than, wheeled vehicles, horse cavalry’s cross-country mobility was unsurpassed. An example of a horse cavalry unit in U.S. Army service is the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division’s reconnaissance battalion, the 4th squadron of the 12th cavalry, which preceded the division’s ultimately disastrous raid into northern Poland in the summer of 2000.

In order to increase the mobility of units that lacked sufficient motorized transportation, several attempts were made to reintroduce the concept of bicycle-mounted units. Some army battalions were converted to bicycle infantry. These units often served as their parent regiment’s mobile reserve when in it was in a defensive posture.

Communication

By early 2000, with the growing scarcity of replacement components and batteries for its radios, the Army had resorted to older, slower, and more reliable methods of communication. The field telephone (often simple, sound powered units) became increasingly important, especially in cantonments and other fixed defensive positions. The use of runners and dispatch riders- sometimes local civilians- to convey messages also became common as radios broke down or wore out. In a few cases, attempts to use carrier pigeons to transport messages between distant cantonments were made. Many AFVs operated without functioning radio units. Often, those AFVs with functioning radios were assigned to unit commanders. Although accurate statistics are difficult to collect from this period, a ratio of 3 to 1 (three inoperable radios to every functioning one) seems reasonable. In this regard, as in many others, the Army of 2000 had more in common with the Army in the first two World Wars than it did with the Army of just a half a decade earlier.

Mail deliveries between the troops on campaign and the folks back in the United States all but ceased in late 1998. Telephone calls and e-mails home had stopped cold prior to that, following the TDM. A drastic decrease in morale soon followed this breakdown in personal communication. As a result, increased space on the few flights and freighters between the foreign fronts and “back home� was devoted to carrying personal mail. Distribution in the field was a nightmare and many pieces of corresponded ended up in various dead-letter offices. Nonetheless, just the impression that the Army was making significant efforts to deliver the mail had a positive effect on the morale of the troops in the field.

Replacement Personnel

By late 1998, the flow of replacement troops from the United States slowed to a trickle. Those troops that did arrive in the ETO were poorly trained and marginally equipped with heavy weapons. Supply simply could not keep up with demand. Heavy combat losses could not be replaced at anything approaching a 1 for 1 basis. If fact, only about 10% of all combat losses from mid 1998 were replaced by American troops from the CONUS. Battlefield commanders were forced to find replacement combat troops from among the thousands of rear echelon soldiers already in theater. By 2000, this pool was considerably smaller than it had been in the war’s first two years. In many cases, rear echelon troops had suffered more from tactical nuclear strikes against the operational rear areas than front line combat troops had.

First to be pulled for front line duty were the pilots and ground crew of air force and army units who, due to aircraft losses and the scarcity of fuel and spare parts for what few aircraft remained, found themselves surplus to requirements. Then dedicated air defense troops who, by mid 1998, had largely lost their raison de etre, were drafted into Army units. Finally beached navy personnel, their ships destroyed or damaged beyond repair in the fierce fleet and small unit actions of 1997 and ’98, were called upon to serve in ground combat formations (when local circumstances permitted, navy personnel were usually assigned as replacements for “local� marine infantry units). Although some naval infantry and Air Force field units were formed during the Twilight War’s later years, these units were usually relatively small. The majority of surplus Air Force and Navy personnel were integrated into existing Army units. By early 2000 around 35% of all divisional personnel were former Air Force, Navy, and Army aviation and air defense troops.

Another method for increasing the fighting strength of American ground combat units was reducing the amount of time wounded servicemen (and women) spent convalescing before returning to active duty. Soldiers who in previous wars would have been sent home with a “million dollar wound� were cycled back into combat units. Soldiers with more serious wounds- those missing limbs, for example- were often assigned to logistics services. In order to maintain unit cohesion and morale, recuperated troops were placed back in their original parent unit whenever possible.

After 1997, it became increasingly common to encounter troops from allied militaries serving in American combat units. Field commanders, desperate for experienced manpower, often made little or no effort to return stranded allied personnel (often wounded troops returning to duty after receiving treatment in American medical facilities) to their original units. Although many of these men deserted and returned to their own forces when the opportunity presented itself, hundreds (if not thousands) of allied troops elected to remain in their assigned American units after developing strong bonds with their new American comrades in arms. Therefore, it was not uncommon to meet British and German soldiers serving in American units (and vice-versa). Less common, but also present in American fighting units by 2000, were Canadians, Danes, Dutch, and even Australian troops.

