OT Navies in WWII

[dragoon500ly]

Since it seems like we are getting a bit off topic on the new PRC Carrier thread...

In discussion about how hard it is to sink a warship, here are some examples:

The USS Franklin was struck by a kamikaze off Okinawa in 1945. The suicide bomber landed on the flight deck among fueled and armed aircraft setting off a series of explosions that killed over 700 of her crew and wounded 200 more within a matter of minutes and causing a near fatal list and extensive fires. She was able to put out the fires with the assistance of her escorts, restart her engines and get out of the danger area. She then made a 12,000-mile voyage to the Brooklyn Navay Yard under her own power, stopping only once to take on stores and spare parts.

The Italian battleship Roma was lost in Sept. 1943 when a single radio-controlled glide bomb penetrated a magazine.

The USS Princeton was lost to a single bomb that penetrated several decks to detonate in a magazine off Leyte in 1944.

The HMAS Australia managed to survive a half-dozen kamikaze hits suffered over several days off Okinawa in 1945.

The HIJMS Mogami was virtually a total wreck after the Battle of Midway having been repeatedly bombed by USN ac., yet managed to keep under way and make it back to base safely, to be repaired and returned to service.

The HIJMS Hiei was lost during the night action on Nov 12-13, 1942 when she took over 50 hits from 5-inch and 8-inch shells, which started uncontrollable fires leaving her dead in the water and an easy prey for US ac the next morning.

The upperworks of the HIJMS Aoba were turned into a total wreck by US cruiser and destroyer gunfire on Oct. 11-12, 1942, yet she managed to make her way out of the area and survive to fight again.

The USS San Francisco survived a dozen hits by 14-inch HE shells, plus 33 5-inch and 6-inch shells on Nov 12-13, 1942.

The USS South Dakota took one 5-inch, 6 6-inch, 18 8-inch and 2 14-inch hits on Nov 14-15, 1942. Two of the hits inflicted a very slight list, eighteen were into her upperworks, knocking out her search radar and causing a loss of electrical power.

The KMS Bismarck took a brutal beating:
24 May: 3 14-inch hits caused some flooding and reduced her speed from 30 to 28 knots. That evening a single torpedo hit reduced her speed to 20 knots.

26 May: 2-3 torpedoes (Germans say 2, Brits say 3) strike the ship, jamming her rudder and making her very slow and difficult to steer.

27 May: In her last fight, Bismarck absorbed between 300-400 hits from 14-inch, 16-inch and 8-inch guns as well as a single torpedo. She was reduced to a burning wreck, wracked by internal explosions and unable to maneuver or return fire. She still remained afloat, her crew fired scuttling charges and the British hit her with three more torpedoes before she finally sank.

The HIJMS Taiho was lost to a single torpedo hit, this resulted in minor damage and she was able to rejoin her task force. A aviation gas storage tank, damaged by the hit, leaked avgas into her bilges where it vaporized and eventually detonated, sinking her on the eve of the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944.

The HIJMS Musashi and Yamato, the largest warships in the world until the 1960s, both absorbed an extraordinary amount of damage before sinking. The Musashi taking 19 torpedo hits and 17 bombs on Oct 24, 1944. The Yamato suffered a dozen torpedoes and six bombs on April 7, 1945.

Finally...

The USS Houston (2nd of that name in the war) was hit by 2 torpedoes on Oct 16, 1945. This caused her to take on 6,500 tons of water, over 45% of her normal full load displacement, yet she survived. No other vessel in history has ever shipped that much water without sinking.

[dragoon500ly]

The first aircraft carrier to be sunk in action was the HMS Courageous which was hit by two torpedoes on Sept 17, 1939.

Her sister ship, HMS Glorious was the second carrier to be lost when she ran into the KMS Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on June 8, 1940.

The first carrier sunk in the Pacific was also British, HMS Hermes was sunk by air attack on March 9, 1942.

The first US carrier, USS Langley was sunk by aircraft in Feb 1942. No longer an aircraft carrier, she had been converted into a aircraft transport and was moving AAC P-40s to Java when she was sunk.

The first Japanese carrier lost was HIJMS Shoho, sunk in the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8, 1942. The first US carrier to be sunk, the USS Lexington followed shortly thereafter.

The last American fleet carrier to be sunk was USS Hornet, on Oct 24, 1942.

The last Japanese carrier to be sunk, HIJMS Amagi was pounded to death by airstrikes in Kure Harbor on July 24, 1945.

[headquarters]

The discussion is an interesting one - although we know who won the war, the Japanese fielded several interesting and highly advanced craft. For their time.

Among these were several submarines like the I-14 and the I -201 and indeed the I-400 class.

Arguably these were some of the more interesting designs of the war - although operational use didnt amount to any major advantage for the IJN.

I enclose a link that is to be taken by a grain of salt - but indicative, still.

It is worth to remember that the performance of the IJN was hampered to some extent by rigid lines of command and doctrine that was outdated by the time the massive US airpower could be brought to bear.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm

[RN7]

I love talking about WW2, more!

[dragoon500ly]

The longest range in which a land-based artillery piece ever deliberately hit a target was a US Army 16-inch/45 coast defense gun which scored a hit at 35,200 yards (17.4 nautical miles) in August 1938 under what was described as "perfect conditions of weather and sea".

The longest range hit at sea happened on July 9, 1940 when the British battleship Warspite put a 15-inch round into the Italian battleship Giulio Cesare at 26,000 yards (12.8 nautical miles).

There were actually several battleship engagements in WWII

North Sea, April 9, 1940: KMS Scharnhorst and KMS Gneisenau fight an indecisive action with HMS Renown off Norway.

Mers El-Kebir, July 3, 1940: The HMS Resolution, HMS Valiant and HMS Hood bombard the French fleet near Oran, Algeria. Sinking the old battleship Bretagne, badly damaging her sister Provence and less seriously damaging the new Dunkerque while the latter's sister Strasbourg escaped unscathed.

Calabria, July 9, 1940: Another intense, but indecisive action is fought in between the Italian Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour vs. HMS Warspite, HMS Royal Sovereign and HMS Malaya.

Denmark Strait, May 24, 1941: KMS Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen sink HMS Hood and badly damaging HMS Prince of Wales.

North Atlantic, May 27, 1941: HMS King George V and HMS Rodney get revenge for the sinking of Hood by reducing Bismarck to a shattered wreck.

Casablanca, November 8, 1942: USS Massachusetts exchanges gunfire with the partially competed French Jean Beat which is badly damaged.

The 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 14-15, 1942: HIJMS Kirishima vs. USS Washington and USS South Dakota. South Dakota was damaged and Kirishima was pounded so badly that she had to be scuttled the next morning.

North Cape, December 26, 1943: HMS Duke of York sinks KMS Scharnhorst in a protracted slugging match.

The Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24-25, 1944: A US squadron including USS Mississippi, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Tennessee, USS California and USS Pennsylvania (all but the Mississippi being veterans of Pearl Harbor) vs. HIJMS Fuso and HIJMS Yamashiro. The IJN was ambushed by the US battleships and thier escorts in an action that was so one-sided that Pennsylvania never got a chance to fire. This is the last battleship action in history.

[dragoon500ly]

We've mentioned on a couple of threads the effect that Kamikaze's had on the Allies and the late war strategic decision to drop the A-bombs.

Kamikaze's were organized in the fall of 1944 and the first attack took place on October 25, 1944 off Samar Island in the southern Philippines. The results were encourging with two CVEs damaged and one CVE sunk.

Further attacks were made in between October 1944 and January 1945. 378 Kamikazes were sent out, all were lost as well as 102 escorting fighters. The sank 16 ships (2 CVEs, 3 DDs, 1 DMS and several smaller craft) and another 87 were damaged (7 CVs, 2 CVLs, 13 CVEs, 5 BBs, 3 CAs, 7 CLs, 23 DDs, 5 DEs,and 1 DMS). Shocked by the sudden change in Japanese tactics, the USN quickly began to change its defensive procedures in an effort to limit the damage that would be caused by future Kamikazes.

The Battle of Iwo Jima saw further Kamikaze attacks. The Japanese were hampered by the extreme range to be flown and their attacks were not as devastating. Several ships were struck, but the only real damage was to one CV and to a CVE that was sunk.

The Battle of Okinawa in April 1945 was the heyday of the Kamikaze. The Japanese deployed over 1,500 kamikazes (all lost) and nearly as many regular aircraft against the USN. American losses were heavy. 21 ships were sunk and 43 damaged so badly that repairs were not completed by the end of the war, another 23 were damaged, but would return to service within 30 days and 151 more were damaged to one degree or another. The USN suffered 9,700 casualties, 4,300 of whom were dead. For the Navy, the Battle of Okinawa was the most costly of the war. Seven percent of all USN losses for the war were suffered off of Okinawa.

All of this was in spite of the many counter-measures taken against the Kamikazes. In addition to better control of defending fighters and antiaircraft guns, there was inhanced crew training in damage control. There was also the the use of radar-equipped destroyers with fighter direction parties forming a picket line to give advance warning of Kamikazes and to direct fighters onto them.

The key problem facing the USN was that the Japanese had 200 airfields within range of Okinawa, too many even for the vast air power available to the US to shut down.

After Okinawa was Operation Downfall, the two invasions that would be launched against Japan itself. For this eventuality, the Japanese had over 5,000 Kamikazes ready. And since this would be fought close to the Japanese home islands, radar pickets and fighters would be less effective. The USN estimated that supporting Downfall would cost them over 10,000 casualties and at least 300 ships sunk or damaged.

[ShadoWarrior]

For Operation Olympic, the first stage of Operation Downfall, it was estimated that there would be a quarter million to a half a million US casualties, over 100,000 of which would be fatalities. And if the operations took longer than anticipated, casualties could/would climb upwards of one and a quarter million. Those were the estimates by US military officers. The estimates by outside (civilian) consultants were about 4-5 times higher!

Plans were also being made to drop up to 15 atomic bombs on and behind the invasion beaches, with troops following just 48 hours later. Needless to say, this would not have been very good for the invading troops.

[95th Rifleman]

HMS Hood was taken down by a single shell to her magazine. Plunging shot went straight through her wooden deck.

[RN7]

HMS Hood was taken down by a single shell to her magazine. Plunging shot went straight through her wooden deck.

Hood was a battlecruiser so thats no suprise. I can see the rational behind the Royal Navy sending the Hood to track Bismarck and Prinz Eugen as she could do 31kts at flank speed, but what a waste of human life ordering her to take on a powerful modern battleship like Bismarck. The whole battlecruiser concept had been exposed at Jutland in 1916, and was totaly obsolete by WW2 with the rapid development of aircraft since WW1.

[ShadoWarrior]

The British had to have lessons literally pounded into them, just as the Americans did. :rolleyes:

[RN7]

For Operation Olympic, the first stage of Operation Downfall, it was estimated that there would be a quarter million to a half a million US casualties, over 100,000 of which would be fatalities. And if the operations took longer than anticipated, casualties could/would climb upwards of one and a quarter million. Those were the estimates by US military officers. The estimates by outside (civilian) consultants were about 4-5 times higher!

Plans were also being made to drop up to 15 atomic bombs on and behind the invasion beaches, with troops following just 48 hours later. Needless to say, this would not have been very good for the invading troops.

Would have been some invasion force all the same;

20 Aircraft Carriers, 36 Escort Carriers, 20 Battleships, 52 Cruisers, 460 Destroyers and Escorts, 5 USAAC Air Forces including 1,000 B-29s, 1 Armoured Division, 9 Infantry Divisions, 1 Airborne Division and 3 Marine Divisions. Plus 6 British Aircraft Carriers and the rest of the British Pacific Fleet, 22 RAF Bomber Squadrons and 20 Australian fighter squadrons.

[dragoon500ly]

HMS Hood was taken down by a single shell to her magazine. Plunging shot went straight through her wooden deck.

There is also a lot of debate as to who actually fired the killing shell, a study that was done recently disputed the claim that Bismarck sank the Hood, the ballistics of the the 15-inch shell simply wouldn't have penetrated the armor at that range; too shallow an angle. Prinz Eugen's 8-inch shells would be coming down almost vertically and thus have a better chance of penetrating Hood's deck armor.

A debate that has been argued over many a glass of beer!

[dragoon500ly]

Operation Downfall was the overall plan for the invasion of Japan. It would consist of two sub-operations.

Operation Olympic was to capture the bottom seventy miles of Kyushu (the southern most of the Japanese home islands). Its objective was to secure ports and airfields to support the second phase. Olympic would consist of three landings, one on the west coast of Kushikino, another in the south at Ariake Bay and the third on the east coast at Miyazaki City. Naval support would consist of 9 BB, 20 CV/CVL, 88 DD, 295 troop transports, 95 attack cargo ships and 555 LSTs just to name some of the forces to be involved.

The Western Landing Force (40th Infantry Division) would seize several small islands west and southwest of Kyushu five days prior to the main landings and set up fighter direction, radar warning, guidance and commo facilities as well as securing safe anchorges for hospital ships and damaged vessels. One day later, the Southern Landing Force would land the 158th Regimental Combat Team on Tanega Island, south of Kyushu, for the same purpose.

X-Day was to be November 1, 1945. The Third Landing Force (1st Cavalry Division, 43rd Infantry Division and the Americal Division) would assault Ariake Bay; the 5th Landing Force (2nd, 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions) would land on the Kushikino beaches and the Seventh Landing Force (25th, 33rd and 41st Infantry Divisions) the Miyazaki area. The Reserve Landing Force (77th, 81st and 98th Infantry Divisions) would not go ashore before November 5th, but would conduct divisionary landings with two of its divisions off the island of Shikoku on October 30, X-2. The Reinforcement Force (11th Airborne Division) was not scheduled for action before November 23, X+22.

The Japanese defenders of Kyushu was made up of the 16th Area Army, consisting of 40th, 56th and 57th Armies (equivalent to US Army Corps). The 16th Area Army would have some 15 divisions as well as numerous independent brigades, regiments and battalions. Prior to the invasion, the 16th Area Army had a ration strength of 750,000 men. Plans to reinforce the invasion area would have increased Army strength (not counting Navy and volunteer combat personnel) to 990,000 men.

The Japanese also prepared "Tokubetsu Kogeki" or Special Attack units to assist in the defense, these were the suicide attack or Kamikazes. According to Japanese records some 10,500 Kamikazes were ready for the Americans. Mostly made up of obsolete and training aircraft as well as the new, Tokka Kamikaze attack aircraft; there were also significant numbers of Oka and Kikka manned rocket bombs. The IJN provided some 3,000 Shinyo motorboats (crammed with explosives, their volunteer crews would ram thier craft into ships and denotate their cargo). Also available were 1,000 underwater special attack craft; the Kaiten was a manned torpedo, the Sea Dragon and Dragon Larva were one manned midget submarines. The last component of the special attack units were over 4,000 Fukuryu or "Crouching Dragons" These were human mines that would wear diving dress and carry long poles attached to explosive charges. Their mission was to attack the assault craft as they approached the invasion beaches.

The Japanese defenders were short of equipment, many of the defending divisions were as short as 50% below TO&E levels. Especially lacking were antitank weapons, so the IJA resorted to the issue of hand carried explosive charges. Another addition to their suicide forces were the kokumin Giyu Sento-Tai, the National Volunteer Combat Force or Giyu. These were poorly trained and even more poorly equipped (bamboo spears or rifles with only 15 rds) volunteers consisting of all men between 15-60 and all women between 17-40, only the infirm or pregeant were allowed to not "volunteer". The Giyu would not wear any uniforms, only a small patch marked with the symbol for "sen", combatant was allowed to give them military status under international law.

By any standard, Operation Olympic was going to be a bloody, bloody battle!

[dragoon500ly]

As the Allies approached Japan, the decision to invade was hotly debated. Of deep concern was how the civilian population would act as the Allies drove inland from the invasion beaches. On two previous occasions, the Americans had meet Japanese civilians.

On Saipan two thirds of the civilian population were killed, a large minority of them had committed suicide rather than be captured. The garrison of 30,000 troops had inflicted 14,000 casualties on the Americans.

On Okinawa, 107,000 Japanese soldiers and at least 75,000 civilians were killed. The Japanese inflicted 60,000 combat and 40,000 noncombat casualties on the US.

The military estimates for Operation Olympic included 125,000 casualties (including 31,000 dead). Operation Coronet was twice as large as Olympic and casualties were expected to be twice as many. The total estimate for the Downfall operations would be about 370,000 (including 80,000 dead) Allied losses.

So just were did the "million US dead" come from?

For the most part, this statement appears in the memoirs of various politicans who were trying to make the case for the use of the atom bomb. This mythical million dead began as an exaggeration of the 370,000 casualties figure (often given as "between 250,000 to 500,000" in military briefing documents from the period). Half a million quickly became a million and casualties became deaths. Newspapers quickly picked up on the million dead because it made better copy. While the million American dead is a sheer myth, the military estimates of 80,000 killed and 290,000 wounded were very realistic, based as they were on recent experience. Any invasion of Japan would have increased the American deaths in World War II by 27%. Avoiding this invasion by any means possible was no laughing matter.

So what other options were available? By the spring of 1945, the naval blockade of Japan was growing tighter. Food was tightly rationed with the average civilian getting 75% of the minimum caloric intake. The winter of 1945-46 would have seen starvation, but keep in mind, that Japan was minimally self-sufficient in food production. While many would starve, most could survive indefinitely. Food shortages would hurt, but it would not lead the the social disintegration necessary to overthrow the military government. Starvation would not guarantee a Japanese surrender and the Allies could not, for political reasons (the voters wanted the war over, now) keep a million soldiers and sailors under arms for a year or more enforcing the blockade.

The problem that faced the Allies was how to get Japan to surrender as soon as possible. The Japanese, in mid-1945, were offering to surrender much as the Germans had done in World War One. In that case the German Army remained relative intact, this was what the Japanese wanted. The Allies were well aware that leaving the German Army intact after WWI had played a key part in its reemergence in WWII.

By August, 1945 the negotiations had come down to the point to whether or not the Japanese Emperor would be allowed to remain on the throne. The Allies were willing to conceed the point as it was viewed that the emperor and his authority would be needed to keep the population under control during the occupation of Japan. Unfortunately, the Japanese made the error of sending their messages through their ambassador in Moscow. And the Soviets had their own agenda. On August 8,1945, the Soviets invaded Manchuria and swept away the Japanese garrison. It was to maintain their position in China that Japan had gone to war in the first place and now, China was lost to them. American bombers had already burned out most of Japan's cities and then, on August 6th and 9th, came the atomic bombs. On August 15th, the emperor issued the order to surrender.

Since then, many have argued the need to drop the atomic bombs. This is all hindsight. AT THE TIME, nothing seemed likely to dissuade the Japanese from making a suicidal last stand in their home islands. The Japanese military had already demonstrated their willingness to fight to the last. Saipan and Okinawa merely confirmed that Japanese civilians were every bit as determined as their militar. Japan had never surrendered.

A naval and air blockade was the only other alternative to any invasion and no one was sure how long this would have to be maintained in order to bring the Japanese to terms. Most estimates had a blockade bringing a surrender sometime in 1946-47, but the Japanese could drag this process out for several years. The Allies could not support this for political reasons, war weariness had set in, the heavy casualties suffered so far had many wanting the troops home. The people wanted peace. Japan had to be defeated as soon as possible and by whatever means possible.

The atomic bombs were not decisive weapon. The US only had three bombs, one of which was expended as a test. It was estimated that it would be at least another three months before the US had enough material for another atomic bomb. What the atomic bomb had going for it was shock. One bomb dropped by a single plane, doing the damage that 600 bombers did in one night. The Japanese didn't know how many more atomic bombs the Americans had, and the US left it to their imaginations how many it might have and how quickly it would use them against the Japanese. But against a people who seemed to disdain death, there was doubt that even the atomic bomb would bring the Japanese to surrender.

Japan required an unprecedented series of calamities before surrender became possible. Destruction of her fleet, the isolation of nearly 400,000 soldier in Pacific island garrisions, most of her cities reduced to ash and rubble, blockade of her ports, the loss of most of her intact armies (in Manchuria) and finally, the use of the atomic bombs. No one, at the time, know how much it would take to force the Japanese to surrender.

But the atomic bombings finally convinced the Japanese that the Allies were willing to destroy them as a people. On August 15,1945, the Emperor of Japan did one of those things that Japanese emperors rarely did. He overrode all opposing counsel and broadcast the order to surrender. With no assurances that the Allies would respect the imperial institutions of Japan, the Emperor threw himself, and his people, upon the uncertain mercies of the same peoples Japan had savagely fought for the past four years.

[ShadoWarrior]

But the atomic bombings finally convinced the Japanese that the Allies were willing to destroy them as a people.
This is a myth. Even after two atomic bombings the Japanese military (mainly the Army generals) did not care about the losses due to bombing (of any sort). As I mentioned before (in the original thread), what finally drove half the Japanese leadership (including the Emperor) to contemplate surrender was the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory. It was the Russians invading them (on Aug. 9), the threat of the Soviets destroying them as a people, that motivated the Emperor to seek an immediate peace. Prior to that their thinking was that if they (the Japanese) inflicted enough casualties on the Allies (the US and Commonwealth) the Allies would be forced to negotiate on terms more favorable to the Japanese. There was no such possibility with the Soviets, since Stalin didn't care how many troops he lost in the process of grabbing land in the Far East, and the Japanese knew this.

[ShadoWarrior]

The military estimates for Operation Olympic included 125,000 casualties (including 31,000 dead). Operation Coronet was twice as large as Olympic and casualties were expected to be twice as many. The total estimate for the Downfall operations would be about 370,000 (including 80,000 dead) Allied losses.

So just were did the "million US dead" come from?

For the most part, this statement appears in the memoirs of various politicans who were trying to make the case for the use of the atom bomb. This mythical million dead began as an exaggeration of the 370,000 casualties figure (often given as "between 250,000 to 500,000" in military briefing documents from the period). Half a million quickly became a million and casualties became deaths. Newspapers quickly picked up on the million dead because it made better copy. While the million American dead is a sheer myth, the military estimates of 80,000 killed and 290,000 wounded were very realistic, based as they were on recent experience. Any invasion of Japan would have increased the American deaths in World War II by 27%. Avoiding this invasion by any means possible was no laughing matter.
If you haven't done so, you should read the Wiki article on Operation Downfall (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall), with special attention to the casualties section and the links to the source citations.

[dragoon500ly]

This is a myth. Even after two atomic bombings the Japanese military (mainly the Army generals) did not care about the losses due to bombing (of any sort). As I mentioned before (in the original thread), what finally drove half the Japanese leadership (including the Emperor) to contemplate surrender was the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory. It was the Russians invading them (on Aug. 9), the threat of the Soviets destroying them as a people, that motivated the Emperor to seek an immediate peace. Prior to that their thinking was that if they (the Japanese) inflicted enough casualties on the Allies (the US and Commonwealth) the Allies would be forced to negotiate on terms more favorable to the Japanese. There was no such possibility with the Soviets, since Stalin didn't care how many troops he lost in the process of grabbing land in the Far East, and the Japanese knew this.

Maybe its me, but I do belive that I made the point that it was a combination of events that convinced the Japanese to surrender. Yes the Russian invasion and the ease with which they demolished the Japanese forces in Manchuria played a major role. The loss of the IJN is another. The naval blockade played another, the loss of most of their cities is yet another card that was dealt. The shock value of the atomic bombs was the final card. No single event, be it the entry of Russia into the Pacific War or atomic bombs convinced the Japanese to surrender.

To be equally certain, the Japanese Army didn't want to surrender, there was even an aborted attempt to prevent the emperor's surrender recording from being broadcast. But enough of the leadership was willing to obey the emperor. And that is what caused the Japanese to surrender.

[dragoon500ly]

If you haven't done so, you should read the Wiki article on Operation Downfall (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall), with special attention to the casualties section and the links to the source citations.

Both King and Nimitz opposed any landings in Japan and wanted to continue a naval and air blockade. Both admirals wanted to attack Taiwan or Korea or stage landings on the Chinese mainland. And both officers were called on the carpet by the JCS for using inflated figures.

Civilian experts predicted much higher losses. But the original briefing documents for Operation Downfall predicted about 370,000 casualities in the initial fighting.

As for wikipedia and its Downfall link, some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions.

The Rand Corporation gamed out Downfall in the 1980s. The Allies were able to secure the ground objectives and suffered about 392,000 casualities. Japanese losses were quite a bit higher, running around 630,000 military and civilian.

So who was right. The world will never know.

And Thank God for that!

[dragoon500ly]

The Regia Marina in World War II

The Royal Italian Navy as of June 10, 1940 was organized as follows:

1st Fleet
5th Battleship Division: 2 BBs
7th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs
8th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

9th Battleship Division (not yet fully operational): 2 BBs
14th Destroyer Squadron: 3 DDs
15th Destroyer Squadron: 5 DDs

1st Cruiser Division: 3 CAs
9th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

4th Cruiser Division: 4 CLs
8th Cruiser Division: 2 CLs
16th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

Auxiliaries: 1 seaplane tender, 3 water tankers, 2 tugs

2nd Fleet
3rd Cruiser Division: 4 CAs
12th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs
11th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

7th Cruiser Division: 4 CLs
13th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

2nd Cruiser Division: 2 CLs
10th Destroyer Squadron: 4 DDs

Auxiliaries: 1 repair ship, 4 water tankers, oil tanker, 2 tugs

Submarine Fleet
1st Group (La Spezia)
11th Squadron: 4 SS
12th Squadron: 6 SS
13th Squadron: 3 SS
14th Squadron: 3 SS
15th Squadron: 4 SS
16th Squadron: 2 SS
17th Squadron: 5 SS
2nd Group (Naples)
21st Squadron: 4 SS
22nd Squadron: 5 SS
3rd Group (Messina)
31st Squadron: 4 SS
33rd Squadron: 4 SS
34th Squadron: 4 SS
35th Squadron: 3 SS
37th Squadron: 3 SS
4th Group (Taranto)
40th Squadron: 4 SS
41st Squadron: 4 SS
42nd Squadron: 1 SS
43rd Squadron: 2 SS
44th Squadron: 1 SS
45th Squadron: 2 SS
46th Squadron: 4 SS
7th Group (Cagliari)
71st Squadron: 4 SS
72nd Squadron: 4 SS

Departmental Naval Forces

Based at La Spezia: 8 DEs, 20 MAS boats, 4 minelayers, 1 transport, 1 gunboat, 1 water tanker.

