29th Infantry Division

[James Langham]

As there is nothing in canon on the 29th Infantry Division, I decided to send it to Korea (there was a suggestion I believe by Chico that it was deployed to the Horn of Africa but this would have caused problems with my plans for the 173rd Airborne).

Here is my suggestion for how it was deployed.

[dragoon500ly]

Good work! Always look forward to your articles.

But I got to flame you on this one James, US Army Korea used the M-60A3 tank during the 1980s, they were one of the last units to convert over to the IPM-1 right around 1989-90 time frame.

When I was serving my last hitch as an instructor at Ft Knox, there was a
M-60A3 company (the only one on base) that was training National Guardsmen and Korean-bound tankers.

Most active duty M-60A1s had been converted/replaced to the A3 configuation (in Germany at least) right around 1982-83. A lot of the tank commanders were less than impressed with the IPM-1 TC position, the powered coupla has a major PITA and the position of the TCs sight came in for a lot of criticism.

On the M-60A3, there is a long tube extension that brings the gunner's night sight picture to roughly knee level, the TC could angle his eyepiece up and be able to keep his head out of the hatch to keep an eye on things and then slightly back and down to see what his gunner was looking at. On the Abrams you had to drop down completely and look through your extension sight...you had the choice of leaving the hatch open and unoccupied or of closing the hatch, and then reopening the hatch with every movement. Not a problem in peacetime, but a great way to encourage an infantryman with a satchel charge during war.

[James Langham]

Good work! Always look forward to your articles.

But I got to flame you on this one James, US Army Korea used the M-60A3 tank during the 1980s, they were one of the last units to convert over to the IPM-1 right around 1989-90 time frame.

When I was serving my last hitch as an instructor at Ft Knox, there was a
M-60A3 company (the only one on base) that was training National Guardsmen and Korean-bound tankers.

Most active duty M-60A1s had been converted/replaced to the A3 configuation (in Germany at least) right around 1982-83. A lot of the tank commanders were less than impressed with the IPM-1 TC position, the powered coupla has a major PITA and the position of the TCs sight came in for a lot of criticism.

On the M-60A3, there is a long tube extension that brings the gunner's night sight picture to roughly knee level, the TC could angle his eyepiece up and be able to keep his head out of the hatch to keep an eye on things and then slightly back and down to see what his gunner was looking at. On the Abrams you had to drop down completely and look through your extension sight...you had the choice of leaving the hatch open and unoccupied or of closing the hatch, and then reopening the hatch with every movement. Not a problem in peacetime, but a great way to encourage an infantryman with a satchel charge during war.

So much for text books! Ok will find a way to fix - I think I can see a fairly obvious one in that it is easier to fly the troops and use the M48s there than ship the tanks from the States.

(and there was me thinking the use of the 29th in Korea instead of their planned area would get me criticized...)

Still I would rather friends here spot the faults than keep them in.

[kota1342000]

I had wondered if anyone else was using the 29th ID too. My version is that the 29th was formed up from angry displaced Americans that had either evacuated ahead of advancing Soviet and Mexican forces or escaped from the occupied areas south of I-40 in the CONUS. I placed them with 110th Corps, and had them retaking Fort Sill, Oklahoma as one of their last major actions.

For my additional units, I tried to keep things short and sweet as the original US and Soviet Combat Vehicle Handbooks did;

"29th Infantry Division (Mech), Ft Sill Ok, 2600 troops, 10 Stingray II, 6 M-60-2000, 8 M4A4E8 Sherman
The 29th was activated by popular demand as the volunteers coming out of the occupied territories and from behind the friendly lines swelled. They were armed up with a recently acquired stock of arms, equipment and vehicles that had just been recaptured from the Mexican Army. They went fully active not long after the victory of the 256th, and moved forward in their wake, retaking Ft Sill and keeping the pressure on the Mexicans. They also faced off with forward elements of Division Cuba of the Soviet Army, and crushed a leading motor rifle battalion in a surprise night action."

(The 256th is a Mechanized Infantry Brigade formed up around wounded troops returning to duty and using the stay behind personnel and colors of a Louisiana National Guard Bde that had originally been detailed to the 5th Infantry Division)

[James Langham]

I had wondered if anyone else was using the 29th ID too. My version is that the 29th was formed up from angry displaced Americans that had either evacuated ahead of advancing Soviet and Mexican forces or escaped from the occupied areas south of I-40 in the CONUS. I placed them with 110th Corps, and had them retaking Fort Sill, Oklahoma as one of their last major actions.

For my additional units, I tried to keep things short and sweet as the original US and Soviet Combat Vehicle Handbooks did;

"29th Infantry Division (Mech), Ft Sill Ok, 2600 troops, 10 Stingray II, 6 M-60-2000, 8 M4A4E8 Sherman
The 29th was activated by popular demand as the volunteers coming out of the occupied territories and from behind the friendly lines swelled. They were armed up with a recently acquired stock of arms, equipment and vehicles that had just been recaptured from the Mexican Army. They went fully active not long after the victory of the 256th, and moved forward in their wake, retaking Ft Sill and keeping the pressure on the Mexicans. They also faced off with forward elements of Division Cuba of the Soviet Army, and crushed a leading motor rifle battalion in a surprise night action."

(The 256th is a Mechanized Infantry Brigade formed up around wounded troops returning to duty and using the stay behind personnel and colors of a Louisiana National Guard Bde that had originally been detailed to the 5th Infantry Division)

Doesn't even need to contradict mine as that sounds like the 29th reforming in the US after being destroyed.

[kota1342000]

Good point! Maybe I dont put enough thought into connections between all of the good stuff that can always be found here :D

[dragoon500ly]

Believe me James, tracking down TO&Es and when a certain piece of equipment reached the troops is enough to drive one gray-headed (or watching reruns of Charmed!).

My own take on the 29th was it going to the Persian Gulf and getting creamed in the fighting following Operation Pegasus II, it was then pulling rear area security and LOC security duties.

[James1978]

The 29th was formed as a Light division when it was reformed in the 1980s and as of 1989, it was the only Light division on the National Guard. So shouldn't any armor battalion have been equipped with the M8/LAV75/whatever? Or is the M48/M60 a plus up to the division to give it some more firepower/staying power?

I'm enjoying your work, so please keep them coming.