In addition to allied troops, some former enemy troops were also eventually incorporated into U.S. army units. Enemy defectors were often employed as translators and guides. POW camps throughout the ETO were canvassed for enemy combat personnel deemed safe/stable enough to be employed as laborers or supply troops. As time wore on, many of these defectors and former prisoners found their way into combat formations. By 2000, it was not unusual to encounter former enemy combatants serving in U.S. Army line infantry units. Although there were some notable exceptions, for the most part, former enemy soldiers were assimilated piecemeal into existing American units rather than being organized wholesale into nationally homogenous “foreign legions�.

This fresh infusion of military personnel, a large proportion of which was relatively untrained and inexperienced in ground combat, was still not nearly enough to replace the devastating losses suffered by combat units. In order to free up more American soldiers for combat duty, rear echelon troops had to be culled for combat replacements. More and more duties traditionally fulfilled by rear-echelon troops were turned over to local civilian volunteers. Most supply production and distribution duties were entrusted to local civilian “contactors�. In some cases where volunteers were not forthcoming, civilians were “conscripted�. Field commanders who were able to recruit and employ willing civilian workers in these essential noncombat tasks were able to significantly increase the fighting ability of their units.

On occasion, some of these civilian laborers joined the units to which they were attached on campaign outside of the cantonment. In some respects, these collections of civilian logistics and support workers resembled the baggage trains and camp followers of armies through the Napoleonic Wars.

Organization

By 2000, most United States army and Marine divisions were operating at around a third of their authorized operational strengths, oftentimes much less. This posed numerous organizational and operational complications for field commanders. In many cases, shattered brigades were disbanded and their surviving personnel used as replacements for other units. The number of maneuver battalions in each brigade was often reduced. Infantry companies routinely operated at around pre-war TOE platoon strength. Most armored brigades contained only enough functional MBTs to equip a single tank battalion. Due to heavy losses in IFVs and APCs, mechanized infantry divisions were often forced to reequip at least one of their brigades with trucks, some of which were lightly armored by field depots. Wherever possible, captured enemy vehicles were used to supplement the dwindling supplies of domestically manufactured vehicles and were often organized into separate units. For example, a mechanized infantry battalion might contain one company mounted in M2 Bradley IFVs, another in M113 APCs, and a third equipped with captured BMP-2s. As with combat personnel, allied AFVs were often claimed by American units. For example, in July of 2000, the U.S. 2nd Marine Division listed a former Bundeswehr Leopard III on its rolls.

In order to mislead enemy military intelligence as to NATO units’ actual strengths, and to provide whatever morale boost divisional identity and tradition may have given its members, divisional designations were maintained.

Late in the Twilight War, Divisional, brigade, and regimental HQs routinely operated with reduced staffs. Battalions, companies, and platoons were often commanded by officers of lower grade than the units’ established TOEs called for. Many platoons were commanded by NCOs. Field commissions were granted in abundance but the Army bureaucracy was so broken down that many of those commissions were never officially recognized.

Morale

Following years of nearly constant fighting, reduced supplies, and little to no contact with the folks back home, morale in the U.S. Army of 2000 was understandably low. Efforts were made to boost the troops’ morale, increase their fighting spirit, and discourage desertion.

After the nuclear exchanges, USO shows and other official morale-boosting entertainments all but ceased. Enterprising morale officers took stock of local talent and recruited musicians, actors, comedians, and other performers from among their parent units to stage improvised shows for the troops. After the TDM, leaves were by and large dispensed with. Most major leave centers had been destroyed by nuclear strikes and small groups of unarmed troops were no longer safe travelling the roads between surviving population centers. This removal of even the temporary respite of a hard-earned leave no doubt led to a widespread decrease in morale. Unit commanders had to get creative. Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) centers offering bathing facilities, clean sheets, food, drink, games, and other entertainments were set up in cantonment rear areas to provide some relief for exhausted, battle-weary troops. In some cases, the MWR included an Army-sanctioned brothel employing local women (volunteers, for the most part) and supervised by Army health officers. As often as possible, troops were rotated through these MRWs in an attempt to improve morale.

As their predecessors had done for centuries, unit chaplains also played an important role in helping to maintain morale. Whether officiating over religious services, administering the last rights, or simply providing the troops with someone to talk to, most chaplains worked hard to improve their charges’ sagging morale.

