Just how much hurt Soviet Artillery will bring to bear....

[dragoon500ly]

Going through a copy of FM 100-2-1 Soviet Army Operations and Tactics and found a table that may be of interest...

Norms governing ammunition expenditure for the destruction or suppression of stationary, unobserved targets at ranges of 10km or less.

Fire coverage is calculated in number of rounds per hectare (a hectare is 10,000 square meters, the equivalent of 2.47 acres).

Target is a battery of SP howitzers, effect is target destruction; rounds fired:
122mm = 450; 130mm = 360; 152mm = 270; 203mm = 120; 120mm mortar = 450; 160mm mortar = 220; 240mm mortar = 120; 122mm MRL = 560

Target is battery of towed artillery in dug-in positions, effect is target suppression; rounds fired: 122mm = 240; 130mm = 220; 152mm = 180; 203mm = 100; 120mm mortar = 240; 160mm mortar = 160; 240mm mortar = 100l 122mm MRL = 400

Target is dug-in troops & weapons, tanks, IFVs & APCs in hasty prepared positions, effect is target suppression; rounds fired: 122mm = 150; 130mm = 150; 152mm = 110; 203mm = 45; 120mm mortar = 140; 160mm mortar = 85; 240mm mortar = 45; 122mm MRL = 240

target suppression has a high probability (90%+) that 25-30% of the elements in the target group or no longer combat effective and/or that 25-30% of the elements in the target area.

target destruction has a high probability (90%+) that at least 50% of the target area has been destroyed or rendered combat ineffective.

The above examples are based on number of rounds fired by a battalion and should be read as a battalion of 122mm OR a battalion of 130mm....any target that would require eight battalions worth of artillery, mortar and MRL would also be a likely target for a tacnuke.

[dragoon500ly]

There are a couple of terms floating around in describing the Soviet organization of artillery for wartime missions. Source is FM 100-2-1 Soviet Operations and Tactics.

Army Artillery Group (AAG): Front artillery assets are normally allocated among committed armies, proportionate to the importance of the assigned tasks. When an army commander receives front artillery assets, he decides, based on his concept of the operation, what artillery will be allocated to his first echelon divisions. Any remaining artillery formations would then be formed into the AAG and charged with the counterbattery role for the army.

Division Artillery Group (DAG): The division commander also allocates artillery, resulting in the formation of the DAG and several RAGs. The division may also organize more than one DAG if necessary, due to span of control, number of battalions and assigned missions. The DAG varies in size from two to four battalions and is employed in general support of the division. The DAG also assists the AAG with the counterbattery mission.

Regimental Artillery Group (RAG): RAGs are formed from organic and attached artillery and reinforcing nondivisional artillery battalions assigned to provide support to the first echelon regiments. RAGS are normally made up from two to four battalions. RAGs are responsible for the engagement of targets that hinder the advance of the attacking force. In addition, a battalion or battery from the RAG may be assigned to direct support of a specific battalion.

[dragoon500ly]

Source is FM 100-2-3 Soviet Troops, Organization and Equipment

A Soviet Front consists of a headquarters, several subordinate armies and supporting elements. A typical front will have 3-4 combined arms armies and 1-2 tank armies assigned.

Artillery support assigned to the front comes in the form of an artillery division and an attached heavy artillery brigade (from RVGK-Reserve of Supreme High Command).

The artillery division consists of 2 gun regts/bdes, 2 how regts/bdes, 1-2 antitank regts/bdes and a MRL brigade, in addition, these units may be made up of either 18-gun bns or 24-gun battalions, resulting in the following equipment totals:

130mm Field Guns M-46 or 152mm Field Guns M-1976 or 152mm SP Guns 2S5:
Regiment: 108-144
Brigade: 144-192
152mm Howitzer D-20 or 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3:
Regiment: 108-144
Brigade: 144-192
100mm Antitank Gun T-12/MT-12 or 125mm Antitank Gun:
Regiment: 36
Brigade: 48
ATGM Launcher Vehicle, BRDM-2/AT-3 or BRDM-2/AT-5
Regiment: 27
Brigade: 36
122mm MRL, BM-21 or 220 MRL, BM-27:
Brigade: 72

The Heavy Artillery Brigade consists of 2 battalions of heavy artillery and 2 battalions of heavy mortars, resulting in the following equipment totals:

203mm Howitzer B-4M or 203mm SP Gun M-1975: 24
240mm Mortar M-204 or 240mm SP Mortar M-1975: 24

The Combined Arms Army artillery assets consists of a Artillery Regiment/Brigade and a MRL Regiment. The Tank Army normally has no additional artillery attached, although (depending on its mission) it may have a artillery regiment and a MRL regiment attached.

The Artillery Regiment consists of 2 gun and 1 howitzer battalions, the Artillery brigade consists of 2 gun and 2 howitzer battalions. Like the artillery divisions, 18 and 24-tube battalions are available, resulting in the following equipment:
130mm Field Gun M-46 or 152mm Field Gun M-1976 or 152mm SP Gun 2S5:
Regiment: 36-48
Brigade: 36-48
152mm Howitzer D-20 or 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3: 18-24 or 36-48

The MRL Regiment consists of 3 MRL battalions, equipped as follows:
122mm MRL BM-21 or 220mm MRL BM-27: 54

The combined arms army consists of 2-4 Motor Rifle Divisions and 1-2 Tank Divisions. A Tank Army consists of 2-4 Tank Divisions and 1-2 Motor Rifle Divisions.

