Soviet Air Defense or "It really sucks to be an airdale over Russia!"

[dragoon500ly]

FM 100-2-1...what would I do without you!

The goal of the Soviet tactical air defense system is to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attacks. This is achieved by forcing enemy aircraft to expend their ordnance while still beyond the effective range of their weaponry or by destroying the aircraft when they come within effective range of Soviet air defense weapons.

There are two important concepts in Soviet tactical air defense. First, air defense is considered to be an integral element of the combined arms concept. Secondly, air defense of the ground forces is achieved by a variety of weapons and equipment that together form a system of air defense.

Soviet air defense does not consider it to be necessary to destroy enemy aircraft. The Soviets realize the value of preventing enemy air crews from pressing their attacks or to force them to prematurely expend their ordnance. If their air defense can prevent NATO airpower from from delivering their ordnance on target, then the Soviets consider their mission to have been accomplished.

A Motor Rifle Battalion (BMP) has an air defense platoon equipped with 9 SA-7/-14 MPADS. A Motor Rifle Company (BTR) has three SA-7/-14 MPADS. Tank Companies do not have MPADS, but are equipped with turret-mounted antiaircraft machine guns.

Soviet tank and motor rifle regiments have an organic air defense battery made up of a headquarters, a platoon of four ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns, a platoon of four SA-9 SP SAM launchers (being replaced by SA-13 SP SAM launchers) as well as support and service elements. The regimental headquarters has a air defense squad with three SA-7/-14 MPADS.

Soviet tank and motor rifle divisions have a SAM Regiment made up of a headquarters, support and service elements and five SAM batteries each equipped with 4 SA-6 or SA-11 TEL and 3 SA-7/-14 MPADS, a further 6 SA-7/-14 MPADS are assigned to the regimental headquarters/service elements.

A combined arms and tank armies are supported by 1-2 SAM Brigades made up of a 3 SAM battalions (each with 3 batteries) with a total of 27 SA-4/SA-12 TELs.

A front will have a further 2 SAM brigades (organized as the army brigades).

[95th Rifleman]

Don't forget the Tunguska, it was available in the late 90's and was (and still is in the newer variants) one of the most lethal mobile ADA platforms.

[dragoon500ly]

The ZU-23-2 mounts twin 23mm cannons on a towed, two wheeled carriage. The cannons are mounted side by side between large ring-type trunnions. In appearance the ZU-23-2 can be confused with the older ZPU-2 14.5mm mount; however the shape and placement of the ZU-23's ammunition boxes (at right angles to the carriage) and its prominent muzzle flash suppressors are distinguishing features.

The ZU-23-2 is a highly mobile, air droppable weapon. A battalion of 18 is organic to the Soviet paratroop division and it is the division's principal AAA weapon. It has an effective engagement range of 2,500m, a max horizontal range of 7,000m. Max cyclic rate of fire is 800-1,000rds per barrel and a basic load of 2,400rds is standard.

In its firing position, the ZU-23 is leveled by jacks and stabilized on a three-point base. An optical-mechanical computing sight is used for anti-aircraft fire and a straight-tube telescope for ground targets. Ammunition is fed from box magazines, holding a 50rd belt, mounted on the outside of each trunnion. Reloading is fast and uncomplicated. The magazines are easily accessible and the beginning link of the new belt attaches to the ending link of the last old cartridge which automatically interrupts the firing cycle when it reaches the feedway and signals the bolt to remain open.

In the tank and motor rifle divisions, the ZU-23-2 is used to provide close-in air defense for the SA-4/SA-6 brigade (two ZU-23-2s per firing battery).

[Tegyrius]

Did the ZSU-30-6 exist anywhere beyond the Soviet Vehicle Guide and Red Storm Rising?

- C.

[dragoon500ly]

Did the ZSU-30-6 exist anywhere beyond the Soviet Vehicle Guide and Red Storm Rising?

- C.

Nope....although there are photos of a ZSU-23-4 chassis fitted with a Red Navy AK-630 mount, but those photos....hmmmm...have a photoshop feel.

[dragoon500ly]

The ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled antiaircraft system with four liquid-cooled 23mm cannons mounted on the front of a large, flat, armored turret. The chassis borrows from other Soviet armored vehicles and the suspension system resembles that of the PT-76 and ASU-85. The driver sits on the left front of the hull and the rest of the crew (commander, gunner and radar operator) are located in the turret. The GUN DISH fire control radar is mounted on the rear of the turret and can be folded down during travel.

A number of different variations exist of the basic ZSU-23-4, these are primarily distinguished externally be the types of stowage boxes on the turret and minor modifications in the mounting of the guns.