American propaganda officers made great use of the fact that dozens of American cities had been destroyed, and millions of civilians killed, by Soviet nuclear strikes. “Remember the TDM� (Thanksgiving Day Massacre) became a slogan frequently employed to demonize the communist enemy and rouse American troops’ fighting spirits. To a lesser extent, the idea that soldiers were fighting for freedom and democracy- the “American Way of Life�- against a godless, totalitarian regime bent on world domination also motivated many of the more idealistic troops to fight on. The cantonment, with its strong sense of community involvement and belonging, also acted as a pull-factor to keep soldiers from deserting. Many soldiers continued to fight more to defend their local cantonment than to defend their distant homeland.

Despite the Army’s best efforts, desertion became an increasing problem and field commanders were given extended latitude in dealing with deserters. Desertion was discouraged to some extent by geography. Outside CONUS, most American troops were unfamiliar with the language and culture of their surroundings. The sense of being a stranger in a strange land probably went a long way in maintaining unit cohesion. The cantonment offered a tangible sense of community and belonging to the troops who lived, worked, and fought there. Tales of cutthroat marauders* roaming the areas outside most cantonments also discouraged some would-be deserters.

*In nearly all cases, marauders were said to have been enemy deserters or local bandits. Reports of American or NATO marauder bands were generally suppressed as much as possible.

Nonetheless, officers had to contend with the slow but steady loss of fighting manpower to desertion. Over time, the Army developed a carrot- and-stick approach to discourage desertion. From time to time, amnesties were offered to deserters (the message being delivered by air-dropped leaflets and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers). Floggings and firing squads acted as the stick. Many units saw a return to corporal and capital punishment for a range of offenses, desertion foremost among them. Discipline was usually left up to the division commander and some deservedly earned a reputation for strict and sometimes brutal enforcement.

Skyrocketing suicide rates also slowly sapped the fighting strength of units in the field. A sense of dislocation, news of the massive civilian casualties back home, the traumatic experience of combat and the widespread sense that the war would never end led many troops to depths of despair. The Army in the field simply did not have the resources to provide mental health services to the growing number of troops dealing with PTSD and other psychological problems. Despite the Army’s best efforts to raise morale, many soldiers decided that death was the only way out of a horrific and hopeless situation.

In most cases, however, soldiers kept fighting for the same reason soldiers have continued to fight under miserable circumstances for millennia- they fought for their buddies.

[kato13]

This seems perfect for a handout so I attached it as an rtf file.

[Webstral]

And a source of possible problems, quarrels and misunderstandings with the local population. It could generate some interesting plots for a game.

I agree. The hangers-on, who are doing some of the jobs that used to be done by the army, are a rich vein of material. I haven't done much with camp followers because I've mostly dealt with units that have fixed bases. However, in the viscous fluidity of the military situation of 2000 in Europe, camp followers would be a big issue.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

However, in the viscous fluidity of the military situation of 2000 in Europe, camp followers would be a big issue.
I can see them being a huge hinderance too if the military unit relies on them too much. If the unit has to move, they'll need to either find transport for their support network, or try to sustain themselves for a while until the followers can either catch up, or a new group is established. Using the 5th and their relatively long and fast movement as an example, this could be quite some distance and for a very long time.

[Marc]

Great work with the updated version, Raellus. Easy to read and with all the needed points to introduce the players in the "Twilight Way of Life". It will keep it in hand for my future sessions. Thanks.

[sglancy12]

Despite the Army’s best efforts, desertion became an increasing problem and field commanders were given extended latitude in dealing with deserters. Desertion was discouraged to some extent by geography. Outside CONUS, most American troops were unfamiliar with the language and culture of their surroundings. The sense of being a stranger in a strange land probably went a long way in maintaining unit cohesion. The cantonment offered a tangible sense of community and belonging to the troops who lived, worked, and fought there. Tales of cutthroat marauders roaming the areas outside most cantonments also discouraged some would-be deserters.

Nonetheless, officers had to contend with the slow but steady loss of fighting manpower to desertion. Over time, the Army developed a carrot- and-stick approach to discourage desertion. From time to time, amnesties were offered to deserters (the message being delivered by air-dropped leaflets and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers). Floggings and firing squads acted as the stick. Many units saw a return to corporal and capital punishment for a range of offenses, desertion foremost among them. Discipline was usually left up to the division commander and some deservedly earned a reputation for strict and sometimes brutal enforcement.


I would just like to offer a couple of things on the subject of desertion.

First, I imagine that the desertion among US Armed Forces over seas would be a lot lower than the rate among forces in the Continental United States. Here are my reasons:

The primary motive for desertion, in my humble opinion, is to get away from the dangers, terrors and discomforts of military duty in the time of war. But with the entire world reduced to chaos following three years of war and a limited nuclear exchange, leaving the armed forces is actually going to make the individual less safe, more uncertain and less comfortable. Being in the armed forces of the remnant of a national government means that there is a remote possibility of resupply or other forms of outside assistance. Safety in numbers and all that. So there is more motive for staying with the organized unit.

The second most compelling reason to desert is, IMHO, a desire to reunite with friends and family outside the military. This desire is going to be a stronger motivator for desertion than the desire for a life of ease, since frankly, there is no life of easy anywhere. To truly find such a life of relative safety and security, a deserter would have to try and reach France or Sweden or Australia or South America. None of that is very likely for US forces deployed over seas. Not the least of which because many of these places may have policies in place hostile to refugees. Think "Children of Men" for how the Union Frances probably treats refugees.

So being stationed in Europe, the Middle East or Korea places the US serviceman so far from home and (in the case of the Middle East and Korea) in such xenophobic and hostile terrain that sticking with their unit may be the only way to survive. Deserters would get a pretty hostile reception from the locals and might have to come crawling back to their unit for food and protection.

Deserters who return on their own might make excellent deterrents for other deserters. Rather than court martial and execute or flog the deserter, the unit commander might make him available to tell everyone how bad it sucks out there in the world all by your lonesome surrounded by Poles, Muslims and Koreans all giving you the stink eye and trying to figure out whether you're worth the trouble to rob.

In fact, the only chance of getting home is to stick with your unit and pray for an evacuation. In fact, after Operation Omega, I imagine that any deserters in the Perisan Gulf or Korean Peninsula might return to their units because they want to be sure they don't miss their only ticket home. I'm sure that when they return they will bring some very interesting stories to cover their absence.

Just to throw in some useless statistics I got off wikipedia... the Pentagon reported just under 8,000 desertions between the start of the Iraq war and 2006. Of those, only one desertion occurred overseas. Take those stats with a grain of salt, but I wouldn't be surprised by them at all.

US Forces stationed in the United States would therefore, I believe, have a much higher desertion rate due to soldiers wanting to return to their home communities (presuming they are not known to have been nuked) and ascertain the welfare of family and friends. After all, they can just start walking and eventually they can get there. With little except official communications crossing the country, many service men are going to walk away from their posts and try and check on their families.

However, these desertions would not have to be permanent. Once servicemen and women have either determined the fate or condition of their home town, neighborhood and loved ones, they might realize that they want to resume their duty and return to the military. (This presumes that their family isn't in a situation where they need every trained, experienced soldier they can get their hands on in order to make it through the week alive.)

Going back to federal service might be as easy as just strolling into the nearest CivGov or Milgov outpost and reporting for duty. Of course a unit commander may have very reasonable suspicions about taking on a probable deserter. Is this man working for marauders? Are they a spy for one of the other Governments? Is he going to sap morale or discipline and try and recruit others to desert with them next time? Even with those valid concerns, it seems unlikely that a deserter would be turned down if they wanted to rejoin... even if they admitted to having walked away from their previous post rather than maintain the fiction that they are just "separated from their unit."

As to punishment, sure you could flog them, like it's the Napoleonic Age, but after that the punishment better be pretty light. You could shoot them like some Communist commissar, but that's hardly the American way of war and it's likely to ensure that those that desert never try to rejoin your unit. Likely as not there would instead be some pretty grueling punishment details, but nothing that would be the equivalent of a suicide mission. Just all the dirty jobs that no one wants to do in the army. Digging Latrines. Providing the muscle digging entrenchments and filling sandbags. Digging. Digging. Digging.

Soldiers probably fear their Sergeant coming at them with a shovel more than they fear a punch in the guts or a boot to the head.

Mind you, I'm talking about soldiers who volunteer to rejoin a unit, not deserters who got caught sneaking out of the perimeter or who got caught napping in a deserted house by a patrol. The ones who are brought back at the point of a bayonet would be far more likely to face corporal or even capital punishment.