Based at Naples: 8 DEs, 2 minelayers, 2 water tankers.

Based at La Maddalena: 8 DEs, 4 MAS boats, 5 minelayers.

Based at Messina: 12 DEs, 1 sub chaser, 16 MAS boats, 4 minelayers, 2 depot ships, 4 water tankers.

Based at Taranto: 2 CLs, 8 DDs, 4 minelayers, 2 transports, 3 water tankers.

Based at Brindisi: 2 DDs, 4 DEs, 2 MAS boats, 1 gunboat, 1 water tanker.

Based at Venice: 4 DEs, 3 minelayers.

Based at Pola: 1 DE, 4 MAS boats, 3 minelayers, 1 oil tanker, 2 water tankers.

Based in Albania: 1 water tanker, 2 minesweepers.

Based at Rhodes: 2 DDs, 4 DEs, 8 SS, 15 MAS boats, 2 minelayers, 2 gunboats, 1 oil tanker.

Based at Tripoli: 4 DEs, 1 mine layer, 1 gunboat.

Based at Tobruk: 4 DDs, 10 SS, 5 gunboats, 3 water tankers.

Italian East Africa: 7 DDs, 8 SS, 2 DEs, 5 MAS boats, 2 gunboats, 3 minelayers, 3 water tankers.

Various ports in Italy, under direct command of Naval HQ: 3 yachts, 1 target ship, 2 survey ships, 5 transports, 1 hospital ship, 2 cable layers, 7 oil tankers, 1 petrol tanker, 9 seagoing tugs.

[ShadoWarrior]

Both King and Nimitz opposed any landings in Japan and wanted to continue a naval and air blockade. Both admirals wanted to attack Taiwan or Korea or stage landings on the Chinese mainland.
MacArthur was one of the biggest proponents for invading the Home Islands. The same bloody-minded fellow who needlessly wasted thousands of lives retaking the strategically unimportant Philippines just to fuel his own ego.

Civilian experts predicted much higher losses. But the original briefing documents for Operation Downfall predicted about 370,000 casualties in the initial fighting.

As for wikipedia and its Downfall link, some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions.

The Rand Corporation gamed out Downfall in the 1980s. The Allies were able to secure the ground objectives and suffered about 392,000 casualities. Japanese losses were quite a bit higher, running around 630,000 military and civilian.
Those Rand figures are close to the figures cited in the Wiki article for what the JCS came up with in mid-1945. I don't put a lot of weight on "some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions" when some of the folks debating such things still persist in believing that the atomic bombs won the war when the preponderance of evidence points otherwise.

[RN7]

Maybe its me, but I do belive that I made the point that it was a combination of events that convinced the Japanese to surrender. Yes the Russian invasion and the ease with which they demolished the Japanese forces in Manchuria played a major role. The loss of the IJN is another. The naval blockade played another, the loss of most of their cities is yet another card that was dealt. The shock value of the atomic bombs was the final card. No single event, be it the entry of Russia into the Pacific War or atomic bombs convinced the Japanese to surrender.

To be equally certain, the Japanese Army didn't want to surrender, there was even an aborted attempt to prevent the emperor's surrender recording from being broadcast. But enough of the leadership was willing to obey the emperor. And that is what caused the Japanese to surrender.

A lot of truth to this. The Japanese military got a taste of what it was like to face a modern fully mechanised army in Manchuria during the Soviet-Japanese border wars in 1938-39, were they pretty much got their but kicked. It sort of determined Japanese conduct throughout WW2 in regards to not declaring war on the Russians. In 1945 the Russians rolled them over again in a little over three weeks, in fact the Russians crushed them. Facing the prospect of the Russians coming at them from Asia and the nuclear armed Americans surrounding them in the Pacific the saner elements among the Japanese leadership had little option but surrender.

[dragoon500ly]

MacArthur was one of the biggest proponents for invading the Home Islands. The same bloody-minded fellow who needlessly wasted thousands of lives retaking the strategically unimportant Philippines just to fuel his own ego.


Those Rand figures are close to the figures cited in the Wiki article for what the JCS came up with in mid-1945. I don't put a lot of weight on "some of the sources quoted have been under fire for some time concerning their conclusions" when some of the folks debating such things still persist in believing that the atomic bombs won the war when the preponderance of evidence points otherwise.

The two atomic bombs were, in and of themselves, not decisive weapons. Operation Musketeer, the B-29 low-level incendiary raids, did a lot more damage and killed far more Japanese then the A-Bombs. It was the sheer shock value of their use on top of the events of the last two years of the war that tipped the scales and gave the Japanese the push to surrender.

Far, far too many Western historians take the view that nuking Japan is what caused the surrender. In Japan's official military history, the Strategic Bombing Survey and numerous interviews with Japanese military and civilians, the point was made that the use of atomic bombs was simply the "straw that broke the camel's back".

And please....don't get me started on "Dug-Out Doug"...it spoils my lunch!

[dragoon500ly]

The Royal Italian Navy in World War II, of all the Italian military, received the most new equipment before the start of the war. Italian planners expected a great deal of the Regia Marina (including taking Gibraltar and conducting sorties into the Atlantic) and much was accomplished. Yet the RM was doomed to failure for several reasons:

Like the Kriegsmarine, the RM started the war with a critical shortage of fuel for their ships. RM holdings at the start of the war ammounted to some 1,880,000 tons of fuel. Fuel use in the first nine months of the war amount to some 1,000,000 tons. The RM was able to rebuild some of its stockpile via the Romanian oil fields (but this source was controlled by Germany and her needs were meet first) as well as restricting the use of the larger Italian warships.

Secondly, the RM was run by Royalist Admirals, firmly wedded to the idea of a grand finale daylight battle between battleships that would decide the course of the war. However, many of the other world's navies also started the war with the same idea, so Italian naval policy is symptomatic of the era.

A third problem was a delay in rearmament. Mussolini refained from major naval rearmament until 1933. With the invasion of Ethiopia and the possible hostility of France, Italy adopted a naval program that would add 300,000 tons of warships every year for the next five years. The Naval Ministry, by 1935, wanted to add 4 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, four cruisers, 24 destroyers, 20 frigates, 12 torpedo boats and 54 submarines. Mussolini, wanted naval growth to be more gradual and thus not fuel an arms race. Italy was not capable, industrially or financially capable of supporting the rearmament program. The smaller units were built, two battleships were delayed until 1937 and two battleships and the three aircraft carriers were deleted.

Another problem lay in the RMs failure to promptly and fully exploit an Italian secret weapons. The frogmen of the fabled X Flotilla. First developed during the crisis of the 1935-36 Ethiopian War, they were allowed to decay in the years following. Properly supported from the start, Italy's special underwater
warfare units could have had a major impact in 1940 instead of late 1941-42.

A fifth problem, was the lack of aircraft carriers. This is widly regarded as THE key reason for the RMs defeat at sea. This lack was compounded by an absence of any sort of land-based Naval Aviation. Mussolini had hoped that the Regia Aeronautica would closely co-operate with the RM, this was not to be and the result was a series of defeats suffered by the RM.

This problem needs to be placed in the context of Italian doctrine. The RM built ships with guns capable of firing tremendous distances. Gunnery was to be aided by seaplanes spotting the fall of the shot. However, the Royal Navys ability to field at least one carrier with every major operation in the Mediterranean allowed their slender fighter strength to control the air above the fleets, denying the Italians fire control and reconnaissance. The RM would end up not fighting the war she was prepared for, but rather the war her enemies were prepared for.

It is intresting to speculate on the RM's capability if it had deployed one or two modern carriers to support its operations. The refusal of the navy to build carriers is often awarded to Mussolini and Balbo; actually, much of the fault can be laid squarely on the shoulders of the RM. The navy's top leadership were so firmly wedded to the idea of battleships as the decisive weapon, that they didn't want any carriers.

Coupled with the lack of its leadership to build carriers, the RM was also crippled by the poor design of its heavy antiaircraft weapons. Its heavy AA guns were excellent for barrage firing, but were not accurate when firing directly at enemy planes. Of all of the RMs losses in WWII, 1/3 of her frontline cruisers and destroyers were lost due to air attack, while 1/2 of her torpedo boats were sunk by air power. Even heavier losses were suffered by the Italian merchant fleet.

The RM's submarine fleet also had their share of problems ranging from a lack of attack computers, air conditioning units that leaked poisonous gases when tubing was ruptured under depth charge attacks, easily seen from the air in the shallower parts of the Mediterranean as well as being slow to dive...not a good situation to be in when under attack.

The RM also lacked flashless powder for their big guns, thus making night actions impossible. Since the RM was wedded firmly to the idea of a decisive daylight action, they saw no need to develop flashless powder. They also lacked an adequate night-time fire control system.

The RMs gunnery problems didn't end there. Their surface fire control systems were not of modern design (1920s). The Italians had also opted for a high muzzle velocity for their guns in order to get as much range as possible, but this also led to the guns wearing out faster and so lose their accuracy. Most twin mounts for 8-inch guns down, were designed for the shells to be fired from the turret at the same time. Mounts with common cradles had the guns too close to each other, causing interference when the shells were in flight (although it did save weight). Elevation of individual guns could not be made to allow for individual wear.

An Italian salvo of shells would often have a high longitudinal dispersion and this could very from salvo to salvo and from shell to shell. With the RM wedded to the idea of long-range surface duels---with inaccurate guns.

During the war, the RM fielded 36 different types of torpedoes, leading to both shortages of specific torpedoes as well as problems of supplying the correct spare parts.

Italian ship design was behind the times, depending on riveting instead of the new electrical welding. Hull lines, were quite flat, leading to major problems for ships in rough seas. The desire of the RM to have the fastest possible ships led to engines being worn out earlier than expected, allowing their ships to be caught and sunk. Electronics was another area of inferiority. In all of WWII, the RM only built 50 radar sets, although several additional sets were ordered from Germany. In spite of having a submarine fleet second only to the Soviet Unions, Italian ASW work lagged far behind other navies. In 1941, the RM had only two sonar outfits. Again the Germans would supply additional sonars, but it was too little, too late.

In the course of the war, the RM would sink 267,236 tons of merchant and warships. This would include 7 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 32 submarines and other small craft belonging to the Royal Navy.

Total losses for the RM by the time of the armistice were 11 cruisers, 33 destroyers, 34 torpedo boats (frigates), and 60 submarines. Italy also lost 595 of the 786 merchant ships that she stated the war with.

[dragoon500ly]

The HIJMS Yamato and Musashi were the largest battleships ever built, displacing almost 70,000 tons at full load. They carried the heaviest guns ever to put to see, nine rifles of 18.11 inch bore (460mm) and were capable of throwing a 3,219lb shell just over 45,000 yards.

They were also white elephants, obsolete almost as soon as they were built. Both ships fell prey to the new decisive weapon of the sea, airpower.

Only once was on these "superbattleships" in a position to face American battleships in a slug-fest, this would have been on October 25, 1944 at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. A Japanese task force consisting of Yamato, three older battleships, as well as a cruiser/destroyer escort slipped through San Bernardino Strait and attacked a CVE task group off Samar Island. The running fight that ensued turned into an American victory as the Japanese broke off their pursuit after sinking 2 CVEs and 3 DDs.

The US planning for the invasion of the Philippines had envisioned the possibility that the IJN might threaten the invasion forces with surface ships. Accordingly Admiral Halsey was to detach seven fast battleships and form Task Force 34 under the command of Admiral Willis Lee, the Navy's best battleship commander. However, when Halsey took Third Fleet north to attack the Japanese carriers, he took the battleships with him (later citing their massive antiaircraft batteries were needed to protect the carriers). Had he not done so or if he had heeded the initial warnings to dispatch them southwards then the largest battleship fight of the war could have taken place with the HIJMS Yamato, Nagato, Haruna and Kongo and the USS Iowa, New Jersey, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Washington and Alabama...and as Samuel Eliot Morison would later write, "What a brawl that would have been!"

[dragoon500ly]

The Golden Age of Torpedo Warfare took place during World War Two. Torpedoes were used extensively by all combatants and by all means possible; land-based, submarines, aircraft and surface ship.

The Japanese enjoyed a significant advantage in torpedo warfare for the first two years of the war. Their primary torpedo was both larger and more capable than that of any other combatant.

Type 8: 24-inch diameter. An older (1920s) design used by older cruisers and destroyers. Weighed 5,207lbs with a 761lb warhead. When set for 38 knot speed, had a range of 10km. When set for 32 knot speed, range went up to 15km.

Type 89: 21-inch diameter. Another 1920s design, used by submarines. Weighs 3,677lbs with a 661lb warhead. At 45 knots, range was 5.5km; at 35 knots range was 10km.

Type 90: 21-inch diameter. A 1930s design used by some cruisers. Weighed 5,743lbs and carried a 827lb warhead. At 46 knots had a 7km range; at 35 knots, range was 15km.

Type 95: 21-inch diameter. The submarine version of the Long Lance torpedo. Weighed in at 3,671lbs and had a warhead of 893lbs. At 50 knots, range was 9km; at 46 knots, range was 12km.

Type 93: 24-inch diameter. The (in)famous Long Lance torpedo. Weighed 5,952lbs and carried a 1,080lb warhead. At 49 knots had a range of 20km; at 36 knots, range was 40km.

Type 97: 17.7-inch diameter. Used by midget submarines, only known use was at Pearl Haarbor. Weighed in at 2,094lbs, with a 772lb warhead. At 45 knots had a 5.5km range.

Type 91-1: 17.7-inch diameter. The standard aerial torpedo at the start of the war, by 1941 was replaced by the Type 91-2. Weighed in at 1,728lbs with a 331lb warhead. At 42 knots, range was 2km. Could be launched at a maximum altitiude of 100ft and a max speed of 200knots

Type 91-2: 17.7-inch diameter. Replaced the 91-1 by early 1942. Weighed 1,841lbs with a 452lb warhead. At 42 knots, range was 2km.

Type 91-3: 17.7-inch diameter. Replaced the 91-2 by 1943, could be dropped at 350 knots and from a max altitude of 200ft. Weighed in at 1,872lbs with a 529lb warhead. At 42 knots had a 2km range.

Type 04: 17.7-inch torpedo. The final version of the aerial torpedo, entered service in 1944 and could be dropped at speeds of up to 400 knots and 250ft. Weighed in at 2,169lbs with a 670lb warhead. At 42 knots, range was 1.5km.

On the other side of the coin....these were the primary US torpedoes of WWII.

Mark 10: 21-inch diameter. A WWI torpedo used on the S-class submarines. Weighed in at 2,215lbs with a 497lb warhead. At 36 knots, had a 3.2km range.

Mark 15: 21-inch diameter. The standard destroyer torpedo. Weighed 3,841lbs and had a 825lb warhead. At 45 knots, had a 5.5km range; at 26 knots had a 13.7km range.

Mark 14: 21-inch diameter. The standard submarine torpedo of WWII, in the early years suffered major failures due primarly to the new magnetic-field-detecting detonator. When set for contact mode, the detonator fired to fire due to the firing pin being made of cheap, easily bendable metal. The problems were finally solved in 1943 and it enjoyed a decent reputation afterwards. Continued in service until the 1970s. Weighed in at 3,280lbs with a 643lb warhead. At 46 knots, range was 4.1km; at 31 knots range was 8.2km.

Mark 13: 17.7-inch diameter. The standard aerial torpedo (also used by late-war PT boats). At first could only be dropped from a max altitude of 50ft and at a speed no greater than 110 knots. By late war could be dropped from 1,000ft and at speeds of over 200 knots. Weighed 2,216lbs with a 600lb warhead. At 33 knots had a 6.7km range.

Mark 18: 21-inch diameter. An unsuccessful copy of the German G7e torpedo. Did not leave a wake. Weighed 3,154lbs with a 575lb warhead. At 29 knots it had a 3.6km range.

Mark 24: 19-inch diameter. The first effective homing torpedo, it was used by ASW aircraft from 1943 onwards against submerged subs. Weighed 680lbs with a 92lb warhead. At 12 knots it had a 3.6km range.

Mark 27: 19-inch diameter. The sub-launched version of the Mark 24. It appeared in 1944. Weighed 720lbs with a 95lb warhead. At 12 knots it had a 4.5km range.

[dragoon500ly]

I was reading the other day yet another book on WWII in which the author tried to put forward what the Japanese should have done (with him in charge...I think).

There were two points that he made that left me sitting in my armchair, laughing.

The first point was that the Japanese should have invaded Australia. And the second was that they should have invaded the Hawaiian islands.

Sorry, had to stop and laugh after the last one.

Of all the world powers, Japan entered WWII with the greatest disadvantage. Now to be sure, Japan had a fairly modern military, but Japan, as an island nation, relied upon imports to fuel her military machine. And she didn't have the merchant hulls to do so. As much as 40% of her imports were carried in foreign-flagged vessels and that stopped when the Pacific erupted in war.

Since the Japanese started the war with a shortfall in merchant hulls, how then could the Japanese support Pacific conquests, not to mention a major war in China. The short answer is that they didn't.

The Imperial Japanese Army committed less than a dozen division-equivalents to the Pacific. Their primary focus was on the war with China and the advance into India/Burma. This was were the IJA sent its best troops and equipment. Indeed, right up to the very end of the war, most of the IJA was stationed in China.

From this standpoint alone, any Japanese invasion of Australia would have lacked the troop strength and the logistic support needed to capture and hold it.

So what about the invasion of Hawaii?

As part of the post Midway planning, the IJA committed two divisions for follow-up operations in Hawaii. A Japanese occupation of the island chain would have seriously hampered US operations until they were retaken. And the fall of Hawaii, would have had serious implications for the "Europe First" doctrine.

The island of Oahu offered the best ground for conducting military operations, as well as being home to the military installations that the Japanese would have needed to maintain control. On Oahu, the US Army already had two infantry divisions (the 24th and 25th), plus the Hawaiian National Guard, various support and Army Air Force troops, as well as numerous Navy and Marine personnel...as well as some very elaborate coastal defenses.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the US moved the entire 27th Infantry Division (an older 'square' division with four regiments) as well as several battalions of tanks, artillery and antiaircraft guns. By March 1942, there were neary 75,000 combat troops as well as over 100,000 support troops on Oahu. Not to mention lots of new aircraft.

In order to cover the invasion, Japan needed Midway...too be sure, bombers could have reached Pearl Harbor, but Midway is a small atoll and could handle, at most, some 100-150 aircraft. Primary air support would have come from the IJN's First Air Fleet made up of their six first line carriers. These would have had trouble going up against an alerted American air defense network, especially with the Pacific Fleet's three carriers lurking in the wings. Such an operation would have tied up even more of an already stretched thin merchant marine.

It is doubtful that Japan could have supported either operation.

So to those budding authors that want to write "historical fiction", please, take the time to do a little research.....

[dragoon500ly]

In any discussion of WWII, the German U-Boat campaign seems get get the most attention. The U.S. slaughter of Japanese shipping is seldom mentioned. U.S. submarines accounted for over half of Japanese merchant shipping. The increasing reach of American land and carrier-based aviation complemented this effort, ensuring that Japanese shipping was under attack almost from the moment it left Japan until it arrived at their front line bases.

This shortfall of shipping was assisted by new construction, but at rates far less than that of the Allies, typically some 500,000 tons of new construction a year with a peak, in 1944 of 1.7 million tons (the same year that the US sank 2.7 million tons).

By the end of 1943, Japan's merchant marine was crippled.

Submarines accounted for 5,880,000 tons sunk during the war, roughly 62% of the total.

Carrier aircraft accounted for another 1,740,000 tons, 18% of the total.

Land based aircraft added 825,000 tons, 9% of the total sunk.

Mines accounted for 600,000 tons or 6%.

And finally 450,000 tons were sunk by accidents at sea or by surface ship action, some 5 % of the total.

Another way of looking at Japan's situation is this:

In Dec. 1941, 6.4 million tons were available.

In Jan. 1943, 5.9 million tons remained.

In Jan. 1944, 4.8 million tons remained.

In Jan. 1945, available shipping had been reduced to 2.4 million tons.

And in Aug. 1945, the Japanese merchant marine was reduced to 1.5 million tons.

USN submarines spent 31,671 days on patrol (roughly 3 weeks on patrol). In attacking 4,112 Japanese merchant ships, US subs expended 14,748 torpedoes (roughly 3.6 per attack). Because of defective torpedoes, the odds of sinking a vessel, from 1941-1943 was less than 20%. It rose to 50% for the rest of the war.

US Subs confirmed the sinking of 188 warships and 1,294 merchant men, this does not include ships attacked, damaged and later sank by some other means. This cost the USN 49 submarines.

The IJN lost 130 submarines in WWII; the British lost 3 subs and the Dutch lost 5 subs in the Pacific. Allied submarines sank 2% of all Japanese shipping sunk.

Japan started the war with 67 subs, the US Pacific Fleet had 56 subs. The IJN built 120 subs during the war....the US built 200.

As successful as US subs were, their crews took high losses. 22% of all US submarine crews were killed during the course of the war. This is the highest percentage loss of any arm of the service.

[ShadoWarrior]

So to those budding authors that want to write "historical fiction", please, take the time to do a little research.....
Harry Turtledove, the award-winning author of many alternate-history novels, wrote one a few years ago (the Days of Infamy duology) in which the initial attack on PH was a full-on invasion, and not just a raid. It was very well researched and pretty plausible. The Japanese do, eventually, lose the war due to America's awesome industrial might. But it takes the US a lot longer to win it, and there's an enormous amount of grief for the unfortunate citizens of Hawaii prior to the US invasion to retake the islands.

[copeab]

This has been touched on a bit in two previous posts, but I'll elaborate on it here: Japan's merchant fleet was inadequate and what she had was improperly used.

This came down to four points:
(1) japan entered the war with too few merchant ships (including those operated by the IJN and IJA)
(2) She inadequately protected the ships she did have (rarely sailing them in convoys or with sufficient escort vessels)
(3) Japan didn't use her ships efficiently. For example, a ship operated by the Army might take a cargo from Japan to Java but return with an empty hold, but a navy ship might sail to Java with an empty hold and return with a full load (this also related to the incredible degree of non-cooperation between the IJA and IJN)
(4) Japan didn't have the resources to fully replace it's merchant shipping losses during the war.

As a result, the Japanese never was able to ship as much men, material and oil and they should have and the situation rapidly declined by the end of the war.

[dragoon500ly]

Harry Turtledove, the award-winning author of many alternate-history novels, wrote one a few years ago (the Days of Infamy duology) in which the initial attack on PH was a full-on invasion, and not just a raid. It was very well researched and pretty plausible. The Japanese do, eventually, lose the war due to America's awesome industrial might. But it takes the US a lot longer to win it, and there's an enormous amount of grief for the unfortunate citizens of Hawaii prior to the US invasion to retake the islands.

I enjoy Turtledove, he takes the time to research his material and that shows through in his books, certainly makes for an enjoyable read!

There is another best selling author that initially impressed me...then he wrote a triology. The final book really destroyed him for me...one of his major battle scenes was an almost line for line description of an older movie called "Zulu". The scene was much better done in the movie.

[dragoon500ly]

This has been touched on a bit in two previous posts, but I'll elaborate on it here: Japan's merchant fleet was inadequate and what she had was improperly used.

This came down to four points:
(1) japan entered the war with too few merchant ships (including those operated by the IJN and IJA)
(2) She inadequately protected the ships she did have (rarely sailing them in convoys or with sufficient escort vessels)
(3) Japan didn't use her ships efficiently. For example, a ship operated by the Army might take a cargo from Japan to Java but return with an empty hold, but a navy ship might sail to Java with an empty hold and return with a full load (this also related to the incredible degree of non-cooperation between the IJA and IJN)
(4) Japan didn't have the resources to fully replace it's merchant shipping losses during the war.

As a result, the Japanese never was able to ship as much men, material and oil and they should have and the situation rapidly declined by the end of the war.

Of all of the stupidity with which the Japanese approached WWII with, the use of her merchant fleet had to be the shining example of how not to fight a modern war. One can only wonder if the war would have lasted into 1945 if the USN had started with a operational torpedo?

[ShadoWarrior]

There is another best selling author that initially impressed me...then he wrote a triology. The final book really destroyed him for me...one of his major battle scenes was an almost line for line description of an older movie called "Zulu". The scene was much better done in the movie.
That sounds all too familiar. I think I read that book which you aren't mentioning and thought the same thing.

[95th Rifleman]

Of all of the stupidity with which the Japanese approached WWII with, the use of her merchant fleet had to be the shining example of how not to fight a modern war. One can only wonder if the war would have lasted into 1945 if the USN had started with a operational torpedo?

It's an interesting what if, once they got decent torpedos the American sub fleet became, arguably, the best of the war. The American subs where able to utilise technological advances that the German U-boat fleet just didn't have access to.

[ShadoWarrior]

One can only wonder if the war would have lasted into 1945 if the USN had started with a operational torpedo?
I think it wouldn't have made too much difference in how fast we got to Japan. By the time we got to Okinawa, the USN was running out of Japanese targets, especially merchant ones, to hit. They simply lacked the fuel to use their ships, military or civil.