[Legbreaker]

Perhaps the newer vehicles were allocated to the "professional" military units first and only the older vehicles were available?

[James1978]

Perhaps the newer vehicles were allocated to the "professional" military units first and only the older vehicles were available?
That's an explanation I can easily buy.

I guess my issue/question comes from the fact as a Light division, why did it have an M60 battalion in the first place?

[HorseSoldier]

The division isn't really missing from the T2K order of battle. It's component units are just under different flags, so adding it to the order of battle is double-dipping units in the 26th and 46th IDs in the T2K order of battle.

Unless the colors for 29th are posited as being attached to a unit mobilized after the war begins, as was suggested up thread, then it seems to me that it can only exist at the expense of 26th or 46th IDs in the order of battle, and would most likely just take their place in Korea or California. Excess brigades from whichever of those units gets the axe could be posited as filling in for the 6th and 10th ID(L) round out brigades and the brigade for the Iceland Defense Force, all of which are also missing from the order of battle (or, more precisely, slated in other units as well -- 42nd and 43rd ID).

[dragoon500ly]

The 29th was formed as a Light division when it was reformed in the 1980s and as of 1989, it was the only Light division on the National Guard. So shouldn't any armor battalion have been equipped with the M8/LAV75/whatever? Or is the M48/M60 a plus up to the division to give it some more firepower/staying power?

I'm enjoying your work, so please keep them coming.

To be accurate a Light Infantry Division in the '80s would not have any armor assigned at all. Their only antitank systems would be the Dragons of the line companies, the Hummer/TOWs of the nine Combat Support Companies and the attack helicopters in their air cav sqn and attack helicopter battalion.

The concept of a LID at the time, was to be very mobile in a strategic sense, everything it had could be airlifted via C-5/C-141. The proud boost was on the ground anywhere in the world in 72 hours. And to be fair, they could it.

It was intended for the LID to be used only in circumstances when a heavy division could not be employed, i.e. urban/jungle/mountain warfare. They would be reinforced, if necessary, by various NG infantry divisions. And initial plans were to form only 2 and perhaps 3 LIDs in addition to the 82nd/101st or 5 lights out of 17 divisions.

So why did the AUS form the 6th, 7th, 10th and 25th LIDs, not to mention the 9th Motorized? Congress can be thanked for that. It was cheaper to field a light fighter than it was to field heavy troops. They didn't require the support structure as well. A real cheap way to field large numbers of soldiers and free up money for the various social programs......

This ignored the fact that LIDs, while strategically far more mobile than the heavies, have the tactical mobility of a World War One doughboy, you can only march so far and so fast on foot. And in every single exercise in which the lights went up against heavies in which the lights did not have a terrain advantage....the lights had their arses handed to them. And even some of the exercises where the lights had the terrain advantage, it was umpire decisions that gave them the victory (COMEON! A Dragon will not knock out a M-1 at 2,500 meters!!!!).

It was at this point that the great LAV-75/RDF Light Tank/M-8 AGS started. The intent was to introduce a good light tank/mobile gun system and equip each LID with 1-2 battalions to give them more firepower. With the end of these programs, that gave the push to go Stryker. And so the Light Fighter experiment ended.

[HorseSoldier]

And, to be fair, in the 80s you had a lot of people prepping to refight Vietnam in Central America on the one hand, and the Reagan administration pushing for specific end state goals in the force structure. Back in those days, the targets were X number of divisions and Y number of ships in the navy, etc.

[James Langham]

Rewritten version incorporating a lot of Kota's history. As ever comments welcome.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

This thread has given me another couple of quotes :D

[schnickelfritz]

I might suggest the substitution of the M4A3E8 for the listed M4A4E8. The M4A4 was the version powered by the Chrysler Multibank engine...essentially 5 Chrysler car V-8's harnessed together. This was done due to the shortage of engines for the Sherman tank. Most were "given" to our Allies under Lend-Lease. There is one intrepid soul in the UK that has restored one to working order.

They were a maintenance nightmare, for obvious reasons.

I am unaware of the M4A4 used to make an E8 model, although the British did use them to make Firefly Shermans, from what I've seen.

The M4A3 series were powered by the same Ford V-8 used in the M-26 Pershing.

A suggestion might be to use M-46 or M-47 Patton tanks...I see a lot of them at local (Chicago, IL) area veterans halls (VFW, etc) that have armor on display. I believe the 90mm on the M-46/M-47 is ballistically similar to the 90mm in the earlier versions of the M-48, simplifying the supply chain. To be honest, I cannot envision a scenario where 76mm ammo for a M4A3E8 would still exist in the US and not be past the rated shelf life.

Also demilitarized M26/46/47 tanks could (especially a company or two, maybe a battalion) be restored to working order with a variety of parts from the M48A3 and M48A5 (power plant, armament/fire control/commo, etc).

Another thought might be to include some "Duster" 40mm AA vehicles as NG leftovers. I know those appear in some of the Challenge Magazine material.

Just a thought-
Dave

[kota1342000]

ARRG! Thank you Dave, had not looked closely at what I had typed before....my M4A4E8 was off by one LOL

[Panther Al]

Actually, the V, or A4 Sherman didn't have a bank of V-8's.

The Chrysler A57 Multibank was made from 5 L Head Inline 6's. It did require more maintenance, but it was an amazing engine. It was a mix of Chrysler and Dodge parts, and built around a common crankcase, and pumped out 470HP.

My Grandfather preferred the V over the other models once he got into his first one. In his view they was a good bit more powerful and agile, and being longer - even if only slightly longer - than a stock Sherman, made for a better firing platform - especially once he got into a Sherman V Firefly.

[schnickelfritz]

My apologies on the confusion...that's what I get for trying to post while the kids are fighting in the next room. If memory serves, Chrysler Corporattion was big on inline engines until the early hemi V-8 engines of the 50's. I would imagine you Grandfather was originally issued a M4A1 or M4A2 and the M4A4, when running well, would probably be significantly more powerful in real world use than the radial or twin diesels.

He was a lucky man to get the Firefly!

Thanks-
Dave

[kota1342000]

The division isn't really missing from the T2K order of battle. It's component units are just under different flags, so adding it to the order of battle is double-dipping units in the 26th and 46th IDs in the T2K order of battle.