A platoon of four ZSU-23-4s are assigned along with four SA-9 SAM launchers to the antiaircraft battery of tank and motor rifle regiments to cover the deadspace of the SA-6 SAM TEL in the division air defense umbrella. Two ZSU-23-4s are usually assigned to support of each of the two first echelon battalions, each weapon normally separated by 200 meters and typically travelling about 400 meters behind the battalion's leading element.

The ZSU-23-4 is not amphibious, but it can ford depths of up to one meter. During river assault operations, the ZSU-23-4 would be ferried to the far bank immediately after the leading companies.

The ZSU-23-4 has the capability to both acquire and track low-flying aircraft and helicopters with an effective AA engagement range of 2,500 meters. It is also capable of firing on the move due to its integrated radar/gun stablization system. The high frequency operation of the GUN DISH radar emits a very narrow beam that provides for excellent aircraft tracking while being difficult to detect or evade. However, such a narrow frequency also dictates a limited range (max range of 20km), this can be compensated by linking the system to other long range acquisition radars in the area. The 23mm cannons can also be used against lightly armored ground vehicles.

The four guns are water cooled and have a maximum cyclic rate of 800-1,000 rounds per barrel. However, the guns are normally fired in 2-3 round bursts in order to reduce ammunition expenditure and prolong barrel life. Each barrel has a ammunition box holding a 500 round belt and 2,000 rounds are stored on board. Supply trucks follow the ZSU-23-4 at a distance of 1.5-2.5km behind and carry an additional 3,000 rounds per ZSU-23-4. Two types of ammunition normally mixed at a ratio of three Frag-HE-T rounds per one API-T round. An HEI-T round is also available.

Electronic target acquisition, tracking and ranging are automated and an on board computer determines superelevation and azimuth lead. Conventional optical sights are also available.

The ZSU-23-4 is air transportable by the An-22 or Il-76. The ZSU-23-4 is afforded a degree of protection by the thin armor (8.9-9.4mm thickness). Collective NBC protection is provided by a radiation detection and warning system and an air filtration and overpressure system.

Heavy machine gun fire can penetrate the hull and turret. Tread and road wheels are vulnerable to artillery fire. HE fragmentation can penetrate the armor, destroy the radar dish or rupture the liquid coolant sleeves on the cannons. The system is also vulnerable to ECM.

[Tegyrius]

Nope....although there are photos of a ZSU-23-4 chassis fitted with a Red Navy AK-630 mount, but those photos....hmmmm...have a photoshop feel.
Thought so. Just checkin'.

Hm. Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

[dragoon500ly]

Thought so. Just checkin'.

Hm. Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

Dates back to WWII, the Germans would deploy their AA guns as far forward as possible, not only provide ADA, but they use their guns in the anti infantry/anti tank role.

Remember the scene in Saving Private Ryan, when the SS deployed a 20mm gun against the rangers/paratroopers? That little snapshot happened on every front. If you ever get the chance to look over the combat logs of various US units, you will see numerous references to a kampfgruppe made up of a platoon or two of infantry, maybe a antitank gun and 2-3 AA guns that would hold up the advance and force troops to deploy, only to see them withdraw 5-6 miles and repeat, every time causing a few dozen personnel/vehicle losses.

Its a lesson that cost the Red Army dearly in WWII and its one that they took to heart. Every Soviet ADA has armor piercing and fragmentation rounds as part of their basic load. Their doctrine stresses not only engagement of aircraft and helicopters, but also direct fire against enemy positions.

The Chechyans (and Afghans) tell stories of platoons of ZSU-23-4s engaging their troops in buildings or in field fortifications.

There is even a report of a regiment of S-60s being deployed against a Afghan village.

[dragoon500ly]

The S-60 is a towed, road-transportable, short to medium-range, single barrel 57mm antiaircraft gun system. It is easily recognized by its four-wheel carriage; long thin tube with multiperforated muzzle brake and its gun shield. The prime mover for the S-60 is the Ural-375 cargo truck, which not only carries the seven man crew as well as its 200 round unit of fire. In additional to its on-carriage optical fire control, the S-60 also employs an off-carriage FLAP WHEEL (max range of 35km) fire control radar, mounted on a separate van.

The S-60 is found in the divisional antiaircraft regiment of Category III tank and motor rifle divisions. However, it is being replaced by the SA-6/SA-8 SAM TELs. It is also found in territorial defense units, especially around airfields. An S-60 regiment consists of four firing batteries, each with six guns and a fire control center.

Tactical AA engagement range is 4,000m with optical guidance and 6,000m with radar guidance. This weapon, while designed to provide defense against aircraft and helicopters, can also be used against lightly armored vehicles.

The four wheel carriage can be leveled and stabilized on jacks to form a point firing base. Loading is accomplished by 4-round horizontally fed clips.

In additions to the single-barreled S-60, a self-propelled version, the ZSU-57-2 (twin S-60s mounted on a T-54 chassis) was deployed in 1957. The ZSU-57-2 is identical, although it cannot be radar controlled. It is now considered obsolete.

