OT: German vs Allied Tech in WW2

[Sanjuro]

This thread was inspired by a post in the thread "In defence of the Red Army" by 95th Rifleman, which I partly disagree with:
WW2 is a good point.

Every allied nation was behind Germany in terms of tech and yet Germany still lost.

Compare the M4 Sherman to the later model Panzer IV's let alone the Panther and Tiger. The German Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek were superior to both the Bazooka and the joke (sorry, by joke I mean the british PIAT). The Germans had the jet aircraft which were superior in every way to the allied fighters.

The problem Germany had was numbers and fuel. In a WW3 scenario the Russians have a massive numerical advantage and this could prove as telling as it was in WW2.

If it takes ten T72's to kill an Abrams and the Russians have those tanks to spare, the Abrams will die. It's how the American shermans killed Tigers.
Germany's tech lead was nothing like as clear cut as that; in a few sectors they had a clear lead, but failed to exploit it. In other areas they were completely left behind.
In the example of aircraft: Germany began WW2 with what appeared to be an unbeatable air force, yet within a year was beaten comprehensively by a smaller opponent. On paper Germany had superior aircraft, yet a combination of rapid technical innovation (eg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miss_Shilling's_orifice ) and greatly superior command and control completely negated their advantages.
Later in the war, both Germany and Britain built jet fighters. The ME262 suffered from 2 problems- the first was Hitler's asinine idea that it should be a bomber. The second, lesser known, was that the engines kept failing- for many months in service over 50% of missions had to be aborted because of (non-combat) engine failures. The British jet engine, on the other hand, was a lower-tech device with a centrifugal compressor- which at the time was a much more practical engine because there was one large casting, instead of dozens of fragile compressor blades.
The Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek were based (with improvements) on Bazookas captured from the Soviets [source: Modern Small Arms, by Frederick Myatt MC]: fair point about the joke though!

[raketenjagdpanzer]

The "German technical superiority" claim is one that always sticks in my bearings. Yes, there is some truth to it. However, the Germans weren't all equipped with wunderwaffen that only true grit, saving private ryan and Band of Brothers was able to overcome.

The German infantry rifle, the Kar98k, was a WWI-era bolt action rifle. As early as the Civil War, the US Army proved that volume of fire from smaller numbers of rifles is vastly more important than sheer numbers of rifles. I'll take a squad of men with Garands against a platoon with Kar98ks all experience being equal.

The "tech" behind the German heavy tanks was often very poorly thought out - aircraft engines and transmissions (I'm looking at you, Maybach) too lightweight to do the job. Pie-in-the-sky ideas like having a full diesel engine...that runs an electrical generator which actually powers the roadwheels...terrible. (Admittedly the Sherman's gas powered engine was pretty terrible, too).

Also, on the Armor front? Yeah the Sherman was massive overkill versus the PzKpfw I-III, about an even match for the IV. It wasn't much of a match for the Tiger but that's not doctrinally what it was for, either.

The Germans never gave serious consideration to nuclear weapons. Yes, they had Heavy Water experiments in Norway, but even if the Allies had left them untouched and the war had dragged on (which the Soviets weren't going to do - they were after blood, the Western Front be damned), there's no way they'd have had a tested and working bomb before the Reds got to them.

As pointed out, German jet engines were crap. Also, regarding jets? The British flew the Gloster prototype in '41 - about the same time the Germans were taking their first steps with jet engine combat a/c. Wasn't built because - surprise! - the Germans were still using prop a/c. The US' entry into the field was '43 with the Shooting Star and even before then with the P59 Airacomet which, while not much faster than piston a/c, carried a very hefty bomb-load and cannon (37mm main gun supported by dual .50s, and a 2500lb bomb-load - half what a B-17 could carry in a short-duration mission).

The Allies overcoming the Germans wasn't just because we kept pouring tons of crap weapons on top of their technically superior weapons. The T-34 in spite of its almost laughable human engineering faults was generally technically superior to most German designs prior to the PzKpfw Tiger Ausf.-b. And even then the Nazis steered clear of the '34 when it could be helped. Moreover, the Germans captured and used the T34 frequently on their retreat from the Russian Front.

The reality is more than "we had bad weapons but had more than they had, so we won". Likewise I feel like I should point out the same regarding NATO v. Soviet weapons. Where the Soviets would have hurt us wouldn't have come primarily from "Well we can swamp one division with ten of inferior men and armaments" - it would've come in the opening hours of the war with their massive intelligence coups, special operations groups, and the like. Remember, the Walkers (may all of them rot forever) essentially gave the Soviets every piece of operational information about the US Navy they could. Everything from classified stats on Fleet deployments down to F-14 fuel consumption and turning ratios. The consequence of not living in a nightmare police state which is what everyone east of the Berlin Wall lived under until 1990, but rather a free and open society was that the Soviets were able to pre-position Spetsnaz groups and equipment throughout western europe.

But this idea that NATO somehow put on blinders and decided to exactly imitate the Nazi military mindset of producing super-tanks and I don't know what is just ridiculously fallacious, and I wish we could drop it.

Our fucking Abrams Tank was designed to survive a fight with a dozen slave labor produced T72s because we as a society decided not to let ourselves live like slaves, throwing huge portions of our GDP into a war machine poised to invade the East (in spite of what the authors of T2k seem to think).

I recommend those of you not acquainted with it read Air-Land Battle and see what it set out to accomplish. Also, for extra homework, look up what the Soviet tactics designed to counter it were. They were so confident in the ability of their divisions full of illiterate conscripts and disposable tanks that from D+1 they were planning on using thousands of tons of biological and chemical agents on concentrations of NATO troops that their own glorious People's Army was unable to overcome, as well as tac-nukes in the rear areas.

I'm sorry if that's ranty and I know people are going to jump on this post but this notion that the Nazis had unbeatable wonder weapons and could've won the war given a few extra months is a lie, and likewise the BMPs on the Seine by D+10 is an equally monstrous lie.

[B.T.]

I normally do not qoute myself, but this is the exception from the rule. I posted this on the "In defence of the Red Army":
"One should not forget, that the German society was in a constant state of paranoia. Even in the developement of weapons, several agencies tried, to convince all others, that their approach would be the best. And that led to a situaton, where different groups worked on the development of certain items, but a central "power" was lacking. Look at the development of a modern infantry rifle, as an example: Fallschirmjägergewehr and Sturmgewehr both were interesting designs, both were really influential. But in the end, a lot of labour and intellectual manpower were wasted. Because everyone tried his thing, ignoring the work of others. (As an aside: This seems to be repeated in the current US: SOCOM, Marines and Army all search for a specific new rifle. But every force uses a different approach. Or look at the developement of helmets: Marines and Army both replaced the PASGT helmet, but both forces developed their own design!)
The majority of the German units in WWII were still equipped with an old rifle (Kar 98), even in the end of the war. And most soldiers did not ride in fancy halftracks, they moved on foot."

There are some more facts, that have to be kept in mind:
The war economy of Germany was concentrated on building the more expensive and important planes, tanks, etc.
But Germany does not have that many natural resources, as several other countries have. The quality of very basic items got worse, during the war. Everything had to be spared. Germany had not enough leather or textiles. The late war uniforms were made of recycled materials, that were of inferior quality. The boots (and later on shoes) got worse. And production of a lot of other things could not catch up with the losses.
And: When the war began, the German forces had been trained for the war. Although the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic should have been a small force, Germany violated the Versailles treaty on numerous occasions. Compared to the allies, the Germans were ready for that war.
Take a look at several other states: The U.S. had been in their "Isolationism"-period with a very small Army. The Soviets had just slaughtered the bulk of their professional officers in the 30ies. I'm not sure about the situation in the UK, but IIRC, the British forces had to be build up from scratch, after the Dunkirk desaster.
Yes, in several aspects or trades, the Germans were "superior", but the best airplane, rifle or tank, does not work, if you do not have the resources, to produce fuel or ammunitions for the technically advanced items. All in all, the German military lost some kind of advantage, the longer the war lasted. And those few fancy "Wunderwaffen" or high-tech gimmicks were just that: gimmicks, that could not change the course of the war.

[RN7]

Briefly: Germany had very few technological clear cut leads over the Allies in WW2, and in industrial efficiency and the development of nuclear weapon they were well behind.

In ballistic and radio controlled missiles they where well ahead of the field, in fact the post-war US and Soviet missile and space programmes were largely based on German developments. In jet engines only Britain was even near them, but in other areas of aviation British and American aircraft technology matched or even surpassed them throughout the war, and in electronics and radars the British were probably ahead of everyone.

On land the larger German tanks were better armed and protected than anyone's expect for the Russians, but German tanks also had reliability issues. The allies also deliberately mass produced the Sherman and others because they were available and they could build them in huge numbers. If the M26 Pershing and Centurion had been available at D-Day in 1944 instead of 1945, they could have handled anything the Germans had thrown at them with ease.

At sea the Germans were probably behind Britain and America outside of submarine technology, and the only lead that Germany had was with certain submarine engine types and torpedoes and the technology was far from the finished article and British ASW countermeasures largely kept pace anything Germany developed.

[Raellus]

I'm sorry, but I'm going to have to go with Max Hastings on this one. In WWII, the Allies had some superior weaponry- the P-51 Mustang, M-1 Garand, and the T-34/85 are all examples. Overall, they also had superior artillery. Allied naval superiority isn't really a matter of debate (aside from the Japanese Yamato class super-battleships which were impressive but anachronistic by 1941 and a couple of advanced German U-boat classes).

On the other hand, the Germans fielded a clearly superior GPMG in the MG-42, the word's first assault rifle, the STG-43/44, and the deadly 88mm DP gun. Most WA tanks crews would have gladly traded in their Sherman or Churchill for a Panther or Tiger, depite their often finicky engines. The ME-262 had is problems and vulnerabilities, but it still gave the allies fits in the air. Most ME-262s that were shot down were done so when they were landing. The Brits might have had jet aircraft first, but they didn't field them in any significant numbers until the war was nearly over. ASFAIK, there weren't any Meteor aces. The Germans also developed the world's first ballistic missile and the first radio-controlled ASMs.

The German's biggest mistake was devoting so much of their war industry on small production runs of extremely complex and complicated wonder-weapons. That, coupled with a delay in converting to a war economy and late-war shortages of fuel and raw materials due to strategic bombing and sabotage meant that the Germans would never be able to translate any technological edge into a decisive strategic advantage.

No one can argue that the correlation of forces was not the decisive factor in the Allies' victory. We had numerical advantages of at least 3-to-1, and in some cases 5-to-1 or more, in every major category of weaponry, from tanks to fighters to warships to men in uniform.

Now back to the Red Army. In WWII, the Soviet Union lost more citizens and soldiers than any other nation on earth. The U.S. had the lowest casualties of any major combatant. With all of their technology, the U.S. and UK combined to kill approximately 500,000 German men at arms during the entire war. The Soviets killed about 4.5m. The Red Army began the war with a decimated officer corps, outdated infantry weapons, and generally very poorly equipped troops. Four years later, they were a juggernaut.

As for arguments about doctrine- no plan survives first contact with the enemy. The idea that superior doctrine would have won the war assumes a short war with flawless execution, no surprises, and a fairly predictable, cooperative enemy. In a longer war, both sides learn to make adjustments.

Hitler expected the U.S.S.R. to collapse in a matter of weeks. "Kick in the door and the whole rotten building will collapse" he said. For a few weeks, it looked like he might be right. Four years later, the Red Army was at the gates of Berlin.

[Panther Al]

Let me hit some high points that was brought up by Raketenjagdpanzer.