[95th Rifleman]

I think it wouldn't have made too much difference in how fast we got to Japan. By the time we got to Okinawa, the USN was running out of Japanese targets, especially merchant ones, to hit. They simply lacked the fuel to use their ships, military or civil.

America had a real slow start due to the fact that they couldn't interdict Japanese shipping effectively. This hindered the early battles as Japanese positions could receive reinforcement and supplies.

If America had been able to interdict Japanese shipping at an early point in the way then the first, bloody battles would of been shorter and less costly. Early victories would of made "how fast we got to Japan" a moot point as it doesn't matter how or when we get to japan if the Japanese can't hold onto anything beyond the home islands.

At Guadacanal the japanese landed 6000 troops via the "Tokyo" express, utilising Destroyers and Light Cruisers. It can be argued that if America had the capacity to interdict these ships properly then the campaighn would of been far less costly.

[ShadoWarrior]

Destroyers and light cruisers are particularly poor (and dangerous) targets for subs. And the US didn't have all that many subs early on. But the US could have begun crippling the Japanese merchant fleet sooner, had they had properly working torps. Wouldn't have affected Guadalcanal much, but it would have been felt in other areas and it would have lessened the Allied losses in the war. But shortened the war? I don't think so.

[95th Rifleman]

Destroyers and light cruisers are particularly poor (and dangerous) targets for subs. And the US didn't have all that many subs early on. But the US could have begun crippling the Japanese merchant fleet sooner, had they had properly working torps. Wouldn't have affected Guadalcanal much, but it would have been felt in other areas and it would have lessened the Allied losses in the war. But shortened the war? I don't think so.

They are only dangerous when the other guy knows how to use them. In a British/American fleet gunning for the destroyers is a good way of commiting suicide.

The Japanese tended to run them in ones and twos, making nice targets for a sub.

[dragoon500ly]

Following Pearl Harbor, the loss of the battle line forced the USN to focus on aircraft carriers as the decisive weapon. Left to fight the surface fight were the heavy and light cruisers. The scale of the surface actions can be judged by this; between 1929 and 1937, 17 heavy cruisers were built, 6 of which were sunk in action.

The Pensacola and Salt Lake City were the oldest of the ships and finished the war with 24 Battle Stars between them. The survived the war, only to be used as target ships for the Bikini nuclear tests and were then used as target ships, finally sinking in 1948. They had thier 8-inch/55 rifles mounted in four turrets, two twin and two triple mounts (with the triple mounts super-imposed over the twin).

The next class were the six cruisers of the Northampton class. Three of the class, the Northampton, Chicago and Houston were sunk in action, the remainder finishing the war and joining the mothballed fleet and finally being scrapped in 1959/60. They pioneered the use of the triple 8-inch mount with two super-imposed forward and one aft, this combination was used by all of the following heavy cruisers.

The Indianapolis class comprised two ships (the other being Portland). Indianapolis was sunk in 1945 (the last major US warship to be sunk). Portland entered mothballs and was scrapped in 1959.

In 1933, the seven ships of the Astoria class started entering service. Of this class, three were sunk; Astoria, Quincy and Vincennes (all in 1942). The remainder of the class were scrapped in 1959/61.

The last of the pre-war heavies, the Wichita was a single class ship, essentially a 8-inch armed version of the Brooklyn class light cruisers, she survived the war, only to meet her end at the hands of the scrapyard in 1959.

The first of the wartime cruisers were the 29 ships of the Baltimore-Oregon City class (they differ in that Baltimore class had two funnels and Oregon City had one funnel with a more compact superstructure, otherwise they were identical). All survived the war, ending up in mothballs and being scrapped in the 1970-1980s. Several (Boston, Canberra, Albany, Chicago, Columbus and Northampton) were converted into the first guided-missile cruisers and served into the 1980s before being mothballed.

The last and arguably the best of the heavy cruisers were the three ships of the Des Moines class. Built with a new design of 8-inch gun that allowed for much more rapid firing, they were just too late for WWII but provided sterling service in Korea and Vietnam. Two were scrapped in the 1990s and one, the Salem, becoming a museum ship.

No discussion of the heavy cruisers can be complete without mentioning the CB or Large Cruisers. The Alaska and Guam entered service just in time for 1945. They called battlecruisers, but the USN always maintained that this was not thier function. Armed with new design 12-inch rifles they never took part in any anti-ship or bombardments, being used as escorts for the fleet carriers. After serving less than three years on active duty, they entered mothballs in 1947 and were scrapped in 1960/61.

The oldest of the light cruisers were the 10 ships of the 1920-era Omaha class. Outdated before the start of the war, they served in the various sideshow theaters and acted as convoy escorts. All were scrapped in 1946-49. They mounted their six-inch main armament in two twin turrets and 4-8 casemate-mounts.

In 1936, the first of 7 Brooklyn-class cruisers entered service. They mounted the heaviest armament of any light cruiser (five triple 6-inch/47 rifles) and were capable of an astonshing rate of fire (3-5 rounds per gun, per minute). All survived the war and entered service with various South American navies. One, the USS Phoenix entered Argentine service and was renamed the General Belgrano and became the first warship to be sunk by a nuclear submarine during the Falkland Islands campaign.

In 1938, the two sisters St. Louis and Helena entered service, a modified Brooklyn design (different placement of their secondary armament). Helena was sunk in 1943. St. Louis survived to enter service with Brazil.

In 1941, the Atlanta class of four started entering service. These were purpose built antiaircraft cruisers that boosted the heavy armamanet of eight twin 5-inch/38 rifles. The Atlanta and the Juneau were sunk in 1942, the San Diego and San Juan were scrapped in 1960-62.

The Atlanta was such a successful design that two repeats were built, the four ships of the Oakland class and the three ships of the Juneau class. Differing only in the removal of two 5-inch turrets (to make room for smaller AA guns). These seven ships provided sterling service throughout the war. They were scrapped in 1961/62.

The Cleveland-Fargo class of 52 ships provided the USN with its CL force for most of the war. Like the Baltimore-Oregon City class, the Clevelands started out with two funnels and the Fargos went down to one funnel. There were no war losses and most entered mothballs, to be scrapped in 1960-63. Several were converted into guided missile cruisers or fleet flagships, being mothballed in the 1960s. The Clevelands were armed with four triple 6-inch/47 mounts.

The final class of light cruisers were the two ships of the Worcester class. Antiaircraft cruisers armed with new mounts (six twin 6-inch rifles). They entered service in 1947 and soon entered mothballs, being scrapped in the 1960s.

Overall, US cruiser design has handicapped by the pre war naval treaties, suffering from thin armor (one nickname for US CAs were "Tin Clads"). Of all the US cruisers only the Omaha and the Atlanta classes mounted torpedoes during the war. US cruisers had excellent guns and superior fire control. Their major weakness was that pre-war, the USN did not practise night fighting to any real degree. A practise that would bear bitter fruit in the 1942 actions off of Guadalcanal.

[Sanjuro]

I have enjoyed a lot of Turtledove's books; however, like many authors he has written one series based on a Confederate victory in the US Civil War which assumes a British intervention in favour of the Confederacy.
To me this is a quite unbelievable scenario; although the Prime Minister, Palmerston, favoured the Confederacy, the likelihood of Britain going to war in favour of a slave-owning nation, thirty years after slavery was abolished in the British Empire has never seemed great.

[ShadoWarrior]

To me this is a quite unbelievable scenario; although the Prime Minister, Palmerston, favoured the Confederacy, the likelihood of Britain going to war in favour of a slave-owning nation, thirty years after slavery was abolished in the British Empire has never seemed great.
Why so unbelievable? This is the same empire that had already fought two wars with Americans in the past 90 years.

It's not so much about slavery as other things. The Empire was undisputed master of the seas at the time. it could easily have inflicted some more punishment upon their upstart former colonials, which doesn't seem so far a stretch. It would weaken a rapidly industrializing rival and put Americans "in their proper place".

[dragoon500ly]

Japan fielded some intresting designs for her cruisers during the war.

The two light cruisers of the Tenryu class were Japan's first "modern" designs when they were launched in 1918. Very comparable to the British C-class cruisers they provided good service during the inter war years. By the start of WWII, they were too old for modernization. Tenryu was sunk in 1942. Tatsuta was sunk in 1944. Armed with four single mount 5.5-inch rifles

Starting in 1919, 5 light cruisers of the Kuma class were developed from experience gained from the Tenryu. They started the war with seven single mount 5.5-inch guns and two quad mount 24-inch torpedo tubes. Heavily modernized during the war, two, Oi and Kitakami were armed with four 5.5-inch and ten quad mounted 24-inch torpedo tubes (20 Long Lance torpedoes on the broadside!!!!!). Later modified to carry eight Kaiten suicide submarines. Four of the class were sunk in 1944, the Kitakami survived the war, damaged, and was scrapped in 1947.

The Nagara class of six light cruisers was laid down in 1921. They served as the flagships of destroyer squadrons. They started the war with seven single mount 5.5-inch guns and two quad mount 24-inch torpedo tubes.

As an experiment to mount the heaviest possible armament (two twin and two single mount 5.5-inchers and two twin 24-inch torpedo tubes) the Yubari only displaced 2,890 tons (compared to Nagara's 5,170 tons). Modernized during the war, Yubari was lost in 1944.

The last group of 5,000 ton light cruisers, the three Sendai class ships filled the same role as the Nagaras. They carried the same armament of seven single mount 5.5-inch rifles and two quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. All were lost in 1943/44.

The two Furutake class heavy cruisers took the lessons of the Yubari and applied them to a larger vessel. They mounted three twin 8in rifles and two quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. Both were lost in 1942.

An improved version of the Furutake, the two Aoba class cruisers entered service in 1926. Armed with three twin 8-inch and two quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. They operated with the Furutake class for many years. Kinugasa was lost in 1942 and the Aoba in 1945.

The Myoko class was the first of the 10,000 ton heavy cruisers and set the standard for the following classes. They mounted five twin 8-inch guns and four quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. One were lost in 1944 to US forces, and two were lost in 1945 to the British, the last, Myoko was heavily damaged in 1944 and was scuttled by the British in 1946.

An improved version of the Myokos, the four Takao class ships mounted five twin 8-inch guns and four quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. Made extensive use of light alloys and welding to control their weight. Three were lost in 1944 and the fourth, Takao, was severely damaged in Singapore harbor by the British midget submarines XE-1 and XE-3.

Originally laid down as light cruisers and mounting five triple 6.1-inch guns (in answer to the US Brooklyn class). The four Mogami-class were modified in 1939-1940 into heavy cruisers, mounting five twin 8-inch rifles and four triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. One was sunk in 1942 and the remaining three in 1944.

The two Tone class cruisers were modified Mogamis. Built to carry a larger number of floatplanes and act as fleet scouts. They mounted their four twin 8-inch guns forward of the bridge, they also carried four triple 24-inch torpedo tubes and five floatplanes. The Chikuma was lost in 1944 and the Tone was sunk in Kure harbor and scrapped after the war.

Designed as training ships, the three Katori class light cruisers became destroyer squadron flagships following the start of the war. They mounted two twin 5.5-inch rifles and two twin 24-inch torpedo tubes. One was lost in 1944, another in 1945 and the third, Kashima, survived the war, to be scrapped in 1947.

Designed as replacements for the older Nagaras, the four Agano class cruisers mounted three twin 6.1-inch rifles and two quad-mounted 24-inch torpedo tubes. Two were lost in 1944, a third, Yahagi, was sunk in the Last Sortie with Yamato and the fourth Sakawa, survived the war to be sunk in the Bikini nuclear test.

The last cruiser, the single Oyodo was a modified Agano. Armed with two triple 6.1-inch rifles, she was intended as a flagship for attack groups. In this role she carried six floatplanes. She was sunk in 1945.

Japanese heavy cruisers were powerful designs, built in excess of the pre war naval treaties. Their main armament was laid out in twin turrets, one of which could only fire to port or starboard, restricting their forward firing weapons to four rifles (compared to six on USN cruisers). They also mounted at least two 24-inch torpedo tubes with the deadly Type 93 Long Lance torpedo. In the fighting off Guadalcanal, they were deadly foes.

Their light cruisers were, for the most part, 1919-1920 designs and poorly suited for modern warfare. But they also carried the Long Lance torpedo, giving them the edge in surface actions.

[dragoon500ly]

That sounds all too familiar. I think I read that book which you aren't mentioning and thought the same thing.

And what a terrible ending to an intresting series!

[dragoon500ly]

Destroyers and light cruisers are particularly poor (and dangerous) targets for subs. And the US didn't have all that many subs early on. But the US could have begun crippling the Japanese merchant fleet sooner, had they had properly working torps. Wouldn't have affected Guadalcanal much, but it would have been felt in other areas and it would have lessened the Allied losses in the war. But shortened the war? I don't think so.

In the early war years, US submarines often found themselves with dream shots, only to have their torpedoes fail.

Consider the USS Growler at the Battle of Midway, the only US sub to attack a Japanese warship in the battle, she was able to get close enough to put four torpedoes into one of the carriers, hit the carrier with all four shots, only to have all of them fail to explode! To add insult to injury, the air flask from one of the torpedoes floated to the service and was used by several Japanese sailors as a floatation device....its no wonder that US submariners wanted to travel to the east coast and commit barbarous acts upon the persons of certain officers working with Weapons Development!

What finally conviced the lab rats was a submarine that set up and fired twelve torpedoes (he reloaded!!!) at a stationary target, at the recommended range, using the recommended settings and got to watch all twelve torpedoes hit the target and fail to go off.

It doesn't get much worse than that!

[dragoon500ly]

Why so unbelievable? This is the same empire that had already fought two wars with Americans in the past 90 years.

It's not so much about slavery as other things. The Empire was undisputed master of the seas at the time. it could easily have inflicted some more punishment upon their upstart former colonials, which doesn't seem so far a stretch. It would weaken a rapidly industrializing rival and put Americans "in their proper place".

And don't forget the San Jacinto affair in which a US warship bordered a British flagged merchant vessel and removed two Confederate diplomats. The US position that the Confederates were not diplomats but rebels was weak at beast. But even more damning was that the merchant was in international waters. It was only the personal intervention of Prince Albert that prevented hot heads from ordering the Royal Navy to teach the Americans a lesson.

So yes, I can see such an incident putting the Royal Navy in the position of smashing the blockade, and considering that most of the USN warships were smaller gunboats, the odds were excellent that the RN would succeed in their mission. With one or more Southern ports open to export cotton and tobacco and import military supplies.......

[ShadoWarrior]

Oi and Kitakami were armed with four 5.5-inch and ten quad mounted 24-inch torpedo tubes (20 Long Lance torpedoes on the broadside!!!!!).
That's one hell of a broadside. Scary. A single ship that can throw an entire squadron's worth of torps in a salvo.

[dragoon500ly]

That's one hell of a broadside. Scary. A single ship that can throw an entire squadron's worth of torps in a salvo.

Picture Oi at 2nd Guadalcanal, with South Dakota in her sights!!!!

Japanese cruisers and most destroyers carried reload torpedoes....haven't found any mention of them being available on Oi and her sister....but wouldn't that be a nightmare scenario for a Task Group commander.

[Sanjuro]

Why so unbelievable? This is the same empire that had already fought two wars with Americans in the past 90 years.

The unbelievable part would have been getting Parliament to agree with the war; especially after the War of 1812 had led to a stable, mutually-acceptable peace and the longest undefended land border in the world.
Now, if the Confederacy had followed Longstreet's advice (in The Killer Angels anyway) and freed the slaves before attacking Fort Sumter; then I suspect British support would have been forthcoming...

[95th Rifleman]

The unbelievable part would have been getting Parliament to agree with the war; especially after the War of 1812 had led to a stable, mutually-acceptable peace and the longest undefended land border in the world.
Now, if the Confederacy had followed Longstreet's advice (in The Killer Angels anyway) and freed the slaves before attacking Fort Sumter; then I suspect British support would have been forthcoming...

It's no secret that the British was ready and willing to assist the Confederacy, we had observors on the ground watching how things played out and reporting back on a regular basis.

Slavery was the only thing that kept us out of the war. Politicaly and strategicly a divided North America was in the best interests of the British Empire but as mentioned we could not support a slave-nation, it just wouldn't wash with parliment and at the time we held the position of "good guys" in the same way America does today, it was inportant to maintain a moral high ground.

Had the south freed the slaves I doubt very much that the Union could of prevailed and we';d have a very different history. The long reaching effects of two American states on world history is a fascinating concept when you look at the 20th century.

[ShadoWarrior]

The long reaching effects of two American states on world history is a fascinating concept when you look at the 20th century.
Yes, it is. One has to wonder how WW1 would have turned out if there had been no American intervention. Had there been a negotiated peace there would never have been a Nazi Germany to feed off of the resentment of what the Allies forced upon Germany. Without a Nazi Germany how would Europe have fared once Stalin finished screwing up Russia? Would he have attacked westwards without having a hated target like Nazi Germany to focus upon? Japan would likely not have needed to resort to attacking the USA or CSA. Would Stalin, free to devote all his attention to Japan, have left Japan alone to wage war on China? Doubtful.

[dragoon500ly]

And that's why Turtledove's work holds my attention. It's a well reasoned, carefully thoughout might-have-been.

[95th Rifleman]

Yes, it is. One has to wonder how WW1 would have turned out if there had been no American intervention. Had there been a negotiated peace there would never have been a Nazi Germany to feed off of the resentment of what the Allies forced upon Germany. Without a Nazi Germany how would Europe have fared once Stalin finished screwing up Russia? Would he have attacked westwards without having a hated target like Nazi Germany to focus upon? Japan would likely not have needed to resort to attacking the USA or CSA. Would Stalin, free to devote all his attention to Japan, have left Japan alone to wage war on China? Doubtful.

America's involvement in WW1 has always been over-estimated. By the time America entered the war, Germany had shot her bolt. America helped make the Germans realise this but even without the Americans WW1 would not of lasted past 1919 at best.

However the concept of a negotiated peace is interesting. Without America to drive the final nail into Germany's coffin they may of been able to negotiate, considering they had already finished their war on the Eastern front. Hitler could not of risen to power without the humiliation of Germany, a negotiated peace without the crippling war indemnity that came from the post-war treaty may of turned Germany into a post-war democracy similar to France and the UK.

WW2 may well of been an alliance of Germany, France and the Uk against Stalin. Without a Japanese attack to push either American state into armed conflict they probably wouldn't bother getting involved at all, taking a wait and see approach to the continent.

[ShadoWarrior]

America's involvement in WW1 has always been over-estimated. By the time America entered the war, Germany had shot her bolt. America helped make the Germans realise this but even without the Americans WW1 would not of lasted past 1919 at best.America's military contribution wasn't so great. Its keeping England from going bankrupt, however, should not be underestimated.

However the concept of a negotiated peace is interesting. Without America to drive the final nail into Germany's coffin they may of been able to negotiate, considering they had already finished their war on the Eastern front. Hitler could not of risen to power without the humiliation of Germany, a negotiated peace without the crippling war indemnity that came from the post-war treaty may of turned Germany into a post-war democracy similar to France and the UK.

WW2 may well of been an alliance of Germany, France and the Uk against Stalin. Without a Japanese attack to push either American state into armed conflict they probably wouldn't bother getting involved at all, taking a wait and see approach to the continent.
I see that there is something that you and I can agree upon.

[RN7]

Of all of the stupidity with which the Japanese approached WWII with, the use of her merchant fleet had to be the shining example of how not to fight a modern war. One can only wonder if the war would have lasted into 1945 if the USN had started with a operational torpedo?

Its often been said that American submarines succeeded in doing to Japanese shipping in the Pacific, to what Germany's submarines failed to do to Allied shipping in the Atlantic. In fact Allied shipping losses from the end of 1941-45 were more then twice in tonnage to what the Japanese lost in the Pacific, and in 1942 Allied shipping losses were six times greater in tonnage in the Atlantic alone to Japanese losses in the Pacific.

Japan actually produced as many submarines as Britain in WW2 (167), although this pales in comparison to Germany who producing twice as much as the rest of the world combined. German submarine technology and tactics progressed rapidly throughout the war.

They were the first to fit the Dutch Snorkel design into their submarines. The Germans also made rapid progress in the development of battery capacity, sonars, homing torpedoes, and fitted hydraulic torpedo loaders onto the Type XXI which gave them the ability to fire 18 torpedoes in under 20 minutes. The Type XXI was considered revolutionary, being able to remain submerged almost all of the time and also faster than all previous designs worldwide, due to the improved streamlining of their shape, batteries with larger capacity and the snorkel, which allowed diesel engines to be used while submerged. Streamlined and hydrodynamically clean hull design allowed later war German submarines to have high submerged speed, being able to outrun many surface ships while submerged, combined with improved dive times, making it much harder to chase and destroy. Yet they lost 785 submarines.

The reason being the Allies, the British in particular, recognised from the outset the danger of the submarine to not only naval shipping but commerce. In addition to the convoy and escort system, Allied anti-submarine weapons and counter-measures kept pace with and even surpassed German submarine developments and tactics, to the point that Allied shipping losses in the Atlantic declined from 6.1 million tonnes in 1942, to 500,000 tonnes in 1944. Geman submarine losses rose from 87 in 1942 to 242 in 1944.

Unlike Britain the Japanese failed to make provisions to protect their shipping until it was way too late, and it was far to little to stop American submarines from choking Japanese imports and resupply to outlying bases and garrisons. Initially it was probably out of arrogance due to their early successes, but they were hoplessely outclassed by Allied technology as the war progressed. Japan also failed to properly utilise its large submarine fleet from the start of the war. They had 63 operational submarines in December 1941 which were as good as what the US Navy had, with better torpedoes. Yet until later in the war when they were on the retreat they largely ignored Allied shipping and went looking for warships. In 1942 Japan lost a million tons of shipping and sunk 7 American submarines. In 1944 Japan lost nearly 4 million tons of shipping and sank 20 American submarines, and lost 56 of her own submarines.

[95th Rifleman]

I see that there is something that you and I can agree upon.

Debate enough subjects, long enough and common ground is reached sooner or later.

[95th Rifleman]

The reason being the Allies, the British in particular, recognised from the outset the danger of the submarine to not only naval shipping but commerce. In addition to the convoy and escort system, Allied anti-submarine weapons and counter-measures kept pace with and even surpassed German submarine developments and tactics, to the point that Allied shipping losses in the Atlantic declined from 6.1 million tonnes in 1942, to 500,000 tonnes in 1944. Geman submarine losses rose from 87 in 1942 to 242 in 1944.


We already had a taste of what subs could do back in WW1. While often slow to learn, this was an education we took to heart when WW2 broke out. Even so, it took us a while to get our shit together and run convoys. During the early stage of the Atlantic war it was open season on merchant shipping.

[ShadoWarrior]

Oddly enough, and very fortunate for the UK (and the rest of the world), Germany failed to learn the lesson of their own success with U-boats in WW1.

When World War II started, Germany only had 65 U-boats, with just 21 of those at sea, ready for war. During the war the Germans sank 5,150 allied ships displacing 21.57 million tons. Of this, the U-boats were responsible for 2828 ships of 14.69 million tons. To place this in perspective, the Germans sank the equivalent of the entire British merchant fleet at the start of the war. Additionally, submarines destroyed 187 warships, including 6 aircraft carriers and 2 battleships.

WW2 U-boat production:

1935 (14)
1936 (21)
1937 (1)
1938 (9)
1939 (18)
1940 (50)
1941 (199)
1942 (237)
1943 (284)
1944 (229)
1945 (91)

Total: 1153

Imagine what would have happened if Germany had used a different Z-plan, one in which resource-intensive dinosaurs like the cruisers and battleships whose keels were laid down prior to the outbreak of war had been deferred to later in the plan in favor of truly massive U-boat construction. How many U-boats could Germany have built in place of the Bismark and Tirpitz? As it was, Germany came close to bringing England to its knees, even with a late start at ramping up U-boat production. Let's suppose that Germany had built 200 U-boats in 1939 and another 200 in 1940. (That's moving the historical production ahead by just 2 years, which is not unreasonable.) Germany succeeds in forcing England to sue for peace by the Spring of 1941. With no threat in the Mediterranean from England, Germany has no need to intervene on Italy's behalf in Greece. The west flank is secure and Operation Barbarossa can begin on its original schedule and with more power as Germany no longer needs to tie up large numbers of men, tanks, and planes in the west. Six weeks more time allows Germany to take Moscow long before the fall rains turn everything into a muddy morass. Leningrad falls soon thereafter. Even if Stalin doesn't sue for peace (which is unlikely, and it's equally unlikely that Hitler would have accepted even if Stalin offered), by the time the Siberians arrive they'd find the Germans already hunkered down in Moscow and Leningrad. Their counteroffensive would have limited effect. With reduced winter losses, and starting positions further east, Germany is more likely to succeed in the Caucasus operations of 1942. If they capture the oilfields (likely in this alternate history), that's pretty much it for any chances of the Soviets ever being able to throw the Germans back on the defensive. Best case for the Russians is that things settle into years of bloody stalemate on the Eastern front. Worst case? Japan attacks a fatally weakened Russia in late 1942 and it's the Russians that have to fight a two-front war, and do so without any lend-lease from the UK or the US.

And speaking of the US, with England at peace with Germany, the Germans never declare war on the US. The French are FUBAR. There will never be a "second front". The US concentrates all its might on Japan. The Pacific war probably ends in late 1944 or early 1945, and without atomic weapons, which are not fast-tracked into development because the US is never threatened by Germany. The invasion of Japan is horrendously bloody.