[Targan]

Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

I've heard of that tactic being used too and it makes a lot of sense but, as with a great deal of stories about operations in Chechnya, it's anecdotal at best. It's rare to get anything better than 2nd, 3rd or 4th hand accounts of what goes on there.

I know one thing for sure, judging by the photos I've seen of Grozny it would suck hard to live there. Rolling vistas of rubble dunes and building skeletons across significant parts of the city. Bummer.

[Raellus]

I've read at least a couple of credible sources that asserted that the Shilka and Tunguska were favored by the Russians and feared by the Chechen rebels because of their effectiveness in engaging tall structures with accurate and devastating fire.

[ArmySGT.]

I have a Paper written by a Ft Leavenworth Student on the subject.

The Chechen operations. Not very flattering for the Russians. Claims they resurrected from experience in Afghanistan using ADA vehicle because of the Guns elevation of up to +80 degrees. The also learned all over again that the "Zoo" is lightly armored and the T54 chassis not up to contemporary standards.

[Webstral]

The Soviet attitude towards ground-based air defense is a reflection of their ideas about how things get done on the battlefield. Although both Soviet and Western models contained ADA, SAM, and fighters, the emphasis differed. The Soviets put a relatively greater emphasis on ground-based defenses, the numerical superiority of the Soviet air arm notwithstanding. I suspect, though I cannot prove, that the Soviets understood that "positive ground control" hampers effectiveness. The Western powers, on the other hand, laid much greater emphasis on counter-air operations in the enemy's airspace. Great importance was attached to redressing the Soviet numerical advantage by rendering runways unusable. The Soviets seem to have accepted that the Western air forces would achieve a certain amount of success in this regard in that many Soviet aircraft are capable of sucking debris into the intakes and surviving.

The Soviet attitude towards killing versus driving off enemy aircraft is coldly practical. Who cares if he dies, so long as his mission fails? Someone else may get him on the way home. In any event, an aircraft driven off represents a wasted sortie. The Soviets would have said that they could drive to the Channel as long as they were not prevented from executing their operations by NATO interference.

[95th Rifleman]

Thought so. Just checkin'.

Hm. Speaking of ADA, does anyone remember reports from Chechnya that the Russians were deploying AAA assets in the infantry support role because tank and IFV guns didn't have the elevation to engage Chechen troops on the upper floors of buildings? Or am I imagining that?

The Israelis used the same tactic with their Vulcans back in lebanon. They took some flak (pardon the pun) for it in the UN but America used her veto to stop any action (not that the israelis listen to the UN anyway).

I think it's technicly ilegal under some treaty but that kind of thing means nothing in war, you use what you have to do the job.

[Matt Wiser]

U.S. Army ADA units in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam used their guns in direct-fire roles against enemy infantry on many occasions. Especially in the Pacific and in Korea. M-42 Dusters in Vietnam broke up many a VC charge on a firebase, and were also used in convoy escort duty.

[dragoon500ly]

When discussing ADA, the argument of which is better SAMs or Guns always pops up. Missile freaks always point out that it takes several thousand rounds to destroy each aircraft, but are missiles really better?

Info is pulled from Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army...

Flipping through peacetime journals and manuals one gets the impression that when a SAM is fired, there is at least a 80% chance of its target being destroyed. But combat is the true test of any weapon system and SAMs.....

In the 1965 Indian-Pakistan War, India fired some 30 SA-2 SAMs and damaged a single Pakistan aircraft.

In the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt fired 22 SA-2 SAMs and missed with every one.

Vietnam was the acid test of the SA-2 and the results are interesting:
In 1965, 194 SA-2 were fired scoring 11 kills for a 5.7% accuracy rating.
In 1966, 1,096 SA-2s were fired, scoring 31 kills, for a 2.8% accuracy.
In 1967, 3,202 SA-2s were fired, scoring 56 kills, for a 1.75% accuracy.
In 1968 (Jan-Mar), 322 SA-2s were fired, scoring 3 kills for a 0.9% accuracy.
In 1972, 4,244 SA-2s (this may include some SA-3s) were fired, scoring 49 kills for a 1.15% accuracy.

All told, an estimated 9,058 SA-2s were fired, destroying 150 aircraft and achieving a 1.7% accuracy rating.

SA-3s are listed as having seen some service in Vietnam in 1972, I have not been able to find any sources listing number that were fired nor confirmation of the aircraft they shot down.

The SA-6 is the next SAM to have seen combat service in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt fired 840 SA-6s, scoring 20 kills for a 2.3% accuracy rating. Syria also fired a large number of SA-6s, but claim that every missile fired destroyed a Israeli aircraft.

Syria is to be congratulated for destroying every aircraft in the Israeli Air Force (including all training aircraft) within the first three days.

