National Guard on the Joint Chiefs!?!?!

[dragoon500ly]

Just when you think that nothing more silly can come out of "Wonderland on the Potomac"...

Two West Virginia Democrats, Sen John Rockefeller and Rep Nick Rahall, have introduced the "Guardians of Freedom Act of 2010". The purpose of GOFA is to give the National Guard a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to "overcome decades of underfunding". The National Guard Association is supporting this bill stating "they have earned the permanent seat at the table."

Two years ago, Congress approved the elevation of the National Guard Bureau chief to four-star rank as well as being officially considered to be an advisor to the Secretary of Defense.


I mean no disrepect to any members of the National Guard, but the Guard has never been considered to be an independent service. There is no need whatsoever to promote a National Guard Chief of Staff. This is nothing more than politics as usual in a city known for losing its grasp on reality.

The simple repair to decades of underfunding is for Congress to allow additional funding on the next defense spending bill.

Wait, did I just accuse Congress of not adequately funding something essential....silly me! Its more important to divert that money to build a six lane highway in somebody's district that doesn't go anywhere; or maybe build a four lane highway bridge to a remote island with a couple of hundred people living on it; or maybe spend six million dollars to study the reproductive habits of the North American Spotted, Sprial-Horn Earthworm!

Politicans!!!! :mad:

[natehale1971]

Ever notice how stupidity like this happens when people go to DC and think that they can run the world better than the people who are actually on location?

[pmulcahy11b]

It's like Joe Haldeman said in The Forever War: You know an army's getting old when it gets top-heavy with officers.

But then again, considering the amount of our defense is National Guard, putting a three-star in charge of all National Guard forces might be legitimate.

[Adm.Lee]

A seat at the DoD table, I can see. Not the JCS. The former plans and prepares for war, the latter executes it, and the Guard(s) have no relation to that function.

IMO, anyway.

[Snake Eyes]

Ever notice how stupidity like this happens when people go to DC and think that they can run the world better than the people who are actually on location?

Is that anything like how every other E-4 thinks he knows better than the Pentagon's civilian leadership how to run the military?

[pmulcahy11b]

Is that anything like how every other E-4 thinks he knows better than the Pentagon's civilian leadership how to run the military?

It's true more often than you think...

[pmulcahy11b]

A seat at the DoD table, I can see. Not the JCS. The former plans and prepares for war, the latter executes it, and the Guard(s) have no relation to that function.

IMO, anyway.

Misread the original post. They don't belong at the JCS any more than, for example, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander belongs at the JCS.

[natehale1971]

Is that anything like how every other E-4 thinks he knows better than the Pentagon's civilian leadership how to run the military?

There are many times, that the Civilians put in charge at the Pentagon just DO NOT LISTEN to the military advisers, because they think they know everything. One such official during the Clinton Years was always talking down to the people on their staff because they felt they were so much more highly educated. Turned out one of the O4s on the staff had several doctorates, and had been a member of several groups like Mensa.

The Head of the National Guard (both Army and Air) should have a seat at the JCOS table... but ONLY during a time of war. Just like the Commandant of the Coast Guard has a seat at the table.

Hell, i've been saying for years that the US should have a land-based military branch similar to the Coast Guard... Either called US Border Guard or US Territorial Guard.

[Snake Eyes]

There are many times, that the Civilians put in charge at the Pentagon just DO NOT LISTEN to the military advisers, because they think they know everything.

Sure ... but compare that to the flipside, where the military brass occasionally has to be reminded who is really in charge of policy - McClellan, MacArthur, McChrystal, et al.




Hell, i've been saying for years that the US should have a land-based military branch similar to the Coast Guard... Either called US Border Guard or US Territorial Guard.

Probably not a bad idea.

[Legbreaker]

Sure ... but compare that to the flipside, where the military brass occasionally has to be reminded who is really in charge of policy - McClellan, MacArthur, McChrystal, et al.