Germany completes the Final Solution. Germany also, eventually, either gets Turkey to join the Axis, or conquers it. After which Germany sweeps through the Middle East, swallowing up Arabia and Persia.

Two superpowers arise from WW2: the US and Germany, with the Third Reich as the largest empire the world has ever known, having conquered nearly all of Europe, and a substantial portion of Asia.

[copeab]

Japan also failed to properly utilise its large submarine fleet from the start of the war.

In particular, it was the doctrine of the IJA for submarines to go after surface warships first, merchant shipping second. With the exception of aircraft carriers, this was a backwards strategy. Sinking a battleship doesn't harm the enemy as much as an equivalent tonnage of freighters and tankers.

[copeab]

Germany completes the Final Solution. Germany also, eventually, either gets Turkey to join the Axis, or conquers it. After which Germany sweeps through the Middle East, swallowing up Arabia and Persia.


This is one of the obvious historical changes in my weird WWII campaign, the result of Russia attacking Germany in 1941 and getting crushed (a major factor in Turkey not joining the Axis was fear of being attacked by Russia; with Russia out of the way, Turkey's neutrality becomes less certain).

Oh, and the Russian invasion was partly the PCs fault. In December 1940 they made sure the Russians knew the Nazis were in Switzerland trying to recruit the dragons there burn down Moscow, among other places ...

[dragoon500ly]

On December 7, 1941, the USN had 171 destroyers in commission.

One third of these were of World War One vintage, the famous "Liberty" or "flush-deck class of which 272 had been built. Between the wars 12 had been lost and 93 had been scrapped under the terms of the London Naval Disarmament Treaty of 1930. An additional 46 were serving in subsidary duties and 50 had been traded to the Royal Navy in 1940. Leaving 71 in service.

The remaining ships were all built after 1932.

One feature of US destroyers was that they were built for a Pacific War. The scarcity of land bases meant that some means of overcoming the vast distances involved had to be found. One solution was the development of the fleet train that allowed the USN to strike anywhere in the Pacific. Another was building extended ranges into their ships. For example, a contemporary British F-class destroyer had a range of 6,000 miles at 15 knots. The US Craven-class destroyer had a range of 9,000 miles at the same speed. All US destroyers were equipped to refuel at sea.

Allen-class. Sole survivor of the pre-flush deck destroyers. Spent the war at Pearl Harbor as a training vessel and scrapped in 1946.

Clemson-class; also known as the Liberty or Flush-Deck class. Displacement ranged from 1,090 to 1,190 tons. Armed with four 4-inch/50 rifles and a single 3-inch/23 AA gun and four triple torpedo mounts. Spent most of the war as convoy escorts or modified into fast landing ships or minesweepers. During 1941-42, they fought against terrible odds in the Philippines and Java. One, the USS Stewart was captured in dry dock and served the war with the IJN. Recovered after the war, she was sunk as a target in 1946. Eighteen were sunk.

Farragut-class. A group of 8 built in 1934. Displacement of 1,395 tons. Introduced the 5-inch/38 DP gun and quad mounted tubes. Initially mounted five 5-inch/38s and two quad mount torpedos. One 5-incher was removed to make room (and weight) for increased AA armament. Three were sunk during the war.

Porter-class. A class of 8 built in 1935 and designed as squadron leaders. Introduced the twin 5-ich/38 mount. Fitted with 4 twin gun mounts and two quad mount torpedoes. Displaced 1,850 tons. Later modified with one twin 5-inch being replaced with a single mount and increased AA armament. One was lost.

Mahan-class. Entering service in 1935, this class of 18 was initially armed with 5 single mount 5-inchers and three quad mounted torpedoes. Later modified with the removal of one 5-incher and two torpedo mounts to allow for increased AA armament. Displaced 1,500 tons. Five were sunk.

Somers-class. Built in 1937, this class of 5 were improved Porters. Displaced 1,850 tons. Started with four twin 5-inch mounts and three quad torpedoe tubes. Later lost one quad mount in favor of increased AA armament. One was lost.

Craven-class, also known as the Gridley-class. Entering service in 1936, this was a class of 22. Displaced 1,500 tons. Armed with four 5-inch single mounts and four quad torpedo tubes. Little changed during the war, although two torpedo mounts were replaced with AA guns. Four were sunk.

Sims-class. Entered service in 1938 as a class of 12 ships. Improved Benham-class armed with five single mount 5-inch/38s and three quad mounted torpedo tubes. Later lost one torpedo mount in favor of AA guns. Displaced 1,570 tons. Five were sunk during the war.

Benson-Livermore-class. Entered service starting in 1939, these two classes totaled 96 vessels (32 Benson and 64 Livermore). Bensons displaced 1,620 tons and Livermores displaced 1,630 tons. Differed only in minor details. Armed with four single 5-inchers and one quintuple torpedo mount. Some were built with two torpedo mounts, but this was quickly removed. Fourteen were lost in the war.

Fletcher-class. This class of 179 started entering service in 1942. The mainstay of the US Pacific Fleet for most of the war. Displaced 2,050 tons and armed with five single mount 5-inch/38s and two quituple torpedo mounts. Towards the end of the war, one torpedo mount was removed in favor of increased AA armament. Twenty were sunk.

Allen M. Summers-class. Entering service in 1943 as a class of 58. These were improved Fletchers armed with three twin 5-inch/38s and two quintuple torpedo mounts. Later lost a torpedo mount, replaced with additional AA guns. Displaced 2,200 tons. Not consider to be successful due to weight problems. Four were sunk.

Gearing-class. Entered service in 1945 as a class of 105. Displaced 2,425 tons. Armed with three twin 5-inch/38s and two quintuple torpedo mounts, later reduced to one torpedo mount and additional AA guns. None were lost.

US destroyers were powerfully armed with dual purpose guns and a strong torpedo armament. As the war progressed, torpedoes were replaced with larger numbers of 40mm and 20mm mounts. They were also noted for an excellent ASW capability with one of the best sonars of the war as well as a heavy depth charge (and later Hedgehog) armament.

All-in-all, well capable of fighting the Pacific War.

[dragoon500ly]

Japanese destroyers in WWII earned a reputation for being deadly anti-ship platforms, due to their heavy torpedo armament, especially the Type 93 Long Lance, arguably the best torpedo of the war. Another, little known capability, was the detroyers carriage of reload torpedoes (not just 1 or 2, but enough to reload all of their tubes) and the provision of rapid reloading gear. A IJN destroyer could fire all of its torpedoes in one salvo and have its tubes reloaded within six minutes. This capability was a deadly surprise to the USN during the battles off Guadacanal.

Momi-class. In service from 1919. Displacing 770 tons. The first IJN destroyers built that did not show the influence of British design. 25 were built. One was lost to a pre-collision, 3 were scrapped, 9 were reclassied and rearmed as patrol boats, 5 became training ships and 7 remained as destroyers. Armed with three single mount 4.7-inch rifles and two twin 21-inch torpedeo tubes. Three were sunk, two were removed in 1939 and one was scrapped in 1947.

Minekaze-class. A class of 13 that entered service in the 1920s. Displaced 1,215 tons and were armed with four single mount 4.7-inch rifles and three twin 21-inch torpedo tubes. 8 were sunk during the war, 3 were scrapped in 1947/48, one was scuttled in 1947 and one was turned over to China in 1947.

Wakatake-class. A class of 6 that entered service in the 1920s. Displaced 820 tons and armed with three single 4.7-inch and two twin 21-inch torpedo mounts. One sank in 1932 and five were sunk during the war.

Kamikaze-class. Entering service in 1922, this class of 9 displaced 1,270 tons. Armed with four single mount 4.7-inchers and three twin 21-inch torpedo tubes. Seven were sunk and two were scrapped in 1947.

Mutsuki-class. A class of 12 that entered service in 1926. Displacing 1,313 tons and armed with four single 4.7in rifles and two triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. All twelve were sunk during the war.

Fubuki-class. Entered service in 1930 with 20 ships.. The first modern IJN destroyers, they displaced 2,090 tons and were armed with three twin 5-inch/50 rifles and three triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. During the war, they lost one 5-inch mount, replaced by additional AA guns. Nineteen were sunk during the war and one was scrapped in 1947.

Akatsuki-class. A class of 4 that service in 1932. Displacing 2,090 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50 and three triple 24-inch torpedo mounts. Later lost one 5-inch mount in favor of additional AA guns. Three were sunk and one went to Russia in 1947.

Hatsuharu-class. A class of 6, entering service in 1934. Displaced 1,715 tons and armed with two twin and one single 5-inch/50 and two triple 24-inch torpedo mounts. The single gun mount was replaced with AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Shiratsuyu-class. Entered service in 1935 as a class of 10. Displaced 1,580 tons and armed with two twin and one single 5-inch/50 and two quadruple 24-inch mounts. Like the Hatsuharu, the single gun mount was replaced by AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Asahio-class. A class of 10 that entered service in 1937. Displaced 1,961 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadrule 24-inch torpedo mounts. Like other destroyers, one gun mount was replaced with AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Kagero-class. A class of 18 that entered service in 1939. Considered to be the ultimate in IJN destroyer design, all subsequent classes differed only in minor details. Displaced 2,033 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadruple torpedo mounts. Later had one gun mount replaced with extra AA guns. Seventeen were lost during the war and one went to CHina in 1947.

Yugumo-class. A class of 20 that entered service in 1941. Displaced 2,077 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadruple torpedo mounts. Later had one gun mount replaced with extra AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Akitsuki-class. A class of 12 that entered service in 1941. Designed to meet the need for AA screening vessles for the carriers. Displaced 2,701 tons and armed with four twin 3.9-inch/70 rifles and one quadruple 24-inch torpedo mount. Six were sunk, one went to Russia, another to China and four were scrapped in 1947/48.

Shimakaze. A single ship that entered service in 1942. Displaced 2,567 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadruple torpedo mounts. Later had one gun mount replaced with extra AA guns. SUnk in 1944.

Matsu-class. A class of 41 that entered service in 1944. Displaced 1,262 tons and armed with one twin and one single 5-inch mount and one quadruple 24-inch torpedo mount. Designed as ASW ships. Nine were sunk, three to China, four to Russia and the remainder scrapped in 1947.

Japanese destroyers were initially designed for the anti-ship role. As Allied airpower became more threatening, they were heavily modified for AA use. IJN DDs were considered to be poor ASW platforms.

[copeab]

Fubuki-class. Entered service in 1930 with 20 ships.. The first modern IJN destroyers, they displaced 2,090 tons and were armed with three twin 5-inch/50 rifles and three triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. During the war, they lost one 5-inch mount, replaced by additional AA guns. Nineteen were sunk during the war and one was scrapped in 1947.


The Fubukis were probably the most formidable destroyers in the world when they first entered service and by 1941 were still quite capable. Their big flaw, like most pre-WWII destroyers of all nations, was a poor AAA armament.

[dragoon500ly]

The Fubukis were probably the most formidable destroyers in the world when they first entered service and by 1941 were still quite capable. Their big flaw, like most pre-WWII destroyers of all nations, was a poor AAA armament.

Yup! They certainly gave the USN nightmares during the Solomon Islands fighting. The Kageros were the ultimate in the design however and all of their follow-up designs were variations on the basic Kagero.

[dragoon500ly]

Talking about poor AAA armament during WWII...

The two worst systems had to be the USN 1.1-inch/75 quad mount and the Japanese 25mm/60 gun in any mounting.

The 1.1-inch or Chicago Piano as it was nicknamed in the fleet, well, the gun crew had a sailor whose job was to carry a sledge hammer and a chisel. His sole function was to pry loose jammed shell casings when they happened. This is one of the things that is very bad for a AAA gun when you are firing at attacking torpedo planes!

The 25mm/60 was a copy of a Hotchkiss design with a limited magazine capacity, typical twelve rounds, and an even more limited engagement zone. To add to the puzzle, the IJN had access to the British 2-pounder and the Bofors 40mm/60 designs, neither of which ever entered service with them. Instead, the IJN simply added more and more 25mm mounts.

Considering that as the war progressed, the Allies realized that the 20mm Oerklions were not effective weapons and that even the quad 40mm mounts didn't have the aircraft destruction capacity to stop Kamikazes.......one wonders just what the IJN was thinking.

[dragoon500ly]

In any discussion of the Pacific War, sooner or later it turns into a discussion of just what might have happened had the largest Japanese battleship, HIJMS Yamato had met the largest USN battleship, USS Iowa in a toe-to-toe fight.

First, the basic stats:

Yamato had a full load displacement of 69,888 tons (she was the largest warship ever launched until the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise in the 1960s). Her length at the waterline was 839'11" with an overall length of 862'9". Beam was 121'1" and she had a draft of 34'1".

Iowa's full load displacement was 57,540 tons. Her length at the waterline was 860" with an overall length of 887"3". She had a beam of 108'2" and a draft of 36'3".

The key features here are the beam and draft measurements, typically a wide-beamed ship with deep draft is a steadier gunnery platform. Yamato being wider and Iowa being deeper, both balance out in the long run. Iowa had a better layour of rudders vs Yamato and actually had a smaller tactical diameter (this is the minimum diameter necessary to make a full circle), thus making her more maneuverable.

Machinery wise, Yamato had twelve boilers and four sets of turbines giving her a max shaft horsepower of 150,000 and a maximum speed of 27 knots. The Iowa had eight boilers and four sets of turbines which turned out 212,000 shaft horsepower with a sustained speed of 32.5 knots (the Iowas were able to reach 35 knots during trials for short periods).

Iowa's higher sustained speed gave her the advantage in closing the range and her ability to kick up to 35 knots whould have given Yamato problems in tracking.

Yamato's armor protection was: Her main belt was 16.1"; her deck armor was 9"; her barbettes (turret bases) was 21.5"; the turret faces had 25.6"; and her conning tower had 19.7" of protection. Iowa had a belt 12.9" thick; deck armor 8.1"; barbette: 17.3"; turret faces of 19.7" and conning tower of 17.5".

On paper, at least Yamato had the advantage, but this is rather deceptive. Thickness of plate also has to make an allowance for quality. In the years prior to WWII, the USN had made considerable strides in armor technology, as a result, the protection offered by its new armor plate was equivalent to about 25% more thickness than the old type of armor used by Yamato. Iowa also appears to have been much better constructed than Yamato. On December 25, 1944, Yamato took a single torpedo hit that demonstrated that the jointing in between her armor belt and her hull was faulty. To correct the fault, the IJN concluded that it would have to add an additional 5,000 tons worth of bracing and armor to the ship's displacement. The IJN simply repaired the hole and pretended that there was no problem.

Armament wise, the Yamato mounted three triple turrets mounting 18.11-inch/45 rifles (two forward and one aft), a secondary armament of two triple 6.1-inch/60 rifles (one each fore and aft), and a dual purpose armament of twelve twin 5-inch/40 rifles. Iowa mounted three triple turrets mounting 16-inch/50 rifles and a dual purpose armament of ten twin 5-inch/38 rifles.

So just how good were the main armament? The 18.11-inch naval rifle had a muzzle velocity of 2,550fps. It could fire one round per gun per minute. The 16-inch rifle had a muzzle velocity of 2,560fps and a rate of fire of two rounds per gun per minute.

At first glance, the 18-inch gun fires a shell weighing some 20% more than the 16-inch, and has a 7% greater range.

But the American advantage is a bit more subtle. The 16-inch had a longer barrel length than the 18-inch, this gives the shell more stability in flight, giving it greater range.

Its when the penetration capability of the two guns is compared that it becomes intresting: At a range of 0 yards, the 18-incher has a pen of 34", compared to 32.62" for the 16-inch. At a range of 20,000 yards, the 18-inch will penetrate about 20.4"; at the same range the 16-inch will penetrate 20.04". Open the range to 30,000 yards and the 18-inch will penetrate about 14.7" and the 16-inch will penetrate 14.97".

But it all boils down to the fact that extended range gunnery duels did not happen. The longest-range deliberate hit by any battleship in either the First World War or in the Second was made by HMS Warspite when it scored a hot at 26,000 yards.

There is also one other factor to consider. The USN's gunnery was supported by superior fire control radar as well as better ballistic computers.

There is no doubt that in a one for one engagement, the Iowa would have emerged bloody, but victorious.

[dragoon500ly]

The Battle of Midway is called the most decisive naval battle of WWII, the turning point of the naval war, and a host of other platitudes. Its the classis David-vs-Goliath battle. The heavily outnumber USN ambushes the superior IJN and nails four carriers and a heavy cruiser and losing only one carrier and a destroyer. The so-called incredible victory.

Or was it?

Certainly when you sit down and flip over the orders of battle, the IJN put committed almost its entire fleet against a handful of USN warships. But when it comes right down to it, just how badly outnumbered was the USN.

The primary strike force for the IJN was the "Kido Butai", the First Carrier Striking Force .

The Kido Butai consisted of the following:
Carrier Division One
CV Akagi: with an air group of 18 A6M2 Zero fighters, 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers and 19 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers. Also carrying 6 Zero fighters for the Midway Garrision and available for CAP.
CV Kaga: with an air group of 18 A6M2 Zero fighters, 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers and 27 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers as well as 9 Zero fighters intended for the Midway Garrison and available for CAP.
Carrier Division Two
CV Hiryu: her air group consisted of 18 A6M2 Zeros, 18 D3A1 Vals and 18
B5N2 Kates as well as 3 additional Zeros intended for Midway.
CV Soryu: her air group consisted of 18 A6M2 Zeros, 19 D3A1 Vals, 18 B5N2 Kates and 2 D4Y1 Judy recon bombers as well as an additional 3 Zeros intended for Midway.
Escorting the carriers were the battleships Haruna and Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the light cruiser Nagara and 11 destroyers.

The combined air groups totaled 93 A6M2 Zero fighters; 73 D3A1 Val dive bombers; 2 D4Y1 Judy recon bombers; 82 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers.

The US committed:
Task Force 17:
USS Yorktown: with an air group of 27 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters, 37 SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers and 15 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers.
She was escorted by 2 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers.

Task Force 16:
USS Enterprise: her air group comprised 27 F4F-4 Wildcats, 37 SBD-3 Dauntless and 14 TBD-1 Devastators.
USS Hornet: her air group comprised 27 F4F-4 Wildcats, 35 SBD-3 Dauntless and 15 TBD-1 Devastators.
Their escorts consisted of 5 heavy and 1 light cruisers and 9 destroyers.

The fleet deployed 81 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters; 109 SBD-3 dive bombers and 44 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers.

An often under appricated member of the fight is the US Garrision on Midway. Their air group consisted of 25 PBY-5 Catalinas in a search role; 5 PBY-5A Catalinas in a strike role; 6 TBF-1 Avengers; 21 F2A-3 Buffalo fighters; 7 F4F-3 Wildcat fighters; 19 SBD-2 Dauntless dive bombers; 21
SB2U-3 Vindicator dive bombers; 1 B-17D photo recon; 15 B-17E heavy bombers; and 4 B-26 medium bombers (carrying torpedoes).

In the course of the battle, the Japanese Invasion Force was attacked by a single Catalina carrying torpedoes as well as B-17 bombers, that damaged one tanker, slightly (by a US torpedo that actually exploded!).

The Kido Butai launched a single air strike on Midway, that damaged many of the installations, but did not damage her AA or coastal defense guns. In the course of the air strike, almost all of the defending fighters were shot down (this would be the last combat action for the Buffalo in US service). The real impact of Midway was in the multiple air strikes that were launched against the Kido Butai that kept the Japanese occuiped with dodging ordnance and disrupted the Japanese CAP. The need to land, refuel and rearm their CAP fighters played a major part in delaying a follow-up strike on Midway.

Due to the relative rawness of the US air groups the three squadrons of torpedo bombers attacked individually and unsupported. This continued the disruption of the Japanese CAP and helped open a window in which the Yorktown and Enterprise dive bombers were able to hit three of the carriers and damage them so severely that they later sank. The final IJN carrier Hiryu was able to launch two separate attacks that first damaged Yorktown and then later so crippled her that she had to be abanded and later sunk by a IJN submarine. Hiryu later fell victim to Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers.

With the loss of the fleet carriers of the Kido Butai, the Japanese were forced to withdraw. In the process of withdraw, two Japanese heavy cruisers collided and one was later sunk by US dive bombers.

The simple version, I know.

But Midway was not the Incredible Victory that many western authors paint it to be. It was a notable victory for the USN and certainly hurt the IJN, badly. But was it a decisive victory? Was it the turning point of the war?

The IJN still enjoyed numerical superiority over the USN. They were still protected by a ring of island bases that allowed them to control the seas around their islands and still were capable of offensive actions. While they had lost all of the carrier aircraft, a large number of their veteran pilots were rescued and were available for latter operations.

IMHO, the decisive battle of the Pacific War was the Battle for Guadalcanal. Here the cream of Japanese Naval Avation died fighting. Here the US took its first major offensive step forward on the long road that would end off an little known island called Okinawa.

[copeab]

But Midway was not the Incredible Victory that many western authors paint it to be. It was a notable victory for the USN and certainly hurt the IJN, badly. But was it a decisive victory? Was it the turning point of the war?


In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

[ShadoWarrior]

I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justifiedOn what grounds?

[Panther Al]

In a nutshell:
Two things. The first and most obvious bit being that the Germans announced that they had reason to believe that it had in it's holds war cargo, and that they would attempt to sink it if it sailed.
Second, as it turns out it did indeed have such cargo, and there for a legit sinking- if tragic.

[RN7]

But Midway was not the Incredible Victory that many western authors paint it to be. It was a notable victory for the USN and certainly hurt the IJN, badly. But was it a decisive victory? Was it the turning point of the war?

The IJN still enjoyed numerical superiority over the USN. They were still protected by a ring of island bases that allowed them to control the seas around their islands and still were capable of offensive actions. While they had lost all of the carrier aircraft, a large number of their veteran pilots were rescued and were available for latter operations.

IMHO, the decisive battle of the Pacific War was the Battle for Guadalcanal. Here the cream of Japanese Naval Avation died fighting. Here the US took its first major offensive step forward on the long road that would end off an little known island called Okinawa.

In a sense Midway was not the victory it has been made out to be because even if the Japanese hadn't lost four aircraft carriers they still would have been beaten, it just would have taken a while longer. However in another sense it was a sensational vistory as the IJN got a hammering, in fact it was the greatest naval defeat that Japan had ever suffered up to that date, and it totaly exploded the short lived myth that they were invincible.

Guadacanal had a similar senationalism to Midway, but it was on land. It was the first time that the Japanese Army was stopped and thoroughly defeated, although the Soviet would argue that they did the same in the lesser known battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol in 1938 and 1939, and its impact was just a great to Allied soldiers and Marines fighting the Japanese in the Pacific and Asia as Midway was to the navy.

[RN7]

In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

Coral Sea was a turning point in the Pacific War for a number of reasons. Firstly it was the first time that the Japanese navy was effectively challenged in the Pacific. Secondly it demonstrated to Japan that Allied resistance or/and offensives would be better organised and more formidable than they previously had been. Thirdly it confirmed to Japan that New Guinea was the absolute outer limit of what it could hope to conquer, and that an invasion of Australia was beyond its capabilities. The fact that Japan actually invaded New Guinea has always puzzled me as it it had few exploitable resources at that time, and only limited logistical capabilities from which to attack Australia. It has always seemed to me to have been a waste of Japanese resources, and I can only think that they went there to disrupt and delay any build up of Allied forces in Australia which would threaten their forces in South East Asia and the Pacific.

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

[RN7]

In any discussion of the Pacific War, sooner or later it turns into a discussion of just what might have happened had the largest Japanese battleship, HIJMS Yamato had met the largest USN battleship, USS Iowa in a toe-to-toe fight

I've always wondered what might have been built if it the war had started a year later, or if the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the most important warship had been delayed a few years. If it had the Yamato would not have been the largest battleships affoat. Consider the opponents.

1) The British Lion Class: The Lions were the most restrained of the planned super battleships, and would have looked very much like the King George V class and were designed for a new pattern 16in triple gun mount that was never produced. 4 ships were planned and 2 were laid down before building was halted in 1940, and was cancelled in 1942.

Displacement: 40,550t standard; 46,300t deep load
Dimensions: 740ft pp, 785ft oa x 104ft x 30ft
Machinery: 4-shaft Parsons geared turbines, 8 Admiralty 3-drum boilers, 130,000shp = 30kts. Oil 3720t
Armor: Belt 15in-5.5in, bulkheads 13in-4in, barbettes 15in-12in, turrets 15in-6in, CT 4.5in-2in, main deck 6in-5in
Armament: 9-16in/45 (3x3), 16-5.25in/50 DP (8x2), 48-2pdr AA (6x8), 2 aircraft

The protection scheme of these ships was similar to the King George V, but with larger guns. These ships would have been formidable, not too different from the American North Carolina class but better protected and faster, and in fact better protected than the American Iowas, but with less range than both. There was also plans to build two later Lion Class in 1946 with a 50,000t standard displacement (56,500 full load). This version would have carried 9-16in guns (3x3) of a newer type with a firing interval of only 20 seconds. The secondary battery would have been 24-4.5in DP (12x2), and the AA battery was to be 60-40mm Bofors (10x6). Speed was intended to be about 29kts. The increased beam would have allowed better underwater protection than and the armor protection included a 14in belt and 4in-6in deck.

An even larger Super Lion was also planned of 59,100t standard, and 69,140 full load, but still retained the same basic armament with more AA guns. The area of ship protected by armor would have been increased, and fuel oil capacity was increased for greatly increased range. The Lion Class would have contested their ground with a Yamato, although maybe not beaten it. But the later Lion Class versions would certainly have.

2) German H Class: The H class were a part of Germany's Z plan to build a balanced fleet and challenge British supremacy at sea. The first two ships were laid down in 1939, but were canceled shortly after. It was planned to build six of these ships.