For starters, yes, it was a rant, and no need for cursing... but I get where you are coming from so no worries. :)

I've never bought into the whole, "Another 6 months (Or Year, or whatever) they would have pulled it off" mentality. There was far too many reasons why that was a pipe dream.

But there is a few errors there.

Lets start with the Mauser 98. For starters, its not a WW1 era rifle. Its actually older than that. But thats minor - the point here is that even though its a old design, being old isn't something that makes it obsolete or useless: In fact, the Mauser 98K is still on active service as a top notch sniper rifle by various countries in its original form - and its action has been copied by about 75% of every other high end sniper system on the planet. Not exactly garbage that. Yes, I would agree the M1 was a better battle rifle - being a semiauto is a huge advantage over bolt action designs. But the M1 isn't used anymore - even for sniping unlike the 98k. And lets not forget the MG42 - still in frontline use today, and still the better of anything anyone else uses - and I've used the MG3 and the M240 in combat, and I'll take a 3 any day of the week.

Secondly, you are spot on for the Heavy tanks. By and large - and I will except the original Tiger I from this - heavy tank designs such as the Tiger 2, Jagdtiger, and the Ferdinand/Elefant was a colossal waste of time and resources that had no business being pushed beyond proof of concept stage. It was a waste of effort, manpower, and resources that has no excuse. However, Maybach doesn't make trannies: just the engines. Transmissions was made by ZF. Who, by the by, is the go to source in europe to this day for transmissions. In fact, those of us that have a BMW for example, have a ZF transmission. Now, the problem that German tanks had isn't because of one thing or another: the root of it is that no Panzer ever was actually built at its designed weight. Take the Pz4. It was designed to be a 22 ton tank. Its transmission, engine, and final drives (And it was the Final Drives that was the killer of german tanks) was geared for a 22 ton tank. Not the 30+ ton tank it wound up being. Same goes for the Tiger, it was designed to be a 45 ton tank, and was a good bit more than that. The Panther, for all its bashers, was almost an exception to the rule. It was meant to be a 40 ton tank, and unlike every other tank they built, they kept it from creeping up to much - it pegged out at 45 tons. Still enough that you had to keep an eye on the final drives, but much better. Also, as far as german tanks go, it was actually the only on that was overpowered. Yes. Overpowered. In order to cut costs, instead of going with a modified engine that was used on the IV, they decided to take the one out of the Tiger. This gave the panther a power to weight ratio that is the equal of the Challenger 1. War time production constraints did cause issues in the reliability of the engines, but thats no fault of the design.

And the Sherman - while a great tank from a reliability and production standpoint - wasn't the equal of a later model IV (G and onwards). More like a late III (L or M). The PzIII was almost un-german in its reliability. For some weird reason, the design was just solid all around. Half the mechanical issues the IV had, could be trusted to work when needed, and had the same armour package as the IV. Its downfall was that it was too small to take larger gun than the 5cm. And don't let that 5cm fool you: it was a better AT weapon than the 75mm in the Sherman. The only advantage the Sherman had over the III was it had a better HE round. But armour was equivalent, as was reliability of the the Early Shermans that was fielded at the same time as the III was. The IV's long 75 was *much* better than the 75 used on the Sherman. All comes down to barrel length and the velocity it allows. The German 75 was a long barrelled, high velocity gun, while the Sherman was a low velocity stubby gun designed to deliver HE rounds to take out MG nests: it was not meant to engage tanks except in an emergency.

You are right about the nuke program, and on the Jet front: the key difference is that the Germans actually tried to field large numbers of Jets where the US still thought it was a dumb idea.

The T34 was the great tank of the war. It was so good, the US actually imported a few in 41 and gave serious though to using it instead of the Sherman. Very Very serious thought. The transmission is what killed the deal though: the ones they sent us was the first flight T34 that made a german Tiger II look like a finely built swiss watch in the reliability department. Once they fixed those issues in 42, it was a whole new tank. And it was the T34 and not the Sherman that convinced the Germans to dump the III and go for the IV (and later the panther). The Panther was the better tank: It was actually equal in reliability to the T34 (Still those transmission issues on the case of the T34) when properly maintained, its armour was vastly better, and had a much better gun. And that includes the DT-5 85mm the later T34's had: Russians have always, to the day, had issues with propellent in large calibre guns that have forced them to built bigger to get equal performance.

Now the rest of the post, I couldn't agree more by and large: Yes, it could be said that we was doing the German thing, and look how that worked out for them, but that ignores the fact that unlike the germans the NATO armies would be properly supported to a degree that the Wehrmacht never was. And like it or not, the M1 was designed to be the ultimate tank - Creighton Abrams himself, when the program was started (Before it was known as a M1, and just after the debacle that was the MBT70) said, "I want a Tiger 2 - just one that works." And they did so: The designers spared no expense in making sure that every facet of the design was maxed out: Protection, Speed, Firepower. Usually you got to give a little in one category to get a little in the other, but they added the forth ingredient: Cash. Toss enough money at any engineering problem, you'll find a way to get around it. Pity he didn't live long enough to see it bear fruit. I could just see him taking the first one out for a spin with 'Thunderbolt 9' painted on the side.

Air-Land Battle is a good source, and like you, I recommend any who hasn't read it, to do so. Its a great way to get a feeling for how the US was planning on fighting WW3. But also, dig deeper than what is found on the internet to see what the Soviets was planning: A lot of what you see there is based on supposition and jingo-ism. The Soviets knew they was facing an uphill battle post 84 - a lot of generals said that once the Reagan build up got solidly underway (I've heard dates of 88-90), there was no longer any real hope of winning without NBC warfare - and they planned accordingly. Falling back on NBC doesn't mean they was throwing in the towel: they was just coming up with a plan that would probably work. Post GW the Soviets really knew they was done for. I think that played a huge role in the end of the Soviet menace. Pre-88, they was still confident of a win - just wouldn't be easy. And they had reason to be reasonably confident. I am nbot going to say they was right, or wrong, but they had solid plans in place to counter the effects of the AirLand Battle, and recall, there wouldn't be much Air in the FEBA - There the Soviets was justly and fairly confident that they had the upper hand thanks to the efforts put into forward air defence.


I have no idea how WW3 in the 80's would have wound up: My gut feeling is the further from 1980 and the closer to 1990 the less likely the Soviets would have pulled it off without going nuclear. Using hindsight, everyone pretty much all the professionals agree it would have been us breaking out the portable buckets of sunshine (Thats 80's air force speak for Nukes) if they kicked off between 75-83 - the western armies, especially and most importantly the US - was a hollow threat.

[Panther Al]

The German's biggest mistake was devoting so much of their war industry on small production runs of extremely complex and complicated wonder-weapons. That, coupled with a delay in converting to a war economy and late-war shortages of fuel and raw materials due to strategic bombing and sabotage meant that the Germans would never be able to translate any technological edge into a decisive strategic advantage.



Here you hit the nail on the head:

Germany was running on the equivalent of peace time production well into 43: It took Speer a lot of work to convince Hitler to allow German industry to work overtime hours, and more than one shift!

[RN7]

I'm sorry, but I'm going to have to go with Max Hastings on this one. In WWII, the Allies had some superior weaponry- the P-51 Mustang, M-1 Garand, and the T-34/85 are all examples. Overall, they also had superior artillery. Allied naval superiority isn't really a matter of debate (aside from the Japanese Yamato class super-battleships which were impressive but anachronistic by 1941 and a couple of advanced German U-boat classes).

On the other hand, the Germans fielded a clearly superior GPMG in the MG-42, the word's first assault rifle, the STG-43/44, and the deadly 88mm DP gun. Most WA tanks crews would have gladly traded in their Sherman or Churchill for a Panther or Tiger, depite their often finicky engines.

And the Allies fielded a superior light machine gun; The Bren Gun, the world's first real infantry support weapon, still used by the British Army until the 1980's and still built in India. The Allies also fielded the M2 Browning, the best heavy machine gun ever made and still the standard heavy machine gun of every NATO and western country and many more besides. Despite its limitations the Germans also had a very healthy respect for the Sherman Firefly, who's 17 pounder chewed up some Panthers and Tigers in Normandy after D-Day, and are credit with killing the Tiger tank commanded by Michael Wittmann who was Germany's top scoring tank ace of WW2. The Allied tank commanders would no dount have prefered to have gone into battle against the Germans with the M26 Pershings and Centurion but the Sherman weighed 33 tonnes as opposed to 46 tons for the Pershing and I think the Centurion was even heavier. I think the logistical problems of transporting them across the sea in landing craft and then putting them on the beaches may have played a part in prolonging their introduction as the smaller Shermans were doing a good enough job and their were thousands available.


The ME-262 had is problems and vulnerabilities, but it still gave the allies fits in the air. Most ME-262s that were shot down were done so when they were landing. The Brits might have had jet aircraft first, but they didn't field them in any significant numbers until the war was nearly over. ASFAIK, there weren't any Meteor aces. The Germans also developed the world's first ballistic missile and the first radio-controlled ASMs.

The Germans were well ahead of the rest of the world in ballistic and radio controlled missiles. The Brits didn't have any need to field the Meteor in any significant numbers until the war was nearly over as the Allied air superiority over Western Europe and Germany was so great they werent needed. Also the RAF forbid Meteor pilots to fly over German occupied territory or to go east of Eindhoven in Holland until January 1945, to prevent downed aircraft being captured by the Germans or the Soviets. There werent any Meteor aces because there were relatively few German fighters flying in 1945 and the Meteor never actually encountered any German fighters.

The German's biggest mistake was devoting so much of their war industry on small production runs of extremely complex and complicated wonder-weapons. That, coupled with a delay in converting to a war economy and late-war shortages of fuel and raw materials due to strategic bombing and sabotage meant that the Germans would never be able to translate any technological edge into a decisive strategic advantage.

No one can argue that the correlation of forces was not the decisive factor in the Allies' victory. We had numerical advantages of at least 3-to-1, and in some cases 5-to-1 or more, in every major category of weaponry, from tanks to fighters to warships to men in uniform.

True

Now back to the Red Army. In WWII, the Soviet Union lost more citizens and soldiers than any other nation on earth. The U.S. had the lowest casualties of any major combatant. With all of their technology, the U.S. and UK combined to kill approximately 500,000 German men at arms during the entire war. The Soviets killed about 4.5m. The Red Army began the war with a decimated officer corps, outdated infantry weapons, and generally very poorly equipped troops. Four years later, they were a juggernaut.

The Germans also killed three times as many Soviets as the Soviets killed Germans. Outside of air and naval operations the only major land battlefield between the UK/USA and Germany from 1940 until the invasion of Sicily in 1943 was North Africa, a small side show compared to the Eastern Front. The UK/USA armies were only realy able to get to grips with the Germans with their full military forces in a geographicaly open battleground after D-Day. The German army casualty rates in the west after D-Day were every bit as severe as they were in the east, and Western air power was superior in technology and also in numbers to even the Soviets.


As for arguments about doctrine- no plan survives first contact with the enemy. The idea that superior doctrine would have won the war assumes a short war with flawless execution, no surprises, and a fairly predictable, cooperative enemy. In a longer war, both sides learn to make adjustments.

Hitler expected the U.S.S.R. to collapse in a matter of weeks. "Kick in the door and the whole rotten building will collapse" he said. For a few weeks, it looked like he might be right. Four years later, the Red Army was at the gates of Berlin.

The Allies could have taken Berlin before the Soviets, in fact the Germans probably wanted them to take Berlin before the Soviets. But the decision who was to take Berlin was decided at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Eisenhower’s halted the Western Allied advance at the Elbe River.