Oh, good point!
I wonder if it's a prerequisite to have "Mc" or "Mac" to be a "difficult" General... :confused:

[Snake Eyes]

I wonder if it's a prerequisite to have "Mc" or "Mac" to be a "difficult" General... :confused:

I never realized that until I typed it out. Weird.

[dragoon500ly]

It's a good ides to have the military answer to the elected officials, its when the elected offcials feel that they have a better understanding of how to conduct military operations (LBJ and Carter come to mind).

I could never be a general officer, simply because if I was in a situation where I was in the Oval Office, watching the President make a dumb ass decision, my bullfrog mouth would override my humming bird ass!!! ;)

[Webstral]

There’s no call for a National Guard representative on the JCS. That’s just silly.

Don Rumsfeld is a perfect example of the non-serving civilian who thinks he knows better than the professionals. He was good at getting certain things done. But the Iraq fiasco has undone whatever good he may have done in the past.


Webstral

[HorseSoldier]

I can +1 the idea of them not needing a seat on the JCS but think there may be something to the idea of evolving the ARNG into its own branch. Having spent way too much time on both the AD and NG side of things one thing I've noted is just how much training time the NG pisses away trying meet AD admin and other requirements.

[dragoon500ly]

The US armed forces has always suffered from too much tail and not enough teeth. A lot of this stems from the US experience in World War Two, where the Regular Army was jumped from ten or so divisions up to 90 active divisions, plus hundred of supporting battalions. The existing RA and NG were so overwhelmed, that one of the surveys that was conducted at the time, showed that there was one prewar soldier for every forty war time only soldiers.

It also didn't help that the National Guard was considered to be a hot bed of political apointees and over-aged soldiers, coupled with several scandals concerning state misuse of NG funding, the Guard entered WWII and suffered the brutal culling of a sizable portion of its prewar leadership. Ever since then, it has almost been a mindset in the RA, that this would have to be done again, in the event of a major war.

The NG has always been considered to be under-funded and poorly-equipped. Even more so during the periods 1970-1990. Even the National Guard Round-Out Brigades were not considered to be combat-ready for at least 30 days with many of the divisions considered to not be ready for combat for 90+ days. But during the lean years of post-Vietnam, even the RA was scrambling for adequate funding. Virtually the only combat capable divisions during this period were 2nd Infantry in Korea, 82nd and 101st Airborne (Strategic Reserve), and US Army Europe. The REFORGER units would have gone into combat missing a third of their front line strength, not to mention shrortages in equipment and personnel on top of that. The equipment situation was made even worse by the stripping of spare parts and the removal of critical equipment from stateside combat equipment.

So I do agree with the decision to move the National Guard bureau chief up to four-star rank. The NG has always needed a louder voice in DoD...but to make the NG a separate branch? Or give them a seat on JCS? Nope! From its foundation following the Spanish-American War, the NG has always been a reserve componment of the RA.

[Webstral]

Issues of underfunding and training time for the Army reserve components go to the very role of the National Guard. When one compares the training time per annum for the RA with the training time for the AR or NG, one is forced to choose between conclusions: the NG is training to an acceptable standard, and therefore the RA is squandering vast amounts of resources with its grossly inflated training budget and schedule; or the RA is training to an acceptable standard and the NG is not. Having worked both sides of the fence in the combat arms, I’m going to say that the latter is a more credible conclusion.

When it comes down to it, the National Guard has no business maintaining combat brigades on a part-time basis. There are several reasons for this. Most pressing (in my mind) is the business of skills. The combat arms kill people and break things. Popular opinion notwithstanding, killing folks and breaking things is a skilled activity that requires constant maintenance if it is to be done correctly once the shooting starts. Naturally, this is why the idea of having reserve formations receive supplementary training before deployment comes up. Unfortunately, this training is overseen by generals who are more interested in preserving their own careers than in properly training their people. Plans are drawn up, and boxes are checked. My unit spent five months training for deployment, and by the end the best that can be said is that we had been run ragged to no good end. We spent a single day—one [expletive deleted] day—on the rifle range. I spent a day at the M203 range, where I received a sub-rudimentary refresher and fired a dozen 40mm grenades. I spent a day at the M240B range, where I fired 200 rounds. The only thing we did reasonably intensively was CQB (close quarters battle). Under the tutelage of our 93rd ID instructors, we spent three or four days in CQB marksmanship. On our own, we practiced house clearing drills with guys who had done it in a high-speed RA unit and a SWAT guy who had joined our unit the month before we were called up.