Displacement: 55,453t standard; 62,497 deep load
Dimensions: 872ft wl, 911ft 5in oa x 122ft x 33ft 6in
Machinery: 3-shafts, 12 MAN double-acting 2-stroke 9cyl diesels, 165,000shp = 30kts
Armor: belt 11.75in-7in, deck3.25in-2in, armored deck 4.75in-4in,
torpedo bulkhead 1.75in,armored bulkheads 8.75in, main turrets 15.25-5in, secondary turrets 4in-1.5in, CT 15.25in
Armament: 8-16in/47 (4x2), 12-5.9in/55 (6x2), 16-4.1in/65 DP (8x2),
16-37mm/83 AA (8x2), 24-20mm AA (6x4), 6-21in TT (submerged), 4 aircraft

Considered to have been enlarged versions of the Bismarck Class. They had improved diesel machinery and 16in guns, but also some of Bismarcks faults with single purpose secondary guns, and poorly distributed armor, and the placement of the armored deck too low in the ship to protect her vital fire control and communications. They also had underwater torpedo tubes that compromises a ship's watertight integrity. However they also had internal subdivision which made them so difficult to sink, excellent fire control, a steady gun platform and excellent anti-torpedo protection. Hitler in one of his mad moments wanted to radically change later versions of this ship with 20in guns and a dispacement of over 100,000t. The H Class would have been formidable ships but not as good as the Lion Class.

3) Soviet Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class: Four ships was authorized in 1938, and three were actually laid down. Construction was halted in 1940 after two were 75% complete. All three hulls were broken up in later 1940's.

Displacement: 59,150t standard; 65,150t deep load
Dimensions: 889ft 1in oa x 127ft 7in x 33ft 6in
Machinery: 3-shaft turbo-electric drive, 231,000shp = 28kts
Armor: Belt 16.75in, deck 8.75in, turret faces 19.5in
Armament: 9-16in/50 (3x3), 12-6in/50 (6x2), 8-4in/56 DP (4x2),
32-37mm/67 AA (8x4), 8-.50in MG, 4 aircraft

The Sovyetskiy Soyuz class would have been formidable opponents, although they sacrificed some speed and retained only a 9 gun main battery. With their huge beams they would have been very steady gun platforms, and their armor protection approached the Yamato class. However their fire control systems and rangefinder would likely have been inferior to both German and Japanese opponents. The Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class was the nearest of the super battleships to have been actually built, and statisticaly would have been a match for the German H Class although maybe not a Yamato.

4) American Montana Class: Five Montana's were authorized in 1940 but construction was suspended in 1942, and canceled in 1943.

Displacement: 60,500t standard; 70,500t full load
Dimensions: 890ft wl, 925ft oa x 121ft x 36ft 8in full load
Machinery: 4-shaft turbines, 8 boilers, 172,000shp = 28kts full load. Oil 7300t, range 15,000nm at 15kts
Armor: Belt 16.1in-10.2in on 1in STS, internal belt 7.2in-1in, armor deck 6in-7.35in with 2.25 in weather deck and. 62-.75in splinter deck, bulkheads 15.3in, barbettes 18in-21.3in, turrets 22.5in face, 9.15in roof, 10in side, 12in rear, CT 18in with 7.25in roof
Armament: 12-16in/50 (4x3), 20-5in/54 DP (10x2), 32-40mm AA (8x4), 20-20mm AA (20x1), 3 aircraft

The Montana's were the best American battlehips ever designed, and their 16in/50 gun was probably the best battleship gun ever produced. It threw the super heavy 2700lb armor piercing shell 42,345 yards. For comparison, the Japanese 18.1in/45 gun threw a 3200lb armor piercing shell 45,960 yards. The American gun weighed less, allowing the Montana's to carry 12 of them, for a broadside weight of 32,400lbs. The Yamatos could only carry nine of the 18.1in guns on a similar size hull with similar armor and speed. Yamato's broadside weight was 28,800lbs. Montana's new 5in/54 DP secondary guns were superior in range and striking power to the older 5in/38. Her AA battery was well laid out with good arcs of fire for the guns. And the 40mm Bofors was better than anything the Japanese Navy had, and her light battery was superior to Yamato's. Montana and Yamato were protected to similar standards, but the quality of American armor was considered to be of a higher standard. Also Montana's were protected against their own 2700 lb shells between 18,000 and 31,000 yards. Montana's great beam and a reversion to a scheme similar to the North Carolinas gave it protection against torpedo attack. U.S. fire control with radar control, outclassed any German or Japanese battleship, although the 15 meter rangefinders of the Yamato class ws still the best optical design. The Montana was the best of all the super-battleships designed or built, and would have proven too great of an opponent for the Yamato. The only battleship that might have realy taken it on was one of the later British Lion Class.

[copeab]

On what grounds?

It's been over 25 years, but basically, it boiled down to the Germans sinking a ship flying a flag of an enemy country sailing in a declared war zone and carrying a suspected war cargo.

I also pointed out that earlier in the war, against merchant shipping U-boats would often surface, fire a bow shot to get the merchant ship to stop, allow the crew to get into lifeboats, then torpedo the merchant ship. The British then began arming merchants with concealed deck guns to fire on the submarines as soon as they surfaced. The Germans then started sinking merchants without warning, which of course led to incredulous British outrage. No one knows if the Lusitania actually had any hidden deck guns, but the U-boat captain had to assume so.

[copeab]

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

From a moral point, I blame the British more than the Germans, since the British were using human shields to protect war materials.

Now, from a more practical political perspective, the whatever war cargo was on the Lusitania was not worth the risk to Germany (although, as it turned out, it still took nearly two years for the US to get upset enough to get involved int he war).

[copeab]

Guadacanal had a similar senationalism to Midway, but it was on land.

Actually, Guadalcanal was very much a land, air and sea battle. Partly because it being fought in all three arenas, it was one of the longer battles of the war.

[RN7]

Actually, Guadalcanal was very much a land, air and sea battle. Partly because it being fought in all three arenas, it was one of the longer battles of the war.

Actually, Guadalcanal was a campaign with many battles.

The Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo in August 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 was a naval battle.
The Battle of Tenaru in August 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942 was a naval battle with air power.
The Battle over Henderson Field from August to December 1942 was an air battle.
The Battle involving the strenthening of the Luga defenses from August to September 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Edson's Ridge in September 1942 was a land battle.
The Action along the Matinkau from Septembet to October 1942 was a land battle with air and naval support.
The Battle of Cape Esperance in October 1942 was a naval battle.
The bombardement and Battle for Henderson Field in October 1942 was a land battle with naval support.
The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942 was a naval battle with air power.
The Matanikau Offensive in November 1942 was a land battle.
The Koli Point Action in November 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Carlson's Patrol in November to December 1942 was a land battle.
The First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942 was a naval battle.
The Second Naval Battle of Guadalanal in November 1942 was a naval battle.
The Battle of Tassafaronga in November 1942 was a naval battle
The First Battle of Mount Austin in December 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Galloping Horse in January 1943 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Sea Horse in January 1943 was a land battle.
The Second Battle of Mount Austin in January 1943 was a land battle.
Operation Ke in January to February 1943 was a naval battle with air support.
The Battle of Rennell Island in January 1943 was a naval battle with air support.

Overall it cost America over 7,000 deaths, 29 ships and 615 aircraft. Japanese casualties were 31,000 deaths, 38 ships and over 800 aircraft.

[RN7]

From a moral point, I blame the British more than the Germans, since the British were using human shields to protect war materials.


Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners?

[ShadoWarrior]

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners?
No, but the Russians did in WW2. :(

[copeab]

No, but the Russians did in WW2. :(

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

[copeab]

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners?

Not that I'm aware of, no, but that's largely the result of Germany's surface ships rarely going to sea after the war started and the British navy not taking subs seriously enough at the start of the war (I mean, dear God, they built nearly 20 steam powered subs).

[Sanjuro]

I have never seen any evidence that the Lusitania was carrying war materials; the onboard explosions which made her sinking so rapid can best be accounted for by the initial impact filling her largely empty coal bunkers with coal dust; when the coal dust in turn exploded the mixture was like a primitive Fuel-Air Explosive.
While not perhaps a war crime, the sinking of the Lusitania was an act of terrorism in that it was declared as a specific target, in an effort to deter passengers.
The unrestricted submarine warfare seemed to bring on a new level of unpleasantness; it is understandable to try and sink ships from ambush if they may be armed, but to capture and execute a ship's captain for attempting to sink the submarine which is shooting at him is not.
http://southernlife.org.uk/fryatt.htm

[dragoon500ly]

In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

Coral Sea was at best, a draw for both sides. To be sure, it did stop the immediate Japanese move on Port Morseby. But what halted the planned invasion was Yamamoto's commencement of the Midway/Aleutians operation.

With the launch of the Guadalcanal battle, the Japanese were forced into a attrition battle that they could not sustain. With the encirclement of Rabual, the cream of the Japanese pilots lay dead. This was a blow that they never recovered from.

[dragoon500ly]

Coral Sea was a turning point in the Pacific War for a number of reasons. Firstly it was the first time that the Japanese navy was effectively challenged in the Pacific. Secondly it demonstrated to Japan that Allied resistance or/and offensives would be better organised and more formidable than they previously had been. Thirdly it confirmed to Japan that New Guinea was the absolute outer limit of what it could hope to conquer, and that an invasion of Australia was beyond its capabilities. The fact that Japan actually invaded New Guinea has always puzzled me as it it had few exploitable resources at that time, and only limited logistical capabilities from which to attack Australia. It has always seemed to me to have been a waste of Japanese resources, and I can only think that they went there to disrupt and delay any build up of Allied forces in Australia which would threaten their forces in South East Asia and the Pacific.

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

Japan's goals in the New Guinea campaign have always had people scratching their heads in confusion. The only thing that I have ever heard that made any sense was that they wanted to capture Port Moresby for use as an air/naval base for a possible future attack on Australia.

The IJA/IJN were at loggerheads about the need to invade Australia. The IJA's veiwpoint was that it would require too much in terms of troop commitments and logistical support. Okay, makes sense, the IJA was hard pressed to provide more than a dozen divisions for the Pacific and certainly Australia would have required a lot more than dozen divisions to conquer/pacify. Logistical wise, the Japanese simply didn't have the merchant shipping to support operations. The IJN on the other hand, favored an invasion of Australia in order the deny the US any safe area to build up forces for a counter-offensive.

With the Port Moresby invasion force turned back, the IJA/IJN now needed to capture the airfield in order to deny its use to the Allies, as well as acquiring a defensive position on the southern shore of New Guinea.

[Targan]

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

I believe that would be the Wilhelm Gustloff. A major tragedy of WWII.

[Fusilier]

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

Unfortunately, there were a few actually.

[95th Rifleman]

Unfortunately, there were a few actually.

To be fair when you consider what the Germans did to the Russians it's not hard to realise why the Russians ignored the rules of war.

If the Germans and raped and murdered their way through half of the UK, we'd be less inclined to be nice.

[Fusilier]

To be fair when you consider what the Germans did to the Russians it's not hard to realise why the Russians ignored the rules of war.

If the Germans and raped and murdered their way through half of the UK, we'd be less inclined to be nice.

I know why they did it, but don't think that is fair at all. The women and children on the boats didn't rape and murder anyone. I tend to disagree with punishment extending to all those who share ethnicity with the guilty. Fortunately, western society (at least) is in agreement with this and our legal system is based on blood justice.

[dragoon500ly]

I've always wondered what might have been built if it the war had started a year later, or if the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the most important warship had been delayed a few years. If it had the Yamato would not have been the largest battleships affoat. Consider the opponents.

1) The British Lion Class: The Lions were the most restrained of the planned super battleships, and would have looked very much like the King George V class and were designed for a new pattern 16in triple gun mount that was never produced. 4 ships were planned and 2 were laid down before building was halted in 1940, and was cancelled in 1942.

2) German H Class: The H class were a part of Germany's Z plan to build a balanced fleet and challenge British supremacy at sea. The first two ships were laid down in 1939, but were canceled shortly after. It was planned to build six of these ships.

3) Soviet Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class: Four ships was authorized in 1938, and three were actually laid down. Construction was halted in 1940 after two were 75% complete. All three hulls were broken up in later 1940's.

4) American Montana Class: Five Montana's were authorized in 1940 but construction was suspended in 1942, and canceled in 1943.

All were impressive designs and, speaking from a wargamer viewpoint, its fun to add one or two into the fleet mix just to see what might have happened. But the growth of the aircraft carrier and its air group is what sounded the death of the battleship.

Still....Montana vs Yamato....Lion vs Tripitz.....

[dragoon500ly]

Logistics, the boring stuff....

By 1945, the U.S. had committed 21 infantry divisions and 6 Marine divisions. To give an idea how how much shipping was entailed in moving these 27 divisions around....a infantry division had 14,000 men and 2,000 vehicles, which would require roughly 100,000 tons of shipping space to move.

Shipping requirements could be cut by over 40% if the division's equipment was broken down as much as possible and boxed. This method required a fully equipped port (with piers and cranes) at the other end to get all of the stuff off the ships. This explains the critical importance of Hawaii and Australia/New Zealand to the Pacific War effort.

Amphibious landings required four times as much shipping as the boxed method because the hear had to be stored in the order it would be needed and ready to be operated as soon as it left the ship. This is called combat loading. The preferred method was to ship the units to ports boxed, unload them, acclimate the troops and then reload the ships in the combat loading manner.

The rule of thumb used was that for every soldier, airman or Marine sent overseas, they required 12 tons of shipping each to get them over there with their equipment. Thereafter, they each required 1 ton a month of shipping to maintain them in action.

Explaining this another way; to send an infantry division overseas boxed required six Liberty ships. To move the same division into a combat zone required the use of 20 ships of various sizes. A dozen of these would be assault transports, the rest would be LSTs and other specialized amphibious ships.

The 27 divisions sent into the Pacific also required nearly 2,000,000 support troops (and replacements for losses). This meant that over 20 million tons of shipping was needed to get them there and then as much as 1.5 million tons of shipping each month to keep them supplied. The lack of decent ports in the Pacific meany that many of the ships had to make a 12,000 mile round trip in order to reach the fighting fronts.

Another factor that impacted Allied strategic planning was the various speeds of these ships. Consider this...

The Landing Force could maintain a speed of 12 knots.

The Bombardment Group (the old battleships) could sustain 15 knots.

The Escort Group (the CVEs providind CAS) could sustain 12 knots.

The Support Group (the tankers, cargo and hospital ships) could sustain 12 knots.

The Carrier Task Force (the fast battleships and fleet carriers) could sustain 15-25 knots and maintain 30 knots for extended periods of time.

Now then, making allowances for maneuvering, replenishment etc, the Carrier Task Force could cover between 300-500 miles per day. The Bombardment and Escort Groups might manage 300 miles a day. And the Landing Force and Support Group would be lucky to manage 250-miles a day. In addition, submarines often supported operations such as maintaining a scouting screen and picking up downed fliers, they could cover between 200-250 miles a day.

So the admirals commanding had to juggle their various task groups. While the slower groups could basically maintain straight-line steady courses, teh Carrier Task Force often found it self making hugh circles around the ocean, moving back and forth in irregular patterns, in order to provide cover for the slower ships. And in order to confuse the enemy while this dance was ongoing, the Carrier Task Force would often make air strikes on anything within range.

[dragoon500ly]

Came across this list....

The food supplies for a typical US Battleship for one week....

Beef, Frozen = 10,000lbs
Veal, Frozen = 2,000lbs
Ham, Smoked = 750lbs
Fish, Frozen = 500lbs
Spam = 250lbs
Potatoes, White = 9,000lbs
Potatoes, Sweet = 900lbs
Carrots = 1,500lbs
Lettuce, Iceberg = 1,200lbs
Tomatoes = 900lbs
Asparagus = 900lbs
Cucumbers = 850lbs
Celery = 600lbs
Rhubarb = 500lbs
Oranges = 1,900lbs
Lemons = 1,200lbs
Eggs = 1,500 dozen
Flour = 14,000lbs
Milk (fresh, condensed and powdered) = 2,200lbs
Seasonings and condiments = 700lbs
Ice Cream = 2,000lbs
Coffee = 4,000lbs

Something else! :rolleyes:

[dragoon500ly]

Came across this little known factoid...

Most naval battles are fought within a hundred or so miles of land. The record for the distance from the battle site to shor belongs to the Royal Navy.

Its known as the Glorious First of June and was fought on June 1, 1794. The battle sight is a shade over 400 miles from land.

[dragoon500ly]

Above and Beyond the Call of Duty

While in many ways the fighting in the Pacific was different from the other theaters of WWII, in one respect it was very different. Infantry fighting is the most dangerous form of battle, but in the Pacific it was particularly lethal.

For example, the US Army Infantry received, on average, one Medal of Honor for every 800 soldiers killed. The US Army Cavalry received one MoH for every 550 troopers killed. The US Navy received one MoH for every 550 sailors killed.

But the Marines had the most impressive ratio of dead to Medals of Honor, receiving one MoH for every 369 marines killed.

[dragoon500ly]

From a pre-war strength of 18,000 officers and men, the USMC rose to a strength of 485,833 officers and men.

While providing only 5% of the US armed forces in WWII, the Marines suffered almost 10% of the total American casualities, roughly 3% of serving Marines died in combat (1 out of every 34).

The operation suffering the highest casualty rate was the assault on Beito Island in Tarawa Atoll. The 2nd Marine Divisions suffered 3,318 losses---18% of the landing force. The regiment that had the highest casualty rate was the 1st Marines on the island of Pelelie (15-22 Sept 1944) where it suffered 1,672 casualties.

During the 1,364 days, 5 hours and 44 minutes of World War II, the United States Marine Corps suffered:

Killed in Action = 15,161
Died of Wounds = 3,259
Wounded in Action = 67,207 (including those wounded more than once)
Missing in Action, Presumed Dead = 2,822
Killed or Died while Prisoners of War = 348
Prisoners of War = 2,274
Non-battle deaths in combat zones = 4,778

Naval Medical personnel attached to the Marines suffered the following:

Killed in Action = 1,681
Died of Wounds = 252
Wound in Action = 5,153
Missing in Action, Presumed Dead = 529
Prisoners of War = 28

During the war, the USMC earned

18 Presidential Unit Citations (Navy)
3 Presidential Unit Citations (Army)
35 Navy Unit Commendations

During the war, Marines earned
82 Medals of Honor (51 posthumously)
1,026 Navy Crosses
3,952 Silver Stars
606 Legion of Merit
354 Navy and marine Corps Medals
29 Soldiers Medal (Army)

Navy Medical personnel earned 7 Medals of Honor (3 posthumously), 66 Navy Crosses and 485 Silver Stars.

[Graebarde]

Came across this list....

The food supplies for a typical US Battleship for one week....

Beef, Frozen = 10,000lbs
Veal, Frozen = 2,000lbs
Ham, Smoked = 750lbs
Fish, Frozen = 500lbs
Spam = 250lbs
Potatoes, White = 9,000lbs
Potatoes, Sweet = 900lbs
Carrots = 1,500lbs
Lettuce, Iceberg = 1,200lbs
Tomatoes = 900lbs
Asparagus = 900lbs
Cucumbers = 850lbs
Celery = 600lbs
Rhubarb = 500lbs
Oranges = 1,900lbs
Lemons = 1,200lbs
Eggs = 1,500 dozen
Flour = 14,000lbs
Milk (fresh, condensed and powdered) = 2,200lbs
Seasonings and condiments = 700lbs
Ice Cream = 2,000lbs
Coffee = 4,000lbs

Something else! :rolleyes:

Navy eats good that's for sure. Meanwhile the doggies ate K-rats.

[dragoon500ly]

Marine Order of Battle at Midway

Midway consists of two islands (Sand and Eastern) and its defenses were organized on these. On 4-5 June, 1942, there were 2,512 Marines (382 in MAG-22). All Marine, Navy and USAAF air units were at NAS, Midway on Eastern Island.

On Sand Island:
HQ and Service Battery, 6th Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
Batteries A and C (two 5-inch/51 each), Seacoast Artillery Group, 6th DB
7-inch Battery (provisional) (two 7-inch/45), SAG, 6th DB
3-inch Navy Battery (provisional) (two 3-inch/50 cd guns), SAG, 6th DB
One half of Battery G (Searchlight), 6th DB
22nd Provisional Marine Company (provided extra personnel for gun crews)
HQ, Detachment, 2nd Raider Battalion
Company C, 2nd Raider Battalion
Tank Platoon, 6th DB (five M-2A4 light tanks)
HQ, Antiaircraft Group, 6th DB
Battery D (four 3-inch AA guns), 3rd Defense Battalion
Batteries D & F (four 3-inch AA guns each), AAG, 6th DB
HQ, Special Weapons Group, 6th Defense Battalion
one half of Battery H, SWG, 6th DB (six .50 cal water-cooled AA guns)
one half of Battery I, SWG, 6th DB (six M-1917A1 .30 cal HMG)
one half of Battery K, SWG, 3rd DB (four 37mm AA guns)
one half of Battery L, SWG, 3rd DB (four 20mm AA guns)
Detachment, 407th Signal Company, Aviation (USAAF radio station)

On Eastern Island:
HQ, Seacoast Artillery Group, 6th Defense Battalion
Battery B (two 5-inch/51), SAG, 6th DB
7-inch Battery (Provisional) (two 7-inch/45), SAG, 6th DB
3-inch Navy Battery (Provisional) (two 3-inch/50 cd guns), SAG, 6th DB
23rd Provisional Marine Company (provided extra personnel for the gun crews)
Company D, 2nd Raider Battalion
HQ, Antiaircraft Group, 3rd Defense Battalion
Battery E (four 3-inch AA guns), AAG, 6th DB
Batteries E & F (four 3-inch AA guns ea), AAG, 3rd DB
one half of Battery H, SWG, 6th DB (six .50 cal water-cooled AA guns)
one half of Battery I, SWG, 6th DB (six M-1917A1 .30 cal HMG)
one half of Battery K, SWG, 3rd DB (four 37mm AA guns)
one half of Battery L, SWG, 3rd DB (four 20mm AA guns)

Japanese Opposition:
The 2nd Combined Special Landing Force consisted of 5,000 IJN/IJA personnel. The assault element was made up of the 1,250 Yokosuka 5th Special Navy Landing Force (to land on Sand Island) and the 1,200 Ichiki Force [28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Division] (and yes this is the same force that attacked the 1st Marine Division on Alligator Creek on Guadalcanal) who would land on Eastern Island. The IJN 11th and 12th Construction Battalions would provide support along with follow-up survey and weather groups. At least this was the plan for the June 7 landing.

Midway was attacked by 108 carrier aircraft (and claimed 53 shot down by AA guns and defending fighters; NOTE: this estimate may be a tad over the real losses). A submarine was damaged by Marine guns.

Came across a USMC site that states that Midway had two 7-inch gun batteries, each of two guns.

American air power at NAS, Midway consisted of:

Marine Aircraft Group 22
HQ Squadron 22
Service Squadron 22
Marine Fighting Squadron 221: 21 F2A-3 Buffalo (20 operational) and 7 F4F-3 Wildcat (6 operational)
Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241: 19 SBD-2 Dauntless (18 operational) and 21 SB2U-3 Vindicator (14 operational,
only 12 air crews)

USN
Patrol Squadron 23: 14 PBY-5 Catalina (13 operational, 11 dedicated to search, 2 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 44: 8 PBY-5A Catalina (7 operational, all dedicated to search)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 24: 6 PBY-5A Catalina (2 dedicated to search, 3 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Patrol Squadron 51: 3 PBY-5A Catalina, (2 dedicated to search, 1 to torpedo attack)
detachment, Torpedo Squadron Eight: 6 TBF-1 Avenger

USAAF
detachment, 349th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 1 B-17D photo recon
detachment, 42nd Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 5 B-17E (4 operational)
detachment, 431st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 6 B-17E
detachment, 31st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 2 B-17E
detachment, 72nd Bombardment Squadron (Heavy): 1 B-17E
detachment, 18th Reconnaissance Squadron (Medium): 2 B-26 in torpedo attack role
detachment, 69th Bombardment Squadron (Medium): 2 B-26B in torpedo attack role

Finally,
Motor Torpedo Squadron One with PT-20, PT-21, PT-22, PT-24, PT-25, PT-26 and PT-27 at Midway

detachment, MTS1: PT-29 and PT-30 at Kure

at French Frigate Shoals: USS Clark, DD-361; USS Ballard, AVD-10 and USS Thorton, AV-12 (support for Catalinas)

At Pearl & Hermes Reef: USS Kaloli, AOG-13; USS Vireo, ATO-144 and USS Crystal, PY-25 (aviation fuel support)

At Lisianski: USS YP-284

At Gardner's Pinnacles: USS YP-345

At Necker Island: USS YP-350

At Laysan: USS YP-290

The YP or Yippies were converted fishing boats that were armed with a radio and perhaps a machinegun. Their job was to monitor the outlaying reefs/islands to insure that the Japanese didn't try to base floatplanes to support their operations against Midway. The presence of these outlaying ships played a little known part in that, by their very presence, prevented the Japanese from conducting long-range aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor by staging seaplanes (refueled by subs) from these "tiny" rocks.

[Targan]

Gee, the Japanese stuffed up their planning for Midway then. Only twice as many invaders as defenders (not counting naval and air assets obviously). Generally a ratio of 3:1 attackers vs defenders is a bare minimum for any hope of success; 5:1 or better is preferable.

[copeab]

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

[RN7]

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.