The Motor Rifle/Tank Division has an Artillery Regiment, consisting of 2 towed and 1 SP howitzer battalions and a MRL battalion.

The towed howitzer battalions each consist of 18 122mm Howitzer D-30.

The SP howitzer battalion consists of 18 152mm SP Howitzer 2S3.

The MRL battalion consists of 18 122mm MRL BM-21

The Motor Rifle Division also has 1 BMP and 2 BTR-equipped Motor Rifle and 1 Tank Regiments, each has a organic howitzer battalion. The BMP/Tank battalions have each 18 122mm SP Howitzers 2S1, the BTR battalions each have 18 122mm Howitzer D-30.

The Tank Division has 3 Tank and 1 BMP regiments, each with an organiz battalion of 18 122mm SP Howitzer 2S1.

There is a saying in the Red Army, that the only God it worships is Artillery and as you can see from the above, it posses a lot of Artillery!

[schnickelfritz]

The questions that come to my mind are:
1) This seems like a huge requirement for ammunition; could ammunition useage of this scale be sustained for more than a few weeks?
2) What would the effect of US/Allied/NATO counterbattery fire and aerial interdiction on firing positions and fire control?
3) What would the effect of said interdiction on supply lines be?
4) Wear and tear on gun tubes, especially on lower-echelon formations?
5) The effect of the needs of the China campaign on pact artillery and ammunition supplies?

My guess is that for the above reasons, artillery fire on this scale would only occur for the first few weeks of the war with any regularity, and then be restricted to important engagements therafter until ammo and replacement parts dwindle after TDM.

Most of the fiction that I've ever seen (Harold Coyle, Clancy, etc) seems to paint a picture that despite heavy losses, NATO is able to make a significant impact interdicting Pact artillery and supplies from the air. What I get is that for the first year or so, towed artillery in Europe is generally useless...things are so fluid and counterbattery/interdiction so effective that losses amongst towed pact artillery will eventually render them ineffective. Then, as the war enters 1998, towed artillery makes a significant comeback on both sides.

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

With all that said, I'd sure not like to be on the receiving end of any of this!

Thanks-
Dave

[DCausey]

Dave brought up the questions I had pretty much. I was especially going to ask about the possible effects of the war in China and about NATO air interdiction.

I'm looking forwards to seeing more people weigh in on this subject.

- DaveC

[Adm.Lee]

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.


IMO, the Soviets are fiendish enough to have their own counter-counterbattery held ready to see if any NATO guns shoot back. Also, artillery batteries are the primary target of "forward detachments" and a tertiary target of Spetsnaz teams.

There is a saying in the Red Army, that the only God it worships is Artillery and as you can see from the above, it posses a lot of Artillery!

Suvorov brought that home to me by pointing out that a motor rifle regiment has 9 companies of mechanized infantry, but 10 batteries of artillery (including mortars and rockets).

I've just been looking at two of my old WW3 games (GDW's Third World War and VG's NATO), and noting again, that neither side's corps or army level artillery assets are represented. I think they do Not cancel each other out.

[dragoon500ly]

The questions that come to my mind are:
1) This seems like a huge requirement for ammunition; could ammunition useage of this scale be sustained for more than a few weeks?
2) What would the effect of US/Allied/NATO counterbattery fire and aerial interdiction on firing positions and fire control?
3) What would the effect of said interdiction on supply lines be?
4) Wear and tear on gun tubes, especially on lower-echelon formations?
5) The effect of the needs of the China campaign on pact artillery and ammunition supplies?

My guess is that for the above reasons, artillery fire on this scale would only occur for the first few weeks of the war with any regularity, and then be restricted to important engagements therafter until ammo and replacement parts dwindle after TDM.

Most of the fiction that I've ever seen (Harold Coyle, Clancy, etc) seems to paint a picture that despite heavy losses, NATO is able to make a significant impact interdicting Pact artillery and supplies from the air. What I get is that for the first year or so, towed artillery in Europe is generally useless...things are so fluid and counterbattery/interdiction so effective that losses amongst towed pact artillery will eventually render them ineffective. Then, as the war enters 1998, towed artillery makes a significant comeback on both sides.

Firing 20+ rounds per gun tube in a battalion seems like an open invitation for MLRS units to "rain your grid square." That seems like a very bad day to me, although I'd really be interested to see what the post-strike images would look like...my guess is like a charred junkyard.

I'd think that strikes like these would take several minutes to complete, making it likely that counterbattery of a variety of forms would occur.

With all that said, I'd sure not like to be on the receiving end of any of this!

Thanks-
Dave

To be sure, the ammo counts are very heavy, but the first example represents an all out attempt to destroy an battery of SPs dispersed in their firing position, its unobserved, and is targeting a hectare of ground, this would be the sort of mission called on a battery that is in a position to interdict an attacking regiment. According to their doctrine, this target would require the maximum effort from at least 1 RAG, and more likely to be hit with a RAG/DAG.