Given all of this, the idea that NG combat brigades would hit the ground with acceptable levels of proficiency at the deadliest trade is rather unlikely. We just got lucky.

Going further, do the various states really require combat brigades organized and equipped like Regular Army units for any purpose written into any of the applicable constitutions? Unless Mexico or Canada is planning an invasion, none of the border states have any use for tanks and MRL in the pursuit of state security and disaster relief. There isn’t much justification for infantry, either. Well-equipped MPs, yes. Infantry, no. The NG combat brigades are a federal reserve that the states get control of until the feds need them. It’s all very silly.

The Army National Guard is in dire need of repurposing. Combat brigades should be phased out and replaced with a National Guard equivalent of Maneuver Enhancement Brigades and Sustainment Brigades. These brigades would be able to take care of disaster relief and security missions perfectly well. One might go so far as to imagine a very small combat arms force for each state maintained on active duty and trained specifically to do rare but tough internal security jobs. These guys would be very few in number, though.

The jobs that MEB and SB perform are a bit more forgiving of on-the-job relearning than combat roles. It would be much more palatable to call up a NG MEB and send them in-theater after a month of refresher training.

The Army’s reserve combat arms strength should be built into the picture. The balance of active combat brigades to active support brigades should be adjusted so that a significantly larger number of trigger-pullers are training at bases where the logistical and support systems are in place already. Instead of relying on the National Guard for additional combat units, the Army should have the combat units it needs training on a full-time basis but a relative shortage of active support units. The support would come from activated NG units.

Of course, my ideas have not a prayer of being put into practice. The inertia of politics and perception will require something more than the ideas of a lowly rifleman before they are overcome.


Webstral

[Adm.Lee]

The US armed forces has always suffered from too much tail and not enough teeth. A lot of this stems from the US experience in World War Two, where the Regular Army was jumped from ten or so divisions up to 90 active divisions, plus hundred of supporting battalions.

"Always?" IMO, the US is usually caught short in both tail and teeth, and the formation of both takes time. Post-WW2, the planning has been to have enough of both by using the Guard and Reserves. The US is in the position that we need more "tail" than most armies, since American forces almost always have to go somewhere else to fight.

[dragoon500ly]

Going further, do the various states really require combat brigades organized and equipped like Regular Army units for any purpose written into any of the applicable constitutions? Unless Mexico or Canada is planning an invasion, none of the border states have any use for tanks and MRL in the pursuit of state security and disaster relief. There isn’t much justification for infantry, either. Well-equipped MPs, yes. Infantry, no. The NG combat brigades are a federal reserve that the states get control of until the feds need them. It’s all very silly.

The Army National Guard is in dire need of repurposing. Combat brigades should be phased out and replaced with a National Guard equivalent of Maneuver Enhancement Brigades and Sustainment Brigades. These brigades would be able to take care of disaster relief and security missions perfectly well. One might go so far as to imagine a very small combat arms force for each state maintained on active duty and trained specifically to do rare but tough internal security jobs. These guys would be very few in number, though.

The jobs that MEB and SB perform are a bit more forgiving of on-the-job relearning than combat roles. It would be much more palatable to call up a NG MEB and send them in-theater after a month of refresher training.

The Army’s reserve combat arms strength should be built into the picture. The balance of active combat brigades to active support brigades should be adjusted so that a significantly larger number of trigger-pullers are training at bases where the logistical and support systems are in place already. Instead of relying on the National Guard for additional combat units, the Army should have the combat units it needs training on a full-time basis but a relative shortage of active support units. The support would come from activated NG units.