Probably the reason that nobody knew about the Japanese Army's defeat in Mongolia and Manchuria, was because Germany had invaded Poland at the very same time that the Russians were booting the Japanese out of Mongolia. In fact most of the Japanese military were probably unaware of it as well outside of the top brass and the troops directly involved in the fighting, as it wouldn't have done much for its wider reputation and morale considering the mauling the Red Army gave them. The bulk of Japan's Army was in China and Manchuria at this time along with much of its armoured forces and heavy artillery, and remained so even when they were fighting the Western Allies in the Pacific.

To some degree it is considered the reason why the Japanese Army was made to redirect its focus on the territories in South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands under the control of America, Britain, Vichy France and the Netherlands and Portugal, as the Japanese Navy had wanted. Previously the Japanese Army had wanted to annex Mongolia and the Soviet Far East and Siberia as far as Lake Baikal to consolidate its control of China and use the resources of the area. Unfortunately the Japanese Army wasn't the force it believed itself to be, as was shown when it came up against a well organised and fully mechanised opponent such as the Red Army. The poorly supplied and equipped Chinese and second line and over extended American, British and Dutch forces were a much easier target for them in 1941, and even then the Americans gave them a very tough time in the Philippines, and the British might have done so in Singapore and Malaya if they had been better led.

When the Japanese Army came up against well organised and supplied American and British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific Islands, New Guinea and Burma, they increasingly came off second best. The power of the Japanese Navy in the early war years, and the favourable terrain of the Pacific Theatre for Japanese Army tactics preserved their reputation for a while until America's military machine overwhelmed them. Had the Japanese Army taken on fully mechanised American or British forces which were based elsewhere at the time, on an equal footing in an inland campaign the result would probably have been the same as it was when they tried to take on the Red Army in 1939.

[copeab]

Probably the reason that nobody knew about the Japanese Army's defeat in Mongolia and Manchuria, was because Germany had invaded Poland at the very same time that the Russians were booting the Japanese out of Mongolia. In fact most of the Japanese military were probably unaware of it as well outside of the top brass and the troops directly involved in the fighting, as it wouldn't have done much for its wider reputation and morale considering the mauling the Red Army gave them.

And the Soviets, ever paranoid, weren't going to say anything ;)

The bulk of Japan's Army was in China and Manchuria at this time along with much of its armoured forces and heavy artillery, and remained so even when they were fighting the Western Allies in the Pacific.

The major contribution of China to the war was tying down a significant portion of the IJA, which could have been better employed elsewhere.

When the Japanese Army came up against well organised and supplied American and British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific Islands, New Guinea and Burma, they increasingly came off second best.


Also, fighting in China in the 1930's taught the Japanese the absolutely wrong lessons about armored warfare and tank design.

Had the Japanese Army taken on fully mechanised American or British forces which were based elsewhere at the time, on an equal footing in an inland campaign the result would probably have been the same as it was when they tried to take on the Red Army in 1939.

Fortunately for the IJA, most of their Pacific possessions were poor tank country. Parts of the Philippines were an exception and where most of the few significant tank battles of the Pacific were fought, which ended up rather one-sided. Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

[dragoon500ly]

Gee, the Japanese stuffed up their planning for Midway then. Only twice as many invaders as defenders (not counting naval and air assets obviously). Generally a ratio of 3:1 attackers vs defenders is a bare minimum for any hope of success; 5:1 or better is preferable.

The whole landing force operation was not very well considered. Naval gunfire support would be by four heavy cruisers, firing for roughly an hour. But as the USN would learn, naval rifles were not the ideal weapon in dealing with a dug in defender. The most likely result would have been shells hitting at a slight angle and ricocheting.

Any attempt to send landing craft up the ship channel would have run into four 7-inch, four 5-inch and at least eight 3-inch guns firing over open sights into a killing area less than a hundred yards wide. Chopped hamburger comes to mind.

If the Japanese landed on the edge of the reef, then they would have faced advancing across a fairly even surface of at least 500 yards, straight into interlocking machinegun fire. Wouldn't have mattered if they landed at high or low tide, since high tide over the reef still didn't give landing craft enough water to float over.

Finally, 6th Defense Battalion spent its time laying in multiple barbed wire barricades seeded with demolition charges and home-made AP mines. I've never found a definite answer on how many barricades were present, but reports that I've seen indicate at least two thick belts with numerous "channeling" barriers in between. But then there are eyewitness acounts of three to four barriers....in either case, it would have been almost impossible for the landing force to cut their way through under fire.

Most likely, the assault troops would have been cut to pieces, just getting to the wire, the IJN could have committed its construction battalions, but there is no indication that the landing force had anything heavier than the 70mm battalion guns (two supporting each island)...and the Marines had plans to use 37mm and 20mm AA guns to support the beach defenses...not to mention that platoon of tanks.

[dragoon500ly]

One common myth of the battle of Midway was the invasion of the wester Aleutians was a pointless diversion. This was not the case. Although of arguably dubious value to the Japanese, possessing Attu and Kiska interfered with the US shipping route to Russia via the North Pacific. While Japan was not at war with Russia at the time, she remembered the beating Russia delivered to her in the late 1930's near Mongolia.

So unknown were these defeats of Japan that Hitler was enraged when Japan did not attack eastern Russia after Barbarossa and he had no idea why. Neither did the rest of the world. Russia had humiliated the IJA (twice!) and japan really didn't want any more of them.

Of course, the forces used on the Aleutians would have been better deployed at Midway (perhaps as a 'norther carrier force'), but it was not a pointless diversion.

Ever since I read "Incredible Victory" as a young man, I was always puzzled by why the IJN went for the Attu/Kiska at the same time as Midway. Didn't the principle of mass mean that you hit the target with everything that you had?

By all accounts, the northern operation had the goals of establishing a presence far enough out to threaten any US/Canadian operation against northern Japan and to get weather stations for better forecasting; another purpose was to convince the US Pacific Fleet to send major units north. At the time, Japan did not want to threaten any shipping heading into the USSR and thus giving Russia a chance to join the the Pacific War. Good, logical thinking. But it was the timing of the operation that hurt the Japanese more than anything else.

Just think how Midway would have been changed with the addition of two Japanese carriers?

[dragoon500ly]

Fortunately for the IJA, most of their Pacific possessions were poor tank country. Parts of the Philippines were an exception and where most of the few significant tank battles of the Pacific were fought, which ended up rather one-sided. Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.

Not to mention that the 37mm antitank gun was still a deadly threat to Japanese tanks.

The only reason why the Matilda and Stuarts were replaced with Grant/Lee and Shermans was that their main armament was ineffective against bunkers.

[Legbreaker]

Worth noting that Allied tanks that had become obsolete in North Africa and Europe (like the Matilda II and M-3 Stuart) were quite effective against Japanese armor.
The Stuart was not highly regarded by Australians in the jungles, mainly because they were too highly geared and had to be kept in 1st most of the time. The Matildas on the other hand, although a much older design and completely outdated was generally loved (especially by the infantry nearby). With a top speed not much more than a man could comfortably jog, they were ideal for the slow movement of jungle fighting. Heavily armoured (compared to other AFVs of it's period) it was able to withstand almost all the AT weapons the Japanese had at their disposal. It's only real drawback was it's armament of the 2 pounder peashooter of a cannon which was never issued explosive rounds.

[dragoon500ly]

The Stuart was not highly regarded by Australians in the jungles, mainly because they were too highly geared and had to be kept in 1st most of the time. The Matildas on the other hand, although a much older design and completely outdated was generally loved. With a top speed not much more than a man could comfortably jog, they were ideal for the slow movement of jungle fighting. Heavily armoured (compared to other AFVs of it's period) it was able to withstand almost all the AT weapons the Japanese had at their disposal. It's only real drawback was it's armament of the 2 pounder peashooter of a cannon which was never issued explosive rounds.

Don't forget the other major drawback of the Stuart...it used aviation gasoline for fuel (due to the shortage of a decent tank engine, Wright Cyclone radial engines were mounted in many US designs).

Stuarts were also very vulernable to having metal rods thrust into their road wheels, the design had open spokes with external bracing, ideal for immobilizing the vehicle with something as simple as a piece of rebar.

[copeab]

Just think how Midway would have been changed with the addition of two Japanese carriers?

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

[dragoon500ly]

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

Actually it wasn't the plane that needed repairs. While there is no official documents, there is a story that the Tone's catapult officer was fairly new to the job and that after launching one floatplane, had managed to damage the catapult.

Still...

[dragoon500ly]

The first combat action for the USMC was Pearl Harbor (12/7/41). Units taking part include:

Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor
Marine Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot, Oahu
Marine Barracks, NAS Ford Island
Marine Barracks, NAS Kaneohe Bay
Marrine Detachment, Ewa Mooring Mast Field
Rear Echelon, 1st Defense Battalion
3rd Defense Battalion
4th Defense Battalion
Rear Echelon, 6th Defense Battalion
2nd Engineer Battalion (- Companies C & D)
2nd and 3rd Platoons, Company A, 2nd Service Battalion
Marine Ship's Detachments, Pacific Fleet (877 Marines onboard USS Nevada
(BB36), USS Oklahoma (BB37), USS Pennsylvania (BB38), USS Arizona
(BB39), USS Tennessee (BB43), USS California (BB44), USS Maryland
(BB46), USS West Virginia (BB48), USS New Orleans (CA32), USS San
Franisco (CA38), USS Raleigh (CL7), USS Detroit (CL8), USS Phoenix
(CL46), USS Honolulu (CL48), USS St. Louis (CL49), USS Helena (CL50) and
USS Utah (AG16).

The last combat action of World War II, took place on the island of Guam, 11-15 December, 1945. Japanese holdouts ambushed an Island Command, Guam patrol, killing three men. Sentries were fired upon in other areas. The 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, elements of the 9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion and Guamanian Police conducted a five day operation that resulted in six Japanese dead and 20 prosioners. While there were holdouts that remained for years, there were no further overt hostile acts.

[dragoon500ly]

In recent posts, a unique Marine organization, the Defense Battalion, has been mentioned. The defense battalion originated in 1937
as a proposal to defend vulnerable American possessions in the Pacific. They would be armed with coast defense and antiaircraft guns and were to be the size of a reinforce battery or small battalion.

The first Defense Battalionwas organized in 1939. Their mission was to counter air attacks, hit-and-run surface ship raids and small landing parties. The full strength Defense "Battalion" were virtually regimental size and were commanded by a colonel. A money-tight Congress was the reason that they were called battalions. Their large size allowed them to be split between islands in the early days.

The typical TO&E in 1939-42 was:

HQ & Service Battery
Coast Defense Group
HQ & Service Battery
2 or 3 Coast Defense Batteries, each armed with two 5-inch/51 rifles.
Antiaircraft Group
HQ & Service Battery
Searchlight Battery with eight 60-inch Sperry searchlights
3 Antiaircraft Batteries, each with four M-3 3-inch AA guns
Machine Group
HQ & Service Battery
2 Machine Gun Batteries, each with 12 M-1917A1 .30-cal HMGs
2 Machine Gun Batteries, each with 12 .50-cal water-cooled HMGs
Provisional Marine Company, with 2 60mm mortars, 2 81mm mortars and 2
37mm M-1918 infantry guns (not always present)

The 1943-44 Defense Battalion TO&E is:
HQ & Service Battery
Seacoast Artillery Group
HQ & Service Battery
2 Gun Batteries, each with four M-1A1 155mm guns
Antiaircraft Group
HQ & Service Battery
Searchlight Battery with 8 60-inch Sperry searchlights
4 Antiaircraft Batteries, each with 4 M-1 90mm AA guns
Special Weapons Group
HQ & Service Battery
Antiaircraft Battery with 6 M-1 40mm AA guns
2 Antiaircraft Batteries, each with 6 Mk4 20mm AA guns
Provisional Marine Company with 2 60mm mortars and 2 81mm mortars
Tank Platoon with 5-8 M-3/M-5 light tanks.

And just to prove that the TO&Es don't always have any contact with reality...

On December 7, 1941, the 1st Defense Battalion was split into four detachments:

Rear Echelon, Pearl Harbor: 261 men with 10 5-inch/51 rifles, 8 3-inch AA
guns, 50 .50-cal HMGs and 50 .30-cal HMGs.

Wake Island Detachment: 422 men with 6 5-inch/51 rifles, 12 3-inch AA guns,
18 .50-cal HMG and 30 .30-cal HMGs.

Johnston Island Detachment: 162 men with 2 5-inch/51 rifles, 4 3-inch AA
guns, 8 .50-cal HMGs and 8 .30-cal HMGs.

Palmyra Island Detachment: 158 men with 4 5-inch/51 rifles, 4 3-inch AA
guns, 8 .50-cal HMGs and 8 .30-cal HMGs.

The large number of weapons held by the Rear Echelon included spares and those awaiting shipment to the other detachments as well as a single
7-inch/45 rifle waiting for shipment to Midway.

[dragoon500ly]

The Guadalcanal Campaign was the first American offensive of the Pacific War. Its initial goals were to capture the seaplane base on Tulagi and an uncompleted airfield on the island of Guadalcanal. It became the focal point of brutal naval, air and land battles that lasted from 7 August 1942 to 8 February 1943. For the IJA, it was there first serious defeat at the hands of the Americans. For the IJN, it was a battle of attrition that bleed the naval aviation units of some of their best pilots and cost them numerous major warships.

The 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal was organized under the D-Series TO&E of 1 July 1942. This would give it a total strength of 19,514 men.

Division HQ
Special Troops
HQ Battalion
HQ Company: 334 men
Signal Company: 267 men
MP Company: 96 men
Special Weapons Battalion
HQ & Service Battery: 99 men
3 Antitank Batteries, each: 100 men; 6 37mm SP ATg & 2 75mm SP ATg
Antiaircraft Battery: 307 men; 16 40mm M1 AAG
Antiaircraft Battery: 126 men; 6 90mm M1 AAG
Parachute Battalion
HQ Company: 106 men
3 Parachute Companies, each: 159 men; 3 60mm mortars
Light Tank Battalion
HQ & Service Company: 80 men
4 Tank Companies, each: 160 men; 18 M-2A4 light tanks
Scout Company: 175 men; 14 M-3A1 scout cars

Service Troops
Service Battalion
HQ Company: 55 men
Service & Supply Company: 352 men
Ordnance Company: 109 men
Division Transport Company: 116 men
3 Regimental Transport Companies, each: 109 men
Medical Battalion
HQ & Service Company: 16 men
5 Medical Companies, each: 98 men
Amphibian Tractor Battalion: 481 men; 100 amtrac, 59 support amtrac

Engineer Regiment
HQ & Service Company: 273 men
Engineer Battalion: 614 men
Pioneer Battalion: 743 men
Naval Construction Battalion: 822 men

Artillery Regiment
HQ & Service Battery: 159 men
105mm Howitzer Battalion
HQ & Service Battery: 154 men
3 Firing Batteries, each: 151 men; 4 M1A1 105mm howitzers
3 Pack Howitzer Battalions, each:
HQ & Service Battery: 152 men
3 Firing Batteries, each: 151 men; 4 M-1 75mm pack howitzers

3 Marine Infantry Regiments, each:
HQ & Service Company: 173 men
Regimental Weapons Company
Company HQ: 48 men
Gun Platoon: 34 men; 2 towed 75mm M1897A2 field guns
3 Antiaircraft & Antitank Gun Platoons, each: 38 men; 2 M1921A1 .50-cal
water-cooled AAMGs, 6 37mm M3A1 antitank guns
3 Infantry Battalions, each:
HQ Company: 111 men
Weapons Company
Company HQ: 29 men
Antiaircraft & Antitank Platoon: 2 M1921A1 .50-cal water-cooled AAMGs,
4 37mm M3A1 antitank guns
Mortar Platoon: 76 men; 4 81mm mortars
3 Machine Gun Platoons, each: 48 men; 12 M-1917A1 .30-cal water-
cooled HMGs
3 Rifle Companies, each: 183 men; 2 M-1919A1 .30-cal LMGs, 2 60mm
mortars


The Divisions was equipped with:

M-1911A1 .45-cal pistols: 798
M50/M55 .45-cal submachine guns: 4,208
M-1903-series .30-cal rifles: 10,953
M-1918A2 .30-cal Browning Automatic Rifles: 7,406
M-1917A1 .30-cal water-cooled HMGs: 544
M-1919A4 .30-cal LMGs: 656
M-1941 .30-cal LMGs (para bn only): 87
M-2HB .50-cal HMGs: 360
M-1921A1 .50-cal water-cooled HMGs: 32
M-3A1 37mm antitank guns: 54
M-6 37mm SP antitank guns: 20
M-1 40mm antiaircraft guns: 16
M-1 90mm antiaircraft guns: 6
M-3 75mm SP antitank guns: 6
M-1897A2 75mm field guns: 6
M-1A1 75mm pack howitzers: 36
M-2A1 105mm howitzers: 12
M-2 60mm mortars: 63
M-1 81mm mortars: 36
M-1 2.36-in rocket launchers (bazookas): 132
M-1 rifle grenade launchers: 456
M-2A4 light tanks: 72
M-3A1 scout cars: 14
LVT-1 troop amphibian tractors: 100
LVT-1 support amphibian tractors: 59
M-1 portable flamethrowers: 24

[dragoon500ly]

The Marine Raider Battalion TO&E: 24 Sept 42

HQ Company: 139 men; 2 M-1919A4 LMGs, 4 Boys .55 AT Rifles
4 Rifle Companies, each: 135 men; 2 M-1919A4 LMGs, 2 60mm mortars, 2
Boys .55 AT Rifles
Weapons Company: 211 men: 8 M-1919A4 LMGs, 3 60mm mortars, 2 Boys .55
AT Rifles

Grand Total of 901 men; 18 M-1919A4 LMGs, 11 60mm mortars and 14 Boys
.55-cal AT rifles.

Personnal weapons was a mix of Rising SMGs, M1903 rifles and pistols.

There are some reports that M-1 Garands were being used, but the offical records only mention Springfields.

Operational, the only known use of the Boys AT Rifle in USMC service was on the Makin Atoll raid were it was used to destroy two seaplanes. There is no record that any Boys were used in action on Guadalcanal, although there is a photograph showing a Boys being carried on a jungle patrol (possibly a staged photo). Veteran stories are that the Boys were left at battalion HQ or were rapidly combat-lossed.

[copeab]

(I'll toss this in, as it's something I've researched for my Weird WWII campaign)

The M-1903 Springfield with M-1 rifle grenade adapter was a superior platform to the M-1 Garand with the M-7 rifle grenade adapter. On the Garand, firing rifle grenades required the weapon be unloaded and the gas port turned off. Additionally, live ammo could not be fired with the M-7 adapter on the gun. OTOH, the Springfield could fire regular ammo with the M-1 adapter on the rifle and, as it had a magazine cutoff, it could keep it's internal magazine loaded with live ammo while firing rifle grenade blanks while operating as a single shot rifle. The US used the M-1903 for its grenadiers well into the war due to the problems with the M-1/M-7 combo.

[copeab]

Personnal weapons was a mix of Rising SMGs, M1903 rifles and pistols.


I thought the Marine Raiders used the M-1941 Johnson rifle (not to be confused with the M-1941 Johnson LMG).

[dragoon500ly]

(I'll toss this in, as it's something I've researched for my Weird WWII campaign)

The M-1903 Springfield with M-1 rifle grenade adapter was a superior platform to the M-1 Garand with the M-7 rifle grenade adapter. On the Garand, firing rifle grenades required the weapon be unloaded and the gas port turned off. Additionally, live ammo could not be fired with the M-7 adapter on the gun. OTOH, the Springfield could fire regular ammo with the M-1 adapter on the rifle and, as it had a magazine cutoff, it could keep it's internal magazine loaded with life ammo while firing rifle grenade blanks while operating as a single shot rifle. The US used the M-1903 for its grenadiers well into the war due to the problems with the M-1/M-7 combo.

Its also one of the reasons why the M-1 Carbine was adopted to fire rifle grenades during Korea.

[copeab]

Its also one of the reasons why the M-1 Carbine was adopted to fire rifle grenades during Korea.

From what I've read in multiple sources, there was a rifle grenade adapter issued for the M-1 carbine in WWII.

[dragoon500ly]

I thought the Marine Raiders used the M-1941 Johnson rifle (not to be confused with the M-1941 Johnson LMG).

When the M-1 Garand was first introduced in 1937, there were teething problems with the sights, the gas port (leading to jamming problems), the Marines were slow to adapt the new rifle before the bugs were worked out.

The M1941 Johnson was first tested by US Army Ordnance in 1939. several features were liked about the rifle, but there were concerns about the strength of the magazine body, the overall length of the receiver as well as the fact that the rifle would not function reliably when fitted with a bayonet. The Ordnance report stated that the Johnson was not materially superior to the Garand and recommended against further consideration as a replacement for the M-1 rifle.

The NRA weighed in against the Garand when their requests to be provided with copies for independent testing was refused by the Ordnance department. The NRA went so far as to publish a series of articles condeming the Garand and praising the Johnson.

The Garand-Johnson controversy reached its peak in early 1940 when Congress threatened to halt funding for the continuing production of the Garand. A shoot-off was conducted in the presence of various high-ranking military officers and various Congressmen. As one Senator stated, "From a layman's viewpoint, they are both mighty fine guns, and there is no particular difference. If the Garand is as good as the other, and we have the machinery already set up to produce it, I see no reason to go into production on a second good gun." This was the first and biggest nail in the Johnson's coffin.

A Marine Corps shoot off held in November 1940, using a Springfield as the control rifle and testing the Garand, the Johnson and a Winchester design ended with the Corps making the decision to maintain the Springfield. The Garand was considered to be superior to the Johnson and plans were made to switch over to the Garand as production capacity ramped up. This was the second nail in the coffin, Johnson's beloved Marine Corps didn't like his rifle.

The Johnson was still considered to have several excellent design features: the barrel could be easily removed, allowing the rifle to be stored in a kit bag for airborne operations. It had excellent accuracy. The straight line stock made it easier to control. It was designed to be manufactured on general production tooling in small to medium machine shops. It had a 10-round rotary magazine that could be easily topped with issue 5-round chargers.

The Johnson M1941 rifle was never adopted by the US Army. The USMC purchased limited numbers and it was issued for testing purposes to the Corps paratrooper and raider battalions (1st Parachute Battalion on Guadalcanal and 4th Marine Radiers Battalion on New Georgia), but it was never an official TO&E requirement. A total of some 70,000 were built, mostly for sale to various foreign governments, of which the Dutch East Indies were perhaps the largest buyer.

But perhaps the most damning verdict on the Johnson rifle came from those fellow Marines who carried it into combat:

"Feed problems were experienced and the Johnson often had to be loaded, one round at a time."

"The configuration of the exposed barrel was considered a delicate design requiring the user to always be careful to protect the exposed barrel."

"The weapon would not always satisfactorily cycle when its bayonet was attached."

[dragoon500ly]

From what I've read in multiple sources, there was a rifle grenade adapter issued for the M-1 carbine in WWII.

I stand corrected (boy did I drop the ball on this...LOL).

The M-8 grenade launcher was standardized on 11 February 1943. Design refinements slowed production and the inital production run of 50,000 was not completed until February 1944. Initial issue was to units in the Pacific some time in December 1943. It did not appear in the ETO until January 1944.

Demand proved to be much higher than anticipated and production was resumed in late 1944 with the first production batch being completed in January, 1945. Total manufacture was 387,165.

In spite of problems with the stock cracking/splitting when firing rifle grenades (the M-1A1 was to only be used as a GL in case of emergencies as the recoil force would bend the metal stock), the M-8 was more popular than the M-7 since it could still fire standard ball rounds with the launcher in place.

[dragoon500ly]

In contrast to his M1941 Rifle, Johnson's M1941 Light Machine Gun was well received by the troops. While it never entered major production, it did see service with the US Army's First Special Service Force as well as the Marines Paratroop and Raider battalions. There are also unconfirmed reports of US Army Rangers having been issued M1941 LMGs.

The primary drawback to the Johnson LMG was that it was considered to be a bit too fragile and delicate for extended military use. The long, unsupported barrel as well as some internal components were not durable enough, being prone to rust or breakage. There was also a tendency to jam during extended firing.

Johnson corrected most of these problems with his M1944 LMG, but by this time in the war, it was felt that changing horses in midstream would not be a good idea.

Perhaps the best view of the M1941 Johnson LMG came from the 4th Raider Battalion on New Georgia, "Men now armed with them wouldn't trade them for any other." This is the highest possible praise for any weapon.

[dragoon500ly]

The Marine Defense Battalions used four different cannons for coastal defense.

The 3-inch/50-cal, Mark 21, Mod 0 was standardized in 1939. It was nicknamed the "3-inch Navy". It weighed in at 7,510lbs and had a maximum range of 14,000 yards. It could fire HE, AP, shrapnel and Illum rounds at a rate of fire of 18rpm. This was a former navy gun removed from various ships.

The main stay of the USMC cd guns was the 5-inch/51-cal, Mark 15, Mod 0. It was standardized in 1938. Nicknamed the "Five-incher" it weighed 23,400lbs. Maximum range was 17,100 yards, It could fire Common HE, High Capacity HE, AP and Illum rounds. Rate of fire was 20rpm. This was another former navy gun, being removed from older battleships as they were modernized.

The largest gun in the USMC arsenel was the 7-inch/45-cal Mark 2, Mod 0. Standardized in 1939. This gun weighed in at 50,500lbs and had an effective range of 16,500 yards. It could fire HE and AP rounds. Rate of fire was 5rpm. There were 12 of these in service, removed from the predreadoughts Connecticut, Mississippi and Vermont prior to World War One and intended for use by the 10th Regiment in France as heavy artillery, these guns never left the US. They were emplaced on Midway, Johnson and Palmyra Islands. USMC records indicate two 2-gun batteries on each island, Navy records say two 1-gun batteries on each island with the rest in reserve at Pearl Harbor.