The SA-7 was used in both Vietnam and in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In Vietnam an estimated 2,400 SA-7s were fired scoring 13 kills for a 0.5% accuracy rating. In the Middle East, 4,356 SA-7s were fired, scoring 2 kills for a 0.04% accuracy rating. The chief advantage of the SA-7 was not in its kills, but in the number of aircraft that were damaged; there is no information for the Vietnam War, but in the 1973 War, Israel reported 28 aircraft damaged.

As you can see, the best SAM performance was in 1965 during the Vietnam War, the USAF/USN rapidly modified ECM pods to degrade missile performance and later developed Wild Weasel tactics to engage the missile sites themselves.

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.

[Webstral]

Also, ADA and SAM are not an either-or proposition. Each supports the other as part of an integrated air defense that (ideally) includes interceptors.

[Panther Al]

Also, ADA and SAM are not an either-or proposition. Each supports the other as part of an integrated air defense that (ideally) includes interceptors.

I've always called Soviet Air Defense Doctrine to be pretty much a lot like Zone Defense on a theatre scale:

Layered defenses, in depth, with assets in place to cover all possible attack vectors - with the understanding that at the front line itself it is impossible to keep track of who is who, so shoot them *all* down.

[dragoon500ly]

Also, ADA and SAM are not an either-or proposition. Each supports the other as part of an integrated air defense that (ideally) includes interceptors.

And only an integrated air defense system provides your troops with friendly skies.

I find it interesting that, in spite of all the claims, SAMs really are not as good as a decent fighter.

[Legbreaker]

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.

It's obviously a typo. Should read 80% of all hits. :D

[Webstral]

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.

It wouldn’t surprise me in the least if there were manufacturers out there claiming an 80% success rate.

[Raellus]

I find it interesting that, in spite of all the claims, SAMs really are not as good as a decent fighter.

True. But, per unit, they are cheaper. That might be one of the reasons the Soviets made some many of them.

[Matt Wiser]

I remember reading in Zaloga's book on Soviet SAMs that the Yugoslavs were angry with the Russians in the '60s after the Soviets sold them the SA-2, claiming an 80% kill rate. They found out via North Vietnam what the real kill rate was and felt the Russians had cheated them.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

I've read at least a couple of credible sources that asserted that the Shilka and Tunguska were favored by the Russians and feared by the Chechen rebels because of their effectiveness in engaging tall structures with accurate and devastating fire.

The Russians have a few "Tank defense vehicles" nowadays (like 4 or 5 for evaluation) that are basically rebuilt T72 hulls with dual autocannon and so forth.

The BMPT (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMPT)

The West Germans also looked at the concept earlier in the mid 70s:

Begleitpanzer 57 AIFSV (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begleitpanzer_57_AIFSV) (Sorry! Link's in German)

(Hee...oh, lookee here! (http://www.pmulcahy.com/best_stuff_that_never_was/best_lcv_that_never_were.htm) :D )

[Schone23666]

When discussing ADA, the argument of which is better SAMs or Guns always pops up. Missile freaks always point out that it takes several thousand rounds to destroy each aircraft, but are missiles really better?

Info is pulled from Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army...

Flipping through peacetime journals and manuals one gets the impression that when a SAM is fired, there is at least a 80% chance of its target being destroyed. But combat is the true test of any weapon system and SAMs.....

In the 1965 Indian-Pakistan War, India fired some 30 SA-2 SAMs and damaged a single Pakistan aircraft.

In the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt fired 22 SA-2 SAMs and missed with every one.

Vietnam was the acid test of the SA-2 and the results are interesting:
In 1965, 194 SA-2 were fired scoring 11 kills for a 5.7% accuracy rating.
In 1966, 1,096 SA-2s were fired, scoring 31 kills, for a 2.8% accuracy.
In 1967, 3,202 SA-2s were fired, scoring 56 kills, for a 1.75% accuracy.
In 1968 (Jan-Mar), 322 SA-2s were fired, scoring 3 kills for a 0.9% accuracy.
In 1972, 4,244 SA-2s (this may include some SA-3s) were fired, scoring 49 kills for a 1.15% accuracy.

All told, an estimated 9,058 SA-2s were fired, destroying 150 aircraft and achieving a 1.7% accuracy rating.

SA-3s are listed as having seen some service in Vietnam in 1972, I have not been able to find any sources listing number that were fired nor confirmation of the aircraft they shot down.

The SA-6 is the next SAM to have seen combat service in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt fired 840 SA-6s, scoring 20 kills for a 2.3% accuracy rating. Syria also fired a large number of SA-6s, but claim that every missile fired destroyed a Israeli aircraft.

Syria is to be congratulated for destroying every aircraft in the Israeli Air Force (including all training aircraft) within the first three days.