The target suppression examples are not much different from US Army Artillery doctrine, at least when firing HE. Switching to ICM/DPICM should drop the ammo requirements by roughly a third.

As to just how much ammo is stockpiled, I've never seen any firm lists on any sort of count beyond 120 days stockpile....as has been mentioned by a variety of authors, modern ammo usage is much, much higher than pre-war planning takes into account.

NATO doesn't field as many artillery tubes as the WP does, and every battery committed to counterbattery, is that much less support for the troops. This is the real reason beyond the development of "shoot-n-scoot" as well as the increasing computerization of the FDCs, all of it designed to enable NATO to put as many rounds as possible, on target, in the shortest possible time.

[dragoon500ly]

A unit of fire is (ROFLMAO!) the planned expenditure of rounds for one tube for one day of combat. Here are the units of fire for the Soviet artillery.

122mm Howitzer D-30 = 80rds
122mm SP Howitzer 2S1 = 80rds
130mm Field Gun M-46 = 80rds
152mm Howitzer D-20 = 60rds
152mm SP Howitzer 2S3 = 60rds
152mm Field Gun M-1976 = 60rds
152mm SP Gun 2S5 = 60rds
203mm Howitzer B-4M = 40rds
203mm SP Gun M-1975 = 40rds
82mm Mortar M-1937 = 120rds
120mm Mortar M-1943 = 80rds
160mm Mortar M-160 = 60rds
240mm Mortar M-240 = 40rds
240mm SP Mortar M-1975 = 40rds
122mm MRL BM-21 = 120rds
140mm MRL BM-14-16 = 48rds
140mm MRL BM-14-17 = 51rds
140mm MRL RPU-14 = 48rds
220mm MRL BM-27 = 32rds

[95th Rifleman]

Allot has been made of NATO avation and it being used to interdict soviet artillery.

I think this is being overestimated. NATO had a qualitive advantage over the WP in almost all areas but one of the few things the Soviets had the edge in was ADA.

I think NATO aircraft would soon find artillery interdiction missions to be near-suicidal when they walk into the superior ADA systems defending them.

[dragoon500ly]

122mm Howitzer D-30: max range 15,300m, max ROF: 8rpm, sustained ROF: 75 rph (rounds per hour)

122mm SP Howitzer 2S1: max range15,300m, max ROF: 8rpm; sustained ROF: 70rph

130mm Field Gun M-46: max range: 27,490m, max ROF: 8rpm; sustained ROF; 70 rph

152mm Howitzer D-20: max range; 27,490m, max ROF: 6rpm; sustained ROF: 70rph

152mm SP Howitzer 2S3: max range: 17,230m (30,000m with RAP); max ROF: 4; sustained ROF: 60rph

152mm Field Gun M-1976: max range: 27,000m; max ROF: 4rpm; sustained ROF: 40rph

152mm SP Gun 2S5: max range: 27,000m+; max ROF: 4rpm; sustained ROF: 50rph

203mm Howitzer B-4M: max range: 18,025m; max ROF: 0.5rpm; sustained ROF: 20rph

203mm SP Gun M-1975: max range: 30,000m, max ROF: 0.5rpm; sustained ROF: 20rph

82mm Mortar M-1937: max range: 3,040m; max ROF: 25rpm; sustained ROF: 140rph

120mm Mortar M-1943: max range: 5,700m; max ROF: 9rpm; sustained ROF: 70rph

160mm Mortar, M-160: max range: 8,040m; max ROF: 3rpm, sustained ROF: 38rph

240mm Mortar M-240: max range: 9,700m; max ROF: 1rpm; sustained ROF: 38rph

240mm SP Mortar, M-1975: max range: 12,000m; max ROF: 1rpm; sustained ROF: 25rph

122mm MRL BM-21: max range: 20,380m

140mm MRL BM-14-16: max range: 9,810m

140mm MRL BM-14-17: max range: 9,810m

140mm MRL RPU-14: max range: 9,810m

220mm MRL, BM-27: max range: 40,000m

[HorseSoldier]

Seen another way, the estimated rounds required to accomplish a given mission suggests Soviet artillery theorists did not see their weapons systems as highly efficient -- i.e. estimated rounds are what was required, not some happy intent to overkill a target.

There was a great deal of speculation back during the Cold War that the Warsaw Pact could only sustain combat operations for a couple months at the intensity level their doctrine called for. With what the Chinese front was drawing off in terms of units and resources, I'd suspect that the Soviet forces on the Western Front (before the nukes freed up troops in the east) weren't able to expend ammo or anything else at the level specified in doctrine.

[Legbreaker]

As others have indicated, my thoughts are there just won't be enough Nato tubes dedicated to counterbattery missions to make a significant long term difference, while the Pact seem to have tubes to spare. All in all, when you take into account the number of tubes, mobility, and all the other factors, my guess is that it would be roughly equal.

[ArmySGT.]

The Smallest Soviet target is a 1000 x 1000 meter grid square.

Soviets will to "Artillery Grid Search" a sort of "Recon by Fire". If they hit something and it explodes they bring the other tubes to bear.