The above mentioned guns were used until 1943 when the were replaced by the M-1A1 155mm gun. Nicknamed the "Long Tom", it weighed 30,100lbs. Unlike the former navy guns, the 155mm could be towed to different positions. Its maximum range was 25,715 yards and it could fire HE, WP, High Capacity HE, and Illum rounds. Rate of fire was 3rpm.

[dragoon500ly]

Operation Watchtower, the US Invasion of Guadalcanal took place on 7 Aug 42 and lasted until 3 Feb 43.

The 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) (Marine Landing Force, Task Force 62.8) deployed in five groups:

Guadalcanal Group
Combat Group A
5th Marines (-2nd Battalion)
1st Battalion (Combat Team 1)
3rd Battalion (Combaat Team 3)
2nd Battalion, 11th Marines (75mm Pack How) (-Battery E)
Co A, 1st Light Tank Battalion
Co A (-2nd Platoon), 1st Engineer Battalion
Co A (-2nd Platoon), 1st Pioneer Battalion
Company A, 1st Medical Battalion
Company A (-2nd Platoon), 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
1st Platoon, Battery A, 1st Special Weapons Battalion
1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Service Battalion
1st Platoon, 1st Scout Company

Combat Group B
1st Marines
1st Battalion (Combat Team 4)
2nd Battalion (Combat Team 5)
3rd Battalion (Combat Team 6)
3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (75mm Pack How)
Company B, 1st Light Tank Battalion
Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion
Company C, 1st Pioneer Battalion
Company E, 1st Medical Battalion
Company B, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
3rd Platoon, Battery A, 1st Special Weapons Battalion
3rd Platoon, Company A, 1st Service Battalion
3rd Platoon, 1st Scout Company

Support Group
1st Engineer Battalion (-Companies A, B and C)
11th Marines (Artillery) (-1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions)
1st Special Weapons Battalion (-1st & 3rd Platoons, Company A)
1st Pioneer Battalion (-Companies A & B)

Northern Group
Tulagi Group (seizure of Tulagi Island)
1st Raider Battalion
1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (D+1 reinforcement)
2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines (D+1 reinforcement)
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (Combat Team 2)
Detachment, 3rd Defense Battalion (1/3 Antiaircraft elements)
2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion
2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Pioneer Battalion
2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Platoon (-detachment), Company C, 2nd Light Tank Battalion (M-3)
Detachment, Company A, 2nd Medical Battalion
Marine Barrage Balloon Squadron 3
Gavutu-Tanambogo Group (seizure of Gavutu-Tanambogi Islands)
1st Parachute Battalion
3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines (D+1 reinforcement)
Detachment, Platoon, Company C, 2nd Tank Battalion
Florida Group (clear Florida Island)
1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (Combat Team A)

Division Reserve
2nd Marines (Reinforced) (-2nd Battalion)
3rd Battalion, 10th Marines (75mm Pack Hows)
Company C (-one platoon), 2nd Tank Battalion
Company A, 2nd Engineer Battalion
Company A, 2nd Pioneer Battalion
Company C, 2nd Service Battalion
Company D, 2nd Medical Battalion
Platoon, 2nd Special Weapons Battalion
1st Platoon, Service & Supply Company, 2nd Service Battalion
1st Band Section, 2nd Marine Division Headquarters Company.

[Adm.Lee]

Actually, things could have turned out quite differently had a single Japanese plane not suffered mechanical problems.

The floatplane that eventually first spotted the US forces was delayed a few hours because it needed repairs. Had it been launched on time, the Japanese could have gotten in a first strike well before the US.

Such are the things the fates of armies (and fleets) depend on.

No, actually, if Tone #4 had launched on time, he wouldn't have seen anything. He was both out of sector (and cutting his route short) and behind schedule when he found the Yorktown. (Shattered Sword, pp.146-8) PO Amari was only about half an hour late in launching, but that's still not good. Chikuma's #1 plane should have spotted TF17, but must have been over the clouds.

[copeab]

No, actually, if Tone #4 had launched on time, he wouldn't have seen anything. He was both out of sector (and cutting his route short) and behind schedule when he found the Yorktown. (Shattered Sword, pp.146-8) PO Amari was only about half an hour late in launching, but that's still not good. Chikuma's #1 plane should have spotted TF17, but must have been over the clouds.

Bah! Why have reality intrude on alternate reality? ;)

[copeab]

Oh, for those interested:

The M-1941 Johnson rifle
http://www.johnsonautomatics.com/joh41.GIF

The M-1941 Johnson LMG
http://world.guns.ru/userfiles/images/machine/mg67/johnson_m1941.jpg

[dragoon500ly]

The Battle of Savo Island, 9 Aug 42

On 8 Aug, the 1st Marine Division landed on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo and smashed the Japanese garrisions or sent them fleeing into the jungle.

The Japanese responded by launching furious air attacks from Rabaul and gathering a naval landing force and sending it south. The USS S-38 spotted the convoy and sank the Meiyo Maru (carrying a large portion of the landing force). This led to the withdraw of the first Japanese attempt to land reinforcements.

Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi sorted from Rabaul with a surface-action group consisting of the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka and Kao, the light cruiser Tenryu and the destroyer Yunagi. Enroute down the Slot (the body of water running down the center of the Solomon Islands), Mikawa's ships were spotted by a RAAF Hudson at 1101 hours, but communications problems prevented this spotting report from reaching the US Commander, Admiral Turner.

Shortly after being spotted by the Hudson, Mikawa launched a scout floatplane from each of his heavy cruisers. These plans proceeded south and operated freely over the American transport anchorage off Tulagi as well as the cruiser groups operating north and south of Savo Island. They were spotted by several ships, but no alarm was given, due in part, to the mistaken belief that they were friendly aircraft.

At 2100 hours, Mikawa received a report from Rabaul indicating that the air attacks had sunk three cruisers, two destroyers and nine transports and that a cruiser and two transports were left burning. With the odds now in favor of the Japanese, at midnight, speed was increased to 28 knots and Mikawa headed for the enemy.

The Allied forces were deployed in three units to cover the approaches to the transport anchorage.

The US destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot (carrying SC search radar) were deployed as radar pickets north and south of Savo Island.

The Southern Group, under Rear Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley, RN; consisted of the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra, USS Chicago and the destroyers USS Bagley and USS Patterson. Prior to the Japanese entering the area, the Australia was detached to carry Admiral Crutchley to a meeting with Admiral Turner, after the meeting, Australia off Lunga point, screening the transports anchored there.

The Northern Group, under Captain F.L. Riefkohi, USN; consisted of the hravy cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Quincy and USS Astoria and the destroyers USS Helm and USS Wilson.

The Eastern Group, under Rear Admiral Norman Scott, USN; consisted of the light cruisers USS San Juan, HMAS Hobart and the destroyers USS Monssen, USS Buchanan and USS Jarvis. Jarvis had been damaged in the air attacks and was floating in between Florida and Guadalcanal. The remainder of the Eastern Group were covering a passage south west of Florida Island.

Surprisingly enough, the Northern and Southern Groups were not at battle stations or, indeed, at any sort of hightened readiness status at all.

The Japanese spotted USS Blue just before midnight, using their superior night optics and specially chosen observers, the IJN often saw Allied ships at night well out of radar range. Blue never detected the incoming warships on radar due to the scattered returns from Guadalcanal and Salvo Islands (the early SC radar did not give reliable info when close to land masses).

Steaming at reduced speed to conceal their wakes the IJN cruisers spotted the Southern Group at 0125 hours. Upon spotting the enemy, speed was increased to 30 knots and the cruisers launched their deadly Long Lance torpedoes. It was not until 0143 hours that a lookout on USS Patterson shouted "Ships ahead!'

The warning "Strange ships entering harbor" was broadcast on the short-range TBS system just as Chokai opened fire on HMAS Canberra, destroying her bridge and damaging her engine rooms. Two torpedoes struck her bow, setting her on fire. Canberra would later be scuttled at 0800 hours. USS Chicago was struck by a torpedo that blew off part of her bow. Surprisingly, no contact report was made to alert the other ships of what had just happenened.

The Japanese force had seperated into two groups, seperated by about 4nm after making a turn to port: Chokai, Aoba, Kako and Kinugasa in the eastern group and Furutaka, Tenrtu and Yubari in the western group. Yunagi was dispatched to deal with USS Jarvis which had just appeared from a rain squall.

The two groups spotted the Northern Group at 0150 hours and launched spreads of torpedoes and then illuminated the sleeping cruisers of the Northern Group with searchlights. USS Astoria was quickly knocked out of action. USS Quincy was caught with her guns still trained in when she was illuminated by the searchlights. A hit in her well deck set her floatplanes on fire and marked her for the Japanese gunners. She was hit by a torpedo in her engine room as well. She sank at 0235 hours.

HIJMS Kako pinned USS Vincennes in her searchlights quickly raked the cruiser. Vincennes was able to return fire damaging Kako. Vincennes was then hit by 2-3 torpedoes from Chokai at about 0155 and then one more from Yubari at 0203 hours. When illuminated by search lights from the east, thinking that they were friendly ships, the Vincennes raised a large American flag. Spotting the large flag, and thinking that this was the flagship, the IJN cruisers from both groups pounded the Vincennes. Caught in this brutal crossfire, Vincennes received over 60 shell hits and 3-4 torpedoes before she capsized and sank at 0250 hours.

The USS Jarvis and HIJMS Yunagi had a brief gun duel before the Yunago broke off to follow the Furutaka group. Yunagi reported that she had engaged a light cruiser of the Achilles class, this later lead to a Japanese air strike the following morning that sank Jarvis.

Admiral Mikawa assassed the situation and determined that it would take 2-3 hours to reform and attack the transport area. Unsure of the location of any US carriers, he decided to withdraw in order to be out of range by morning. During the withdraw, the radar picket USS Ralph Talbot was severly damaged by the Furutaka group, but managed to duck into a rain squall.

For minor damage to three cruisers and a destroyer, the Allies paid with four cruisers sunk and a cruiser and two destroyers damaged.

Iron Bottom Sound had claimed its first victims.

[dragoon500ly]

Overall it cost America over 7,000 deaths, 29 ships and 615 aircraft. Japanese casualties were 31,000 deaths, 38 ships and over 800 aircraft.

The actual breakdown of losses for both sides were:

Allies lost 1,769 killed on the ground; 5,041 at sea and 420 in the air for a total of 7,230.

Japanese losses came to 25,600 killed in action, 3,543 lost at sea and 1,200 killed in the air for a total of 30,343.

Allies lost 2 fleet carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 1 transport and 3 destroyer conversions (APDs) for a total of 29 ships.

The IJN lost 1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 11 destroyers, 6 submarines, 13 transports and 1 destroyer conversion (APD) for a total of 38 ships.

American aircraft losses totaled:
Cactus Air Force: 115 F4F, 66 SBD, 16 TBF, 19 P-400/P-39, 18 B-17, 1 B-26 and 17 PBY or a total of 252 ac lost to all causes.

Carrier Air Losses: came to 81 F4F, 63 SBD and 40 TBF for a total of 184 ac lost to all causes.

Grand Total of 436ac.

The Japanese 11th Air Fleet (Rabaul) lost 107 Zeros, 15 Vals, 100 Bettys, 19 seaplanes and 1 float plane for a total of 242 lost to all causes.

The Japanese Carrier Air Groups lost 81 Zeros, 69 Vals, 47 Kates and 1 Judy for a total of 198.

Grand Total of 440 ac.

These cover the losses suffered during the primary combat period lasting from 1 Aug 1942 to 15 Nov 1942.

[dragoon500ly]

It always surprises me just how ignorant some of the military officers that I work with simply don't have any intrest in military history. Now, to be fair, the vast majority of officers do have a deep intrest in military history and are ready to agure at the drop of a hat the merits of line vs. column in the Napoleonic Wars. But I'm seeing a distrubing percentage of officers, that just don't take the time to understand how the mistakes of the past can teach you about today's actions.

One naval lieutenant, who shall remain nameless, got into an arguement with me over Guadalcanal, and how the Army needlessly prolonged the fighting....WTF, over? This officer also maintained that the Navy did everthing possible to insure that the Marines were well supplied. Hence this little article.

When the 1st Marine Division was first sent to New Zealand, the marines executed the move as an administrative move from one base to another. One result of this was that the cargo ships were commercially loaded, Basically all equipment was broken down as far as possible, crated and then loaded, cramming the most material possible into the hull. This also meant that the division was not in a position to make an amphibious landing. The division would have to unload its equipment, and reassemble and repack it and then combat load the transports. Colonel Hunt perhaps said it best, "the essence of combat loading is not to load the toilet paper on top of the ammunition." Hampering the marines was the limited port facilities of Wellington (at the time). The Aotea quay only had space for five freighters, for example.

The Division D-4, Colonel Pate calculated that there would not be enough cargo space available to transport all of the division's equipment and supplies. Each man would only be allowed to take what was needed to actually live and fight. All excess clothing, bedding rolls and company property would be stored in Wellington. Nonessential units or elements of units would also be left behind, as well as 75% of the division's heavy vehicles. Supply stocks were slimmed down from the prescribed 90 days to 60 days worth. And the division's ammunition reserves were pared down to only 10 units of fire.

Each cargo ship was assigned a detachment of 300 marines under a field officer to work around the clock, unloading, sorting and reloading. To the enternal disgust of the marines, the New Zealander dock unions insisted on regular tea breaks and refused to work their crews in the inclement weather that soon arrived. The police summarily ordered them off the docks, and with the exception of the operators of the loading machinery, all work was performed by the leathernecks.

The quay was pelted by the rain and as the marines worked, the rain melted the flimsy cardboard packaging of many supplies, washed the labels off of cans and caused the waterlogged cartons to split open and spill their contents. The quay soon became a marsh with dunes of cornflakes intermingled with paper pulp, clothing, candy bars, cigarettes and ration cans. It truely was a sight that would never be forgotten.

On 8 Aug, 1942, the marines landed on Guadalcanal and operations onBeach Red soon ran into trouble. The beach was littered with ground landing craft and was covered in boxes, crates and barrels. Off shore, more landing craft idled, waiting for a spot on the beach to open up and allow them to land. To unload the craft, there were only 300 men of the 1st Pioneer Battalion. So bad was the situation, that the transports were ordered to each detach 15 sailors to go ashore and assist, but even this was not enough to make sense of the bedlam ashore. The only respite to the beach congestion occuried when the Japanese air raid halted operations for three and a half hours.

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When the marines captured Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, they also captured quite a bit of Japanese equipment. There were three antiaircraft batteries, ammunition dumps, a radio station, a refrigerating plant, an air compressor plant as well as vehicles and tons of supplies. Not the least of the captures was a copy of the current version of the main Japanese naval code---what Intelligence called the JN-25c. The marines also captured a Japanese shore-based air search radar; both of these were quickly loaded onto the transports.

With the disaster of the Battle of Savo Island and the decision to withdraw the carriers, Admiral Turner was left with no choice built to withdraw the vulnerable transports. Unfortunately, only a faction of the supplies and virtually none of the heavy equipment had been offloaded.

For the marines, their mission had changed. They now had to hold onto the uncompleted airfield at all costs. The 1st Marine Division was also splintered with 6,075 marines left on Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo islands and 10,819 marines on Guadalcanal (Turner's transports took another 1,800 marines with them). With only five combat battalions available General Vandegrift had to shorten his perimeter and secure new landing beaches on Lunga Point. This meant that Beach Red (and the available supplies) would now be over 3 miles outside of the perimeter. To add to the problem of digging in, there was a scarcity of picks, shovels and axes, no mines and only 18 rolls of barbed wire available. Some barbed wire was recovered from cattle fences, but there was only enough wire for limited use at the key points (usually a single or double strand fence!).

Fortunately, the Japanese made no further attacks for the next four days, giving the marines the precious time they need to move their supplies to within the perimeter and then dispersed into dumps. The marines also inventoried the captured Japanese supplies, all told, the marines had four units of fire and seventeen days of rations (two meals a day).

The key to Guadalcanal was the airfield. The Japanese had completed both ends, but there was a 180 foot wide gap in the middle that would need over 6,700 cubic feet of earth to fill. The marines had landed only a single angle-bladed bulldozer, but the Japanese had provided six road rollers, four generators, six trucks, fifty handcarts about seventy-five shovels and two gas powered locomotives that pulled hopper cars for earth moving. By August 12, the runway gap had been filled in and it had been extended to 2,660 feet. By August 18, it was stretched to 3,778 feet. Henderson Field was now ready to receive aircraft.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in authorizing the Guadalcanal operation, made a serious error in appreciating the time required to move supplies to the South Pacific and compounded this error by simple ignorance of the general physical layout of the theater and its stark primitiveness.

The initial plan was for the Army to set up a supply line that ran directly from San Francisco, lacking resources at Pear Harbor, the Navy followed suit. There was no coordination of supply activities and both services were requisitioning separate shipping for the long haul to the same destinations.

The Commander of the South Pacific theater, Admiral Ghormley chose Auckland, New Zealand to become the advance base for the US. Auckland lay 5,680 miles from San Francisco and 1,825 miles from Guadalcanal (New York City, for example is only 3,500 miles form Liverpool or Casablanca, the advance bases for the European and Mediterranean theaters).

Ghormley came under fire for this decision, but he was well aware that distance alone would not be the sole element affecting shipping movement. Cargos loaded in San Francisco would have to be unloaded, sorted, stored and then reloaded before movement to the combat areas. This required deepwater harbors with berthing, lighterage, warehouses, cranes and stevedores. Only Auckland had all of these. The forward bases at Espiritu Santo and Efate (and, of course, Guadalcanal) had none of these refinements. Noumea possesed four berths but none of the other facilities needed.

The Joint Chiefs had foreseen the need for specially equipped units to build advance bases. Detachements has been organized, code-named "Lions" for large advanced fleet bases and "Cubs" for internediate fuel and supply bases. Ghormley requested one of each as well as essentials such as naval construction battalions. No Lions would arrive in the South Pacific in 1942 and the first Cub to arrive at Noumea, did so without its desperately needed lighterage and pontoons.

Noumea, the advanced base supporting Guadalcanal best displayed the failure to appreciate the logistical problems of the theater. The port had a maximum capacity of twenty-four ships a month, by September 23, 1942, the harbor held eighty-six cargo ships that had become substitutes for nonexistent warehouse space. Many of the ships lacked the cranes to offload the heavy cargo, cranes that would not be available until October. Cargo intended for Brisbane was loaded on top of carge intended for Noumea. Shipping manifests often identified their cargos as "machinery" or "dry goods". A shortage of labor and transportation left tons of unmarked and unsorted stores stacked helter-skelter, exposed to the weather and to pilferage. Both services separately unloaded its ships and sometimes only partly unloaded a ship and returned it to anchor.

The local Army commander, General Patch cooperated with Ghormley in trying to tame this diaster. He formed a provisional port company of his own at Noumea and recruited more laborers. He supplied Army clothing and food to Naval personnel and when Vandegrift requested machetes (essential for jungle movement), Patch had his engineers modified and ship some of the 20,000 cavalry sabers that had been sent to Noumea.

Moving supplies the 1,100 miles from Noumea to Guadalcanal (roughly the distance from New Orleans to New York City) was another difficulty. R4Ds (Navy DC-3/C-47s) carried critical items, such as fuel and evacuated most of the wounded. A single squadron was available initially (18 planes), a second squadron did not reach the theater until late October. The lack of port facilities at Guadalcanal required those cargo ships equipped with landing craft to haul supplies for the final leg. This practice had an important impact on the Navy's tactical capabilities. Because of the limited ability of the marines to litterally manhandle supplies, the transports had to be sent up in twos and threes, generating severe strains on the scarce destroyer resources available for escorts. This escort duty, fractured all division and squadron integrity, with deadly consequences in the night surface actions around Guadalcanal.

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Life on Guadalcanal went on with minor air raids. The almost daily raids at about noon quickly became a fact of life for the marines. On August 12th, the marines started a supply run of two Higgins boats and a tank lighter between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. On the first run, a IJN submarine surfaced and started to engage the landing craft with its deck gun until marines of Battery E, 11th Marines bracketed the sub with their 75mm pack howitzers. "Oscar" as the subs were nicknamed would surface and fire a few rounds into the perimeter. On the 13th, one that approached Guadalcanal was taken under fire from 75mm half-track mounted guns and discouraged.

On August 10th, a marine patrol on the Matanikau River captured a Japanese sailor. While under going interrogation, he revealed that some his fellow sailors might surrender as well. The Division Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Goettge, added this info to a report of a white flag having been seen and decided to lead a patrol to capture a few prisoners, eventually numbering twenty-five men, the patrol included many key members of the Division Intelligence Section as well as the Regimental Surgeon of the 5th Marines, Lieutenat Commander Pratt.

Vandergrift gave reluctant permission and the Goettge patrol departed by boat after dark on August 12th. As Colonel Goettge stepped into the brush off the beach, he was killed by a burst of fire. The patrol was quickly pinned down on the beach and took heavy casualties. A runner was dispatched and he reached marine lines near dawn. Two other men who had escaped as the Japanese overran the patrol later reached safety. When the news reached the 5th Marines commander, Colonel Hunt dispatched a reinforced company, which landed west of Point Cruz and swept back without contact. Of the remaining members of the Gottege Patrol only a handful of tidal graves, a few helmets and Dr. Pratt's empty medical bag were ever found. Eighteen members are still Missing in Action, Presumed Dead.

As bad as the loss of key members of the Division Intelligence Section was, it was not until thirty six years later that declassified documents revealed the potential for an even greater disaster. The missing included the Japanese interpreter for the 5th Marines, Lieutenant Ralph Corry, who had performed consular work in Japan before the war. But Corry had recently labored at breaking Japanese codes in Washington D.C.. Unsatisfied with this contribution, he had volunteered for more active service and had somehow gained permission to join the 1st Marine Division. Had he been captured and compelled to talk, the knowledge that the Americans were reading Japanese codes would have inflicted great harm on the conduct of the war in the Pacific.

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Japanese Operations

During the early days of Guadalcanal, the Japanese were debating both the intent and the strength of the American Assault. The first tentative censensus was that it was little more than a reconnaissance in force. However, it was decided that no time would be wasted in arrangeing moves to expel the Americans.

As reports from Guadalcanal made their way to Area Army Headquarters at Rabaul, the situation become more and more clear; reports from air recon of 30 transports promted 8th Fleet to estimate that one division was involved. The 17th Army took the view that no more than one regiment was involved and that the large number of transports were present due "to the amenities" that the Americans required.

By August 10th, the IJN confirmed the presence of a Marine division on Guadalcanal. Accordingly, the IJA made plans for the brigade commanded by Major General Kawaguchi (35th Infantry Brigade) be transported to the island. A detachment (reinforced battalion), from the 4th Infantry Regiment (the Aoba Detachement) as well as another reinforced battalion from the 28th Infantry Regiment (the Ichiki Detachment) would reinforce the counter-attack. The Kawaguchi Brigade was currently in the Palaus, waiting for transport, the Aoba Detachment was in the Philippines and the Ichiki Detachement was at Guam, with its transport in place. Ichiki would be able to arrive on the scene first.

On August 12th, an aerial recon flight reported that the main body of the US forces had been withdrawn. With this bit of news, the Japanese accelerated the movement of the Ichiki Detachment.

Colonel Ichiki received orders to make a quick attack to recapture the uncompleted airfireld, for this purpose, a spearhead of 900 men would be landed at Taivu Point (22 miles east of Lunga Point), as a diversion,some 250 men of the Special Naval Landing Force would be placed at Kokumbona, on the western side of the American perimeter.

The Ichiki detachement would travel light (the troops would carry 250 rounds of ammunition and seven days of rations) reflecting the supreme self-confidence of their commander.

The Ischiki Detachment consisted of
Headquarters = 164 men
Headquarters, 2nd Bn, 28th Infantry = 23 men
1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th Companies (each of 105 men) = 420
Machine Gun Company (8 HMGs) = 110 men
one Platoon, Battalion Gun Unit (2 70mm guns) = 50
1st Company, 7th Engineer Construction Regiment = 150
total = 917 men

The detachment was landed at Taivu Point at 0100 hours on August 19 and they marched 9 miles to Tetere, where they remained to rest at 0630 hours.

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American radio intelligence monitored the dispatch sending Ichiki into the area. While they were unable to determine the contents of the message, they were able to confirm the movement of IJA reinforcements. By August 17th, Intelligence was able to place a special shock unit in the Guadalcanal area. Their belief was that an attack on the airfield would accure sometime around August 20th.

On August 12th, a few engineers began a movement to thte Tetere area to survey a possible airfield site, leading to the Marines first contact with Ichiki. A rifle platoon was detached as escort and was informed on the 13th of rumors that a Japanese force had landed further east. The platoon leader decided to return to the Marine perimeter to report the intelligence and to take a larger force out to verify it.

On August 19th, a combat patrol of 60 men from Company A, 1st Bn, 1st Marines entered the jungle. At the same time, Ichiki sent a patrol of 38 men ahead to set up a radio station near Alligator Creek.

About noon, as the Marines halted for rest and food, native guides warned them of the approach of the Japanese. The Marines prepared a hasty ambush. In a firefight that lasted roughly an hour, the marines killed all but 5 of the Japanese, the survivors escaping back into the brush. The marines lost 3 killed and 3 wounded. Examining the ambush site, the marines noted that the dead Japanese wore the star of the Imperial Army instead of the chrysanthemum of the Imperial Navy. The new condition of their uniforms confirmed their recent arrival on the island and the large amount of communications equipment betrayed the presence of a larger unit. A map was also captured that revealed in stunning detail that the Japanese knew that the Marine defenses on Alligator Creek extended only a short distance inland.