Absolutely true Horse, and Im terrible about double dipping for additional order of battle stuff. But I try to make up for it by either explaining what had happened to the original parent units of the component brigades, or building new formations out of the pool of inactive colors.

[pmulcahy11b]

One thing I do every so often when I come up with the "Twilight 2000 Notes" part of my descriptions on my site is incorporate a little story about how some unit got some equipment it shouldn't have had, or just say that a certain vehicle "somehow" ended up at a certain unit (I assign a lot of unusual vehicles to the TX ARNG's 49th AD that way -- as much as I love the Army, I had a good time in the Guard and learned a lot of valuable stuff from those old veterans that came in handy the whole time I was in the Army). Or the little story, I think it's under the SAR-80 in Singaporean Assault Rifles, about the mysterious raid on Soviet submarine pens at Cam Ranh Bay early in the war. Sometimes, you can just through some unusual equipment, weapons, or vehicles at a unit, and when necessary, figure out later where they came from. Too much winging is bad, but a little bit of winging it doesn't really hurt, and can be used to throw a little mystery at the players.

[James Langham]

As ever nitpicks and comments welcome.

I haven't forgotten my more recent articles and I'm still working on them but I periodically revisit my older articles and update them - this is one of them. Enjoy!

[kiltedguard]

Not for nothing...but if you are really looking to get into the weeds with this, you can find the MTOEs for almost anything from the Army's past through the Army Heritage Center in Carlisle PA. If you go yourself....Lt. Col. Andresen (ret.) might come out just to see what oddball was trying to read an MTOE. :) If not...you can usually order documents.

[Olefin]

If you are really looking to resurrect US units (since Horse Solider is right and the 29th is already in the game, its just distributed among other units) how about the 198th Brigade or the 11th Brigade from the 99th Division, along with the division itself?

[dragoon500ly]

I've always been bothered by the way the writers (GDWs) simply stated that for example, these three armored brigades will form this completely new division.

When you look over the TO&Es and the ROAD and Air-Land battle concepts, the independent armored and mechanized brigades had a mission. They were assigned directly to the various corps to be used as reserves, to reinforce a division for a specific operation, to be used as covering forces or to protect flanks/rear areas. There never was any intention or even a need to group them into divisions, after all, why wait until a war is underway before you try to throw together a division, not to mention its support structure.

To be sure, the US, in World War II did exactly that, expanding from a pre war base of 174,000 men (in 11 divisions) and, in five years, building up to a strength of 8,300,000 (in 91 divisions). It was, and still is an impressive achievement. But that very build-up cuased tremendous problems. Training at all levels was so short as to be, at best poor, and at worst laughable. Leaders couldn't lead and soldiers, couldn't soldier. It took over three years of intense effort, stupid defeats and lots and lots (did I mention lots?) of trail and error to produce the military machine that played such a critical part in winning the war.

The lessons learned from World War Two is that it takes time to create a division and train its personnel to work together, effectively. It was easy for Washington to say that they were creating four new divisions, but that process took some four years to complete, before the Light Infantry Divisions were declared to be "combat ready". So to say that the Army would have dumped its prewar doctrine in order to create an "ersatz" division(s) and then throw that the division straight into combat...in real life, I doubt that the Pentegon would have wasted the time.

[Olefin]

I agree with you there as to raising new divisions - I have a unit in my East Africa story that is a battalion from a division they were trying to raise but in the end they only managed to put together a single regiment in the time they had and only two battalions of it managed to make it to Africa.

Never agreed with the training division's as presented by GDW - for one they would have done something to get them some armor for sure. Even if all it was were old Sheridans and M113 APC's or the M8 AGS. Sending in pure foot infantry, many of them half trained, without some kind of armor support is basically throwing them away.

And why even form new divisions when their current divisions are heavily depleted? If you have divisions that are now basically brigades or regiments then send the 5000 guys from a training division to a combat division where they could actually have some veterans to show them how to survive.

So lets form new divisions instead of bringing your combat formations back up to strength? Especially considering the last guy who did that was Hitler - and look how good that worked out for him. In many ways the game has American military leaders acting very stupidly - always thought those who wrote the game had a grudge against the US military and it shows in many ways, this being one of them.

[HorseSoldier]

I've always been bothered by the way the writers (GDWs) simply stated that for example, these three armored brigades will form this completely new division.

Agreed. I think they did that primarily to not exceed a targeted length in the USAVG as they were writing it -- individual histories for all the NG and the two USAR* separate brigades would have probably doubled the unit histories section in that book.

Rather than being brigaded into new divisions at the beginning of the war, without a pre-existing divisional structure, support units, etc., I would guess that many of them, beginning in late 97 and early 98, would have gone from being Corps or higher assets to being permanently attached to depleted divisions to bring them back up to strength.

* There were three USAR combat brigades in the 80s, but one of them was the roundout for 6th ID(L).

[dragoon500ly]

Agreed. I think they did that primarily to not exceed a targeted length in the USAVG as they were writing it -- individual histories for all the NG and the two USAR* separate brigades would have probably doubled the unit histories section in that book.

Rather than being brigaded into new divisions at the beginning of the war, without a pre-existing divisional structure, support units, etc., I would guess that many of them, beginning in late 97 and early 98, would have gone from being Corps or higher assets to being permanently attached to depleted divisions to bring them back up to strength.

* There were three USAR combat brigades in the 80s, but one of them was the roundout for 6th ID(L).

And according to the pre-war doctrine, that would also be a possible use for the seperate brigades.

[dragoon500ly]

Never agreed with the training division's as presented by GDW - for one they would have done something to get them some armor for sure. Even if all it was were old Sheridans and M113 APC's or the M8 AGS. Sending in pure foot infantry, many of them half trained, without some kind of armor support is basically throwing them away.

GDWs approach also overlooked that the training divisions were exactly that, cadres to replace the existing instructors at the service schools with the mission of training draftees in the event of a war. So, taking a training division and converting it into a LID is simply gutting your training establishment, which would lead to problems with training the next batch of recruits. It was certainly not a well researched factoid.

[The Rifleman]

GDWs approach also overlooked that the training divisions were exactly that, cadres to replace the existing instructors at the service schools with the mission of training draftees in the event of a war. So, taking a training division and converting it into a LID is simply gutting your training establishment, which would lead to problems with training the next batch of recruits. It was certainly not a well researched factoid.