What your missing is the Soviets have on Echelon of Command and Control Greater than NATO. The Front. NATO stops at Army to which several Divisions are attached. The Soviets go one higher with Front to which several Armies are attached.

The Doctrinal difference lies in how much East there is when looking from the West.

[dragoon500ly]

Once again FM 100-2-1 Soviet Operations and Tactics is the source...

At regiment and above, an artillery officer who plans and coordinates artillery fires serves on the staff of maneuver un it commanders. He is called the Chief of Arty (COA) at regiment and the Chief Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA) at division or above. While he does not command the artillery units organic or attached to his maneuver unit, he is responsible for their control. The commander of the organic artillery unit attached to the maneuver unit is directly responsible for the performance of his artillery unit.

The division CRTA controls the divisional artillery regiment, the MRL battalion, the SSM battalion, the AT battalion and the ATGM batteries, mortar batteries and howitzer battalions of the subordinate maneuver regiments, though he does not command any of these units. The CRTA also has the authority to inspect the artillery units of the division and to hold them accountable for their technical proficiency.

In combat, the artillery groups form the basic framework for the control of artillery fires in the division. Decisions about the employment of artillery are made on a centralized basis. The division commander, with recommendations from the CRTA, exercises control over all organic and allocated artillery within the division. The following procedures are observed:
1) The division commander specifies the artiller organization for combat and the tasks to be carried out by the artillery.
2) The CRTA conducts and coordinates fire planning.
3) Artillery commanders normally are collocated with the commanders of the supported maneuver force.
4) The DAG commanders report directly to the CRTA.
5) RAG commanders report directly to the supported maneuver regimental commander while retaining contact with the CRTA.
6) Artillery battery and battalion commanders keep their supported maneuver commanders informed and report to their controlling artillery headquarters.


The artillery commander normally is collocated with the commander of the maneuver unit he is supporting and therefore effects coordination face-to-face. Provisions is also made for the artillery commander to enter the VHF(FM) command net of the supported unit. Except when subunits have been detached for special missions, artillery commanders retain rigid control of the deployment of weapons and observation posts to provide continuous artillery support in all phases of combat.

Radio and wire are the primary means of communications with visual and sound devices being used as a secondary means of communications. By regulation, communications are established from senior to subordinate and from supporting units to supporting unit.

Soviet artillery units may send radio traffic over support unit command nets, artillery command nets and fire direction nets. Artillery group command nets (RAG/DAG) have battalion commanders as substations. Battalion nets have battery commanders and the battalion observation nets if required.

Towed artillery units rely on the R-107 (VHF) portable radio for internal radio communications. Self-propelled units use the R-123 (VHF) vehicular radio, which is installed in every howitzer. At higher levels of command, long-range HF (AM) radios, such as the R-130 are used.

Wire communications are used whenever subunits remain in one location for any length of time, such as when in defensive positions. To provide redundancy, artillery wire nets normally parallel the wire nets of the supported units.

The Soviets also use pyrotechnics, especially in coordinating prearranged fires with the advance of maneuver units. Signal flags are used to acknowledge fire commands at the gun positions, for convoy control and for signaling between the firing point and the truck park (prime movers and ammunition carriers) in a battery firing position.

[dragoon500ly]

Soviet field artillery is subdivided into field guns, howitzers, mortars and multiple rocket launchers. Most Soviet field artillery is towed (with the exception of the MRLs). Towed guns are lightweight, low cost and simple. Their disadvantages are their lack of cross-country mobility and the absence of crew protection from NBC and counterbattery.

Field Guns are used for killing troops in the open; destroying buildings above ground level; engaging of rapidly moving targets; bombardment of distant targets such as artillery batteries, headquarters and columns moving in the rear areas; destroying tactical nuclear delivery means.

Howitzers are used for hitting indirect targets and for destroying or neutralizing enemy defensive positions.

SP Howitzers have been introduced in recent years, enhancing the Soviet artillery's ability to give continuous support in a conventional or NBC environment. While SP howitzers are protected by light armor and NBC filtration systems, their ability to resupply ammunition is limited as they depend on wheeled vehicles for logistic support.

Multiple Rocket Launchers are used to deliver massive strikes at decisive moments in a battle. They are an excellent area coverage weapon. Their ability to coverage a large area and their rapid ripple fire make MRLs an excellent delivery system for chemical agents.

Mortars are used to provide immediate support to motor rifle regiments.

[dragoon500ly]

Conventional artillery ammunition in the Red Army consists of HE, Fragmentation and HE-Fragmentation types. HE shells are used for destroying fortifications. Fragmentation shells are used for attacking personnel and equipment in the open. HE-Fragmentation shells are fitted with fuses for either instantaneous or delayed detonation and are the standard projectiles for all guns and howitzers. A time-delay fuse is also available for airburst effects.

The impact area of fragments from one HE-Fragmentation shell are:
122mm: 800 square meters
152mm: 950 square meters

The sizes of craters caused by one HE shell varies according to the surface struck, its condition and the type of fuse used. These are average dimensions for point detonation fuzes striking flat ground:
122mm: 1.5 meters at its widest point and 0.5 meters maximum depth.
152mm 1.5 meters at its widest point and 1.5 meters maximum depth.

Field artillery pieces (152mm and smaller) have an antitank capability and 10% of their basic load is armor-piercing ammunition.

Smoke is used to obscure the view from OPs and fire positions. Smoke shells are used when the wind is blowing towards or across the enemy positions. Smoke is also used for marking enemy positions and deceiving the enemy by concealing the size and direction of an attack.

Illumination rounds are used in night combat to observe enemy movements, to acquire targets for all arms and to provide reference points. The standard illumination shell lights up an area of up to 1.5 kilometers radius for 30 seconds. One gun firing 2-3 rounds per minute is required to provide continuous illumination for every 750-1,000 meters. Other types of ammunition include: Nuclear, HE rocket assisted projectiles, chemical, incendiary, canister and propaganda.

[Adm.Lee]

What your missing is the Soviets have on Echelon of Command and Control Greater than NATO. The Front. NATO stops at Army to which several Divisions are attached. The Soviets go one higher with Front to which several Armies are attached.


Not so much-- the Soviets didn't use corps HQs as a rule. Armies were 4 or 5 divisions, plus supporting arms, with no intervening corps. A front was usually 3 armies, reinforceable to 5, plus an air army. NATO used corps of 2-4 divisions, with an army HQ controlling 3-5 corps.

[ArmySGT.]

Not so much-- the Soviets didn't use corps HQs as a rule. Armies were 4 or 5 divisions, plus supporting arms, with no intervening corps. A front was usually 3 armies, reinforceable to 5, plus an air army. NATO used corps of 2-4 divisions, with an army HQ controlling 3-5 corps.

Still a Corps is smaller than a Army, In addition it is coordination of Asset between Armies, with yet another level of assigned logistic and support assets. In addition to another layer of Artillery and Rocket forces that can be moved from Army to Army.

A level of coordination that would be like a having a five star general on each Front with Staff and more.

[HorseSoldier]

Soviet Armies tended to have four divisions, NATO Corps probably average three when looked at from the big picture level -- but this is somewhat misleading, since NATO divisions and corps tend to be bigger than Soviet/WP divisions and armies. The two are essentially identical echelons -- in Soviet usage a Corps was an oversized division, and so isn't a one for one counterpart to a NATO Corps.

[Grimace]

I've heard various stories (don't know how many are true), from either people IN World War 2 or people who had fathers who served in WW2. I even heard from people who knew Germans in WW2. Pretty much everything I've heard supports one common thought between U.S. and Soviet artillery.

U.S. artillery was very effective at what it did. It "seemed" like a lot because it was accurate and therefore effective. The Soviets, on the other hand, had a MASSIVE amount of artillery. It wasn't as effective as U.S. artillery, but it didn't have to be. Where the Americans used 4-5 guns to do something and do it with less shots, the Soviets used 20-30 guns to do it. The Soviets used more rounds, but eventually they accomplished the same thing.

I have a feeling that, based on the Soviets WW2 experience, they kept that same principle of thought for their artillery. I'm friends with a Marine that was in Artillery while in the USMC. While he was in, he was all gung-ho and "we'll kick their ass" and the U.S. was the biggest, baddest mamma-jamma out there. Now that he's been out a while, he admits that the biggest threat to them was the sheer quantity of the Soviet equipment. Sure, they could counter-battery two, or even three Soviet batteries pretty quickly (in practice), but there was so much Soviet artillery they were pretty sure they'd have to vacate their position pretty quickly or the numerical superiority would eventually zero in on them.

That's all it takes. Sure the U.S. can do a lot with their pieces, but the Soviets could do a lot with all their pieces as well. NATO would take out their fair share and then some, but the sheer size of the Soviet artillery branch would eventually leave them with artillery cover.

I, personally, don't view arial counter-battery to be all that effective against something like the Soviet army. Oh, it'll work some, but the Soviet ADA as well as the rather massive Soviet Air Force would make most arial counter-battery would likely turn into a pretty big blood bath for BOTH sides.

The biggest question mark for the whole thing is how much of a drain the Chinese front would be. Would it be enough to reduce the artillery forces in the West? Somehow I doubt that the Soviets woud weaken themselves against a more modern, possibly even more aggresive enemy in the West to fight a mostly foot army in the East. If China ever made a strong push into the USSR proper, then I could see a much greater amount of power being drawn the from West and pushed into the East.

[dragoon500ly]

The artillery organization of the Soviets has developed to meet two conflicting requirements, responsiveness and centralization. In order to meet the needs for the breakthrough attack, centralization of all artillery assets is required. At the same time, the mobile battle and the meeting engagements requires a rapid response. At every level from battalion up, the Soviets provide the support needed by the commander to accomplish these two goals.

The NATO response to these two requirements is to adopt a flexible system, in which a single forward observer can direct all artillery within range onto a single target. Furthermore, this system does not require the FO to relay his request through ever higher levels of command, but can instead, speak directly to the artillery.

First introduced in World War II, and refined in Korea and Vietnam, this type of organization allows for an incredibly short response time, a US forward observer can expect the first rounds to be falling on target within 100 seconds. With a battery dedicated to a specific unit, this response time can be shortened even further to as little as 38 seconds.