Word reached Ichiki about 1630 of the clash between his commo party and an American company. He rushed forward with one company to help and confirmed the destruction of his party. Ichiki pressed on and did not halt until 0430 hours after he crossed the Nalimbu River.

The captured Japanese map and other documents told General Vandegrift that the unit was regimental sized and had recently left Guam. They did not tell him of the exact size, location and intentions of this force. The map not only illustrated the Marine positions along Alligator Creek, but also accurately depicted the Marine artillery positions near the airstrip.

Faced with a series of difficult choice, Vandegrift had to make a decision. His staff recommend that he unleash his only reserve battalion to attack the approaching the Japanese. But lacking clear information as to the enemy strength and intentions, and being left without a reserve, he made the decision to await the Japanese attack within his perimeter.

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Alligator Creek was the watercourse anchoring the eastern perimeter of the Marines. In spite of its name, it was not a creek, but rather a tidal lagoon that emptied into the sea only during the monsoon season, or after a storm. It was no more than 100 feet wide at any point and was separated from the sea by a sandbar that varied from 25-50 feet and rose 10 feet above the "creek". The west bank was slightly higher than the east bank.

On August 20th, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines manned the west bank of Alligator Creek from a point about 1,000 yards inland north of the sandbar, From the corner formed by the sandbar, the 2nd Battalion's line turned sharply west and linked with the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The work of clearing vegatation to extend the line 3,500 yards further inland had begun, but was not yet complete by this date. On the sand bar near the west bank, the marines strung a single-strand barbed-wire fence. Dug-in machineguns covered the sand bar and because Alligator Creek approached the sea at an oblique angle "upstream" guns could rake the bar and the portion of the east bank connected to it. A 37mm antitank gun was positioned to sweep the bar and an extra supply of cannister rounds lay ready. The angle itself was held by a platoon from Company G, 1st Marines and two platoons of the 1st Special Weapons Battalion (some 100 marines). A thin line of outposts and small patrols watched from the eastern bank.

At 1200 hours on August 20th, Colonel Ichiki held an orders group and issued his attack plan. With little regard for the Marine dispositions, he ordered a march down the beach, ending in an assault on the old Japanese camp near Lunga Point and then fanning out to capture the airfield. A small party of engineers would scout out crossing sites and the first company would head out after 2000 hours. The order of march would be three rifle companies, with the battalion headquarters leading the detachment headquarters, the machine gun company and the battalion gun platoon, then the remaining rifle company with the engineer company bringing up the rear.

It was pitch-dark as Ichiki's men approached Alligator Creek. The Marine outposts had reported hearing voices and metallis sounds and were withdrawn. About 2400 hours, a sentry at the point fired at a shape that didn't answer his challenge. Rifle fire began to rattle across the tidal lagoon, engaging the engineer patrol and the lead company of Ichiki's detachment. Colonel Ichiki arrived at about 0030 hours and conferred with his battalion commander and the leading company commander. He ordered an assault across the sand bar by a strong detachment, under covering fire. At 0200 hours, a green flare was launched, signaling the start of the attack.

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The initial Japanese attack was launched by the 2nd Company (roughly 100 men) over the sand bar. Screaming battle crys they poured onto the sand bar and straight into Marine firepower. Leaving a trail of dead and dying the Japanese drove down the sandbar, only to halt when they reached the single-strand of barbed wire, some 30 yards in front of the Marine positions. The leaders examined the wire, fearing that it had been electrified. Taking full advantage of the pause, the Marines poured fire into the group of Japanese soldiers. But the Ichiki Detachment was not considered to be a shock unit without cause. Snipping or flattening the barrier, the last few survivors swirled about the marine fighting holes and engaged in hand-to-hand combat.

For nine months, Allied units had often ran to the rear, abandoning duty when confronted by shrieking Japanese infantry. But the Marines were grass-green, but resolute, for all they knew, this was what combat was supposed to be like. And they held their ground and killed Japanese. One story perhaps best shows the determination of the marines. One machine gun, posted near the focal point of the breakthrough entered Marine folklore. The gunner, Private Rivers poured hundreds of rounds into the attacking Japanese until a bullet struck him in the face, killing him. Even as he died, he held the trigger down and emptied a last 200 round box into the attackers. Corporal Diamond then manned the gun until he was wounded in the arm. His place was taken by Private Schmid then fired the gun into an exploding grenade sent fragments into his eyes, blinding him, but he fought on with his pistol.

Ichiki sent the 2nd and 3rd Companies into the attack, but no progress was made. They were able to finally knock out the 37mm gun that had created such havoc on the sand bar. Seeing the penetration, the battalion commander ordered a platoon from his reserve into the line. Within the hour, the line was restored and all of the Japanese who had crossed the wire were dead.

With his main assault blunted, Ichiki used his machine gun company and his battalion guns in an attempt to gain fire superiority, but his attempt failed as the Marines called in the 75mm howitzers of the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines. The marine artillery fire created disorder among Ichiki's men as they rallied for another assault.

In another effort to break the marine lines, a company was sent through the surf and around the open beach flank of the marines but this assault was raked by machine gun fire and then deluged under artillery. Leaving a few men and machine guns to harrass the marines, Ichiki withdrew his mand into a coconut grove some 200 yards from the marine lines.

In this latter phase of the fighting, Martin Clemens, the coastwatcher now attached to Division Intelligence received word that his chief scout, Sergeant Major Vouza was desperately wounded but insistent on telling Clemens his story. Vouza had arrived at a small village when he was captured by a party of Japanese, discovering a small American flag on his person, he was interrogated. When Vouza refused to talk, he captors tied him to a tree and then pounded him with rifle butts and finally jabbed bayonets into his chest and arms. He remained silent, so, with one final slash of a bayonet across his throat, the Japanese left him to die. Regaining consciousness hours later, Vouza managed to chew his way through the ropes and then made his way back to the marine perimeter. Weakened by blood loss, Vouza crawled the last three miles on his hands and knees. Completing his story, he then gasped out a description of the size and equipment of the Japanese unit that he had seen. As Clemens held his hand, Vouze finished by dictating a last message to his wife before finally collapsing. Whisked to a hospital, Vouza staged an amazing recovery. Within two weeks he was back on his feet and was soon once again on patrol. General Vandegrift adwarded Vouza the Silver Star and then conferred a much rarer honor by appointing Vouze a Sergeant Major of the United States Marine Corps.

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At daybreak on August 21st, Ichiki showed no signs of withdrawl, but in no condition to make another attack. With daylight was also resolved that there was no other Japanese unit available to make an assault. The decision to release the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was made. Reinforced by a platoon of light tanks, the battalion would cross Alligator Creek well inland and then sweep forward, outflanking the Japanese. Due to the terrain, the tanks would have to cross over the sandbar.

At about 0950 hours, first contact was made with Ichiki's detachment and, as the Marine report stated, made their "customary bayonet charge", following another newly-made Marine custom, the marines broke the attack and then closed in to kill the survivors. Steadily pushing forward and overcoming pockets of resistance, Ichiki's men were soon pushed into a little triangle by the mouth of the lagoon.

All morning long, the 2nd Battalion had been exchaning fire and picking off unwary Japanese. With the sounds of gradually increasing firing, the marines on the west bank soon saw parties of Japanese darting among the coconut trees, some dashed out onto the beach where they fell victim to the marines, or were strafed by aircraft. Others attempted to break out to the east, only to run headlong into Company C deployed in a blocking position.

The platoon of light tanks was soon sent over the sandbar at about 1500 hours and they cleared the beach and then swung into the coconut grove. Lacking antitank guns, the Japanese were reduced to confronting the tanks with grenades or magnetic antitank mines. One tank was disabled when a tread was blown off, but its crew was evacuated to the other tanks, who then resumed ravaging the grove. When the tanks returned back over the sandbar, Vandegrift later wrote, "the rear of the tanks looked like meat grinders".

In spite of the tank action, Japanese were still fighting in the grove. According to the Japanese Defense Agency official history, Colonel Ichiki burned the regimental colors and committed suicide. One Japanese survivor reports that he last saw Colonel Ichiki walking towards the front line, a trip from which he did not return, to the survivor's knowledge. This is entirely plausible and perhaps explains the paralysis that seems to have gripped the detachment after the failure of the night attack.

By 1700 hours, cautious patrols started across the sandbar and linked up with the 1st Battalion. Marines began to move onto the sandbar and the grove to gawk at what they had wrough and to collect survenirs while corpsmen moved among the bodies. But a number of Ichiki's men chose to use their last breaths in an attempt to kill one more American. They shot a few marines and one Japanese sergeant started a brief meeting of the commander of the 1st Marines and the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Battalions by discharging a pistol into their faces---without effect---before committing suicide. Seeing this as final evidence of Japanese treachery, the marines answer was brutally simple. Lining up on the banks of Alligator Creek, riflemen sent corpses twitching with round after round while other marines moved into the grove and along the beach, ensuring that all of Ichiki's men joined their commander in death.

During the battle, one Japanese soldier surrendered and twelve wounded soldiers, including one officer were taken prisoner. Marine losses totaled 44 killed and 71 wounded. Scattered along the beach, sandbar and the grove were the bodies of 777 Japanese. The marines also captured 10 heavy and 20 light machine guns, 700 rifles, 20 pistols, 2 70mm guns, 12 flamethrowers and a considerable quantity of demolitions equipment. They were particularly happer to relieve Ichiki's men of a large number of much needed shovels.

Between August 22nd and 29th, some 128 survivors of the Ichiki Detachment made their way back to Taivu Point. On the 22nd a radio message was sent, informing the 17th Area Army of the Ichiki's Deatchment "almost annihilated at a point short of the airfield". At first, this message was greeted with disbelief, not until the 25th, when a dispatch by the senior surviving officer, Lieutenant Sakakibara, was the extent of the disaster recognized.

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August 20, 1942 was considered to be a red letter day for the 1st Marine Division. It saw the arrival of the first US aviation unit, Marine Air Group 23. MAG-23 consisted of two fighter (VMF-223 and VMF-224) and two dive bomber (VMSB-231 and VMSB-232) squadrons.

MAG-23 was a newly organized group and to state that its air crews were "grass green" was being polite. The first element of MAG-23 (VMF-223 and VMSB-232) received a mix of the latest graduates from flight school with an assortment of pilots that had survived the Battle of Midway. The two squadrons headed for the South Pacific on August 2nd onboard the escort carrier Long Island with a total of 19 F4F-4 Wildcats and 12 SBD-3 Dauntless.

The Long Island reached its launching point some 190 miles off the southern tip of Guadalcanal and launched its load of Marine aircraft.

For the last eleven days, the 1st Marine Division had endured almost daily air attacks. And as the skies filled with the rumble of piston engines, the Marines braced for another air raid. This time, the aircraft were quickly identified as Dauntless and Wildcats. When the lead dive-bomber, piloted by VMSB-232's Major Richard Mangrum, came to a stop, he was personally greeted with a handshake from Vandegrift. The aircrews were taken aback by the wild joy of the Marines, who tossed helmets in the air and cheered. Veterans noted that a good many of the youngsters shed tears and where not ashamed to admit that their own eyes were moist as well. No episode of the campaign gave such a boost to Marine morale as the arrival of the first American planes.

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On August 16th, the soldiers of the Ichiki Detachement's Second Echelon and the the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force were on board three transports and escorted by a light cruiser and eight destroyers. What followed would turn into an intricate dance of alternating lunges toward and away from Guadalcanal. The convoy's movements were tied to the operations of the Combined Fleet.

The Japanese had assembled two large task forces comprising four battleships, four carriers, one escort carrier, sixteen cruisers, one seaplane carrier and thirty destroyers for operations around Guadalcanal.

Since the disaster at Midway, the IJN had been busy rebuilding its air groups and refining its tactical doctrine. The newly conceived doctrine would place the cruisers in a line some 150-200 miles in advance of the carriers, where they would be in position to finish off enemy ships crippled by carrier attacks as well as serve as a magnet for attacking American aircraft.

The carriers would operate in divisions of two fleet and one light carrier. The light carrier would be responsible for local protection and would operate an air group of twenty-seven fighters and nine torpedo bombers (for ASW protection). The fleet carriers would now operate an air group of twenty-seven fighters, twenty-seven dive bombers and eighteen torpedo bombers. The fleet carriers would be responsible for all offensive action. In order to supplement the air search capability of the fleet, the battleships and cruisers would carry the maximum number of floatplanes.

The fleet needed time to implement these changes and to conduct training, but the American offensive denied the IJN a respite. The staff of the 3rd Fleet (which had the carriers) were able to consult only briefly with the staff of the 2nd Fleet (battleships and cruisers) before the sailed. The only clear point to come out of the staff discussion was the need to defeat the American carriers took first priority; defending the reinforcement convoy was a distant second.

The USN's Task Force 61 (under Admiral Fletcher), with three carriers, one battleship, seven cruisers and eighteen destroyers, loitered in the waters to the southeast of the Solomon Islands, just out of range of the Japanese search planes based at Rabaul. Twice daily, Fletcher launched 200-mile air searches, but as at Coral Sea and Midway, he anticipated warning of the approach of the IJN from radio intelligence. But recent changes in the Japanese code prevented intelligence from reading the contents of messages and traffic analysis (RDFing and reading of call signs) would only be able to hint at Japanese intentions and maneuvers.

On August 16th, some intelligence officers interpreted the radio silence of 3rd Fleet to mean that it had sailed. But the Pacific Fleet summary for August 17th placed the IJNs fleet carriers in home waters, although it did acknowledge the possibility that they would soon set sail. At midnight on the 18th, the IJN threw a monkey wrench into the US radio intelligence efforts by changing all major calls signs, temporarily halting the most important source of insight from traffic analysis. Two days later, Pacific Fleet placed the IJN carriers in home waters and rated a sorte as a "slight possibility".

By August 21st, the Melbourne radio intel station suggested that the IJN carriers were at Turk, based on a single interepted message directed to the cruiser Chikuma (a known carrier escort). But doubts about the accuracy of Melbourne's call sign recoveries and the routing of dozens of messages for the carriers through Tokyo contradicated that surmise.

While the USN was baffled about the location of the Japanese carrier task force, the Japanese were equally perplexed about the location of the American carrier task force. On August 20th, flying boats spotted two American carriers 250 miles southeast of Guadalcanal. And on the 21st they interperted the last message of a Mavis reporting itself under fighter attack as confirming the location of the Americans. Orders went promptly to the reinforcement convoy to turn around in order to keep out of range of American aircraft. The Japanese 11th Air Fleet dispatched a strike of twenty-six Bettys and thirteen Zeros in a failed effort to attack the carriers; on their return trip, they decided to drop their bombs on Henderson Field. The Zero escort ran into a section of four Wildcats from VMF-223 at about 1207 hours. In the ensuing fight the Zeros claimed to have engaged thirteen Wildcats and shot down four , plus two probables. All of the American fighters were damaged, two would never fly again. The Americans claimed one Zero shot down (actually no Zeros were lost). Such was the reputation of the Zero at this time, that the mere survival of all four pilots caused squadron morale to zoom!

[Matt Wiser]

Colonel Ichiki sums up the Japanese attitude: "Spirit" can overcome everything. Even being outnumbered and outgunned, and lacking tanks and heavy artillery, "Japanese spirit" can overcome all obstacles.

According to John Toland's The Rising Sun, Ichiki burned his colors just as one of the tanks found him and a small group of soliders. Before he could be mown down with the others, he killed himself.

[dragoon500ly]

Colonel Ichiki sums up the Japanese attitude: "Spirit" can overcome everything. Even being outnumbered and outgunned, and lacking tanks and heavy artillery, "Japanese spirit" can overcome all obstacles.

According to John Toland's The Rising Sun, Ichiki burned his colors just as one of the tanks found him and a small group of soliders. Before he could be mown down with the others, he killed himself.

The exact cause of Ichiki's death is unknown. The Japanese Self Defense Agencies' official history states that he burned his regimental colors (but his detachment was a reinforced battalion group, so why would he have the regiment's colors?) and then committed suicide; so Toland is simply repeating part of the line. There is a Marine Corps monograph that states that a high ranking officer killed himself as a tank was approaching him, again possible.

But there is also a story from one of the Japanese survivors that states that Ichiki went forward to rally his men and never returned. Of all the stories, I find this the most plausible because it jives with Ichiki's character, AND it explains why his remaining troops fell back to the coconut grove and underwent their odd paralysis. The next morning as 1st Bn, 1st Marines were making their attack, the Japanese defense was disjointed and had little, if any, central direction, exactly the situation a unit that had lost its higher officers would have reacted.

All respect to John Toland, he's a great author, but I believe that Ichiki met his death in the early morning hours before the Marine counterattack.

[Matt Wiser]

The battalion he led was 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment: Ichiki was the Regimental commander. His regimental command group was with the advance echelon, and thus had the regimental colors. The rest of the 28th Infantry were to follow up a week later, but Ichiki's "spirit" got the better of him and this battalion was wiped out as a result.

[Raellus]

I highly recommend James D. Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno, about the naval side of the Guadalcanal campaign. Just the prologue is beautiful. As he rightly points out, it was really the only part of the Pacific War during which both sides were operating from positions of parity. The naval casualty figures from the year-long campaign are nearly identical.

Actually, all of Hornfischer's work is very good- his Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors about the Battle off Samar (part of the larger Leyte Gulf battles) is excellent.

[dragoon500ly]

The battalion he led was 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment: Ichiki was the Regimental commander. His regimental command group was with the advance echelon, and thus had the regimental colors. The rest of the 28th Infantry were to follow up a week later, but Ichiki's "spirit" got the better of him and this battalion was wiped out as a result.

Hmm, while the 28th Infantry Regiment did fight on Guadalcanal, Ichiki's 2nd Echleon was simply the support troops of the 2nd Battalion and a detachment from the regimental gun company. An intresting footnote is that there is a report of the 28th burning its regimental colors some time later. If that report is true, and if the JSDF official history is true and the regimental colors were burned, then either the regiment had two sets of colors or somebody is mistaken somewhere. And lots of luck trying to nail down which! ;)

Myself, I believe that some sort of color was burned, the real question is was this the color presented by the Emperor himself or some kind of "field" color?

[Matt Wiser]

Found this at j-aircraft.org's forum: it's in their section about the ships of the Imperial Navy, and mentions the Ichiki Detachment.

Re: Ichiki Detachment
« Reply #1 on: March 10, 2011, 09:59:28 pm »

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Probably off topic, but to follow up from Bloody Ridge The Battle that Saved Guadalcanal, by Michael S. Smith

Ichiki's First Echelon - taken from Senshi Sosho, 14:292

Detachment Headquarters (with one 70mm gun) - 164
2d Battalion, 28th Infantry (-) - 603
2/28 Headquarters (23)
1st Company (105)
2nd Company (105)
3rd Company (105)
[each company with two platoons only]
2/28 Machine Gun Company
2/28 Gun Platoon (50) (two 70mm guns)
1st Company, 7th Engineer Regiment (150)

Total: 917

Transported to Guadalcanal aboard destroyers Kagero, Hagikaze, Arashi, Tanikaze, Hamakaze, Urakaze (commanded by RAdm Tanaka Raizo), to depart 16 August 1942 and proceed directly to Guadalcanal, landing troops on Taviu Point on evening of 18 August 1942

Each destroyer carrying approximately 150 troops and equipped with two motorboats, two cutters and seven collapsible boats (Hamakaze and Urakaze only had six of the later). Ichiki sailed aboard Arashi.

AND


Ichiki's Second Echelon (commanded by Major Mizuno Takeshi) (1,411 troops) also to depart Truk 16 August 1942 aboard transports Daifuku Maru and Boston Mau, to land Taivu point evening of 23 August 1942. Escorted by CL Jintsu and Patrol Boats 34 and 35.

Ichiki Detachment had two antitank companies: the 28th Regimental Antitank Company (4 37mm guns) and the attached 8th Independent Antitank Company (6 37mm guns)



Here is an interesting look at the Ichiki Detachment of Guadalcanal fame. This is a Babel Fish translation. My notes are in brackets. I have moderately rewritten the translation. It is interesting to note that his detachment included an antitank company, but I guess they were left in the second echelon and not included in the disastrous first echelon. Maybe they never landed, for I can’t find them in Frank’s Guadalcanal OB. I found them later with an OB for the 16th Division on Leyte.

"formation of Ichiki Detachment, the 7th Division’s 28th Infantry Regiment, consisted of 1st Company, 7th Engineers and the 8th Independent Rapid Fire Artillery Company [antitank], staff approximately 2000 names.

As for the 17th Army and the 8th Fleet divided Ichiki Detachment into 2 echelons, riding separately 1st echelon approximately 900 names in six destroyers.

163 men in the task force headquarters, 23 men in battalion headquarters, 420 infantrymen in 4 companies (submachine gun 36, grenade discharge 24), machine gun party 110 name (with 8 heavy machine guns), 50 men with one platoon of battalion guns (2 infantry guns), 150 engineers in 1 company embarks and is dispatched. Remainder of the task force with the Yokosuka 5th special naval landing would be sent in a 2nd echelon by transports. Or more in a manner of speaking was infantry 1 battalions and as for the portable ammunition of the infantry unit each 250 [rounds per man?], food was limited to 7 day's amount.

History

Ichiki Detachment history (1942 May ~ August)
May With the infantry 28th regiment mainstay in Hokkaido Asahikawa city for the Midway capture especially is formed. Task force leader the 28th Regimental Commander is Colonel Ichiki.

May 14th early morning, they boarded a train and starting the Asahikawa city station which is made quiet. Embarking to the wafter Yoshihiro Maru and the Nankai Maru counterespionage system May 18th two, the Hiroshima Ujina departured the port.

Starting, 2 days later, fact of the Midway island capture maneuvers is told to the officers and men for the first time. May 25th entered Saipan port. With the anchorage which is surrounded in the coral reef, the collapsible boat (the folding palpus). Intensive training of the opposed landing which you use was executed.
May 28th Saipan combat mission. From Saipan, guard of the warships is received.

We receive sad news of defeat of the June 6th. Furthermore as for large portion of the guard warships it came to the point of continuing advance, but the transports which carry Ichiki Detachment reverses.

16 day Guam landing. Nearly 2 months from now on, stationing life which utilizes the old US military barracks mark is led. An order to return to Japan arrives on August 6. August 7th early morning, embark to two transports and departs, but, the person of most is surprised the following 8th morning awaking. The transport which place by your, in the Guam of the expectation which yesterday morning departs port. Because it anchored. By August 8th that way wafter departure Guam.

In August 12th Truk Island approaches. As for Ichiki Detachment, the 1st echelon and it means to be divided into the 2nd echelon. As for the August 16th 1st echelon as an advance element, in six destroyers the amount riding. Guadalcanal destination is announced to everyone midway.

It lands to the August 18th nighttime Guadalcanal island [taibo] promontory.

Source is //www.ssystem.net/42.html

[RN7]

Best Fighter Planes of WW2

EUROPE
EARLY WAR PERIOD
Messerschmitt Bf 109: The Bf 109 fighter was flown by many Luftwaffe aces during WW2, including Erich Hartmann the leading fighter ace of all time, Gerhard Barkhorn the second highest scoring ace of all time, and the top scoring German ace over Western pilots Hans-Joachim Marseille. The Bf 109 first saw combat in the Spanish Civil War were German Condor Legion pilots quickly gained superiority over Russian I-15 and I-16 fighters used by the Communists. By 1939 the D model with a top speed of 304 mph equipped all German fighter squadrons, and in 1939-40 proved more than a match for the frontline fighters of Poland, Belgium, Holland and France. By the Battle of Britain the Bf 109E was coming into service with a top speed of 354 mph, and compared well against early British Spitfires. By 1942 the Bf 109G Gustav was reaching over 400 mph and was being used on all fronts, including ground attack, bomber interception and photo recon missions. Although the Bf 109 was a fine fighter it has some flaws such as a cramped cockpit, restricted rear visibility and a narrow track undercariage that made ground handling tricky. Its control also became progressively heavier as speed increased, and although manuverability was very good at low and medium speed, it deteriorated greatly at high speed. It was also short ranged which limited its tactical use.

Supermarine Spitfire: Most British WW2 aces flew the Spitfire, which proved to be a very adaptable fighter and in various versions served throughout the war period in all theatres. The Spitfire's all metal stressed-skin was a new technology at this time and delayed its production. When the war started the RAF insisted in holding most of its modern fighters in Britain and no Spitfires were sent to France. The Spitfire Mk. IA was powered by the famous Rolls Royce V-12 Merlin II engine, giving the early Spitfire a top level speed of about 360 mph and a climb rate of 2,530 ft./min. By the the Battle of Britain, markedly improved climb and acceleration rates had been achieved and fitted. Performance was similar to the Bf 109E, with the Spitfire being slightly faster and more maneuverable and the Bf 109 being faster in the dive and with a superior roll rate and having a performance edge above 20,000 ft. Early Spitfires were not fitted with fuel injection, and the engines would quit for lack of fuel if the aircraft pulled negative g's during a maneuver or was flown upside down. This problem was not fully solved until improved pressure carburetors were adopted in 1943. Later Spitfires models kept pace with upgraded Bf 109s and Fw 190s, incorporating many detail improvements and better streamlining, and top speeds of 450 mph. Overall the Spitfire was an exceptional fighter which excelled in the interceptor role it took on during the Battle of Britain. However like most other European fighters its primary shortcoming was its short range which became a serious fault when the RAF went over to the offensive.

[Targan]

Gentlemen, just a quick reminder that if information posted is partly or wholly sourced from works not originally authored by the poster, it needs to have some sort of attribution attached.

[Matt Wiser]

Fellas, has anyone been to this site? Plenty of info about the ships, aircraft, subs, and ordnance of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm