This Day in History

[dragoon500ly]

August 6th, 1945

The atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima took place.

"And behold! I am created, the destroyer of Worlds!"

[raketenjagdpanzer]

"Now we're all sons-of-bitches."

[mikeo80]

I, for one, am ok with the dropping of the atomic bomb. My dad was training to be a carrier pilot for the invasion of Japan. They were told in training that 50% casualties in pilots was to be expected.

My $0.02

Mike

[Legbreaker]

August 6th, 1945

Of course that was yesterday - international date line and all that! ;)

[raketenjagdpanzer]

I, for one, am ok with the dropping of the atomic bomb. My dad was training to be a carrier pilot for the invasion of Japan. They were told in training that 50% casualties in pilots was to be expected.

My $0.02

Mike

I, too, sleep well at night knowing the bombs were dropped.

[Graebarde]

I'll be the third to say I loose no sleep with the use of the bombs. My dad was in an armored field artillery in the Philipines at the time. He had a buddy that went on occupation in Japan, toured the beaches that they were scheduled to assault in third wave with their 'Priests'. It was attrocious the defenses they faced, and explained why they had at least three times basic load of cannister rounds. Lord only knows what the casulties would have been, but there's a high probability that I would never have been born.

[Adm.Lee]

The casualties for Olympic and Coronet would have been scary.

In some readings about 1995, I found some stuff that indicated that Magic/Ultra had let MacArthur down. Initially, it was thought there were 4 Japanese divisions on Kyushu, then they revised that to 9 divisions by August. American plans called for landing 3 corps, so that's about 9-10 divisions for the attacker. Not good odds, even with all the carriers we had, and air support from Okinawa. (This would have all been from the forces available in the Pacific, troops & planes from Europe would still be in transit.)

The scary bit for me was discovering the Japanese really had 14 divisions there, plus 3 tank brigades, and a really good idea where we were going to land. The difference was in troops pulled from Manchuria, so they were somewhat fresh and tested.

[Webstral]

I've been watching some of the more recent programs on the war in the Pacific. I'm struck by the increasing ferocity of combat as the fighting drew nearer to Japan. Honestly, I'm rather surprised that chemical weapons weren't used against the general population to soften them up before the initial landings. Too many of us look at the atomic bombings from our comfortable viewpoints and have no concept of the outlook of Americans who were facing fighting as brutal as anything on the Eastern Front.

[headquarters]

I've been watching some of the more recent programs on the war in the Pacific. I'm struck by the increasing ferocity of combat as the fighting drew nearer to Japan. Honestly, I'm rather surprised that chemical weapons weren't used against the general population to soften them up before the initial landings. Too many of us look at the atomic bombings from our comfortable viewpoints and have no concept of the outlook of Americans who were facing fighting as brutal as anything on the Eastern Front.


MY musings on the subject - all in my humble opinion of course..

It is doubtless that Japan committed warcrimes on a large scale from 1933 - 1945. ( Their second world war period.) They eventually reaped the spoils of this and of course the populace bore the brunt.

Japan was subjected to a massive and near unprecedented atrocious aerial bombardment by the USAF. ( Conventional). Civillian centers were targeted as well as industrial and military targets. The USAF even commissioned 75 000 (!) V1 rockets or copies thereof to further slam the Japanese in the hope that they would give in. ( Dont know if any where used or how many actuallt were built).

The USN also blockaded Japan to the best of its ability leading to massive shortages, starvation and general need. Still the Japanese did not give in and indeed they conducted massive militarization programs to organise large parts of the populace into militias - some even armed with melee weapons.

The US / allied forces were faced with a large and professional force and a huge militia force that were well dug in and fighting in their homeland. Allied landing areas wrere limited. Japanese tenacity and so on were well known factors. Some allied analysts even believed that guerilla warfare would continue for years or even decades after a successful invasion and subsequent victory - if that was accomplished at all.

Casualties overall for the allies would have been staggering. So high, infact , that some believed ( like the Japanese high command as far as I know) that a truce or peace with some sort of acceptable terms would be possible for Japan.The allies had to take into account their public opinion back home as well as the military realities. This meant that they also had a timelimit to consider to see the victory through.

In this climate if you will , the decision to drop the atomic bombs was taken. The US gambled that Japan would surrender shortly after the event and that the loss of life would be relatively small compared to protracted and all out conventional warfare. This probably includes calculations on Japanese casualties.

So it is not easy to judge on the morality of the matter. The nukes probably killed a lot less people than the blockade and the conventional bombing campaigns against the civilian population did. Using WMD against populated areas is crossing a line nevertheless.

Everyone should make up their own minds I guess.

[Cdnwolf]

MY musings on the subject - all in my humble opinion of course..

So it is not easy to judge on the morality of the matter. The nukes probably killed a lot less people than the blockade and the conventional bombing campaigns against the civilian population did. Using WMD against populated areas is crossing a line nevertheless.

Everyone should make up their own minds I guess.

I agree only on this point that the cost in civilian lives was the lesser of two evils.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

One oft-overlooked fact was that the Japanese also had 3000 aircraft remaining - most outdated, or in poor condition - to sortie against the invasion fleet. This amounted to, by US estimates, two to three destroyed carriers of the line (destroyed as in, totally sunk) plus a lot of other smaller support ships. That's assuming CAP and perimeter defense ships worked entirely as planned.

The invasion also called for the softening up of enemy positions with atom bombs, so even more would've been used. And US troops would've marched straight into the fallout zones.

[Targan]

I'm morally torn on the nuking of Japan (twice). On one hand I'm against the targeting of civilian population centers with WMDs. On the other hand the Japanese treated Allied POWs about as bad as it's possible to treat anyone. So I can't help but feel that, as a society, the bastards had it coming. I still feel bad though, for the women and children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who had little to no influence over what the Japanese military had done.

[WallShadow]

The use of nuclear weapons is a horrific thing; this should never be forgotten. I pray they are never, ever used to harm human beings again.

Saying that, and borrowing on Targan's comment on WMDs, need I point out the CBW branch of the Imperial Army, Special Unit 731 and its long run in China and Manchuria? Or the specialized ceramic "bomb" developed to keep bacteriologic weapons viable until dropped? Bubonic plague-infested rats set loose in China, such that the disease kept resurfacing for years thereafter? Then there is the Uranium-235 shipped to Japan from Germany, with which the Japanese were to manufacture a dirty bomb: any doubt as to whether they would have hesitated for humanitarian reasons?

Consideration for the civilian population was not a strong point in Japanese military culture, and hadn't been for over a decade--problems were evident in China in the '20s.

[headquarters]

I agree with Targan and Wallshadow - in the context of the time using nuclear weapons probably seemed more acceptable.

Given the scope and brutality of WWII maybe we should be thankful the various sides didnt use more WMDs..

[Cdnwolf]

On August 9 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. It was an act that saw the end of World War II - and lead to the deaths of more than 150,000 people.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

On August 9 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. It was an act that saw the end of World War II - and lead to the deaths of more than 150,000 people.

124000 died in the firebombing of Tokyo. Had no atom bombs been dropped, more cities would have been scourged thusly.

[pmulcahy11b]

Honestly, I'm rather surprised that chemical weapons weren't used against the general population to soften them up before the initial landings.

Many of the scenarios for Olympica did call for the use of chemicals. And the use of possibly as many as seven more atomic bombs. And the new P-80 Shooting Star and Gloster Meteor. And captured German V-1s and V-2s. And pretty much anything else that crossed the NCA's minds at the time.

The first day would have called for five landing beaches, each one the size of the entire Overlord operation. Countries that had thusfar only played a bit part in World War 2 would be contributing hundreds or thousands of troops.

[Adm.Lee]

Countries that had thus far only played a bit part in World War 2 would be contributing hundreds or thousands of troops.

Not sure what you mean here. MacArthur was actively trying to limit the number of Commonwealth forces committed, and they certainly weren't playing bit parts.

[Legbreaker]

Absolutely. Take Australia for example. For a while there we were the ONLY country fighting in the Pacific region, and it was Australian troops which inflicted the first defeats upon the Japanese.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Not sure what you mean here. MacArthur was actively trying to limit the number of Commonwealth forces committed, and they certainly weren't playing bit parts.

There were a number of American nations that would possibly have been involved as they were already working with or as part of the Allied war effort.

Mexico had already committed a fighter squadron and its support components to the Pacific war (operating in the Phillipines).

Argentina declared war on Germany and Japan in March 1945 but before then about 800 Argentine volunteers served with British, Canadian and South African air forces in Europe.

Brazil had sent an air force/army expeditionary force to the Mediterranean of some 25,000 personnel after German u-boat attacks on Brazilian shipping and would likely have sent troops to the Pacific because the public supported the cause.

Chile distanced itself from the Axis powers over the course of the war and declared war against Japan in 1945 although by then the war was almost over.

Colombia was in a "state of belligerency" with Germany after a u-boat sank a Colombian ship in late 1943. Colombian forces helped guard the Panama Canal.

Cuba declared war against the Axis powers in 1941 and was planning a conscription programme so they could send troops but they were still being finalized when the war ended.

Dominican Republic declared war on Japan and Germany after Pearl Harbour and about 110-120 Dominicans were placed in US units and fought in the war.

Guatemala declared war on Japan and Germany after Pearl Harbour.

Honduras declared war on Japan and Germany after Pearl Harbour.

Nicaragua declared war on Japan after Pearl Harbour and then later on Germany and its European allies.

Uruguay while neutral for most of the war declared war against the Axis towards the end of the war although a number of pilots joined the Free French

[dragoon500ly]

One oft-overlooked fact was that the Japanese also had 3000 aircraft remaining - most outdated, or in poor condition - to sortie against the invasion fleet. This amounted to, by US estimates, two to three destroyed carriers of the line (destroyed as in, totally sunk) plus a lot of other smaller support ships. That's assuming CAP and perimeter defense ships worked entirely as planned.

Okinawa cost the USN dearly in ships sunk and damaged. But it could have been much worse. The Kapanese military followed their normal doctrine and went for the capital warships. With the invasion of Japan, their targeting lists were changed...the kamikaze's would instead attack troop transports as they neared the coast

[dragoon500ly]

June of 1945 saw the Allies advancing to within striking range of the Japanese home islands. The Philippines were mostly recaptured. The Imperial Navy had been devasted in the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. The Japanese merchant marine was a shell of its former self, gutted by U.S. submarines, air power and mines. The fall of the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa gave the U.S. bases for reinforcing the strategic air campaign against Japan. Germany had finally surrendered and Japan faced the wraith of the United Nations, alone.

The Japanese plan for their final battle was KETSU-GO (Decisive Struggle), it had the twin objectives of defeating the Allies militarily, as well as psychologically. Its goal was to inflict so many losses upon the Allies, that they would be forced to abdanon their unconditional surrender policy and enter negotations with Japan.

The Japanese had several advantages that might have lead to their success. First, being islands, Japan would have to be attacked via amphibious assault. Second, even groaning under the weight of the American bombing campaign, Japan could still produce some 1,200 aircraft a month and had sufficient weapons and supplies to equip its land forces. SInce the Japanese would be fighting on their home islands, their gorces would not be isolated as they had been for much of the war. The Imperial General Headquarters was optimistic that they would be able to force the Allies to the peace table and that they would be able to keep the majority of their possessions.

IGHQ anticipated that the Americans would first attack Kyushu and seize harbors and air fields to support later landings and they built up their fortifications not only on the beaches, but inland as well. Their goal was to engage the Americans and either defeat them or inflict unacceptable losses. The kamikazes would be used during the initial phase of the American assault landings to strike their assault transports, massive losses to the assault troops would firther delay and disrupt the American invasion.

The Japanese would also enjoy the advantage of the terrain, much of Kyushu was mountainous. The Japanese would be able to defend in depth and make the Allies pay for every yard that they gained. IGHQ intended to reinforce Kyushu during the battle. Even if the US eventually conquered the island, the assault on Honshu would be delayed, making Wasington that much more willing to negotate.

The 16th Area Army was charged with the initial defense of Kyushu. US Intelligence placed its strength at two armored and no less than fifteen infantry divisions. To dispute American airpower, the Japanese had 4,000 army and 5,000 naval aircraft available (roughly half of these were of these were obselete aircraft to be used as kamikazes). The IJN was responisble for mainting control of the communications between the home islands and with Manchuria. By August, 1945, the IJN had six aircraft carriers, four battleships, eleven cruisers, forty-two destroyers and fifty-eight submarines as well as thousands of special attack craft (kamikazes), ranging from midget submarines, motor boats loaded with explosives, to human guided torpedoes as well as divers carrying satchel charges.

