The Tiger squeak and other shortages

[Sanjuro]

When the US entered WW2, the USAF planned to cripple German war production by targetting key components- notably, ball-bearing production.
While these attacks were eventually successful (albeit at a horrific cost), many German products were simply built without ball-bearings, accepting the shorter service life this would bring. This in turn explains the characteristic squeak of approaching Tiger tanks in every WW2 movie!
Are there any other components which, while their loss might seem to be a show-stopper, can be done without in the short to medium term?

[HorseSoldier]

Interesting question.

I've also read accounts from late in the war where the Germans had a shortage of lug nuts for wheels. So in some cases, they just issued trucks without the normal (and safe) number of lug nuts, and the end users would have to keep speeds below some number and stop every 20 km or so to tighten up the lug nuts they did have on the vehicle.

[dragoon500ly]

This in turn explains the characteristic squeak of approaching Tiger tanks in every WW2 movie!

Groan!

Every tank, regardless of when or who produces it, creaks, squeaks, groans. Ball-bearings, or the lack thereof, are not built into tank tracks.

[Grimace]

Yeah, I was under the impression that tank "squeak" came from a combination of either "live" or "dead" return track and what sort of material was stuck in the wheels. Get mud/dust in the wheels and you'll get squeak.

As far as other things that might seem to be a show stopper....it all depends on the development of synthetics. Hydraulics, rubber...that sort of thing that might be able to have a synthetic alternative might be something that would qualify as a potential show-stopper.

[dragoon500ly]

It all boils down to oil and oil refineries...if you don't have either then you have no capacity to make war, produce most of what makes the 20th/21st Centuries go.

USAAF bombed the ball bearing plants to pieces, the Germans simply decentralized and went under ground. Even the Strategic Bombing Survey stated that going after ball bearings caused needless losses for little gain. But after Ike finally convinced 8th Air Force/Bomber Command to go after the oil fields and refineries, it crippled Germany on so many levels. At one point Hitler ordered all of the 1944 potato crop in order to make alky-based fuel for the Wehrmacht, part of the reason for the famine of 1945.

[Adm.Lee]

USAAF bombed the ball bearing plants to pieces, the Germans simply decentralized and went under ground. Even the Strategic Bombing Survey stated that going after ball bearings caused needless losses for little gain.


That's even a bit optimistic, from what I've read.

But after Ike finally convinced 8th Air Force/Bomber Command to go after the oil fields and refineries, it crippled Germany on so many levels. At one point Hitler ordered all of the 1944 potato crop in order to make alky-based fuel for the Wehrmacht, part of the reason for the famine of 1945.

Oil was always on the list, it was just that it was much better defended, and harder to get to.

As I read it, the real keystones that collapsed the German war machine was the transportation infrastructure and power grid. Once the fighters were turned loose on the railnet and the Rhine River barges (used to move coal and iron ore to the Ruhr) were attacked, that's when the wheels came off. To avoid the factories getting bombed, the Germans dispersed them. That came back to bite them when the rail & barge net went down, and whatever pieces couldn't be assembled.

Modern bombing analysis has found that the power grid is an easy soft-kill, as the Serbs and Iraqis found out in the 1990s.

A really good book on this is Stephen Budiansky, Air Power. In there, it's related that the easiest-attacked link in the supply chain is between factory and supply depot, not depot to unit or at the factory. Of course, wars are always different, as this is why the USAF spent a lot of time working over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

[dragoon500ly]

As I read it, the real keystones that collapsed the German war machine was the transportation infrastructure and power grid. Once the fighters were turned loose on the railnet and the Rhine River barges (used to move coal and iron ore to the Ruhr) were attacked, that's when the wheels came off. To avoid the factories getting bombed, the Germans dispersed them. That came back to bite them when the rail & barge net went down, and whatever pieces couldn't be assembled.

Modern bombing analysis has found that the power grid is an easy soft-kill, as the Serbs and Iraqis found out in the 1990s.

A really good book on this is Stephen Budiansky, Air Power. In there, it's related that the easiest-attacked link in the supply chain is between factory and supply depot, not depot to unit or at the factory. Of course, wars are always different, as this is why the USAF spent a lot of time working over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Never said going after oil would not be easy...but going after the refineries, the storage depots and yes even the trains and barges hauling the stuff (not to mention the coal) had a dramatic effect on the Nazi war machine.

The failure of the Allied bombing campaign lay in the stuipid, silly and out right lunatic pre-war ideas on the conduct of strategic bombing. "The bombers will always get through", "speed is safety", "no fighter can stop a well armed heavy bomber", "bombing the cities will end the war"....

[Abbott Shaull]

That's even a bit optimistic, from what I've read.



Oil was always on the list, it was just that it was much better defended, and harder to get to.

As I read it, the real keystones that collapsed the German war machine was the transportation infrastructure and power grid. Once the fighters were turned loose on the railnet and the Rhine River barges (used to move coal and iron ore to the Ruhr) were attacked, that's when the wheels came off. To avoid the factories getting bombed, the Germans dispersed them. That came back to bite them when the rail & barge net went down, and whatever pieces couldn't be assembled.

Modern bombing analysis has found that the power grid is an easy soft-kill, as the Serbs and Iraqis found out in the 1990s.

A really good book on this is Stephen Budiansky, Air Power. In there, it's related that the easiest-attacked link in the supply chain is between factory and supply depot, not depot to unit or at the factory. Of course, wars are always different, as this is why the USAF spent a lot of time working over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Dispite the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they still manage to get fair amount of supplies through to the troops they were supporting.