[RN7]

Let me hit some high points that was brought up by Raketenjagdpanzer.


For starters, yes, it was a rant, and no need for cursing... but I get where you are coming from so no worries. :)

I've never bought into the whole, "Another 6 months (Or Year, or whatever) they would have pulled it off" mentality. There was far too many reasons why that was a pipe dream.

But there is a few errors there.

Lets start with the Mauser 98. For starters, its not a WW1 era rifle. Its actually older than that. But thats minor - the point here is that even though its a old design, being old isn't something that makes it obsolete or useless: In fact, the Mauser 98K is still on active service as a top notch sniper rifle by various countries in its original form - and its action has been copied by about 75% of every other high end sniper system on the planet. Not exactly garbage that. Yes, I would agree the M1 was a better battle rifle - being a semiauto is a huge advantage over bolt action designs. But the M1 isn't used anymore - even for sniping unlike the 98k. And lets not forget the MG42 - still in frontline use today, and still the better of anything anyone else uses - and I've used the MG3 and the M240 in combat, and I'll take a 3 any day of the week.

Secondly, you are spot on for the Heavy tanks. By and large - and I will except the original Tiger I from this - heavy tank designs such as the Tiger 2, Jagdtiger, and the Ferdinand/Elefant was a colossal waste of time and resources that had no business being pushed beyond proof of concept stage. It was a waste of effort, manpower, and resources that has no excuse. However, Maybach doesn't make trannies: just the engines. Transmissions was made by ZF. Who, by the by, is the go to source in europe to this day for transmissions. In fact, those of us that have a BMW for example, have a ZF transmission. Now, the problem that German tanks had isn't because of one thing or another: the root of it is that no Panzer ever was actually built at its designed weight. Take the Pz4. It was designed to be a 22 ton tank. Its transmission, engine, and final drives (And it was the Final Drives that was the killer of german tanks) was geared for a 22 ton tank. Not the 30+ ton tank it wound up being. Same goes for the Tiger, it was designed to be a 45 ton tank, and was a good bit more than that. The Panther, for all its bashers, was almost an exception to the rule. It was meant to be a 40 ton tank, and unlike every other tank they built, they kept it from creeping up to much - it pegged out at 45 tons. Still enough that you had to keep an eye on the final drives, but much better. Also, as far as german tanks go, it was actually the only on that was overpowered. Yes. Overpowered. In order to cut costs, instead of going with a modified engine that was used on the IV, they decided to take the one out of the Tiger. This gave the panther a power to weight ratio that is the equal of the Challenger 1. War time production constraints did cause issues in the reliability of the engines, but thats no fault of the design.

And the Sherman - while a great tank from a reliability and production standpoint - wasn't the equal of a later model IV (G and onwards). More like a late III (L or M). The PzIII was almost un-german in its reliability. For some weird reason, the design was just solid all around. Half the mechanical issues the IV had, could be trusted to work when needed, and had the same armour package as the IV. Its downfall was that it was too small to take larger gun than the 5cm. And don't let that 5cm fool you: it was a better AT weapon than the 75mm in the Sherman. The only advantage the Sherman had over the III was it had a better HE round. But armour was equivalent, as was reliability of the the Early Shermans that was fielded at the same time as the III was. The IV's long 75 was *much* better than the 75 used on the Sherman. All comes down to barrel length and the velocity it allows. The German 75 was a long barrelled, high velocity gun, while the Sherman was a low velocity stubby gun designed to deliver HE rounds to take out MG nests: it was not meant to engage tanks except in an emergency.

You are right about the nuke program, and on the Jet front: the key difference is that the Germans actually tried to field large numbers of Jets where the US still thought it was a dumb idea.

The T34 was the great tank of the war. It was so good, the US actually imported a few in 41 and gave serious though to using it instead of the Sherman. Very Very serious thought. The transmission is what killed the deal though: the ones they sent us was the first flight T34 that made a german Tiger II look like a finely built swiss watch in the reliability department. Once they fixed those issues in 42, it was a whole new tank. And it was the T34 and not the Sherman that convinced the Germans to dump the III and go for the IV (and later the panther). The Panther was the better tank: It was actually equal in reliability to the T34 (Still those transmission issues on the case of the T34) when properly maintained, its armour was vastly better, and had a much better gun. And that includes the DT-5 85mm the later T34's had: Russians have always, to the day, had issues with propellent in large calibre guns that have forced them to built bigger to get equal performance.

Now the rest of the post, I couldn't agree more by and large: Yes, it could be said that we was doing the German thing, and look how that worked out for them, but that ignores the fact that unlike the germans the NATO armies would be properly supported to a degree that the Wehrmacht never was. And like it or not, the M1 was designed to be the ultimate tank - Creighton Abrams himself, when the program was started (Before it was known as a M1, and just after the debacle that was the MBT70) said, "I want a Tiger 2 - just one that works." And they did so: The designers spared no expense in making sure that every facet of the design was maxed out: Protection, Speed, Firepower. Usually you got to give a little in one category to get a little in the other, but they added the forth ingredient: Cash. Toss enough money at any engineering problem, you'll find a way to get around it. Pity he didn't live long enough to see it bear fruit. I could just see him taking the first one out for a spin with 'Thunderbolt 9' painted on the side.

Air-Land Battle is a good source, and like you, I recommend any who hasn't read it, to do so. Its a great way to get a feeling for how the US was planning on fighting WW3. But also, dig deeper than what is found on the internet to see what the Soviets was planning: A lot of what you see there is based on supposition and jingo-ism. The Soviets knew they was facing an uphill battle post 84 - a lot of generals said that once the Reagan build up got solidly underway (I've heard dates of 88-90), there was no longer any real hope of winning without NBC warfare - and they planned accordingly. Falling back on NBC doesn't mean they was throwing in the towel: they was just coming up with a plan that would probably work. Post GW the Soviets really knew they was done for. I think that played a huge role in the end of the Soviet menace. Pre-88, they was still confident of a win - just wouldn't be easy. And they had reason to be reasonably confident. I am nbot going to say they was right, or wrong, but they had solid plans in place to counter the effects of the AirLand Battle, and recall, there wouldn't be much Air in the FEBA - There the Soviets was justly and fairly confident that they had the upper hand thanks to the efforts put into forward air defence.


I have no idea how WW3 in the 80's would have wound up: My gut feeling is the further from 1980 and the closer to 1990 the less likely the Soviets would have pulled it off without going nuclear. Using hindsight, everyone pretty much all the professionals agree it would have been us breaking out the portable buckets of sunshine (Thats 80's air force speak for Nukes) if they kicked off between 75-83 - the western armies, especially and most importantly the US - was a hollow threat.

I think I'd agree with most of that except for the fact that you missed the Sherman Firefly, which was a very effective tank killer at standard combat ranges.

The problem with post-war American tanks was that they weren't much better than anything the Soviets had and they had fewer tanks. The M60 was basicaly a progressive development of the WW2 M26, via the M47/M48. None of these tanks were bad tanks, just they not much better if at all than the Soviet T-55/T-62/T-64 generation. US tankers in Europe from the late 60's until 1980 must have been looking at the BAOR in NORTHAG with their 60 ton Chieftain tanks with 120mm rifled guns and saying to the Generals in the Pentagon "why cant we have one of them?"

[pmulcahy11b]

Let me reiterate the experience of the late Michael March, my next-door neighbor and former Sherman crewman (started as a driver, and eventually worked his way into the TC's hatch). He got to Europe about two weeks after D-Day, and his crew was given a "reissue;" the Sherman had been hit a short time before and the entire crew was killed or wounded. The repair troops patched the Sherman up, but weren't very effective at cleaning up the mess inside. Mike told me that every time they started up the vehicle and the engine started getting warm, you could smell the previous crew.

He (and other Sherman crewman) were told straight out that in fight with a Tiger or Panther, they would lose four Shermans in the process of knocking out that German tank. The Shermans were inferior technology, but the Germans couldn't match our production rate. Given a hypothetical WW3, NATO would find themselves on the opposite side of equation -- The Warsaw Pact would mob us with tons of inferior tanks and vehicles, inferior tech aircraft, and troops that have been taught to rock and roll instead of using aimed semiautomatic fire.

The only thing that might save us is superior technology that is so superior that it equalizes the fight. And, in another parallel to the Nazis, we had a lot of wunderwaffen, but not enough to be an equalizing force. Another thing that achieve a partial equalization might be the large amounts of B-52s and B-1s that we still had in the 90s.

Unfortunately, I fear that what would happen is that a lot of Pershings would unwrap...

[Webstral]

The 98k is an interesting case of a superb system that is not well adapted for the circumstances of its use. I probably don’t need to elaborate with this crowd regarding the excellence of design of the 98k or of its lasting impact on the design of bolt action rifles. As Panther Al points out, the legacy of the 98k endures. However, the legacy is as a sniper rifle, not a battle rifle. The Germans had a superb weapon that was not optimized for infantry combat the way it actually occurs—especially in restricted terrain. The 98k was very poorly suited for the fighting in Stalingrad, where numbers of Sturmgewehr would have been warmly welcomed.

One of the important aspects of technology is knowing how to use it. As has been pointed out, the Me-262 could have had a very significant impact on the air war over Europe if Hitler hadn’t been so fixated on turning it into a bomber. The Battle of the Atlantic could have been turned around much sooner if the US has put more B-24s in at the beginning. The Germans realized early on just how flexible and powerful the 88mm was. The US developed the remarkable Norden bomb sight but tested it in the American Southwest, where sunny skies predominate. The whole concept of daylight bombing was predicated on good visibility from high altitude—conditions that don’t reliably occur over Germany. The Germans realized early on that the turret needs to include most of the tank crew and a radio; thus, with fewer and less combat-worthy tanks than the British and French, they won the Battle of France. I could go on and on, but most of us here know everything I’ve written so far. The inherent qualities of the machine are but a modest slice of the pie that is their success on the battlefield.

[Panther Al]

RN7 is right that I missed the Firefly (A Tank my grandfather finished the war in) and, as well, the Easy 8 - which is probably the best Sherman ever built. Both of these, and even the 76mm armed M4, was a much better Sherman. But they was still a small fraction of the total number of Shermans in the field before the last few months.


I would rate either the Firefly or the E8 as better than any IV, and almost equal to the Panther (Armour still sucks in comparison).


Now, as to why the M26 didn't see combat till March....



Blame the Pentagon. The M26 should have been fielded in time for the push up the Italian boot, not to mention D-Day. It was, for all intents, capable of being ready in time. However, the staffers in the puzzle palace believed that the Heavy Tank was an evil that needed to be purged from the US Army, the main argument was that resources devoted to building, and transporting, the M26 could easily be used to send 3 Sherman's to the front. Considering how good the stock Sherman was compared to the IV, it don't think it passes the smell test. The Pershing was *not* the equal to the Tiger 2. It was however the Equal to the Panther, and the Tiger 1. Its armour protection (depending on where exactly you point too - in spots it was less) was the same as both tanks, and the 90mm gun wasn't as hot as you'd might think - it was based on the 90mm AA gun yes, and the stock 90mm AA gun was the equal to the 88L71, but the gun mounted in the Pershing was basically a sawed off version, not allowing the ammo to get to full velocity before leaving the barrel and hindering its terminal performance. However, that performance was equal to the 88L56 and the 75L70, and its mobility was the equal as well.

[Panther Al]

The 98k is an interesting case of a superb system that is not well adapted for the circumstances of its use. I probably don’t need to elaborate with this crowd regarding the excellence of design of the 98k or of its lasting impact on the design of bolt action rifles. As Panther Al points out, the legacy of the 98k endures. However, the legacy is as a sniper rifle, not a battle rifle. The Germans had a superb weapon that was not optimized for infantry combat the way it actually occurs—especially in restricted terrain. The 98k was very poorly suited for the fighting in Stalingrad, where numbers of Sturmgewehr would have been warmly welcomed.

One of the important aspects of technology is knowing how to use it. As has been pointed out, the Me-262 could have had a very significant impact on the air war over Europe if Hitler hadn’t been so fixated on turning it into a bomber. The Battle of the Atlantic could have been turned around much sooner if the US has put more B-24s in at the beginning. The Germans realized early on just how flexible and powerful the 88mm was. The US developed the remarkable Norden bomb sight but tested it in the American Southwest, where sunny skies predominate. The whole concept of daylight bombing was predicated on good visibility from high altitude—conditions that don’t reliably occur over Germany. The Germans realized early on that the turret needs to include most of the tank crew and a radio; thus, with fewer and less combat-worthy tanks than the British and French, they won the Battle of France. I could go on and on, but most of us here know everything I’ve written so far. The inherent qualities of the machine are but a modest slice of the pie that is their success on the battlefield.

I'm not saying the 98K was a great battle rifle: note I mentioned the M1 was better in that regard. But it was a rifle they had a great deal off from the first world war, they didn't have to do anything but dust off the machinery to get production going again. In this case, this was a rare example of the German military taking the sensible road when it came to procurement. It was designed for open field battle: where its range could come into play. Deserts of Afrika? Yeah... it was a dominating rifle there. Once you got into the cities, the tighter woods, yeah... Thats why I believe there was such an emphasis on the Machine Pistol post 43. They saw the problems, and unlike anyone else, actually took steps to find the right answer: the StG44 (MP44).

[Raellus]

And the Allies fielded a superior light machine gun; The Bren Gun, the world's first real infantry support weapon, still used by the British Army until the 1980's and still built in India.

Don't get me wrong, I like the Bren, but the MG-42 was superior to the Bren Gun in nearly every way except maybe weight. The modern German version of the MG-42, the MG-3, is still in use around the world today, as is the M60 which was modelled on the MG-42.

The Allies also fielded the M2 Browning, the best heavy machine gun ever made and still the standard heavy machine gun of every NATO and western country and many more besides.

Good call.

Despite its limitations the Germans also had a very healthy respect for the Sherman Firefly, who's 17 pounder chewed up some Panthers and Tigers in Normandy after D-Day, and are credit with killing the Tiger tank commanded by Michael Wittmann who was Germany's top scoring tank ace of WW2.

Yes, the 17-pounder was a badass AT gun. It was the gun the Germans respected, not the tank it what mounted on.

The Germans also killed three times as many Soviets as the Soviets killed Germans.

Very true. But the Soviets still won. I only bring this up as it supports my premise in the Defense of the Red Army thread.

The German army casualty rates in the west after D-Day were every bit as severe as they were in the east, and Western air power was superior in technology and also in numbers to even the Soviets.

I don't think your first claim is very accurate. During the five weeks of Operation Bagration, launched in June of '44, the Red Army destroyed Army Group Center and bagged the Soviets 17 German divisions utterly destroyed and 50 others shattered. The Soviets claimed 400,000 Germans killed, 2000 tanks destroyed, and 158,000 prisoners taken. By contrast, the Germans lost about 200,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, and 250,000 men captured during the entire Normandy campaign, including the Falaise Pocket battles (all told, nearly three months of fighting). That's just the most glaring example.

Your second claim is right on the money.

The Allies could have taken Berlin before the Soviets, in fact the Germans probably wanted them to take Berlin before the Soviets. But the decision who was to take Berlin was decided at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Eisenhower’s halted the Western Allied advance at the Elbe River.

The Western Allies were also much more reluctant to take casualties and so Eisenhower decided to let the Soviets earn Berlin with their blood. Stalin and the Red Army generals were more than willing to oblige.

[95th Rifleman]

Allies where behind he curve right up to 1944.

Look t the British, we didn't even have a tank that could fire HE and AP untill we bought the American M3's! We had to have one tank in every squadrn equipped with a howitzer to provide smoke and HE shells because the 6 pounders on everything else could only fire AP.

The Firefly was a quickfix because nothing in the British inventory could carry the 17pouner and we had to turn it on it's side to squeeze it into the the sherman. Only one in eery 4 tanks was a Firefly at best and the Germans learned to knock them out first.

[Panther Al]

Allies where behind he curve right up to 1944.

Look t the British, we didn't even have a tank that could fire HE and AP untill we bought the American M3's! We had to have one tank in every squadrn equipped with a howitzer to provide smoke and HE shells because the 6 pounders on everything else could only fire AP.

The Firefly was a quickfix because nothing in the British inventory could carry the 17pouner and we had to turn it on it's side to squeeze it into the the sherman. Only one in eery 4 tanks was a Firefly at best and the Germans learned to knock them out first.

Exactly, which was what the Brits (And the yanks) learned to do in Africa when the long gunned IV's started showing up, so turnabout always sucks.

[Legbreaker]

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

[Sanjuro]

RN7 said in electronics and radars the British were probably ahead of everyone.
True: and then there is computing and codebreaking. The world's first electronic computer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colossus_computer , and a cryptology facility so advanced that for over thirty years no one even believed their achievements were even technically possible. Britain was even able to sell captured Enigma technology all over the world as "unbreakable coding machines" and then happily read everyone's encrypted messages...
On the subject of Gloster jets... in my first flying instruction job, there was a retired pilot who taught groundschool. He had been a Hurricane pilot early in WW2, then after several combat tours he was "rested" by being assigned to fly with the ATA delivering aircraft to combat stations.
One day he was ordered to collect a new aircraft- with two engines. Not having much multi-engine experience, he read all he could about multi-engine handling techniques on the train to the airfield. On arrival, he was told "it's behind the hangar, help yourself"- but was very confused because the aircraft had no propellors.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

...I'm sorry if that's ranty and I know people are going to jump on this post...
Um yeah, I am going to jump on a few things here but probably not the ones people think. In fact what I'm going to say means I am quite happy to jump to Raellus's defence for his original post in defence of the Red Army.


...The Germans never gave serious consideration to nuclear weapons. Yes, they had Heavy Water experiments in Norway, but even if the Allies had left them untouched and the war had dragged on (which the Soviets weren't going to do - they were after blood, the Western Front be damned), there's no way they'd have had a tested and working bomb before the Reds got to them...
Jury is still out I think on this, I've read statements from German scientists from after the war saying that they actively prevented the development of atomic weapons even though they believed that they could have achieved production. In particular, they claimed that by using technical language involving physics and higher math, they were able to confuse the issue enough that they never truly conveyed the power of atomic weapons to the Nazi regime nor the ability to produce them.

And I've also read claims that the Germans didn't have the knowledge to do so or that they didn't have the necessary uranium resources and so on, so it seems that the whole issue is never going to be particularly clear...


...The consequence of not living in a nightmare police state which is what everyone east of the Berlin Wall lived under until 1990, but rather a free and open society was that the Soviets were able to pre-position Spetsnaz groups and equipment throughout western europe...
I personally know Czechs, Russians and Poles who were living behind the Iron Curtain and yes indoctrination played a huge part in the development of their cultures and the secret police played a significant part in their lives (even more so with East Germany) but for the majority of people living outside the Soviet Union, life was actually pretty damned good some of the time. Free and I mean COMPLETELY free education and medical care and if you didn't have a job one would be found for you (if however, you were a lazy swine who didn't want to work, you would often be thrown in forced labour prisons or conscripted)

In Poland and Czechoslovakia for example, they had more freedoms than the Soviets and more consumer goods and generally more food, clothes and luxury items in the shops. My Czech work colleague used to be a coal miner and the liberties extended to miners would never happen in the West simply because the communist regimes relied heavily on the mines and gave the miners a lot of leeway - such as the ability to refuse conscription and the "exchange rate" was pretty good, three years in the Army or one year in the mines.

True the mines were dangerous but no more so than mines in any Western nation. My work colleague stayed as a miner for many years and was able to afford such luxuries as a brand new colour TV from West Germany - TVs that were regularly sold in Czechoslovak department stores.

Hungarians had a rather "too easy" time crossing the border into Austria during certain years of the Cold War because memories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were still very strong and the border guards of both nations might sometimes be related by old family ties. Hungarians often went into Austria to shop for items that they then sold on to the Soviets!

... a dozen slave labor produced T72s...
Many Soviet workers actually took pride in their work and firmly believing the crap that the Soviet State indoctrinated them with, many of them felt that they were contributing to the security of the Motherland and helping to keep the world free. That plus the Soviets massive expenditure on Civil Defence shelters and training compared to the West convinced many Soviet citizens that the State did care about their ability to survive any aggression from the West.

You have to consider that despite the harshness of the State, the Russians in particular lived in a harsh land and were used to making sacrifices for Rodina (that plus the fact that they have been invaded by significant military forces nearly every two hundred years tends you make you more accepting of the need for sacrifice).

The Soviet Union did have significant problems, food & clothing shortages particularly, but the idea that everyone east of the Berlin Wall lived under a nightmare police state is hyperbole and propaganda and dare I say, indoctrination, from the West.

[Mahatatain]

The Western Allies were also much more reluctant to take casualties and so Eisenhower decided to let the Soviets earn Berlin with their blood. Stalin and the Red Army generals were more than willing to oblige.
If I remember correctly (I read this book quite a few years ago) in Stephen E. Ambrose's biography of Eisenhower (Eisenhower: Soldier and President) he says that Eisenhower resisted pressure to take Berlin and chose instead to engage the major remaining elements of the German Army, approaching his strategy from a military rather than a political point of view.

Ambrose then went on to say that when Eisenhower became President he recognised that the political point of view sometimes outweighs the military and that he may have made a strategic mistake in not driving straight to Berlin when he could have.

We will never know however.....

[copeab]

A few points:

The undergunning of the Sherman was largely the result of the flawed doctrine of the US in having tank destroyers (like the M-10, M-36 and M-18) kill other tanks.

The Arado Ar 234 was the blitz bomber Hitler wanted the Me 262 to be, but had it showed up a few months earlire in it's role as recon plane, the Germans would have almost certainly spotted the D-Day invasion fleet assembling (at that time, the Germans really had no effective air recon over England).

The Me 262, with engine development problems, probably would not have entered service much sooner even without Hitler's meddling.

The US viewed solders as interchangable pieces and had a disgraceful method of replacing dead/wounded soldiers with new ones. The "we'll sacrifice four Shermans for one Panther" was just an extension of this.

The M-1 carbine (and especially M-2) could be viewed as an early version of the PDW concept -- a light, handy weapon for use by troops whose primary job isn't a rifleman.

Although the Germans get all the attention, the US successfully used guided glide bombs in the Pacific, mostly for destroying bridges in the CBI Theater.

[RN7]

Yes, the 17-pounder was a badass AT gun. It was the gun the Germans respected, not the tank it what mounted on.

The Germans respected French tanks in 1940 because on paper they were better than their own, but their now just an afterthought in WW2 history. The Allies coverted 2,300 Sherman Fireflies which was probably equivalent to most of the German tank fleet in Western Europe from 1944-45.


Very true. But the Soviets still won. I only bring this up as it supports my premise in the Defense of the Red Army thread.

There are many reasons why the Soviet won and the Germans lost, and there isn't enough time or space in this thread to fully discuss it.


I don't think your first claim is very accurate. During the five weeks of Operation Bagration, launched in June of '44, the Red Army destroyed Army Group Center and bagged the Soviets 17 German divisions utterly destroyed and 50 others shattered. The Soviets claimed 400,000 Germans killed, 2000 tanks destroyed, and 158,000 prisoners taken. By contrast, the Germans lost about 200,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, and 250,000 men captured during the entire Normandy campaign, including the Falaise Pocket battles (all told, nearly three months of fighting). That's just the most glaring example.

German frontline strength during Operation Bagration were 400,000 troops, under 500 tanks and assault guns, with another 400,000 support and non combat personnel. The Soviets had over 2.3 million troops and 4,000 tanks and assault guns. The Germans were outnumbered 3:1 to one or 6:1 if you only count frontline German troops. The actually German casualties in Bagration were 400,000 total casualties (killed, missing and wounded) and the Soviets lost 780,000 men and 2,900 tanks.

In Operation Overlord from the 6th June until the 25th of August the Allies had over 2 million troops as opposed to just over 1 million Germans. German casualties were 209,000 troops and 2,200 tanks and assault guns, while the Allied casualties were 226,000 troops and 4,000 tanks. During Operation Dragoon, the other less well known Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944 200,000 Allied troops faced 300,000 Germans. Allies casualties were 20,000 as opposed to 27,000 Germans.

Basically the battles fought on the Eastern Front throughout the war were one a titanic scale, as whoever lost faced extermination due to the polar opposite ideologies and the Nazi racial element that was brought into the war. Losses throughout the war were staggering but the Soviet tended to lose a lot more even in victory until 1945 when Germany was all but defeated. For most of the war the German troops were far better trained and led than their Soviet counterparts, but were let down by supply problems and political interference from Berlin. However German land forces were less dominant throughout the war against Western forces excluding the catastrophic problems the Allies had in 1940 for various reasons. The casualty rates of German troops versus American and British troops are generally similar on both sides in North Africa, Italy and NW Europe after D-Day with a few exceptions, but in general the Allies inflicted heavier casualties against the Germans than what they received, and more importantly they generally won the battles and had manpower and supply problems that the Germans only dreamed of having.


The Western Allies were also much more reluctant to take casualties and so Eisenhower decided to let the Soviets earn Berlin with their blood. Stalin and the Red Army generals were more than willing to oblige.

Stalin had a lot less respect for human life than any Western General

[Panther Al]

RN7,

This might feel like I am bashing, but I swear, I'm not... :)


A couple more fallacies in the last one you put up. In 1940, on the whole, the French Tanks *was* the best out there. True, they did have problems (One man turrets anyone?), but by and large the latest generations (S35 and H35/39 - not to mention the Char B-1) of French tanks was much better than most of what was fielded by the germans. It was German Tactics - and french strategic stupidity - that allowed the Fall of France.

While manpower losses might be accurate for Overlord, the Tank loss numbers you have came from allied sources. Which are massively overstated by almost a factor of 10. I've seen the daily strength reports of the German Units involved in the normandy campaign, and while they did lose a lot of tanks, they never fielded that many in the first place on the western front at any one time. The strongest, and only up to strength, Panzer Unit there was the Panzer Lehr, and they only had 162 Panzers. The various SS Panzer divisions was averaging around a hundred each. The 21st was at a lower number. Replacements sent to the front from June to September amounted roughly 300 Panzers of all types (This doesn't include new units arriving). At peak: 31 August, the total Panzer Strength in the western front topped out at 784. Including those in workshops - which amounted to half of that number. Just taking Panthers alone, only 1130 was sent west before Sep 1, of those, 397 was still on the books as operational, 240 (I don't have the exact number for this handy, want to say it was between 240 and 250) in workshops, with another 124 withdrawn to other fronts.


Panthers accounted for half of all the panzers (including StuG's) on the western front between 6 June and 6 August. Of those present (484 with 1.SS-Pz.Rgt 1, 2, 9, 12; 1.Pz-Rgt 3, and 6, each of 79 (Save for Pz-Rgt6 with 89)) only 131 was wrote off as a total loss. By this time 32 was sent from ordnance depots, and another 73 from Mailly-le-Camp training school upping totals to 458 on hand. Oddly enough, it wasn't till August that Panthers stopped being the bulk of Panzers sent to the west - August to September was when the Panzer Brigades arrived, and they was only 1-3 in panther/other panzer strength.

Part of the accounting issue for German Panzer losses between German Sources and Allied, is that we counted Halftracks as Panzers: Which is stupid, but there you go. And the Lehr's Infantry Regiments was fully equipped to the last man with all the latest armoured halftracks for rides. The only division (Heer or SS) to be so equipped - and they took heavy losses in those rides while serving as fire brigades.

Granted, come november, the strength reports ballooned for the Ardennes offensive, but thats not important to this point.


Copeab is spot on as to why the Sherman was under gunned. It was never meant to take on tanks in the first place: it was supposed to be an Infantry Support Tank.

[Raellus]

If you're comparing German casualty figures on both fronts after June 6th, 1944, I think you need to take into consideration the fact that a lot of Germans surrendered to WA formations because they didn't want to be captured and/or killed by the Red Army. These voluntary surrenders would presumably be counted in the tally of overall casualties, skewing that number slightly in favor of the WA (making the WA look more effective than they actually were). I think that this is misleading, because it happened almost by default. If anything, this willingness of some German units to surrender to Western forces indicates that the Red Army was in some ways a force modifier, its mere existence helping the WA (in that they didn't have to fight Germans hoping/seeking to be captured by them). In other words, if it weren't for the threat posed by the Red Army, some of those German units in the west would have fought as hard as the ones on the Eastern Front did.

[LAW0306]

we have a differnt helmet because we do differnt things. with out getting into secrets on a forum. do your homework before you bash the best army in the world or the United States Marine Corps.

[LAW0306]

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

True leg it does make a ping....but as you know we fight in teams like you aussies do. So please stick your head up and my battle buddy will smoke you or the attached MG team. just not a very good point. we never fight one on one...thats tv and movies...we fight as teams....war is a team sport.

[Adm.Lee]

Something to consider when comparing the WW2 Wehrmacht and NATO's forces is that those German wonder-weapons were pretty rare on the ground.

They equipped only some of their formations as panzer and panzergrenadiers, the vast majority of German soldiers fought with the Kar98k, hardly any armored support, and artillery from captured Soviet 76mm guns pulled by horses.

The Western Allies in WW2, and NATO in the Cold War, had the wherewithal to back up their "just good enough" and "dependent on firepower" forces and doctrines when they fought. You can say that the King Tigers and Jagdpanthers were a luxury force, deployed in small numbers and overwhelmed by heavy odds, but the Leopards and Challengers and Abrams tanks were meant to equip *all* of the NATO armies.

Second item: check out the book Death traps by Belton Cooper. He was a WW2 Ordnance officer in the 3rd Armored Division. In his version, the Ordnance Corps offered Patton and others the Pershing tank in the winter of 1943-44, but they turned it down, not wanting to a) deal with the inevitable teething troubles, and b) have a disruption in the supply chain, especially one that would cut the number of tanks shipped by a factor of 2 or 3. Given the Allies' superiority in airpower, artillery, and the presence of 90mm TDs, that might be a compromise to consider.

[RN7]

RN7,

This might feel like I am bashing, but I swear, I'm not... :).

Oh no fell free to contradict all you like!

A couple more fallacies in the last one you put up. In 1940, on the whole, the French Tanks *was* the best out there. True, they did have problems (One man turrets anyone?), but by and large the latest generations (S35 and H35/39 - not to mention the Char B-1) of French tanks was much better than most of what was fielded by the germans. It was German Tactics - and french strategic stupidity - that allowed the Fall of France.

Well I sort of presumed that you knew I knew the reasons why the French were so poor in the Battle of France as I think every knows them, hence why I said later in my reply to Raellus “excluding the catastrophic problems the Allies had in 1940 for various reasons”

While manpower losses might be accurate for Overlord, the Tank loss numbers you have came from allied sources. Which are massively overstated by almost a factor of 10. I've seen the daily strength reports of the German Units involved in the normandy campaign, and while they did lose a lot of tanks, they never fielded that many in the first place on the western front at any one time. The strongest, and only up to strength, Panzer Unit there was the Panzer Lehr, and they only had 162 Panzers.

I think I included September figures as well, strike that it’s a typo.

From my sources Panzer Lehr had either 188 tanks (89 Panthers and 99 Pz IV and 41 Stug) or 144 tanks (52 Panther, 92 Pz IV and 40 Stug) on the 1st of June 1944. Obviously a few discrepancies in combat ready/short term and long term repair reports.


The various SS Panzer divisions was averaging around a hundred each. The 21st was at a lower number.

Off the top of my head at the start of D-Day the following German divisions had....

Panzer Lehr Division: 188 tanks (89 Panther, 99 Pz IV, 41 Stug)
1st SS Panzer Division: 88 tanks (38 Panther, 50 Pz IV, 45 Stug)
2nd Panzer Division: 166 tanks (70 Panther, 96 Panzer IV, 19 Stug)
2nd SS Panzer Division: 92 tanks (37 Panther, 55 Pz IV, 42 Stug)
3rd Fallschirmjager Division; 0 tank
10th SS Panzer Division: 39 tanks (39 Panther, 38 Stug)
12th SS Panzer Division: 148 tanks (50 Panzer, 98 Panzer IV, 2 Stug)
17th SS Division: 0 tanks
19th SS Division: 0 tanks (42 Stug)
21st Panzer Division: 112 tanks (112 Panther)
716th Infantry Division: 0 tanks

Replacements sent to the front from June to September amounted roughly 300 Panzers of all types (This doesn't include new units arriving). At peak: 31 August, the total Panzer Strength in the western front topped out at 784. Including those in workshops - which amounted to half of that number. Just taking Panthers alone, only 1130 was sent west before Sep 1, of those, 397 was still on the books as operational, 240 (I don't have the exact number for this handy, want to say it was between 240 and 250) in workshops, with another 124 withdrawn to other fronts.

Panthers accounted for half of all the panzers (including StuG's) on the western front between 6 June and 6 August. Of those present (484 with 1.SS-Pz.Rgt 1, 2, 9, 12; 1.Pz-Rgt 3, and 6, each of 79 (Save for Pz-Rgt6 with 89)) only 131 was wrote off as a total loss. By this time 32 was sent from ordnance depots, and another 73 from Mailly-le-Camp training school upping totals to 458 on hand. Oddly enough, it wasn't till August that Panthers stopped being the bulk of Panzers sent to the west - August to September was when the Panzer Brigades arrived, and they was only 1-3 in panther/other panzer strength.

Part of the accounting issue for German Panzer losses between German Sources and Allied, is that we counted Halftracks as Panzers: Which is stupid, but there you go. And the Lehr's Infantry Regiments was fully equipped to the last man with all the latest armoured halftracks for rides. The only division (Heer or SS) to be so equipped - and they took heavy losses in those rides while serving as fire brigades.


I believe German tank reinforcements for June was 48 Tiger I, 256 Panther and 121 Pz IV. Losses were 19 Tiger 1, 80 Panther, 125 Pz IV and 27 Stug.
In July they received 42 Tiger 1, 83 Panther, 31 Pz IV and 56 Stug. Losses were 14 Tiger 1, 125 Panther, 149 Pz IV and 68 Stug plus others.
In August they received 14 Tiger 1, 11 Pz IV and 59 Stug. Losses were 15 Tiger 1, 41 Panther, 49 Pz IV and 78 Stug plus others.

I believe the total German tank losses were 224 for June, 288 for July, 105 for August and 1,228 for September for a total 1,845. The September figure obviously increases total German tank losses.

[Panther Al]

Oh no fell free to contradict all you like!



Well I sort of presumed that you knew I knew the reasons why the French were so poor in the Battle of France as I think every knows them, hence why I said later in my reply to Raellus “excluding the catastrophic problems the Allies had in 1940 for various reasons”



I think I included September figures as well, strike that it’s a typo.

From my sources Panzer Lehr had either 188 tanks (89 Panthers and 99 Pz IV and 41 Stug) or 144 tanks (52 Panther, 92 Pz IV and 40 Stug) on the 1st of June 1944. Obviously a few discrepancies in combat ready/short term and long term repair reports.




Off the top of my head at the start of D-Day the following German divisions had....

Panzer Lehr Division: 188 tanks (89 Panther, 99 Pz IV, 41 Stug)
1st SS Panzer Division: 88 tanks (38 Panther, 50 Pz IV, 45 Stug)
2nd Panzer Division: 166 tanks (70 Panther, 96 Panzer IV, 19 Stug)
2nd SS Panzer Division: 92 tanks (37 Panther, 55 Pz IV, 42 Stug)
3rd Fallschirmjager Division; 0 tank
10th SS Panzer Division: 39 tanks (39 Panther, 38 Stug)
12th SS Panzer Division: 148 tanks (50 Panzer, 98 Panzer IV, 2 Stug)
17th SS Division: 0 tanks
19th SS Division: 0 tanks (42 Stug)
21st Panzer Division: 112 tanks (112 Panther)
716th Infantry Division: 0 tanks




I believe German tank reinforcements for June was 48 Tiger I, 256 Panther and 121 Pz IV. Losses were 19 Tiger 1, 80 Panther, 125 Pz IV and 27 Stug.
In July they received 42 Tiger 1, 83 Panther, 31 Pz IV and 56 Stug. Losses were 14 Tiger 1, 125 Panther, 149 Pz IV and 68 Stug plus others.
In August they received 14 Tiger 1, 11 Pz IV and 59 Stug. Losses were 15 Tiger 1, 41 Panther, 49 Pz IV and 78 Stug plus others.

I believe the total German tank losses were 224 for June, 288 for July, 105 for August and 1,228 for September for a total 1,845. The September figure obviously increases total German tank losses.

*waggles his fingers* Those numbers are not the ones I have, though with all things when it comes to german records you never do know.

However, the 21st's numbers is *way* off. The 21st had NO panthers at all in its TOE. Also, while September was a murderous month for the Panzer forces, by this time there was only 3 Panther Regiments left by 9 Sept: they had all been withdrawn, so a lot of those losses was older models. Not to mention I do believe - though I have scant evidence, just enough to make me think this - that the loss numbers are slightly exaggerated. Most of my numbers come from actual strength reports as reported by the units, coupled with delivery information. While none are fully and totally reported, and there is always room for 'inflation' on the combat reports, I feel comfortable about them.

The Pocket trapped a lot of German Equipment, but the legend of all the Panzers being left behind is largely that: Legend. A lot was abandoned don't get me wrong, but the Germans knew how important it was to get the armour out, and they recovered more than was believed at the time. Not enough to make a huge difference, but...

Ritgen mentioned - at least I want to say it was him, but I know I read it one of the post war memoirs, that it was pretty common to have units overstate its losses to a slight degree in order to encourage the rear to increase its importance in receiving replacements. Early in the war, it was to the advantage to overstate strength, but by the time the war was heading to its conclusion, it was felt it was better to try to find any reason to get to the head of the line for replacements.

Its this, and the aformentioned scarcity of solid info due to the destruction of files and records that makes this such a point of debate. :)

[RN7]

*waggles his fingers* Those numbers are not the ones I have, though with all things when it comes to german records you never do know.

However, the 21st's numbers is *way* off. The 21st had NO panthers at all in its TOE.

Sorry that was a typo, the 2st had 112 Panther IV, I also made one with the 12th SS Panzer: Should be 50 Panther, 98 Panzer IV and 2 Stug.

I'm also looking at a German source (7AOK Kriegtagbuch from captured German documents) that show the 2nd panzer battalion of the 21st Panzer Division was still using some ex-French Somua tanks at the beginning of June, and the 3rd battalion was due to be refitted with Panthers.

[RN7]

If you're comparing German casualty figures on both fronts after June 6th, 1944, I think you need to take into consideration the fact that a lot of Germans surrendered to WA formations because they didn't want to be captured and/or killed by the Red Army. These voluntary surrenders would presumably be counted in the tally of overall casualties, skewing that number slightly in favor of the WA (making the WA look more effective than they actually were). I think that this is misleading, because it happened almost by default. If anything, this willingness of some German units to surrender to Western forces indicates that the Red Army was in some ways a force modifier, its mere existence helping the WA (in that they didn't have to fight Germans hoping/seeking to be captured by them). In other words, if it weren't for the threat posed by the Red Army, some of those German units in the west would have fought as hard as the ones on the Eastern Front did.

I didn't include prisoner of war figures for either front. But if I was in the German Army on the Eastern front in 1945 I think I'd be making my way as far west as I could get as soon as possible!

[Legbreaker]

Which I believe is exactly what happened, particularly in the last weeks and especially days of the war. Nobody wanted to be captured by the Russians!

[copeab]

I think it's fair to point out the British weren't generally superior to the American tanks. British cruiser tanks were underarmed and underarmored, while the infantry tanks were undrrgunned snd maddeningly slow. Most of the cruiser tanks had reliability issues. It wasn't until the Centurion (which abandoned the ctuiser/infantry distinction) that the British had a really good tamk.

While the British 6-pdr was a better AT weapon than the Sherman's 75mm, it was less useful for everything else.

[Webstral]

The Soviet Union did have significant problems, food & clothing shortages particularly, but the idea that everyone east of the Berlin Wall lived under a nightmare police state is hyperbole and propaganda and dare I say, indoctrination, from the West.

Regarding economic conditions inside the Soviet Union, I suggest a read from the late 1960’s: Workers’ Paradise Lost by Eugene Lyons. Remarkably prescient. This work has figured strongly into my efforts to build a v1 chronology that connects 1989 with the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet War in 1995.

[Webstral]

The US viewed solders as interchangable pieces and had a disgraceful method of replacing dead/wounded soldiers with new ones.

In the line, no less! Good God, where would we have been without our crushingly superior industrial capacity? How many [expletive deleted] green infantrymen did we sacrifice on the altar of our impatience? Even today, I wonder what would happen if we needed to replace thousands of infantry in short order.

This, by the way, is why I advocate for a National Guard three times the size of the current National Guard with few infantry units but lots of MPs and engineers. When there is a massive requirement for infantry replacements, the junior enlisted guys and the buck sergeants can be run through a 90-day infantry school with better results than one would get with raw recruits. Raw recruits then either replace the Guardsmen or go through a 6-month infantry school, including at least one JRTC rotation, so they actually know [expletive deleted] something before being required to hit the lines.

When will we ever learn from the Germans?

[Legbreaker]

When will we ever learn from the Germans?

Not going to happen I'm afraid. That would mean applying some common sense to the situation.... :(

Although I have a different opinion on the detail, I'm with you on the preference for some sort of national service. Doesn't have to be military (although that would be preferred), could be simply joining an emergency service such as Rural Fire Service (RFS), State Emergency Service (SES) or something similar. Put idle young hands to use, perhaps assisting farmers with manual labour, cleaning up rubbish from highways, or something else productive. Throw in some discipline and maybe a bit of drill and you'll end up with people willing to listen and obey chains of command - could cut a few weeks off training times in case of wartime emergency.

[Adm.Lee]

In the line, no less! Good God, where would we have been without our crushingly superior industrial capacity? How many [expletive deleted] green infantrymen did we sacrifice on the altar of our impatience? Even today, I wonder what would happen if we needed to replace thousands of infantry in short order.
...
When will we ever learn from the Germans?

The Germans who only sent out replacement soldiers at the end of the month? Who had to combine companies nearly every week to have even half-strength battalions in some regiments? Who regularly scraped up whatever soldiers were nearby, such as transients or hospital dischargees, and sent them willy-nilly into combat as "replacement" platoons, with little or no integration into the command structure or unit?

When the American army could make attacks, take casualties and have units at full strength again in two days? That's what the system was designed for, and as far as that goes, it worked. Where it fell down was in our small army in the ETO. There weren't enough divisions to allow any unit to pull back long enough to absorb replacement soldiers.

With as few formations as Ike had, even with the slower replacement system the Germans had, we would have been forced to throw the raw replacements into the line, in ad hoc replacement companies and platoons, just like the Germans did. I doubt the results would have been any better.

I don't see the replacement system itself as the limiting factor, but perhaps the underestimation at the regiment/battalion level on how long infantry small units needed to absorb and assimilate new men. I've read in places that it got better as the divisions and regiments accumulated experience, and took their time to rotate units more often.

[Webstral]

The Germans did not have an ideal solution. We know this because they didn't win. Every army throws together scratch teams as required by circumstances. The strategic and operational realities imposed on the German Army by the lunacy of the senior leadership compelled them to do things like mentioned above, despite the fact that the Germans understood the value of having replacements absorbed in an orderly fashion.

We were not so desperate. We behaved like we were desperate, but that's not the same as actually being desperate. There's a world of difference between combining companies of veterans and fleshing out a company of veterans with new arrivals.

Ike may not have had overwhelming numerical superiority, but he wasn't at a numerical disadvantage, either. We made the numbers picture much worse than it had to be by making awful choices, like attacking through the Hertgen Forest to no good end. Or continuing the offensive up the Italian boot. This is not to say, of course, that the Germans weren't saddled by awful decisions coming down from the top.

What we really should have learned from the Germans is a proper investment in training up front. New officers trained for a year before going into the line. NCOs trained for six months or more. I can't remember off the top of my head how long infantry privates trained. I know that number changed over the course of the war. Nonetheless, German infantry and infantry leadership arrived at the front better trained than our guys did. The qualitative problems led to an ongoing need on our part to throw yet more raw troops into the front and yet more after that because the poor SOBs kept getting themselves killed in few days' time. The Germans eventually reached the point at which they were obliged to send poorly-trained units to the front, but only after attrition had taken its toll on everybody. Warfare by the numbers is cruel, and we could have done much better given our numerical advantage overall.

[Panther Al]

Till late 43 the scheduled training time for a German tanker was 22 months from induction off of civie street to when he is assigned to a field unit. And that's not officers: the time spent in training was for all ranks including the privates.

[pmulcahy11b]

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

Oh the Marines in the Pacific and shortly thereafter among the US Army in Africa that there's a way to use that to your advantage in some circumstances.

While you're in the rear, find a couple of small pieces of metal. Drop them on each other, to test whether they sound like an M1 Garand that is out of ammo.

Then, in battle, have one of your buddies fire up to seven rounds (enough so that you're not out of ammo). Then, drop your magic piece of metal. Your squad then looks for what enemy dummy sticks his head up, and they promptly fill enemy dummy with lead.

That trick worked great with enemy snipers or sharpshooters, and enemy machinegun teams.

[pmulcahy11b]

And I've also read claims that the Germans didn't have the knowledge to do so or that they didn't have the necessary uranium resources and so on, so it seems that the whole issue is never going to be particularly clear...


The Germans' lack of uranium was one of the reasons they invaded the USSR. The bigwigs were actually hoping to get to the Urals, parts of which had large amounts of uranium ore.

[Legbreaker]

While you're in the rear, find a couple of small pieces of metal. Drop them on each other, to test whether they sound like an M1 Garand that is out of ammo.

This is true, however my point was that the M1 was about the only semi automatic rifle issued as standard to any nation in WWII. Virtually everyone else, including the US Marines in the beginning, were equipped with WWI or earlier bolt action rifles, or weapons which were only a "modernised" version of them.

Personally, I'd have preferred a semi auto over bolt action, and automatic over semi, however that's just me. I know of soldiers who could accurately fire a bolt action rifle faster than could be imagined - around 100+ rpm! (ignoring reloading) My own grandfather was one of them, and he wasn't even infantry.

Despite having a number of advantages over the traditional bolt action rifle, the M1 still has that flaw which, although could be turned to advantage on occasion, was still a significant drawback most of the time when compared with more modern designs.

[Sanjuro]

No question, as a tripod mount or emplaced weapon the MG42 is better than the Bren- however, as a squad support weapon the Bren was without peer at the time. Lightweight (for the time, anyway) reliable (just don't put 30 rounds in the magazine) and accurate, usable by one man at a pinch, fairly weatherproof (one of its last frontline uses was with the Royal Marines for Arctic service)- and iconic in appearance.
It is interesting that, after decades of not using LMGs (the MAG/GPMG covering both the LMG and MMG roles) the British Army decided to go back to having a squad support weapon, the L86- not only at the squad level, but issued one per 4-man fireteam. Standard ammo load initially was 6 thirty round mags per rifleman- but 2 of those were reserved for the LSW gunner.

[Targan]

we have a differnt helmet because we do differnt things. with out getting into secrets on a forum. do your homework before you bash the best army in the world or the United States Marine Corps.

Wait, I'm confused. Where's the bashing? That the USMC developed their own helmet is a statement of fact. Did I miss the post where someone disparaged the efficacy of the USMC's helmet?

[Raellus]

I've read a lot of books about the USMC in WWII (& Korea and Vietnam) over the last couple of years and, overall, I am really impressed with its performance. They fought in some of the fiercest, no-quarter combat of the war (Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Peleilu, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, to name a few) and despite often taking heavy casualties, they almost always prevailed.

The Japanese, although tough and determined enemies, were cursed with some of the worst tech of the war. Pretty much all of their weapons systems were inferior to the Western equivalent. The Zero was king for a while, but as soon as allied pilots figured out not to get into a turning/climbing fight with it, it lost a lot of its mystique. Later Allied designs like the Hellcat and Corsair were superior. The Yamato super battleship was impressive and would have been superior in most respects in the age of the battle line, but in the era of naval air, it was a dinosaur.

Japanese infantry weapons were generally crap, across the board. The only major exception was their little "knee" mortars, which could generate impressive close-in indirect fire support. They never had enough artillery, their tanks were crap, and most Japanese infantrymen fought with long, unwieldly bolt-action rifles.

It kind of makes one wonder how the Japanese would have fared with better weapons systems and better leadership.

[copeab]

The Germans who only sent out replacement soldiers at the end of the month? Who had to combine companies nearly every week to have even half-strength battalions in some regiments? Who regularly scraped up whatever soldiers were nearby, such as transients or hospital dischargees, and sent them willy-nilly into combat as "replacement" platoons, with little or no integration into the command structure or unit?


By the end of the war, yes. At the start, no.

The German policy in 1939 was to ;et a unit drop to a certain level due to attrition, then pull it out of combat for a period of time. New soldiers then joined the unit and were integrated/indoctrinated while the veterans were resting. Then, after a period of time, the unit was sent back into action.

This system probably worked well until the first half of 1943, with Stalingrad, Kursk and the fall of North Africa, and continued to deteriorate the rest of the war.

The US, OTOH, just threw new soldiers arriving at the front into units in combat. Many veterans didn't bother to learn the new guys' names, since they expected them to be dead in 2-3 days. Some wouldn't bother to get to know a replacement until he had survived a couple of weeks.

When the American army could make attacks, take casualties and have units at full strength again in two days? That's what the system was designed for, and as far as that goes, it worked. Where it fell down was in our small army in the ETO.

More accurately, the US did have enough riflemen in the war. Other troop types were generally available in adequate (in some cases abundant) numbers.

For example, if doctrine had allowed the Sherman to be armed so it could hunt and kill other tanks, there really would have been no need for all the independent tank destroyer battalions.

[copeab]

.
The Japanese, although tough and determined enemies, were cursed with some of the worst tech of the war. Pretty much all of their weapons systems were inferior to the Western equivalent. The Zero was king for a while, but as soon as allied pilots figured out not to get into a turning/climbing fight with it, it lost a lot of its mystique. Later Allied designs like the Hellcat and Corsair were superior.

The much-maligned P-40 was actually a good match against the Zero as long as the Allied pilot didn't engage in a low-speed turning dogfight or try to out-climb the Zero.

(At high speeds, the P-40 could actually out-turn the Zero)

Japanese infantry weapons were generally crap, across the board. The only major exception was their little "knee" mortars, which could generate impressive close-in indirect fire support. They never had enough artillery, their tanks were crap, and most Japanese infantrymen fought with long, unwieldly bolt-action rifles.

Despite looking like an antique, the Japanese 70mm battalion infantry gun was quite effective.

While their tanks had thing armor and weak guns, they were reliable and had good cross-country performance. The main problem was that fighting the Chinese had taught the Japanese the wrong lessons about tank warfare.

It kind of makes one wonder how the Japanese would have fared with better weapons systems and better leadership.

IIRC, each infantry rifle was stamped with the Imperial chrysanthemum: this marked the weapon as the Emperor's property, which the soldier was allowed to use on his behalf.

Additionally, the long bayonets the Japanese used were "stand ins" for the katana.

[copeab]

Let's remember other German bits of tech that didn't work right:

(1) The FG 42 tried to pack too much power into too small a package, resulting in terrible recoil in automatic fire. Additionally, the cost to produce one was outrageous.

(2) The Me 163 Komet, a rocket fighter tat killed more of it's own pilots than Allied planes did. And that doesn't include ground crew killed by the toxic fuel.

[Legbreaker]

All sides of the war tried different ideas out which failed spectacularly. That's just the price of developing new and wonderful ways of killing the enemy... ;)

[95th Rifleman]

All sides of the war tried different ideas out which failed spectacularly. That's just the price of developing new and wonderful ways of killing the enemy... ;)

I'm reminded of that American bloke who tried to attach incendiary devices to bats.

[Legbreaker]

Or the British idea to detect U-boats by training seabirds to dive on them.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Or the Type 99 machine gun the Japanese had that featured a bayonet lug.

[copeab]

Or the Type 99 machine gun the Japanese had that featured a bayonet lug.

The Japanese loved bayonets more thanthan the USMC did ;)

[Raellus]

Or the incidiary-carrying balloons the Japanese unleased against the U.S. west coast.

[copeab]

I'm reminded of that American bloke who tried to attach incendiary devices to bats.

Those actually worked in tests, in one case blowing up the car of a general observing the test ...

[Webstral]

I'm reminded of that American bloke who tried to attach incendiary devices to bats.

That idea would have worked if it hadn't proved possible to cut out the middle man (bat) and deliver incendiaries straight from the bomb bay to the target.

[Webstral]

(2) The Me 163 Komet, a rocket fighter tat killed more of it's own pilots than Allied planes did. And that doesn't include ground crew killed by the toxic fuel.

There was an idea ahead of its time. If the fuel problem could have been solved in early 1944, the Komet would have the been the ultimate interceptor of its day.

[95th Rifleman]

The Japanese loved bayonets more thanthan the USMC did ;)

Nah the only sentient lifeform that loves bayonets more than the USMC is that crazed species known as the Scottish Highlander.

[Legbreaker]

Or the Australian infantryman. Worse, an Australian infantryman in a kilt! :p
1825

[headquarters]

No question, as a tripod mount or emplaced weapon the MG42 is better than the Bren- however, as a squad support weapon the Bren was without peer at the time. Lightweight (for the time, anyway) reliable (just don't put 30 rounds in the magazine) and accurate, usable by one man at a pinch, fairly weatherproof (one of its last frontline uses was with the Royal Marines for Arctic service)- and iconic in appearance.
It is interesting that, after decades of not using LMGs (the MAG/GPMG covering both the LMG and MMG roles) the British Army decided to go back to having a squad support weapon, the L86- not only at the squad level, but issued one per 4-man fireteam. Standard ammo load initially was 6 thirty round mags per rifleman- but 2 of those were reserved for the LSW gunner.

the mg 42 and its ante decessors - the mg 3 etc are - in my humble opinion - far superior to the mag fed Bren. The Bren - or its Czech predecessor the VZ or LK 26 ( or was it 28 ) was the best there was in the early 1930s. I would say that the MG 42 had better versatility and a more credible sustained fire ability. ( Considering squad mobile automatic fire was only starting to be introduced as a concept in those days.)

Thats not to say that the Bren wasnt any good.

[headquarters]

Wait, I'm confused. Where's the bashing? That the USMC developed their own helmet is a statement of fact. Did I miss the post where someone disparaged the efficacy of the USMC's helmet?

there was no bash.

The USMC is one of our times most legendary miltary formations. No one has said anything else in this thread so far.

[headquarters]

It's worth noting that besides the American M1, virtually everyone else where using bolt action rifles. And the M1, although semi-automatic, had a bit of a serious drawback - that pesky "ping" announcing to the world it was empty.

Considering the ranges most firefights took place - and the general din of battle- the M1 was by far better in practical application than any other prolific stsndard issue rifle of the war. The clink at the end of the mag sounds like a possible drawback to alert your enemy that you are empty - as I imagine the frantic swearing of a bolt rifle fireing grunt would be when he runs out..

just my opinion of course

[headquarters]

I believe that most powers in that horrible war fielded some good - and indeed some bad gear.

Doctrine and leadership were often the most difficult obstacle to utilize the technology to a marked advantage.Lack of foresight in the higher echelons and in some cases lack of political will to commit resources to win come to mind. The Germans didnt start to run their aircraft factories around the clock until a couple of years in for example. The last major war still influenced peoples concepts of ho to fight the present one.

The Germans were quick however to capitalize on their armour and use modern doctrine- but for instance - during the invasion of France and the low countries in 1940 the actual number of German tanks were NOT superior to allied tank power. The allies spread their thinly - the Germans concentrated /manouvered theirs as proved a winning tactic in that combat enviroment.

The Italians believed for the longest time that they did not need to upgrade their airpower / fighters to allied standards. They of course - got clobbered by the Allies overall in the sky. They did make a few good things though such as Beretta MP 38s , and the Beretta service pistol. But they still issued most troops with the questionable Mannlicher-Carcano.

The Japanese had fierce troops with what seemed like unswerving loyalty etc. They opted to issue them with semi obsolete bolt action rifles and tried to win the war without upgrading their infantry gear throughout the war

The Brits fielded the Sten Gun - arguably one of the simplest automatic firearms ever made prolific - but they made good use of it through training their lads and employing tactics that were workable.

Its easy to think that the powers that be in those days cooly calculated their moves - but they made decisions in an enviroment of casualties in the hundreds of thousands and in some cases with enemy arial bombardment actually hitting their place of business / seat of governance.

all in all - the shear economical disparity ( especially after the bombing of the industrial base of Germany) made the Axis chances of winning militarily very slim from mid 42. They could of course hope to get a victory because of a US forfeit , but luckily the US saw it through until the end and in a fashion that at the same time showed stalin that his advance had better halt were it did.

just one guys opinion everybody.