The SA-7 was used in both Vietnam and in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In Vietnam an estimated 2,400 SA-7s were fired scoring 13 kills for a 0.5% accuracy rating. In the Middle East, 4,356 SA-7s were fired, scoring 2 kills for a 0.04% accuracy rating. The chief advantage of the SA-7 was not in its kills, but in the number of aircraft that were damaged; there is no information for the Vietnam War, but in the 1973 War, Israel reported 28 aircraft damaged.

As you can see, the best SAM performance was in 1965 during the Vietnam War, the USAF/USN rapidly modified ECM pods to degrade missile performance and later developed Wild Weasel tactics to engage the missile sites themselves.

So much for the 80% chance of destroying an enemy aircraft.


Does anyone have information on the overall stats on the Iraqi air defense network during the first Gulf War? I know, I should research it myself but I'm feeling lazy. :p But just offhand, are there any stats or info out there what their overall accuracy and effectiveness was in regards to their SAM and ADA systems?

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=HaYCjfvHIsQ

[dragoon500ly]

Here's one of a US Quad.50 firing

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=aczpm9r-K18

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=o1NHzjz104s

[dragoon500ly]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=dgB0XGV_xZc

[Matt Wiser]

Find the Gulf War Air Power Survey: it should have what you're looking for. It should be in any decent college library. A couple things are worth mentioning: Baghdad was more heavily defended than Murmansk was, and had twice the density of SAMs and AAA than the most heavily defended targets in Eastern Europe. And yet, total losses to all Iraqi air defense (SAMs/AAA) and MiGs (Scott Speicher) were 49; both fixed-wing and helos.

[Legbreaker]

Bagdad, hell, all of Iraqi for that matter, isn't really comparable to the Soviet Union in it's prime.
My guess is the Iraqis were poorly trained, poorly led and had virtually nil motivation. It's a miracle they hit as many planes as they did!
It could be said that more planes were probably shot down by "celebratory fire" (the practise of emptying mags into the air just because you're happy) than actual aimed AA fire. :confused:

[Raellus]

Bagdad, hell, all of Iraqi for that matter, isn't really comparable to the Soviet Union in it's prime.
My guess is the Iraqis were poorly trained, poorly led and had virtually nil motivation.

I couldn't agree more. Comparing Iraq to the USSR is like comparing the RVN to the USA- aside from some of the gear both used, it's not a fair or accurate comparison of capability.

[Matt Wiser]

Remember, we had six months to plan and prepare to take that air defense system down. If we'd had to go in, say in August or September, 1990, losses would've been heavier. Baghdad was so heavily defended (SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, Roland, MANPADS, and AAA) that only F-117s and cruise missiles went Downtown. This after a Daylight strike against Baghdad on 19 Jan 91 resulted in two F-16s down to SA-3, mainly due to the Wild Weasels already vacating the area (out of HARMs). But the sky turned brown due to all of the AAA being fired. Several other target areas were just as bad: Al Qaim by the Syrian border (WMD site), Basra, H-2/H-3 air base complexes, and Tallil AB. All had SA-2, SA-3, and AAA in quantity.

[Webstral]

Regarding morale, the Iraqi air defenders were defending their own airspace. We know the draftees in Kuwait had low morale and training, but the air defense types were protecting their homeland.

Matt's point about time for preparation is valid. We also had a numerical advantage, a technological advantage, and a doctrinal advantage. The Iraqi Air Force had not been used as a Western or even Soviet air force during the Iran-Iraq War. Although the early stages of the Iran-Iraq fighting taught the Iraqis the value of hardened aircraft shelters, the middle and later stages of the war featured few of the characteristics that would have marked conflict in Germany or Korea or that did mark the Coalition air offensive in 1991. It's one thing to have the gear, it's another to have a clear concept of use supported by training and organization.

Sheer density of ADA might not have served the Soviets any beter than it did the Iraqis. When the interdependent parts of a centralized air defense network are uncoupled, the serviceability of the remaining parts is compromised. Whether Nighthawks would have been as effective in their decapitation role in Central Europe is an open question. However, the use of stealth bombers to deliver precision strikes against the enemy's C3I hubs would have tested the Soviet redundancies and deception measures. Sheer weight of fire from ground-based defenses cannot entirely offset the advantage of flexibility and initiative that rests with the side putting up aircraft.

In 1996, the Soviets have been fighting for an extended period in China. The reserves of aircraft, crews, and parts that might have existed without a Sino-Soviet War aren't there when the West Germans cross the border. By the time the anglophone air forces enter the fight, the quantitative advantages enjoyed by the Soviets in 1994 might no longer exist in Central Europe. Although I rather doubt the situation much resembles that of Iraq in early 1991, NATO might well posses the advantage in numbers and quality of aircraft in December 1996. This would throw the onus of defense back on the ground-based network. How well the Pact system in the DDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland would weather NATO action is a good question. After all, the fighting in Germany is seven weeks old by the time the USAF gets involved. This is a lot of time to observe the Soviet air defenses at work.