Not so fast. First, look at the numbers. You've got 12 training divisions that were doing nothing but inital entry training (basic). Thats a lot of NCOs, and they were keeping the officer structure for it too. There were quite a few qualified captains and colonels that were doing all the administrative work and planning the logistics there. If you had 12 divisions, all active, all doing nothing but cranking out basic training recruits, you'd see a lot of opened reserve posts (which happened in the war on terror) like shelby, dix, attabury, so on. There are a lot more recruits coming then there are divisions to put them in.

Next, you have the historical context. During WWII, you have had systems where at the completion of basic, the trainees go off to war with the drill sergeants as their NCOs. That how the Marine Corps built up the 4th, 5th, 6th divisions. Even John Basilone declined to become an instructor, but still ended up training the soldiers he brought to Iwo Jima. The army did a similar tactic training for Vietnam. When the army needed to expand, the 4th took its soldiers before the even went to basic, and trained them right off with their own NCOs. Its important to note that the drill sergeants in these units come from different units then the instructors that teach the courses.

You've got to look at the strategic situation. There are school house units turning out basic trainees. Even every state from the National Guard has a "state military acadmey" or "regional training institute" that has instructors. What the army needs is more force structure. There just isn't enough manuver units without them. They are going to use that structure already in place to expand and put all those first sergeants, company commanders, majors and colonels to work.

Finally, you have the emergency situation with the invasion by mexico and soviet forces in washington state. Even the "school brigade" and the "cadet brigade" are formed. They are taking people right out of basic and sending them to war. Remove the LIDs and there is nothing to stop the invasions with.

As a side note to what started this thread, if the cold war had not ended and gone into our "alternate" T2K world, then the force structure would not have changed. I was a memember of the 26th ID in 1993 when it was closed, along with the 50th AD, and the units merged with the 42nd ID and the newly stood up 29th ID. If the cold war had not ended, the 50th AD and the 26th ID would not have been closed. The 46th ID that is stood up by the GDW staff is made up of historically 29th ID units.

The 46th Infantry division was only active a few years between wars in the 50s, and its units historically belonged to the 32nd ID out of Michigan. The army has a thing for history and would have stood up the 29th division from Virgina/Maryland for their own troops. The most simple way to correct this issue is to address the 46th ID as the 29th ID.

[Graebarde]

Not so fast. First, look at the numbers. You've got 12 training divisions that were doing nothing but inital entry training (basic). Thats a lot of NCOs, and they were keeping the officer structure for it too. There were quite a few qualified captains and colonels that were doing all the administrative work and planning the logistics there. If you had 12 divisions, all active, all doing nothing but cranking out basic training recruits, you'd see a lot of opened reserve posts (which happened in the war on terror) like shelby, dix, attabury, so on. There are a lot more recruits coming then there are divisions to put them in.

Those training divisions do MORE than just BCT, they also do the AIT for combat arms and some of the less technical support skills. The trainee undergoes 16 weeks of training, such as the OSUT units do today. The 16 weeks can be reduced with some less tactical or important skills being less emphasised. The cadre of the training units that house the trainees is also minimal. Cadre strenghts of company, battalion and brigade are minimal at best. At the company level there are TWO officers for the company, each platoon has maybe three NCO cadre, plus the cooks, clerks and supply personnel. Battalion is a short staff that is very austure, maybe 25 in the HHC doing admin mostly, and brigade is as bare. The committee group is the largest assembly of cadre personnel as they do the field training and classroom instruction. Company NCOs do the D&C, discipline, etc.

There are NOT a lot of NCO and officer to strip from these divisions.

AND many of the cadre can be convelescent (sp) assignments as the war progressed. I remember the NCO cadre in my BCT and AIT in '68 (taken at two locations btw). The fact they were combat veterans and invoked 'lessons learned' on us (at least my perception) had and influence.

Yes they could bring in more convelecent NCO to form the units into 'line units' in the later phases, but I think they would keep the divisions functioning as they were designed as LONG as possible, and the schools would as well. The schools would be putting out new officers and NCOs, such as they did during 'Nam with accelerated OCS and NCOES courses kicking out sergeants (though I think rather than sergeants and staff sergeants they would be better making them corporals and sergants. I was NOT impressed with the honor graduate staff sergeants I came across, and one cost me a stripe after I kicked his ass, but that's another story.)

[The Rifleman]

Those training divisions do MORE than just BCT, they also do the AIT for combat arms and some of the less technical support skills. The trainee undergoes 16 weeks of training, such as the OSUT units do today. The 16 weeks can be reduced with some less tactical or important skills being less emphasised. The cadre of the training units that house the trainees is also minimal. Cadre strenghts of company, battalion and brigade are minimal at best. At the company level there are TWO officers for the company, each platoon has maybe three NCO cadre, plus the cooks, clerks and supply personnel. Battalion is a short staff that is very austure, maybe 25 in the HHC doing admin mostly, and brigade is as bare. The committee group is the largest assembly of cadre personnel as they do the field training and classroom instruction. Company NCOs do the D&C, discipline, etc.

There are NOT a lot of NCO and officer to strip from these divisions.

AND many of the cadre can be convelescent (sp) assignments as the war progressed. I remember the NCO cadre in my BCT and AIT in '68 (taken at two locations btw). The fact they were combat veterans and invoked 'lessons learned' on us (at least my perception) had and influence.

Yes they could bring in more convelecent NCO to form the units into 'line units' in the later phases, but I think they would keep the divisions functioning as they were designed as LONG as possible, and the schools would as well. The schools would be putting out new officers and NCOs, such as they did during 'Nam with accelerated OCS and NCOES courses kicking out sergeants (though I think rather than sergeants and staff sergeants they would be better making them corporals and sergants. I was NOT impressed with the honor graduate staff sergeants I came across, and one cost me a stripe after I kicked his ass, but that's another story.)

What you're saying is partially accurate, but you've got to remember that we are going back into time. The conversion of the divsions hadn't happened yet. For example, it was 98th Infantry Division (Training) as opposed to 98th Infantry Divsion (IT). The total army school system may have never happened. Part of the draw down in the 90s was that the army didn't need all this structure for just BCT. OSUT was only limited to combat arms 11, 13, and 19 series.