In game terms I find the emergency programs of weapon making that the loosing side and indeed the Soviets ( and to some extent the Brits in 1940) had going highly interesting.The making of field expedient armaments would be a valued skill in T2K I imagine. If you could churn out a few scrap metal/plumbing based SMGs to whatever crate of handgun caliber bullets the village has traded for then you could probably have the best horse, the best-washed wench and the least rotten potatos and the only house with a complete roof in the whole village!

[Panther Al]

No question, as a tripod mount or emplaced weapon the MG42 is better than the Bren- however, as a squad support weapon the Bren was without peer at the time. Lightweight (for the time, anyway) reliable (just don't put 30 rounds in the magazine) and accurate, usable by one man at a pinch, fairly weatherproof (one of its last frontline uses was with the Royal Marines for Arctic service)- and iconic in appearance.
It is interesting that, after decades of not using LMGs (the MAG/GPMG covering both the LMG and MMG roles) the British Army decided to go back to having a squad support weapon, the L86- not only at the squad level, but issued one per 4-man fireteam. Standard ammo load initially was 6 thirty round mags per rifleman- but 2 of those were reserved for the LSW gunner.

The Bren was a great weapon: don't think otherwise. It was just limited in its roles. The reason why the MG 34/42 was much better was that it was the better weapon in a *lot* of roles.

Your typical '42 infantry squad (section) - 10 guys - typically, on average, and there is always exceptions, would only be equipped with one Bren/BAR, and one SMG. That was how things was formed up. Proper Machineguns was all placed in separate battalions, that was chopped up and parcelled out as need. The US at least had two advantages over the British system: The M1 over the SMLE, and the fact that there was a company level weapons platoon that had 2 belt fed machine guns. As the war went on, you would usually see an additional BAR/Bren, and another 1 or 2 SMG's.

The Germans, on the other hand, was set with a book value of 12 in a squad. They picked 12 because the assumed that for various reasons, two wouldn't be available, be it sick, lame, lazy, or such like. Each half squad in the Mechanised forces in 42 - and more than a few leg infantry units - had a MG34/42 and a SMG- with the rest of the squad there for the sole reason of protecting the MG, and feeding it. A typical german platoon had more raw firepower than any allied company - and sometimes battalions (Russians anyone?).

The main reason behind the makeup of the platoons is from how they was supposed to be used. The western allies felt that the base of fire from the platoon is aimed fire from the riflemen, while the automatic rifle keeps the bad guys at range, and help deal with the rushes. This isn't a bad idea - its very economical in ammo consumption. But it isn't well suited to mobile combat. The Germans on the other hand looked at it like this: No matter what, we are always going to be outnumbered. We have to find a way to make up for that. So they based each squad on a pair of mutually supporting weapon sections, each with the sole reason for existence of feeding a proper machine gun, with a very high rate of fire (1200 rounds a minute) designed to put as many bullets as possible in a small area in a short time. As one friend put it, "It was meant to be a 600m shotgun."

Funny enough, most armies these days seem to be built on...

2 Fire Sections...

Based around a MG.

Granted, as the war wore on those numbers got all messed up.

But back on point.

The big disadvantage of the MG42 over the Bren/BAR is ammo consumption. After all, the MG42 is only 2 pounds heavier than the Bren, and in my mind, I'm ok with a 2 pound heavier weapon compared to the MG42's biggest advantage over the Bren.

Ammo Consumption.

Yes, its biggest issues and plusses was ammo: It ran through a lot. Speaking from experience, the advantages that a belt fed machine gun gives over a magazine fed automatic rifle is much better than the problem of toting the ammo.

Of course, this is all my opinion, and you know what they say about that. :)

[RN7]

The Japanese, although tough and determined enemies, were cursed with some of the worst tech of the war.

Pretty much all of their weapons systems were inferior to the Western equivalent. The Zero was king for a while, but as soon as allied pilots figured out not to get into a turning/climbing fight with it, it lost a lot of its mystique. Later Allied designs like the Hellcat and Corsair were superior. The Yamato super battleship was impressive and would have been superior in most respects in the age of the battle line, but in the era of naval air, it was a dinosaur.

Japanese infantry weapons were generally crap, across the board. The only major exception was their little "knee" mortars, which could generate impressive close-in indirect fire support. They never had enough artillery, their tanks were crap, and most Japanese infantrymen fought with long, unwieldly bolt-action rifles.

It kind of makes one wonder how the Japanese would have fared with better weapons systems and better leadership.

Some of their warship designs, munitions and aircraft were actually quite good throughout the war and highly regarded, but unfortunately they werent as good as what America was producing, nor could they build them in them in anything like the quantities that America could with ease. The Yamato despite it dimensions and the size of its main batteries was a technologicaly inferior battleship to US Navy Iowa Class, and would probably have lost if it had ever encountered an Iowa in battle. The British Vanguard might have taken it out as well.

[Raellus]

Some of their warship designs, munitions and aircraft were actually quite good throughout the war and highly regarded, but unfortunately they werent as good as what America was producing, nor could they build them in them in anything like the quantities that America could with ease. The Yamato despite it dimensions and the size of its main batteries was a technologicaly inferior battleship to US Navy Iowa Class, and would probably have lost if it had ever encountered an Iowa in battle. The British Vanguard might have taken it out as well.

I forgot to mention the Long Lance torpedo. That was some deadly device.

[RN7]

The much-maligned P-40 was actually a good match against the Zero as long as the Allied pilot didn't engage in a low-speed turning dogfight or try to out-climb the Zero.

(At high speeds, the P-40 could actually out-turn the Zero).

The P-40 had a slow climb rate and an inferior turn rate to the Zero, but it was actually as fast as the Spitfire 1A and Bf-109E and was slightly quicker than the Zero. The Zero was more maneuverable than the P-40 but it was more maneuverable than every other fighter in 1940/41. The P-40 had good armor, firepower, roll rate, and dive speed, and the Japanese rated it as their most dangerous opponent at low altitude. The P-40 actually had a very good air-to-air combat record, particularly with Chennault Flying Tigers in China against the Japanese, the 325th Fighter Group in Italy and the Royal New Zealand Air Force and was still in use with American forces at the end of the war.

While their tanks had thing armor and weak guns, they were reliable and had good cross-country performance. The main problem was that fighting the Chinese had taught the Japanese the wrong lessons about tank warfare.

The main problem with the Japanese is that they didn't learn any lessons about tank warfare.

In 1939 the Russian army gave them such a hammering in northern China that Japan refused to even think about attacking Russia even after the German invasion. The Japanese Army continued to use the same outdated tactics and type of weapons throughout the war against the Allies instead of learning how to fight against modern mechanised armies. Little or no attempt was made to ask the German army for their very experienced and competant advice in how to counter Soviet or Western mechanised armies and tactics, or to even license producing modern German tanks to give themselves a fighting chance when they went up against modern Allied tanks. The result was a one sided slaughter and led to the biggest military defeat in the history of the Japanese Army when Stalin send the Red Army back into China in August 1945.

[pmulcahy11b]

Wait, I'm confused. Where's the bashing? That the USMC developed their own helmet is a statement of fact. Did I miss the post where someone disparaged the efficacy of the USMC's helmet?

Wait, I'm confused. When did the Marines develop a new helmet? What does it look like?

[Webstral]

The main problem with the Japanese is that they didn't learn any lessons about tank warfare. In 1939 the Russian army gave them such a hammering in northern China that Japan refused to even think...

This is one of the big problems with NTC and JRTC, in my mind. When you lose the game by a couple of runs, you have a serious look at what you can do improve your game. When you lose the game by a dozen runs, you shrug your shoulders and put it behind you. My brigade walked away from NTC with nothing new to talk about because we got taken so thoroughly to the cleaners that we were more interested in forgetting about the experience and salvaging our self-esteem than in investigating why we got pounded so hard. The OPFOR needs to learn how to back off and provide the BLUFOR with a learning experience, not another high-fiving experience for themselves at the downtown establishments. The Japanese got handled so roughly that they turned their backs on all of the lessons they could have learned.

[headquarters]

The Bren and the Bar were good squad weapons - probably the best or among the best - until the advent of the MG42 and the German doctrine described by Panther.

So I agree with him - thats not to say that well trained troops didnt make the Bren a potent weapon. The British and others ended up using the Bren far longer than WWII.

The Bren was a great weapon: don't think otherwise. It was just limited in its roles. The reason why the MG 34/42 was much better was that it was the better weapon in a *lot* of roles.

Your typical '42 infantry squad (section) - 10 guys - typically, on average, and there is always exceptions, would only be equipped with one Bren/BAR, and one SMG. That was how things was formed up. Proper Machineguns was all placed in separate battalions, that was chopped up and parcelled out as need. The US at least had two advantages over the British system: The M1 over the SMLE, and the fact that there was a company level weapons platoon that had 2 belt fed machine guns. As the war went on, you would usually see an additional BAR/Bren, and another 1 or 2 SMG's.

The Germans, on the other hand, was set with a book value of 12 in a squad. They picked 12 because the assumed that for various reasons, two wouldn't be available, be it sick, lame, lazy, or such like. Each half squad in the Mechanised forces in 42 - and more than a few leg infantry units - had a MG34/42 and a SMG- with the rest of the squad there for the sole reason of protecting the MG, and feeding it. A typical german platoon had more raw firepower than any allied company - and sometimes battalions (Russians anyone?).

The main reason behind the makeup of the platoons is from how they was supposed to be used. The western allies felt that the base of fire from the platoon is aimed fire from the riflemen, while the automatic rifle keeps the bad guys at range, and help deal with the rushes. This isn't a bad idea - its very economical in ammo consumption. But it isn't well suited to mobile combat. The Germans on the other hand looked at it like this: No matter what, we are always going to be outnumbered. We have to find a way to make up for that. So they based each squad on a pair of mutually supporting weapon sections, each with the sole reason for existence of feeding a proper machine gun, with a very high rate of fire (1200 rounds a minute) designed to put as many bullets as possible in a small area in a short time. As one friend put it, "It was meant to be a 600m shotgun."

Funny enough, most armies these days seem to be built on...

2 Fire Sections...

Based around a MG.

Granted, as the war wore on those numbers got all messed up.

But back on point.

The big disadvantage of the MG42 over the Bren/BAR is ammo consumption. After all, the MG42 is only 2 pounds heavier than the Bren, and in my mind, I'm ok with a 2 pound heavier weapon compared to the MG42's biggest advantage over the Bren.

Ammo Consumption.

Yes, its biggest issues and plusses was ammo: It ran through a lot. Speaking from experience, the advantages that a belt fed machine gun gives over a magazine fed automatic rifle is much better than the problem of toting the ammo.

Of course, this is all my opinion, and you know what they say about that. :)

[95th Rifleman]

The Bren and the Bar were good squad weapons - probably the best or among the best - until the advent of the MG42 and the German doctrine described by Panther.

So I agree with him - thats not to say that well trained troops didnt make the Bren a potent weapon. The British and others ended up using the Bren far longer than WWII.

That was a bad thing aswell.

We whre caught up on the idea of an LSW style support weapon and in the 80's built the L86 to supplement the L85 when the rest of the world had already realised you needed a proper LMG for squad support.

Wasn't untill after the gulf war we started using the Minimi.

[Legbreaker]

there was no bash.

That's exactly the point. There was no bash of the US forces, just an overreaction to a non-event.

[LAW0306]

god bless you leg.