[Legbreaker]

After all, the fighting in Germany is seven weeks old by the time the USAF gets involved. This is a lot of time to observe the Soviet air defenses at work.

Depending on which version you use (see the timelines thread).
It's also a lot of time for the Soviets to iron out any problems against the Germans, as well as get hands on experience flying against a western force with similar tactics and strategy as the US, Britain, etc. By the time the rest of the world gets involved, they're likely to be rather efficient and organised.

It's also worth noting that Iraqi didn't even TRY to use aircover in any serious way. Their entire defensive strategy (if that's what you can call it) relied 99.9% on ground forces, whereas in the early stages of the European conflict in T2K the Soviets and their allies have at least air parity, if not superiority.

From memory, it's this eventual superiority by the East that forces Germany to call on Nato.

[Matt Wiser]

Of 42 kills of Iraqi aircraft (fixed-wing and helos), 36 were fixed-wing. Of those, half were running to Iran. But that left 18 others that did try to come up and fight-and lost. Mirage F-1s, MiG-29s, MiG-25s, MiG-23s, and MiG-21s tried the challenge.

There were three "unconventional kills" of fixed-wing: one MiG-29 tried a low-level split S in a fight with an F-15; and splattered himself all over the desert floor. Another had a Mirage F-1 that was chasing an EF-111 at low level-with an F-15 getting in close. The Spark Vark cleared a low ridge: the Mirage didn't. And an MiG-29 was landing at Tallil AB during an RAF Tornado raid with JP-233s. The MiG flew under an attacking Tornado and was hit by some of the anti-runway munitions-and crashed. The first two were credited, but the RAF refused to give the Tornado crew credit for a kill. But the Tornado in question was christened "MiG Eater" with nose art of a shark eating a MiG-29.

[Webstral]

Depending on which version you use (see the timelines thread).

For the sake of clarification, I should point out to the newcomers that I always use the v1 chronology.

It's also a lot of time for the Soviets to iron out any problems against the Germans, as well as get hands on experience flying against a western force with similar tactics and strategy as the US, Britain, etc. By the time the rest of the world gets involved, they're likely to be rather efficient and organised.

…whereas in the early stages of the European conflict in T2K the Soviets and their allies have at least air parity, if not superiority… From memory, it's this eventual superiority by the East that forces Germany to call on Nato.

The writers do mention Soviet air power prominently in v1:

“By the end of November, the Bundeswehr was in serious trouble. Soviet Frontal Aviation had left their most modern aircraft in the west; these were qualitatively a match for the Luftwaffe and quantitatively more than a match. As the Bundeswehr lines began to crumble” (GDW, 1984, p. 24)…

Based on this idea, it seems reasonable to believe that air power tipped the scales in favor of the Pact, although I also believe that the Pact had to rush in large numbers of replacements to keep the forces on the ground fighting.

How effective Soviet air defenses in the Northern Tier (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia) are in December 1996 is difficult to say with any certainty. Many variables apply. For instance, while there appears to be a wealth of experience to be mined in the Far East, recent reading suggests to me that the Soviets were keen to isolate non-dogmatic military ideas learned in Afghanistan. We might argue that the scale of the fighting in the Far East would make the lessons impossible to ignore. I suggest that the scale of the problem would cause the internal security apparatus to go into overdrive in an effort to prevent heretical ideas regarding initiative and the like from contaminating the rest of the Army and various air services. Obviously, it’s impossible to completely block the flow of ideas from the Far East, but the State could do much to retard the flow.

The fighting against West Germany is a double-edged sword for the Pact. Leg is right that seven weeks of practice is going to mean a lot for Pact air defenses. We should see a lot of tightening up of procedures. Perhaps some changes in doctrine will start to emerge. Fighting a Western-style air force will yield some positive results for the Pact in terms of fortifying them against the onslaught by the USAF, RAF, and CFAC.

On the other hand, the Pact will be fighting in the spotlight, so to speak. NATO will have the opportunity to watch without spending any of its strength. We should take it as axiomatic that the West Germans will share everything they are learning with their allies. As the Pact adapts, NATO will be able to observe the adaptation. It’s like watching a rival team play for a season without having to play them.

We also should bear in mind that the Luftwaffe is a very different force than the USAF. Without getting into the exercise of measuring manhood length, we should remember that the Luftwaffe and the USAF fly different airframes, have different ideas on how to use those airframes, and have different quantities of airframes. In 1996, the USAF dwarfs the Luftwaffe. Even a conservative estimate of the number of USAF combat aircraft in Europe in late 1996 should give the US at least twice as many fighting planes as the West Germans. Numbers matter, even if everything else is the same.

Of course, everything else is not the same. In the real world in 1996, the West Germans relied on the Tornado for most missions. In Twilight: 2000, they might have kept the F-4 in service for a while longer. Since the Luftwaffe didn’t operate the Tornado ADV (air defense variant), and since the Eurofighter Typhoon wasn’t available in time for the big show, we can only assume that the Luftwaffe would have kept its Phantoms for the air defense role. Although a splendid aircraft that has received numerous upgrades, the Phantom is not the same creature as either the F-16 or the F-15. In terms of strike missions, which are what this thread is about, the West German approach at the end of the Cold War was ultra-low penetration to low-altitude delivery of munitions by Tornadoes. Like the European allies in general, the West Germans planned to make the most of limited resources by going in low and fast without big packages of specialized aircraft or extensive EW. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that Tornadoes can do their job in the assigned way, but there will be substantial losses to ground-based defenses.

The West Germans knew they were up against a numerically superior foe in the air. They also would have known that the enemy had specially designed modern aircraft for the jobs at hand, such as the MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-27, MiG-27, Su-25, and others. I’m not an airman, so the best I can do is speculate about how the Luftwaffe would have tried to manage the air situation under rather unfavorable circumstances. Even assuming that the Luftwaffe kept at least some of its Phantoms in service through 1996, the strong suit of the West Germans in terms of fighting Pact air power would have been counter-air missions against enemy air bases and strikes against Pact C3I centers. Tornadoes would have done this job going in low and fast. How the Luftwaffe would have divided its bombing sorties between counter-air strikes against Pact air bases, strikes on C3I targets, interdiction missions, and close air support is beyond my ability to say. However, I think it’s fair to say that the initial emphasis would have been on counter-air and C3I strikes in order to establish a tolerable air situation. It’s hard to say how successful the Luftwaffe would have been in the first week or two. The lessons learned by the RAF in the Gulf would have been applied vigorously in an ongoing Cold War environment. The West Germans had the advantage of tactical or even strategic surprise, the value of which is not to be underestimated. The West Germans would have opened with a surge, which would have generated enough sorties vis-à-vis their Pact counterparts to reduce the effects of West German numerical inferiority in the short term. However, even if we assume that the Luftwaffe generally achieved its goals in the first two weeks, the inability of the Bundeswehr to seal the deal on the ground would have exposed the Luftwaffe to the combined effects of very large numbers of Pact aircraft entering the war zone and the very great depth of the theater. The v1 chronology establishes that the West Germans essentially lost the air war during the last half of November, exposing the Bundeswehr to the weight of Pact ground attack fires.

A few important ideas are relevant when making an assessment of the ability of the USAF to prosecute offensive operations in East Germany in December. I’ll start with the conditions of the USAF. The USAF has specialized aircraft for all the jobs that need doing. By December, the wings that were slated to reinforce Europe would have been in place for a month or more. While the need for combat air patrols during the German-Pact fighting would have been greater than during peace time, the tempo would not have compared with wartime tempo. The air crews, ground crews, and aircraft would have entered the fighting in December in good condition. Intelligence probably would have been available to the USAF almost as quickly as it was available to the Luftwaffe. The developing operational and tactical patterns of the Pact could be analyzed before a single engagement by US, UK, or Canadian pilot. Perhaps as importantly, the USAF is a different creature than the Luftwaffe. Whereas the Luftwaffe emphasized ultra-low penetration for strike missions, the USAF emphasized medium-level penetration by large strike packages of specialized aircraft with massive EW support. At the risk of putting too fine a point on the matter, one does not defend against this kind of aggressor the same way one defends against strike packages of Tornadoes (and perhaps AlphaJets) screaming in just above the treetops.

On the Pact side, seven weeks of high-tempo operations would have taken their toll. In all likelihood, there would have been several surges over the seven weeks of the German-Pact phase of the war. Persistent West German attacks on Pact airfields within striking distance of the front lines would have yielded substantial losses in aircraft and ground crews. Exhaustion would have set in among air and ground crews alike, leading to slower turnaround times, more aircraft grounded for maintenance, more aircraft going up with nonfunctional systems, and accidents. Obviously, the exhaustion phenomenon is going to affect the West Germans, too; but in December, the contest enters a new phase in which the Anglophone members of NATO take on the Pact. The Americans, British, and Canadians enter the fight in just about the best condition possible, whereas the Pact defenders are already battered and tired. Worse, the Pact is up against a type of air operation they haven’t yet experienced in China or in Europe. They got to see the USAF strut its stuff in Operation Desert Storm, so the American mode is not entirely new to them. Still, there’s a paradigm shift. At the same time, the RAF picks up where the Luftwaffe left off in terms of Tornado operations. Although comparing the Pact air defense situation in Central Europe in December 1996 to the Iraqi air defense situation in early 1991 is a reach, the situation may be just as far removed from that described by General Sir John Hackett in The Third World War. Ground-based air defenses would be more important than ever.

Unfortunately for the Pact, medium-altitude attacks rise above ADA. Again, I’m not an airman, so my understanding of the picture is rather rudimentary. However, I believe the scheme underlying large strike packages of specialized aircraft with massive EW support is to keep the aircraft out of the reach of the ADA while using powerful jamming to defeat the defending SAM. Anti-radiation missiles and precision guided munitions knock out defenses and the target without the aircraft having to come down into the enemy’s ground-based wall of fire. At least, this is how it’s supposed to work. The Pact’s integrated air defenses will have taken rather a beating during the seven weeks of the German-Pact phase of the war, although repaired systems and replacements will have mitigated some of the damage. Still, with large numbers of Pact aircraft—especially strike aircraft—committed in the Far East and yet more lost in the recent fighting, the numbers game in the air may very well belong to NATO. Ground-based defenses are not flexible, so the practice of opening corridors through the defending radar, ADA, and SAM used so effectively during Operation Desert Storm might very well prove irresistible under conditions of NATO air superiority.

I have always believed that the US essentially bushwhacked the Soviets upon entering the war. Call it a Red Pearl Harbor. Some sort of operational agreement between the US and the USSR kept the German-Pact war contained until the Germans started to lose. Once the US entered the war, a well-planned surge was executed against the Pact defenders. While the Pact might not have been caught with their pants down, the need to prosecute the war with the West Germans would have prevented the defenders from being really ready for a sudden burst of offensive activity from the USAF, RAF, and CFAC.

The really interesting part of the contest between Soviet/Pact ground-based defenses and NATO air attacks occurs in Poland, I believe. Very dense fixed defenses on the ground would have had their ground-based air defenses counterparts. Fighting in Europe, Korea, and the Gulf would have seriously taxed the stockpiles of precision munitions available to the West, obliging more of the NATO mud movers to descend into the maelstrom of ADA to deliver CAS. That’s where I think the contest between Pact weight of fire from the ground and Western tactics and techniques gets interesting.

[Raellus]

There were three "unconventional kills" of fixed-wing: one MiG-29 tried a low-level split S in a fight with an F-15; and splattered himself all over the desert floor. Another had a Mirage F-1 that was chasing an EF-111 at low level-with an F-15 getting in close. The Spark Vark cleared a low ridge: the Mirage didn't.

Someone [else] has been watching DOGFIGHTS... :cool:

[Adm.Lee]

Of 42 kills of Iraqi aircraft (fixed-wing and helos), 36 were fixed-wing. Of those, half were running to Iran. But that left 18 others that did try to come up and fight-and lost. Mirage F-1s, MiG-29s, MiG-25s, MiG-23s, and MiG-21s tried the challenge.


I read an article recently about the rise of drones in air warfare. One of the project officers in the Pentagon was an Eagle driver in GW1. He had one his wall a photo taken from the helmet camera of the MiG-29 he'd shot down. It showed the missile warhead exploding: the last thing that pilot saw, quite literally.

Kinda gruesome.

[Matt Wiser]

That was COL Cesar "Rico" Rodriguez, USAF. He has three kills: two from GW 1, and one from Kosovo. (One MiG-29 and MiG-23 in the former, one MiG-29 in the latter conflict)

[Matt Wiser]

Web: from talking with my cousin Jacqui (USN F/A-18E driver), the usual limit for AAA is 10,000 feet. You hardly see the heavy AAA anymore, like the 85-mm and 100-mm that one saw in NVN. Most of the AAA systems seen these days are 57-mm and below. Unless you're going in to support troops in contact, or have ordnance that requires a low level delivery (A-10s and their guns, for example, or if dropping aerial mines in a waterway, say), pilots these days generally stay above 10,000 feet. Obviously, if we have to take apart an IADS on a no-notice basis, tactics will be different until the target system is torn apart.

[ArmySGT.]

Grozny Experience (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/grozny.htm)

[Legbreaker]

Grozny Experience (http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/grozny.htm)

Which is a good example of what is not the case in T2K.
In T2K the military did not suffer from lack of funds, etc and war, while perhaps not 100% expected, was known to be likely. Therefore it's quite conceivable, if not extremely probable, that the Soviets would have spent the time, money and effort to ensure their units were ready for combat.

[James Langham]

Did the ZSU-30-6 exist anywhere beyond the Soviet Vehicle Guide and Red Storm Rising?

- C.

I regarded it as a prototype design that was rushed into production in 1995. The ZSU30-2 was another candidate in the same programme and was also pushed into production. As an alternative have one replace the other as the first was unsatisfactory in service.