[Abbott Shaull]

Never said going after oil would not be easy...but going after the refineries, the storage depots and yes even the trains and barges hauling the stuff (not to mention the coal) had a dramatic effect on the Nazi war machine.

The failure of the Allied bombing campaign lay in the stuipid, silly and out right lunatic pre-war ideas on the conduct of strategic bombing. "The bombers will always get through", "speed is safety", "no fighter can stop a well armed heavy bomber", "bombing the cities will end the war"....

Yeah bombing populations centers was a silly idea, all it did was pissed enough people to keep the war going. Granted much like to day civilian population is still mixed in close enough the industrial centers of the said cities that making accurate bombing back then impossible. No that is lot of the problem, we bomb factories and they moved them underground. We bomb railways and they would be replace. Take out bridges and they would be rebuilt in good speed. Attack their airfields and their air force fighters were still flying...

[Sanjuro]

I spent much of last week in Cologne; some of my colleagues were impressed that the cathedral survived virtually unscathed, when much of the rest of the city was flattened.
First point; given the extensive use of incendiaries, a building with an almost entirely stone structure has a better chance of survival.
Second point (the one that highlights my natural cynicism); leave the cathedral standing, and you have a fine marker point to help you find any other target- especially after the introduction of H2S radar...

[HorseSoldier]

Dispite the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they still manage to get fair amount of supplies through to the troops they were supporting.

Earl Tilford's Crosswinds -- The Air Force's Setup in Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/Crosswinds-Air-Forces-Setup-Vietnam/dp/1603441263/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1299453045&sr=1-3) is a pretty good look (and scathing critique) of how the USAF approached counter-insurgency work in Vietnam and SE Asia. Tilford is a retired USAF officer who served in SE Asia, so some of his stuff is based on first hand experience (if I remember right -- been a while since I read it for a History of Air Power class in my undergrad days.)

[dragoon500ly]

I spent much of last week in Cologne; some of my colleagues were impressed that the cathedral survived virtually unscathed, when much of the rest of the city was flattened.
First point; given the extensive use of incendiaries, a building with an almost entirely stone structure has a better chance of survival.
Second point (the one that highlights my natural cynicism); leave the cathedral standing, and you have a fine marker point to help you find any other target- especially after the introduction of H2S radar...

Which was what they were doing right up until the Nazis caught on and they started setting up radar decoys...but then is the essence of electronic warfare, everytime there is an advance by the offense, the defense comes up with a counter...

[dragoon500ly]

Everyone always makes a big deal about the tank squeak...one of the biggest indicators of tanks, believe it or not, is visually and not audible. The big plume of diesel exhaust as the engine revs up when the tank starts up slope for example. A sharp-eyed scout can see the exhaust plume almost a kilometer out with just a pair of binos, toss in thermals...and the sighting range can open up to 2-3 kilometers depending on ambient temp.

Of course, there is the old standby. The grizzled ole sarge steps out of the scout track and places his hand on the ground..."heavy armor moving, three clicks thataway!"

[Panther Al]

Everyone always makes a big deal about the tank squeak...one of the biggest indicators of tanks, believe it or not, is visually and not audible. The big plume of diesel exhaust as the engine revs up when the tank starts up slope for example. A sharp-eyed scout can see the exhaust plume almost a kilometer out with just a pair of binos, toss in thermals...and the sighting range can open up to 2-3 kilometers depending on ambient temp.

Of course, there is the old standby. The grizzled ole sarge steps out of the scout track and places his hand on the ground..."heavy armor moving, three clicks thataway!"

Yep, the diesel plume is the easiest way to spot any armoured vehicle. That's one of the reasons we used the Abrams as a scout track instead of the M3's.

[dragoon500ly]

Yep, the diesel plume is the easiest way to spot any armoured vehicle. That's one of the reasons we used the Abrams as a scout track instead of the M3's.

Its like all of the tricks that the 19Ds were taught during the scout course. You can always detect troops by the smell of tobacco, the smell of cooking, the hum of voices and the utter silence of any wildlife in the area.

When vehicles are in the area, the smell of POL (fuel and oil), the stink of exhaust, engines idling, metal-on-metal contact (hatches opening and closing).

And at night it was even easier, because no matter what nation...some idiot would light up a cig and it is truely amazing how far that little red ember can be seen on a dark night...either by the ole Eyeball Mark I system or through NODs...

[Abbott Shaull]

Its like all of the tricks that the 19Ds were taught during the scout course. You can always detect troops by the smell of tobacco, the smell of cooking, the hum of voices and the utter silence of any wildlife in the area.

When vehicles are in the area, the smell of POL (fuel and oil), the stink of exhaust, engines idling, metal-on-metal contact (hatches opening and closing).

And at night it was even easier, because no matter what nation...some idiot would light up a cig and it is truely amazing how far that little red ember can be seen on a dark night...either by the ole Eyeball Mark I system or through NODs...

But, Butthead needed his fix from his Kool Menthol...lol

[dragoon500ly]

But, Butthead needed his fix from his Kool Menthol...lol

Yup! Just like buddies in a foxhole who just have to talk, dispite knowing that the OPFOR would be probing their lines...or tank crews sleeping in their vehicle instead of keeping somebody on alert....for that one we were able to remove the bolts from no less than four sets of roadwheels. To add insult to injury, we left the bolts resting on top of the splash board on the front slope of the M-60....the idiots still tried to drive off before roadwheels started to proceed the tank. LMAO! And a BIG SALUTE to the 4th Infantry Division, REFORGER-79!!!!!!