The Soviets are well aware of this system, but they have made the decision not to use it. Their belief that the NATO system's almost total reliance on radio communications will fail under the power of Soviet electronic warfare. NATO's fire control system will also be vulnerable to the EMP effects of nuclear weapons and finally they realize the difficultly of using a microphone while wearing a NBC suit or a protective mask.

The Soviet emphasis on centralization of artillery planning at regimental and divisional level does not allow for the NATO system. Its use by the Soviets would impose an incredible strain in terms of the numbers of forward observers, radios and technicians to support it.

The above is based on FM 100-2-1 and "Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army".

[dragoon500ly]

based on the FM 100-series and Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army.

The artillery offensive is intended to suppress enemy defenses before and during an attack and precedes the assault units as they advance from one objective to another. It may be combined with air strikes and NBC weapons (if needed). It strength and duration depend on the time available to prepare the offensive; the type of attack being launched as well as other factors.

In the attack from march, artillery support is limited and will often be provided by the battalion's mortars or by the regiment's howitzer battalion in the direct-fire role. The artillery offensive becomes more refined in support of the hasty attack, and increases in its sophistication, duration and size up to the breakthrough attack when the Soviets will mass the fire of 80-100 guns and expend 10,000-20,000 shells per kilometer of frontage.

Reconnaissance and target acquisition will precede the artillery offensive. For a hasty attack, the artillery will rely on the reports of reconnaissance patrols or troops in contact to identify targets. A breakthrough attack will be preceded by lengthy and through reconnaissance and systematic target acquisition. A detailed list of targets will be drawn up: the destruction of nuclear capable delivery systems having first priority, followed by command posts, observation posts, communications and radar centers, field and air defense artillery units, combat units in reserve positions, combat support positions and defensive strongpoints.

In the hasty attack, target identification and the allocation of guns to each target are carried out orally and on the spot, usually by the artillery regiment/battalion commander.

In the breakthrough attack, the artillery offensive will be set out in detail, with barrage plans prepared with the aid of extensive charts and formulas to calculate the number and type of shells each target will require. Typically, these plans are drawn up by the Army's Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery (ACRTA). If time does not permit, then the planning will take place at divisional or even regimental level.

Once reconnaissance and target acquisition has been completed, the artillery offensive takes place over three phases: The Preparation Phase; The Fires in Support of the Attack Phase and the Fires Through the Depths of the Defense Phase.

In a hasty attack, the preparation phase depends on the tactical situation and how quickly the artillery can deploy into its firing positions. Preparation for a hasty attack averages between 10-20 minutes while the troops form up for the attack and includes direct-fire.

In a breakthrough attack, the preparatory fires can list 40-60 minutes. All preparatory fires are halved if a nuclear strike is planned. The purpose of preparatory fires is to suppress enemy defenses; disorganize command and control; neutralize defending artillery and fire control; and create passages through obstacles. False preparatory fires can be used to disguise the location of an attack.

Preparatory fires start with several minutes of firing at the maximum rate, then reverts to a slower sustained rate for most of the preparation and then ends with several minutes of firing at the maximum rate. Only enemy batteries that have actually opened fire will be engaged so that front-line targets will receive the full weight of the preparation.

As the assault units advance from the line of departure, the fires supporting the attack phase commences. These fires are both pre-planned and available on call (usually through direct-fire). The centralization mode will end as attacking units (only!) assume control of their artillery assets.

The fires supporting the attack will continue to hit enemy front-line positions until the lead attacking tanks are 250 meters from them; a shorter distance would make the tanks vulnerable to their own shells and a longer distance would give the enemy time to engage the tanks.

As the tanks reach the enemy positions, the fires supporting the attack phase ends and the fires through the depth of the defenses phase begins, this proceeds the advance as the assault unit breaks through the forward positions and into the depths of the defense. This is not a rolling barrage, but rather is a pre-planned shift of fires to targets in the enemy's rear designed to suppress and defenses. By this point, army control of the artillery ceases and
control of any remaining artillery is released to regimental/divisional control. In addition, a reserve of artillery will be maintained on call to defeat enemy counterattacks.

During this latter phase, Soviet artillery will start moving forward (no more than one third of the batteries moving at any one time). The Soviets believe that effective suppression requires continuous, uninterrupted fire. SP batteries will displace more frequently than towed batteries (who will typically remain in place to provide on call fire).

The Soviet artillery offensive is a vital part of the Soviet combined-arms approach to warfare.

[Webstral]

The Soviets are well aware of this system, but they have made the decision not to use it. Their belief that the NATO system's almost total reliance on radio communications will fail under the power of Soviet electronic warfare. NATO's fire control system will also be vulnerable to the EMP effects of nuclear weapons and finally they realize the difficultly of using a microphone while wearing a NBC suit or a protective mask.

The Soviets also don’t trust their junior officers to exercise initiative on their own. Predictable tactical performance is a predicate of flexible operational performance. Lieutenants, captains, and light colonels can’t go screwing with the fire plan just because they have a local problem. Junior officers who are accustomed to exercising their own initiative are dangerous—dangerous to the operational plan and dangerous to the State. Soldiers of almost any rank can be replaced, according to the Soviet way of thinking. The security of the State cannot be compromised; and if that means a clunky performance on the battlefield, then so be it.