Webstral


You know, this is an intresting train of thought. If the RA was responsible solely for the combat arms with all support functions part of the National Guard with the Reserves responsible for training/expansion, hmmmmm need to run some numbers...

[Legbreaker]

It's a very practical approach in my opinion. Many (hopefully all) reserve troops have civilian skills whch may or may not be put to good use in supporting roles. Not very many civilian skills are likely to see a lot of use at the sharp end ona regular basis.
Here in Australia there has been a move to "demilitarise" many support type jobs. One that springs to mind is the massive reduction in the Catering Corp back in the late 80's early 90's. Where previously there wasn't a civilian in sight, by the mid 90's most of the messes I attended had roughly 1 senior soldier (usually a Warrant Officer or Staff Sergeant) to about 10 civilian cooks, cleaners, dishwashers, etc. The majority of the civilians were ex-prisoners out on parole, so I can't say it was exactly quality being produced...

[HorseSoldier]

I agree with Webstral's post, at least in regards to conventional units -- assorted unrealistic or irrelevant annual taskings undermine the ability to train to even a modest standard in peacetime, and then pre-deployment training once activated is just shoddy (at least the pre-deployment training I got from a USAR unit mostly featured instructors wearing clown shoes -- I'm sure there is a range of quality, and there simply has to be better out there than the incompetent jackasses I dealt with).

On weekend drill status basically I just can't train my Joes to do anything between Regular Army requirements that usually aren't even tailored to the reality of the National Guard and a National Guard chain of command geared towards pretending we're Regular Army two days a month.

Quarterly, I've got six training days or so to work with. Of those six training days, I lose a half day or so to Suicide Prevention classes, mood assessments, SGLI benefit and GI bill briefings and assorted other stuff that does nothing to help build survivable trigger pullers.

I lose another day or so, total, to PT formations where my chain of command says guys have to dress up in APFT uniforms and do Regular Army style PT -- which at two days a month does nothing to help their actual PT scores. My argument that I can accomplish the same calorie burn by putting my guys in full kit and have them do IMT, casaulty carries, bail out drills from our vehicles, and assorted other stuff that does build competence, muscle memory, and reflexive knowledge needed to be survivable trigger pullers pretty much falls on dead ears because my career minded chain of command is afraid higher ups will only see that we don't suit up in PT uniforms and do side straddle hops and conclude that PT is not a priority.

Figure another training day per quarter, total, is blown drawing vehicles, turning vehicles in, and loading and unloading BII, because the full-time guys running the CSMS won't just give up an extended dispatch on vehicles so every weekend I've got Joes on the trucks they have to draw and turn them in. The Regular Army doesn't do extended dispatch for vehicles that will just sit in the motor pool, so the NG won't do it either.

Take another quarter to half day off the calendar for accountability layouts of TA-50 either to make sure the Joes don't show up to drill in mid-winter without their issued cold weather stuff or to make sure the books are squared away for the supply sergeant getting his books inspected.

Finally, figure another half day to day is wasted doing NCOERs, counseling for junior enlisted, and such that some leadership won't do on their own time because they aren't getting paid for it.

So when it's all said and done I've got maybe a total of 2-3 days worth of actual training time -- and that is even still sort of a misleading, since those days are mostly chopped up and shortened by all the above complications. And then a chunk of that time is still spoken for doing stupid stuff like getting everyone qualified on the current combatives program training them to roll around in ACUs and wrestling shoes and thinking that provides relevant skills for going hands on with eighty pounds of kit on and a rifle strapped to you.

Frankly, I may have gotten spoiled by too much time on the dark side where things work a whole lot better and the division between NG and AD isn't nearly as notable but it's just a mess -- and I actually think that nine years of war has made the system more broken, rather than exposed issues and lead to corrections.

[dragoon500ly]

Never seems to fail does it, you have to spend so much time doing make work, paper work, nitpick work and never be able to spend enough time teaching your soldiers how to be soldiers.