Your numbers are fairly close. Yes, there are only two officers per company and only three NCOs per platoon. But key is that your company command section is intact. Thats your clerk, commander, first sergeant and supply. Each platoon is getting a very good platoon sergeant and two squad leaders. The brains of the operation - company, platoon are there! These are light infantry divisions, so your HHC doesn't have to be big. You aren't moving sabot rounds for tanks and thousands of gallons of fuel for bradleys. Also, having those few key staff people, the brains of the logistics are there! So the numbers at battalion level would look like this -

Three Infantry Companies each:
Commander
XO
First sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply Sergeant E-6
Armorer E-5
3 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs

3x Infantry Platoons each:
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2x Squad Leader E-6
1x Squad Leader E-6 (vacant)
8x Team Leader E-5 (vacant)
31 enlisted basic trainees as infantry

HHC
Commander
First Sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply sergeant E-6

Transportation section
Section Sergeant E-6
8 vehicle drivers E-4

Mess Section
Food Service NCO E-7
4 cooks E-4

Medic Section
Squad leader E-6
4 medics E-4

Maintanence Section
Motor Sergeant E-7
ULLS clerk E-5
Squad Leader E-6
4 mechanics E-4

Mortar Platoon
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2 x Section Sergeants E-6
12 enlisted basic trainees as mortar crews

Battalion Staff
Commander
XO/S-3
S-1
S-2 (vacant)
S-4
Sergeant Major
Ops Sergeant E-8
PAK section Sergeant E-7
4 enlisted staff E-4
8 enlisted staff (vacant)
8 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs, vehicle drivers, staff

As we can see, the missing links are platoon leaders and E-5 team leaders. I am NOT a fan of raw, untrained LTs, but an even bigger pet peeve is "shake and bake" sergeants. The point is, its world war III. If infantry battalions didn't have an S-2 after 3 years of WWIII would it hurt? Probably not. How long do you expect brand new LTs to survive in combat and how much do they contribute, compared to those E7s and E6s ? I'd say not much. These platoons are going to be able to shoot, move, communicate from the direction and training provided by those seasoned senior NCOs.

Where I do see a big problem is the missing E-5s. You can train soldiers in groups of 10, but the E-5s really are the ones that catch mistakes and ensure that things are moving along. They only have 3 joes to watch. However, after the first few fights, natural leaders and soldiers that have a knack for infantry combat will quickly rise and they'll be your team leaders.

Also, look at the strength for one of these new LIDs. They are running at about 5,000 full strength, not the 12,000 LID of pre-war. Times are desperate. Also, think about this: its 2000 and the US itself is in turmoil. Can't send soldiers overseas because there is no fuel, no ships. There are invaders coming across mexico and in washington state. Where would new draftees even come from? How would we get them to ft benning or ft knox? Closing some of the basic training centers and turning them into divisions just makes sense.

[HorseSoldier]

It's worth noting that the USAR light infantry divisions do not become maneuver units until the summer of 1998, eight or nine months after the strategic nuclear campaign begins. Presumably, even before the war with Mexico, civil unrest had reached a tipping point where whatever long term ill effects to the training process their conversion represented was deemed less important than augmenting law enforcement and military forces still CONUS in reestablishing order.

From the unit histories, several of those divisions got badly mauled in action against marauders, which speaks to how bad the situation was by late summer/early fall '98. Admittedly some of that may speak to poor performance by units that had limited resources, training, and experience, and some of it may represent covert resistance by well-equipped and organized New America cells rather than bandits and such. But whatever the details on the ground, it's pretty clear that by July '98, the US was in dire straits and desperate for manpower to help with its internal issues.

[Legbreaker]

Not so fast. First, look at the numbers....

+1

You also need to look at the dates these units were converted, and whether or not Civgov or Milgov commands them. Post nuke they're not likely to be receiving many new recruits so there reason for being is gone.

[The Rifleman]

Admittedly some of that may speak to poor performance by units that had limited resources, training, and experience

Thats it right there. You don't have enough experienced leaders, you have a longer span of control and you run the risk of losing big in a fight. These weren't premier combat organizations. Also, if you notice the ones that were committed slowly to a fight and gained some experience, they did better. The ones that were fighting right off and didn't have time to learn lessons got hammered.

[Graebarde]

What you're saying is partially accurate, but you've got to remember that we are going back into time. The conversion of the divsions hadn't happened yet. For example, it was 98th Infantry Division (Training) as opposed to 98th Infantry Divsion (IT). The total army school system may have never happened. Part of the draw down in the 90s was that the army didn't need all this structure for just BCT. OSUT was only limited to combat arms 11, 13, and 19 series.

First they are NOT Infantry Division (Training) or (IT), they are designated as TRAINING divisions, with no branch indicated. And I realize the Twilight timeline the conversion to IT had not yet taken place, though it was '93 when the transition started. As for the army school system, it preceeds this period. The branch schools have been around since at least WW2. And the school system trained specialists, not combat arms other than the higher grades/ranks. OSUT for combat arms makes sense, since a company of clerks, cooks, drivers, mechanics, medics, etc does not make a lot of sense generally speaking. And the TD has the schools for the support courses. The BCT would be OSUT concept, with persons selected for the support courses taken out after phase one (BCT) probably, or perhaps one company in a battalion had only BCT for the REMFs.


Your numbers are fairly close. Yes, there are only two officers per company and only three NCOs per platoon. But key is that your company command section is intact. Thats your clerk, commander, first sergeant and supply. Each platoon is getting a very good platoon sergeant and two squad leaders. The brains of the operation - company, platoon are there! These are light infantry divisions, so your HHC doesn't have to be big. You aren't moving sabot rounds for tanks and thousands of gallons of fuel for bradleys. Also, having those few key staff people, the brains of the logistics are there!

The Platoon NCOs we had in the companies were Staff Sergeants and Sergeants or Corporals. The only training SFC we had, which would be a platoon sergeant, was the SDI. As for VERY GOOD, that is debateable as I saw some loosers along with the Excellent, but that's not the argument. Yes a conversion to the said light infantry division would be easier than to the heavy, that's a given.


