BCT Idea: When and Where?

[kalos72]

Anyone know when the Army's new Brigade Combat Team idea formed and who was the major driver in the design and later implementation? Anyone have a link or details please?

[HorseSoldier]

When: Post-Iraq invasion.

Who: Some jackass who needed an extra bullet statement on his OER if he was ever going to make general.

Why: See above. Probably the same jackass who signed off on the universally-ineffective camouflage pattern we got shafted with in the same time frame.

More seriously, while it is not an exact blueprint for the BCT idea, Douglas MacGregor's Breaking the Phalanx (http://www.amazon.com/Breaking-Phalanx-Design-Landpower-Century/dp/0275957942), which came out in the mid-late 90s, suggested a lot of the ideas that later got incorporated in the re-org.

[Jeff9650]

I think this might help you:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/bua.htm

[Webstral]

Breaking the Phalanx said some things that needed saying. A lot of people were wondering why so much of the organic support was held at the division level--basically why there was such a strong distinction between independent brigades and divisional brigades. Somalia brought the problem into sharp focus. Other deployments in which formations had to be assembled piecemeal reinforced the idea that the US Army needed a more modular design.

There was a lot of resistance for a couple of reasons. The combat support folks and the combat service support folks were going to lose a lot of senior slots--especially among the officers. Division commanders were going to lose some of their power to influence events by concentrating all of the division's support assets. However, since in practice the the support assets were OPCON'd (operational control) to the brigades, the next logical step was to make the assignment permanent. This is the latest swing of the pendulum in the endless battle between centralization and decentralization.

It seems that the battalion commanders of the support troops have been given some major additional challenges. Command of a combined support package must be at least as challenging as command of a combined arms package.

I'm quite fond of the maneuver enhancement brigade concept. I advocated something quite like it before the MEB came online. This, and the sustainment brigades, is where I think all National Guard brigades should be headed. I remain convinced that if our Regular Army combat arms guys are being trained properly during their time at their home bases, then there is no way for reservists to maintain comparable skills. One weekend a month, plus a two-week AT, just isn't enough to keep the infantry (or other combat arms) sharp and ready for action. Combat support and combat service support jobs offer more forgiving conditions for brushing up on the necessary skills.

At any rate, the concept of the division being a miniature corps that can be tailored for specific missions is one that was long overdue, in my mind. If need be a mech-pure division still can be assembled; but the modular concept enables a heavy division to take on as many light troops as necessary to accomplish a specific mission or a light division to take on heavy troops.

My comments, HorseSoldier, are intended to support your observation.

Webstral

[Eddie]

Not to take away from Web, the short answers to your questions are General Eric Shinseki is credited with the move beginning in 1998 and 1999. Who the actual guy that thought it up was, the world may never know, but he was the guy in charge at the time and was the face of it.

[kalos72]

Thanks guys... :)