Just some thoughts.

Should we create a separate thread to discuss the way other countries address their desertion and recruitment problems?

And what do you call it when deserters/stragglers attempt to rejoin friendly forces? What is the term for that?


A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

[Legbreaker]

I agree wholeheartedly about the desertion issue as described by sglancy. I'd even go so far as to extend the arguement to cover Soviet troops in Poland - Home is a VERY long walk away through terrain absolutely crawling with marauders and rear eschelon units just waiting to pounce upon deserters.
At least staying with the military gives strength in numbers and the probability of food in the belly for the forseeable future.

[pmulcahy11b]

I'll agree with SGlancy here. When you are a part of a military unit, they become your family in a big way -- that unit becomes your home with an extended family (albeit, often dysfunctional) in it. In the face of World War 3, the survivors of that unit will draw even closer together when they are far away from the US and there's no immediate prospect of going home in sight.

In combat, your fellow soldiers' safety also often becomes more important to you than your own safety. Even in peacetime, letting your fellow soldiers down is really considered low. That too will draw the surviving troops closer together. It may even be what holds together units composed of different nationalities.

[Legbreaker]

Even conscripts are going to feel the sense of family. It might only be a sense all conscripts are in the same boat, but they will still feel it. This may go some way towards explaining why individual desertions from the PACT forces were fairly minimal while whole units disobeyed higher command and stuck together (at least initially until the supplies on hand ran out).

[Webstral]

In most cases, however, soldiers kept fighting for the same reason soldiers have continued to fight under miserable circumstances for millennia- they fought for their buddies.

A very nice piece of work, Raellus. I agree with others that this would make a very good, very tidy introduction to Twilight: 2000 for new players.


Webstral

[Webstral]

US Forces stationed in the United States would therefore, I believe, have a much higher desertion rate due to soldiers wanting to return to their home communities (presuming they are not known to have been nuked) and ascertain the welfare of family and friends. After all, they can just start walking and eventually they can get there. With little except official communications crossing the country, many service men are going to walk away from their posts and try and check on their families.

Good call on that one. Wherever on e wishes to set the bar for desertions, CONUS is going to have it worse than the ETO, the Middle East, or Korea.

Webstral

[Raellus]

A PDF of the article.

[Raellus]

The article translated into Catalan and illustrated by our very own Marc. Thanks, mate!

https://sites.google.com/site/elrefugidelargonauta/twilight-2000/estat-de-l-exercit-dels-estats-units-a-les-acaballes-del-conflicte

[Marc]

Thanks to you, Raellus. :)

After reading your Ok, I’ve added the link to access the page from our Twilight:2000 section of L’Argonauta. I’m sure our visitors will enjoy the overall result.

[Lundgren]

Really nice writeup :)

Shows that there are a lot of good information that I still haven't found at this forum.

[B.T.]

@ Raellus: Excellent write-up, good info, consider it "stolen" :)
@Marc: I cant read it, but the illustrations seem very fitting!

[Raellus]

Thanks, guys. I'm currently working on a "chapter" on cantonments. I'll post a draft for review as soon as its finished.

[Draq]

An excellent article, I've included it in my 'introduction' folder. A small compilation of things that form a comprehensive summary of the setting for v1 t2k, without having to sort through the books.

[Raellus]

Thanks, Draq. I'm pleased that you found it helpful.

[pmulcahy11b]

This is a good article. Just one point I'd like to make. While aircraft and helicopter use was still viable, rear-area troops could find themselves fighting special ops, airborne, and air assault troops on a regular basis -- Soviet OPLANs called for huge drops to capture certain supplies such as CEOIs, KYK modules, POL -- and places like B/D/G/JTACS and B/D/G/JTOCS practice sudden mass relocations (sudden for them, still takes about an hour for everyone to get going). They will also find themselves plastered by artillery, rockets, missiles, and air strikes, more than a soldier at the front might see.

[Raellus]

I didn't mean to imply that rear-area/support troops didn't see any combat prior to the manpower shortages that necessitated their conversion to line infantry. You're absolutely right about shelling and Soviet raiders. I just meant that they wouldn't have a lot of firsthand experience in conducting basic infantry tactics- much less, at least, than front-line troops.

[swaghauler]

Nice post man.