So the numbers at battalion level would look like this -

Three Infantry Companies each:
Commander
XO
First sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply Sergeant E-6
Armorer E-5
3 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs

3x Infantry Platoons each:
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2x Squad Leader E-6
1x Squad Leader E-6 (vacant)
8x Team Leader E-5 (vacant)
31 enlisted basic trainees as infantry

HHC
Commander
First Sergeant E-8
PAK clerk E-5
Supply sergeant E-6

Transportation section
Section Sergeant E-6
8 vehicle drivers E-4

Mess Section
Food Service NCO E-7
4 cooks E-4

Medic Section
Squad leader E-6
4 medics E-4

Maintanence Section
Motor Sergeant E-7
ULLS clerk E-5
Squad Leader E-6
4 mechanics E-4

Mortar Platoon
Platoon Leader (vacant)
Platoon Sergeant E-7
2 x Section Sergeants E-6
12 enlisted basic trainees as mortar crews

Battalion Staff
Commander
XO/S-3
S-1
S-2 (vacant)
S-4
Sergeant Major
Ops Sergeant E-8
PAK section Sergeant E-7
4 enlisted staff E-4
8 enlisted staff (vacant)
8 enlisted basic trainees as RTOs, vehicle drivers, staff

This is REALLY a light support for the battalion, especially at the mess level. Doesn't there need to be a mess team at each company level? See above the company breakout of NCOs, though Committee group could and probably would contribute some needed NCOs in the E5-E7 paygrades.

As we can see, the missing links are platoon leaders and E-5 team leaders. I am NOT a fan of raw, untrained LTs, but an even bigger pet peeve is "shake and bake" sergeants. The point is, its world war III. If infantry battalions didn't have an S-2 after 3 years of WWIII would it hurt? Probably not. How long do you expect brand new LTs to survive in combat and how much do they contribute, compared to those E7s and E6s ? I'd say not much. These platoons are going to be able to shoot, move, communicate from the direction and training provided by those seasoned senior NCOs.

Where I do see a big problem is the missing E-5s. You can train soldiers in groups of 10, but the E-5s really are the ones that catch mistakes and ensure that things are moving along. They only have 3 joes to watch. However, after the first few fights, natural leaders and soldiers that have a knack for infantry combat will quickly rise and they'll be your team leaders.

I agree with this assessment. See the Committee Group comment as to where SOME of the missing NCOs will come from. CG has the largest group of troops in the TD, and the 'experts' per se.

Also, look at the strength for one of these new LIDs. They are running at about 5,000 full strength, not the 12,000 LID of pre-war. Times are desperate. Also, think about this: its 2000 and the US itself is in turmoil. Can't send soldiers overseas because there is no fuel, no ships. There are invaders coming across mexico and in washington state. Where would new draftees even come from? How would we get them to ft benning or ft knox? Closing some of the basic training centers and turning them into divisions just makes sense.

TDs only have about 3000 cadre total of all ranks and specialties. Granted times are desperate, that's a given. Where do the draftee's come from? Refugee camps for one, since in the army at least they can get a meal and it's more secure.. debateable I know. There would not be a need to move them to Benning, Knox or anywhere else. The TDs would set up at places like McCoy, Chaffee, Shelby, and other reserve camps/forts as well as at the existing forts such as Lewis, Ord, Sill, Polk, Riley, Hood, and other places where the RA units have moved out to the front. Facilities are there, why waste them. The TDs are regionally allocated. But as with everything else in Twilight, once TDM occurs all bets are off.

[The Rifleman]

@ Graebarde

Yes, I know that this organization is NOT very pretty. Also, as has been debated, these divisions did not fair very well. I think that some of the contributing factors is that we are all veterans, with knowledge from different eras, and on top of that, the T2K timeline makes everything blurry with "what ifs".

When I attended OSUT in the early 90s, every basic training company had 5 platoons, with an E-7 and and E-6 each. Also, if there was a new DS in training, he was not counted in the totals. Further, at one point, some of the battalions had 5 companies in them. I've scaled back from that, but still, its a lot of senior billet holders. That didn't include all the instructors, which in the armor field, was quite a few. There was a full compliment of 14 tanks per company, and a dozen instructors per company as well. Those guys were the E-5s and E-6s. Then, on top of that, the rifle ranges, the mine training course, the hand grenade range, land nav course.... all had their own dedicated staff. I didn't touch any of them either.

The mess section in many line units is only authorized a few guys to boil water for the "T" rats, nothing more. Yes, I know, it looks like dog squeeze, but the cooks are going to draw on the infantry for KPs, and old school KP, where you do a lot more than just wash the pots and pans.

The place where I would be the most concerned is the medics. There just isn't enough for a platoon medic, and barely enough for company medics. I suppose the they could be sucked off from in-processing or hospital units, but that would be highly concerning to me.

As you said yourself, TDs have a cadre of 3,000 people. But they really aren't starting the war with much more than 5,000.

Everything you said is completely valid. I guess it just comes down to how you view organization of assets. I'm assuming that you'd have rather seen the 30,000 or so new soldiers distributed amoungst the existing divisions, brining their strength up to 3-7k. The merit to that plan is that you are putting novices with veterans. That could work well, but you end up with the headaches of the vietnam war and WWII individual replacement systems.

For me, I'd rather see smaller divisions as they are more agile and easy to weild. I like the idea of divisions training as a unit in CONUS before they deploy. When the LIDs were sent over, I would have then shipped the used up units back on the returning ships. An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it? Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base.

[Legbreaker]

What I'm seeing here is reality interfering with the game.
The unit histories, etc were originally written back in the early to mid 80's. Many of the points raised about why certain organisational structures can/cannot be possible are from dates and events after the original material was written, and therefore their relevance is questionable at best.

[Olefin]

"An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it? Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base. "

I agree with you completely there Rifleman - that unit, in reality, would have been rotated back and rebuilt. At the time they got hammered in the game they were still bringing in new units. So why leave it in place as an emasculated brigade that was basically useless - instead it would have gone home on the next ships heading back and been rebuilt, most likely using one of the training divisions to build it back up to strength and being re-equipped with stateside gear - i.e. M60A4's and M113's or new build M1's and reconditioned Bradleys.

The writers of the game gave the Soviets way too much credit and had the US do things they would never do and act very dumb in many ways.

There are other examples - the 25th Light disintegrates in Korea and falls apart and they reform the division with less than 1000 survivors. At the same time you have the 7th Light staying intact but also getting hammered and also having less than 1000 men.