[Webstral]

Horse, we experienced much the same phenomenon. Even when we were training, most of the time was spent lounging about waiting for the next thing. There was one day on one drill when we had lanes set up so that everyone was kept busy about half of the time. This was good stuff, if very basic. The RA functions the same way, lamentably, but at 18+ training days per month they can waste a little time.
Dragoon, I don't mean that all of the support functions should be turned over to the reserves. I think, though, that the reserves should turn all of their combat brigades into support brigades, while the RA should turn a like number of support brigades into combat brigades. The RA should retain enough support capacity to get the ball rolling at the beginning of the next deployment and to act as a nucleus around which reserve brigades can be arranged to build corps-level assets. The modular brigade system would allow support packages to be tailored on both sides of the street. Perhaps all divisional support should be active duty, while corps and army support assets would be a mixture of active and reserve brigades.
Warning: tangent follows:

Of course, having a more robust reserve system would help a good deal. I engaged in a lengthy exchange with a very well-read gentleman regarding the obligations implied by the Second Amendment. He had a wealth of good source material, although he not always skilled at separating his predispositions from the words on the proverbial page. In any event, by the end of the exchange I was convinced that the Second Amendment and other associated documents mandate membership of the citizenry in a militia. Whether one agrees with this position or not, I think we can all agree that at this point in American history universal conscription into any form of reserve force is both undesirable and politically unfeasible. However, if the various states were to connect their various SDF with the “well-regulated militia” clause of the Second Amendment, millions of firearms owners could be accessed by National Guard recruiters while attending their SDF drill. Members of active duty and reserve armed forces (including the National Guard) should be exempt from militia service for the duration of their military service—an added incentive to join the Guard. (“Heck, Jimbo, we’re showing up for drill anyway. Instead of paying fees to cover the damned militia expenses, let’s get paid for the weekend.”)


Webstral

[cavtroop]

I was in an Armored Cavalry NG troop for almost 6 years, as a TC on an M901. Training was mostly a joke - show up Saturday morning, take a bus to the Cape, draw your vehicle, PMCS it, get briefed, and, if everything goes smoothly, you're ready to start training by 2pm. Some maneuvers for the afternoon, dinner, a night patrol. Sunday morning you had to have the vehicles back in by noon or so, which meant the motor pool by 10am, so you could perform maintenance on them - lube the chassis, etc. Back to the armory by 5pm, home by 7. So for a weekends of 'training' you got maybe 5 or 6 real hours in, not very valuable. about 1/2 the weekends, we'd forgo the vehicles and do dismounted stuff, so we could get more time in.

They had civilian mechanics that were supposed to take care of the vehicles for us during the week, but they were mostly concerned with making sure we gave them back to them cleaner than we got them, so they could screw off all week I guess. That pissed me off more than just about anything.

Then, you had your two weeks in the summer, which was balls to the wall. We trained harder during those two weeks than I ever did on active duty, trying to cram as much in as we could. This also meant that after 5 or so days of almost 24/7 training, you were useless. Also unfortunately, this was in the years after the GW1 so budget was tight - over the 6 years I was in the NG, we hardly ever got any live ammo (or hell, even blanks) to train with. Never once saw MILES gear in the NG, either.

In the end, it was fairly futile. Some very very good soldiers in my old NG unit, but we had our share of slugs that were promoted to E6 just because the 1SG liked them, etc. Fatties that had been in 18 years, couldn't do 5 push-ups, but maintained their rank, or got shuffled to the HQ platoon to drive a 5 ton or something. Supposedly the NG has moved to a points system for promotions now, but I've been out 12 years, so I have no clue.

So Webtrals point about the readiness of the NG to serve as combat unit mostly stands. With 90+ days tune-up and some real training with live rounds etc, I'm willing to bet most of the unit would have performed nearly as well as an AD unit, but the 10% that couldn't have cut it would have really hurt unit readiness.