I’m reading The Soviet-Afghan War by the Russian General Staff (translated into English and edited by American officers). I read this book several years ago, but I find this time around I’m paying closer attention to some of the details that eluded me the first time. The Russians note the inability of detailed fire plans to respond to fluid situations. The Muj fought in place or maneuvered as circumstances dictated—often in total disregard of the Soviet plan of action. Combat aviation responded well, but the artillery did not for some time. Once the artillery acquired a degree of flexibility, the rest of the Soviet Army struggled to keep the newly acquired flexibility of the afghansty contained in Afghanistan. I’ve read this sort of thing before, but it’s useful to review periodically.

I’ve often assumed that the hard-learned lessons of the Far East would make their way to Europe quickly. Now I’m questioning that assumption. If the Soviet troops in the Far East learned a degree of tactical flexibility in response to Operation Red Willow (the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995) and the failed Pact offensive of Spring 1996 (is there a name for this anywhere?), then the Soviets might try to keep said flexibility in its Far Eastern bottle. The same might apply to air operations as well. If so, then the entrance of the USAF, RAF, and CFAC (Canadian Forces Air Command) would have creamed Soviet air power in Central Europe. On the ground, the Soviets would have found the GSFG fighting in a fashion for which neither training nor doctrine was well-suited at all. Just how the Soviet experience in the Far East affected the Soviet (and Pact) forces in Eastern Europe is a question worth reexamining.

[dragoon500ly]

Haven't seen that book in several years, got to get my hands on another copy!

One of the things that is interesting about Soviet Artillery is the high degree of control. For example, they require that the battery commander be present in the forward observation post, so you have the OP, the battery headquarters and the FDC all in one nice little target! This practice puts the commander on the spot to make the decisions about target acquisition, identification and engagement, thus centralizing command, avoiding communications problems and also making the battery more responsive to the tactical situation.

[Legbreaker]

...Operation Red Willow (the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995)...

Where'd you find that name?

[Webstral]

Where'd you find that name?

I made it up.

[Webstral]

One of the things that is interesting about Soviet Artillery is the high degree of control. For example, they require that the battery commander be present in the forward observation post, so you have the OP, the battery headquarters and the FDC all in one nice little target! This practice puts the commander on the spot to make the decisions about target acquisition, identification and engagement, thus centralizing command, avoiding communications problems and also making the battery more responsive to the tactical situation.

Of course, the battery isn’t very responsive to the tactical situation if the commander can’t see the target or has been put out of action. In the kind of fast-moving action embraced by Soviet offensive doctrine, getting the battery commanders forward to observe potential targets would be a genuine challenge. I question how realistic the idea of sending masses of battery commanders forward is. I suspect the Soviets had as much interest in pinning the tail of responsibility on the donkey as they did in responsiveness to the tactical situation.

[bobcat]

Haven't seen that book in several years, got to get my hands on another copy!

One of the things that is interesting about Soviet Artillery is the high degree of control. For example, they require that the battery commander be present in the forward observation post, so you have the OP, the battery headquarters and the FDC all in one nice little target! This practice puts the commander on the spot to make the decisions about target acquisition, identification and engagement, thus centralizing command, avoiding communications problems and also making the battery more responsive to the tactical situation.

where as here in the US we put target acquisition in the hands of privates. i still enjoy the fact that as i private in the US army i had more control over more firepower than most officers in foreign armies.:D

[Schone23666]

This might be a bit of a general question, and if so, then forgive me. But how MOBILE is Soviet Artillery overall? I know that will depend on what size/caliber and weight of what artillery pieces we're referring to, but how decent overall is Soviet Artillery at executing "shoot and scoot"? Granted their mortars and SPG's would have mobility, but I would think their towed guns are going to be a bit more vulnerable. Did they practice emergency move orders, or did they have a tendency to just stick in place?

I would think that due to their rather rigid doctrine, their artillery wouldn't have a lot of flexibility. I wouldn't doubt the amount of punishment they could bring to bear, which would be hellish, but I'm not sure I'd want to be them if I came under counterbattery fire from other NATO units or airstrikes...

[dragoon500ly]

According to the FM-100 series, Soviet SP guns can be moving within 2-3 minutes. Towed guns are moving within 10-15 minutes.

But what everyone forgets is that the Soviets possessed so much artillery that they outgunned NATO somewhere around 4-1 (overall, at the point of a breakthrough, 10-1 would be more likely), so they had the ability to engage frontline targets AND counterbattery; where as NATO has to make the choice to engage attacking targets OR counterbattery. Not only did the army artillery groups (AAGs) have counterbattery missions, but the divisional MRL battalion was considered to be the best counterbattery tool, not only by dumping 1,600 rounds of 122mm HE onto a grid square, but by being able to dump chemical weapons onto that same target.

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=dgB0XGV_xZc

[Webstral]

The above link goes to 57mm ADA guns firing. Still, it's easy enough to find BM-21 footage.