So why reform the 25th at all? Send the survivors to the 7th and bring it back up to where it can at least be useful. Having two different divisional structures with only 1100 men between them makes absolutely no sense and in reality the Army would have folded them together or sent them home and used them as cadres of veterans that the training divisions could have been formed around.

Same with three Marine Corps division in Korea that between them have 3000 men. That makes absolutely no sense - so why have two weak divisions that are basically peacetime battalions? They should be one division with 3000 men and 20 tanks, which in July of 2000 makes them quite formidable, not three divided formations.

The GDW designers seemed to have been reading histories of the Wehrmacht in WWII and not the US Army when they came up with their idea of creating new formations instead of sending them replacements or rotating units back home.

[Graebarde]

What I'm seeing here is reality interfering with the game.
The unit histories, etc were originally written back in the early to mid 80's. Many of the points raised about why certain organisational structures can/cannot be possible are from dates and events after the original material was written, and therefore their relevance is questionable at best.

Maybe, however my position IS from the period in which the game set. Heck, it's the era I KNOW.

[The Rifleman]

Maybe, however my position IS from the period in which the game set. Heck, it's the era I KNOW.

I think that describes many of us. We lived it. Its probably why this game is more popular with people in the 30s and 40s as opposed to kids.

[The Rifleman]

"An example of this would be 2nd Armored Division. What good does it do to have a division with less than 1,000 people in it? Thats going too far. I'd use that as a cadre to then build around, in CONUS. It gives the veterans a break and at the same time it gives the unit an expereince base. "

I agree with you completely there Rifleman - that unit, in reality, would have been rotated back and rebuilt. At the time they got hammered in the game they were still bringing in new units. So why leave it in place as an emasculated brigade that was basically useless - instead it would have gone home on the next ships heading back and been rebuilt, most likely using one of the training divisions to build it back up to strength and being re-equipped with stateside gear - i.e. M60A4's and M113's or new build M1's and reconditioned Bradleys.

The writers of the game gave the Soviets way too much credit and had the US do things they would never do and act very dumb in many ways.

There are other examples - the 25th Light disintegrates in Korea and falls apart and they reform the division with less than 1000 survivors. At the same time you have the 7th Light staying intact but also getting hammered and also having less than 1000 men.

So why reform the 25th at all? Send the survivors to the 7th and bring it back up to where it can at least be useful. Having two different divisional structures with only 1100 men between them makes absolutely no sense and in reality the Army would have folded them together or sent them home and used them as cadres of veterans that the training divisions could have been formed around.

Same with three Marine Corps division in Korea that between them have 3000 men. That makes absolutely no sense - so why have two weak divisions that are basically peacetime battalions? They should be one division with 3000 men and 20 tanks, which in July of 2000 makes them quite formidable, not three divided formations.

The GDW designers seemed to have been reading histories of the Wehrmacht in WWII and not the US Army when they came up with their idea of creating new formations instead of sending them replacements or rotating units back home.

I agree with the above completely. As has been noted elsewhere, with the haters of the 44th Armored Division, independanty brigades have a special use. Massed numbers of them dilute combat power that could be used elsewhere. The germans tried a lot of seperate panzer brigades on the Soviet front in 43 and quickly ended the experiment. The US army had lots of independant tank battalions and TD battalions and found that they just didn't work for too many reasons to explain.

I would think that similarly, having these 400 person divisions as one "brigade" wouldn't cut it. Its just a waste of combat power and reasources. However, using them as a cadre, and as others have pointed out, scooping up starving refugees and putting an M231 or M16 in their hands, would provide a unit to do either security missions or clearing out bandits or even policing duties. It would go a long way towards restoring stability in the US.

[HorseSoldier]

I've been working on a write up that might get submitted for the next Good Luck e-zine (assuming I can actually get it done by then) about the 194th Militia Regiment -- basically the local defense militias active in the 194th Armored Brigade's AO in southern Illinois/Missouri/Kentucky. The militia does local security functions and frees up the personnel from the brigade to focus on security for the refinery at Robinson and more proactive, longer range patrolling. It also allows the brigade to rapidly focus more of its combat power against larger threats or objectives without having to completely leave its farming communities swinging in the breeze.

The basic premise is kind of a low budget Vietnam CAP program crossed with the Iraq/A'stan ETTs -- the militia has its own NCOs and officers, but has limited number of cadre from 194th Arm'd Bde embedded all the way down to platoon level. The Regimental structure also incorporates attempts to reestablish civilian law enforcement in the AO and a company headquarters that coordinates scout/liaison teams of local militia assigned to 194th Armored's units for their knowledge of local terrain and human terrain.

Organizationally, it's mostly part-timers with the building block being four squad platoons recruited from individual settlements -- during low threat (or high labor demand) time periods, each squad does one week of active service per month, but this can be flexed as resources allow and threat level dictates. Armament is a mix of M16EZs and an assortment of civilian firearms, everything from AR-15s and other military style weapons to hunting rifles and shotguns. Uniforms are, likewise, anything from BDUs to civilian hunting clothing to street clothes, worn with locally made copies of the 194th Arm'd Bde's patch and a militia patch either sewn on or worn on a brassard.

I think this sort of arrangement would be prevalent in pretty much all cantonment areas with a military garrison in the US (MilGov or CivGov), and means that in a real emergency a military unit in an established cantonment area could exceed its listed manpower by 50-100% (though these extra forces probably aren't capable of much more than conducting static defenses, and lack the firepower to go toe to toe with a well equipped, well trained opponent).

I'd imagine that overseas where US or other forces were foreigners and outsiders, I'd think this system would also be workable, though probably with the de jure arrangement typically being that local militia were affiliated with the host nation military but being de facto incorporated into the local cantonment's military unit, whatever the nationality. (Though, obviously, this only works anywhere if the military unit in cantonment is not dealing with significant hostility and unrest from the local population -- in the face of pronounced overt or covert resistance from the locals, this kind of militia organization would be more problematic and less successful.)

[James Langham]

Maybe one of the reasons for the Training Divisions being converted is that there was not any infrastructure to allow them to get new recruits to train. With everything going to Hell, a logical alternative might be to have each division recruit and train locally.

As for the illogical nature of decisions I still maintain the theory that history shows that few governments or leaders have a good record of making good decisions...

[dragoon500ly]

You run into the same problem...would it be a more efficient use of resources to "create" a dozen "new" LIDs, or use the cadres to bring existing divisions up to strength?

In this case, the Army would have deactivated several of the Training Divisions and assign their cadre to other divisions (allowing able-bodied soldiers to be sent to the front) or sent en-bloc to reinforce a division already in combat.

[Legbreaker]

In this case, the Army would have deactivated several of the Training Divisions and assign their cadre to other divisions...

Isn't that essentially what the books are saying? The personnel of the training units were reassigned to new active combat units, but they were all "reassigned" at the same time to the same "new" unit. :confused:

[dragoon500ly]

According to "Armies of NATO's Central Front"

The US Army Reserve maintained the following Training Divisions: 70th; 76th; 78th; 80th; 84th; 85th; 91st; 95th; 98th; 100th; 104th; and the 108th

The "American Vehicle Guide" disposes of these divisions as follows:

70th is converted into a LID 20Jul98 and committed to Austria
76th is converted into a LID 20JUL98 and goes to Yugoslavia
78th gets converted into a LID 20JUL98 and is at Fort Dix
80th is converted into a LID 20JUL98 and goes to Yugoslavia
84th goes LID 29JUL98 and stays in V Military Region(northern US)
85th becmes a LID 20JUL98 and is serving in the SW US
91st goes LID 20JUL98 and is in central California
95th goes the way of the LID 20JUL98 and is in Oklahoma
98th becomes a LID 20JUL98 and is in Louisiana
100th becomes a LID 20JUL98 and is at Fort Carson Colorado
104th goes LID 20JUL98 and is in the Pacific NW
108th becomes a LID 20JUL98 and is in the III Military Region

So at the height of WWIII, when troops are badly needed as replacements, the decision is made to gut the training establishment and convert everything into LIDs and then throw them into combat.

I'm the first to admit that the DOD normally does not allow logic to interfere with its plans, but this would create a deadly sprial; without a training establishment of some kind, then there would be no replacement troops, which means that the combat units will rapidly sprial into total combat in-effectiveness within an very short period of time.

Perhaps GDW intended this to explain how divisions were reduced from 15-16,000 down to 1-2,000. The argument can even be made that with the press of civil unrest, a Soviet invasion of Alaska and a Mexican invasion of the Southwest, that there is a pressing need for organized troops to hold the line. But if the decision was made for that reason, then it is, without a doubt, one of the most short-sighted decisions ever made as it would doom any future combat operations.

[Legbreaker]

It's worth noting the there was a rapid succession of Presidents in the 2-3 months before this occurred. There was nobody in charge at the time the changes were made, and not exactly a lot of organisation above the local level.
Without working infrastructure around them, the training units were extremely unlikely to receive further recruits. Therefore, with events deteriorating rapidly both overseas and at home, the best use for the training units was not to keep them as they were and idle, but to transform them into something useful for civil defence, and reinforcements for the three main theatres (Europe, Middle East, Korea). Note also, the Soviets had just landed in Alaska (which explains the 104th).

[Olefin]

the one training division conversion that makes no sense is the 70th - why send it over as a new division when it would have made a lot more sense to allocate its troops to divisions that were hard hit? The 2nd Armored was basically an empty shell of itself by then - those men would have been able to restore it back to being an effective unit.

Ditto several other units in Germany.

The rest I could see as emergency units that were needed because there wasnt enough left in the US - but the 70th definitely should have gone over as replacements for other units.

[Legbreaker]

...but the 70th definitely should have gone over as replacements for other units.

I disagree. Take a look at the other units in the XV Corps and why they are where they are. There's the 1st Armoured and 43rd Infantry, both of which were withdrawn from Poland and rushed into southern Germany to counter the Czech and Italian forces driving into Bavaria.
Then look at the units in Centag as a whole. Besides the two divisions mentioned above, there's only one other division - the 35th Infantry. The remaining two units both suffered major damage earlier in the war and consist (on paper) as no more than a brigade/regiment.

This area of the front obviously required reinforcement at the time and the 70th ID was likely the logical choice since taking a previously existing unit from another location would have had serious consequences.

Sure, the manpower could have been broken up and used as replacements, but the 70th was already a functioning unit with it's own internal command and logistical structure, with the NCOs and Officers having worked with each other for some time previously. Breaking it up would throw away the working relationships and "shorthand" these people had developed with each other - not something to be done lightly.

[Graebarde]

It's worth noting the there was a rapid succession of Presidents in the 2-3 months before this occurred. There was nobody in charge at the time the changes were made, and not exactly a lot of organisation above the local level.
Without working infrastructure around them, the training units were extremely unlikely to receive further recruits. Therefore, with events deteriorating rapidly both overseas and at home, the best use for the training units was not to keep them as they were and idle, but to transform them into something useful for civil defence, and reinforcements for the three main theatres (Europe, Middle East, Korea). Note also, the Soviets had just landed in Alaska (which explains the 104th).

Heres a list of the Division, HQ location, Probable Mobilization/training center* for the divisions. * Some of these are taken from sites I could find that listed where they actually were destined for training

70th Livonia MI (????) Several choices, but none really in CivGov AO.
76th West Hartford CT (Cp Edwards/Ft Devens MA)
78th Newark NJ (Ft Dix NJ)
80th Richmond VA (Ft AP Hill VA)
84th Milwaukee WI (Ft McCoy WI)
85th Chicago IL (Ft Campbell KY)
91st San Francisco CA (Ft Ord CA)
95th Oklahoma City OK (or Tulsa) (Ft Chaffee AR)
98th Rochester NY (Ft Polk LA)
100th Louisville KY (Ft Knox KY)
104th Vancouver WA (Ft Lewis WA)
108th Charlotte NC (Ft Bragg NC)

Given the 'home' area of the respective divisions many stayed where they were from per se. The ones sent overseas under the CivGov orders of course didn't. Only the 85th from Illinois which was sent to the SW, the 98th from New York which was sent to Louisiana, and the 100th from Louisville found themselves away from home country. Of course the relocations are under MilGov in CONUS and would be to meet the demand of the situation. Only the 98th would be at it's mobilization/training center I think.