I’ve always felt that the US pays too little attention to MRL. The MLRS is a fine system, but there aren’t enough launchers. A division commander should have a full battalion of these bad boys at his beck and call. I can’t remember where I when I read that on average it takes an infantryman 30 seconds to find adequate cover. Once he’s under cover, the radius at which a given round causes casualties decreases dramatically, since concussion becomes the problem for the rifleman. Sustained fire is a thing of the past. Therefore, if one wishes to take out targets of opportunity, a large number of rounds need to arrive in a short period of time. Light mortars and MRL are the weapons of choice for this.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

The above link goes to 57mm ADA guns firing. Still, it's easy enough to find BM-21 footage.

I’ve always felt that the US pays too little attention to MRL. The MLRS is a fine system, but there aren’t enough launchers. A division commander should have a full battalion of these bad boys at his beck and call. I can’t remember where I when I read that on average it takes an infantryman 30 seconds to find adequate cover. Once he’s under cover, the radius at which a given round causes casualties decreases dramatically, since concussion becomes the problem for the rifleman. Sustained fire is a thing of the past. Therefore, if one wishes to take out targets of opportunity, a large number of rounds need to arrive in a short period of time. Light mortars and MRL are the weapons of choice for this.

Well, there's the truck-mounted one they have now. The HiMARS I believe it is?

EDIT :Yeah, HIMARS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HIMARS)

[Adm.Lee]

This might be a bit of a general question, and if so, then forgive me. But how MOBILE is Soviet Artillery overall? I know that will depend on what size/caliber and weight of what artillery pieces we're referring to, but how decent overall is Soviet Artillery at executing "shoot and scoot"?

ISTR the divisional guns (152mm and 122mm) were SP, and thus could move more quickly. The stuff at Army and Front level would be towed, and less mobile. But, those would have more nearby guns/rockets assigned to counter-counterbattery and more ADA assets around them.

[Legbreaker]

It would appear that the Soviets didn't need to worry too much about being able to shoot and scoot given the overwhelming superiority in available barrels. So what if they lost a few from counterbattery fire. Those NATO weapons would quickly be neutralised either by counter counterbatteries, or the overall ground offensive overrunning them.
And of course we already know the low value the individual soldier held in the Soviet scheme. So what if they lost a few if the overall objective was achieved.

The big issue I see to my untrained eyes is logistics. Could they keep their artillery and everyone else supplied with the required ammunition?

[ArmySGT.]

Russian 152mm Towed in action (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRR-D3gu4XQ&feature=related)

Things to be seen.

Long caliber rifled guns.
No electronics
Semi automatic breech (watch those fingers comrade)
Re-used brass powder charge holder. (brass case seems to get a powder charge, primer, and some kind of cap or plug.

Unskilled crew. I don't speak russian so these could be students. Otherwise these are some poorly led, unmotivated, poorly trained crews.

Exactly as you expect conscripts to be.

[ArmySGT.]

Russian 240mm Mortar in action (http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=ACMcOE_LjMw)

Things to be seen.

battery appears to be 4 tubes.

Crew appears to be 4-6.

Rotary ammunition carousel. 10-12 rounds.

Auto loader.

No electronics.

No defensive weaponry. Crew small arms.

A laser guided Rocket round? Much larger round that appear to have a seeker in the nose. Rocket venturis in the base and needs a booster from a mortar fin base projectile to clear the tube before ignition.

Apparently a seige mortar.

[Webstral]

It would appear that the Soviets didn't need to worry too much about being able to shoot and scoot given the overwhelming superiority in available barrels. So what if they lost a few from counterbattery fire. Those NATO weapons would quickly be neutralised either by counter counterbatteries, or the overall ground offensive overrunning them.
And of course we already know the low value the individual soldier held in the Soviet scheme. So what if they lost a few if the overall objective was achieved.

The big issue I see to my untrained eyes is logistics. Could they keep their artillery and everyone else supplied with the required ammunition?

Again at the risk of bringing about the end of the world, I’m entirely in agreement with Leg on this one—from the Soviet point of view. Years ago, a senior MI officer suggested that the Soviets would have used their towed pieces to attract counterbattery fire. MRL would have been waiting.

The two big ticket items in terms of tonnage of supply in modern warfare are fuel and large caliber ammunition. The Soviets would have needed plenty of both, since their offensive scheme included lots of tanks and lots of artillery. Trucks move this stuff. Roads have limited capacity. Traffic jams occur. Operation Desert Storm showed that keeping the supplies moving forward is a challenge. The Syrians, who had done this kind of thing recently enough, kept things moving. The Saudis, who had no real world experience in this area, ran into problems. Heck, after four days the US Army was running out of some key items.

In Twilight: 2000 terms, the Soviets would have spanked the Chinese defenders at the beginning of each leap forward from their supply dumps during 1995. Combat power would have dropped off in a reverse J curve after a certain time or certain distance. In Europe, with Pact forces on the defensive in the DDR, the logistical picture would have been more favorable for the Soviets. Moving stocks forward through Poland would have presented the usual challenges, but getting the fuel and ammunition from the rail heads to the forward units in East Germany would have been much easier than if the Soviets were invading West Germany. I would expect a much higher sustained volume of artillery fire against the West Germans under these conditions.