[dragoon500ly]

The final US plan for the invasion of Japan was Operation Downfall. It consisted to two components: Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, to secure naval and air bases and Operation Coronet, the invasion of the main island of Honshu.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the summer of 1945, had three basic choices for Downfall. First, to encircle Japan by invading China, establish bases there and use those bases to first blockade and then to invade the home islands. Second, to isolate Japna via naval blockade and massively reinforce the existing bombing campaign and force Japan to surrender without having to invade the home islands. Third, was to assault Japn through amphibious invasion and force the Japanese to surrender by seizing Tokyo and key industrial areas.

The JCS strongly debated these courses, the naval supporting option two and the army supporting option three. The first option was rejected as it would needlessly run up casualties without forcing Japan to surrender. Other worries were that the growing war wariness would force an end to the war before final victory was achieved. There was also the very real concern that Kapanese forces outside of the home islands would continue to fight on. On May 25, 1945, the JCS issued a directive to launch an amphibious assault on Japan. General Douglas MacArthur was placed in command of Operation Olympic.

On 18 June, the JCD presented their plans to President Truman, who issued the go order for Downfall. And on July 26, he, British Prime Minister Clement Atlee and Soviet leader Josef Stalin issued the Potsdam Declaration warning Japan to surrender of face "total destruction". The Japanese rejected this ultimatum and on July 30, the JCS directed Generals MacArthur and Wedemeyer (commanding in China) and Admiral Nimitz to coordinating plans for Downfall. Operation Olympic would jump off first, followed four months alter by Coronet.

The British contribution to Olympic would consist of the British Pacific Fleet and elements of the Royal Air Force. The British would contribute more forces for Coronet. One of the factors limiting the size of the British forces were the deep concerns that Japanese units the remainder of the Far East would go on fighting, even if the home islands did surrender. It would be necessary to retain forces for posisble use. The British still planned for a force of from three to six divisions to be committed to Cornet. The specific units were never designated, but would have most likely consisted of at least one British, Australia, New Zealand, India and possibly a Canadian infantry divisions.

[dragoon500ly]

The logistical problems supporting Downfall were immence. The American line of supply streatched for thousands of miles back to the United States. It was necessary to build bases, support facilites and warhouse faciliteis.

Downfall called for a force of forty-two divisions. This included thirteen reserved for Olympic and twenty-nine for Coronet. Twenty-seven of these divisions were already present in the Pacific, another fifteen would have to be redeployed from Europe and a strategic reserve of an additional fifteen divisions would be maintained in the United States.

The Philippines, Okinawa and other Pacific islands would be developed as base areas for Downfall. Not only would the massive combat force need to be sustained, but the tens of thousands of support troops, the engineers, supplu, ordnance, medical, transport and administrative personnel would have to be housed and supplied.

Initially, the plan was to abandon existing bases and build new, much larger bases. But this would require far too much transportation effort to move the existing bases. Two choices were made, first was to expanded the existing bases, coupled with new base construction at strategic areas, and second was to make shipments of men and material, straight from the United States and directly to the assault areas. There were even plans to invade the northenmost island of Hokkaido, to open supply lines to Russia in the event of Soviet participation in the invasion of Japan.

[dragoon500ly]

Imperial General Headquarters would defend the home islands with six Area Armies. The 5th Area Army (HQ in Sapporo) would defend Hokkaido with five infantry divisions, the 11th (HQ in Sendai) with six infantry divisions, 12th (HQ in Tokyo) with two armored and twenty infantry divisions, 13th (HQ in Nagoya) with seven infantry divisions (two forming) and 15th (HQ in Osaka), with eight infantry divisions, Area Armies were responsible for the main island of Honshu and the 16th Area Army (HQ in Fukuoka), with two armored, fifteen infantry divisions was responsible for Kyushu. In reserve, in CHina) were the 6th Area Army (HQ in Wuchang-Hengyang) with eleven infantry divisions, the 23rd Area Army (HQ in Canton) with three infantry divisions and the North Chine Reserve Army, with one armored and five infantry divisions.

Supporting the defense were three Air Armies, the 1st was based in northern Honshu and fielded 600 kamizake and 500 combat aircraft, the 6th Air Army was based in southern Honshu and fielded 1,000 kamizake and 500 combat aircraft, in reserve was the 5th Air Army (in Korea) with 500 kamikazes and 200 combat aircraft.

The initial forces for Operation Olympic would be the 6th Army, consisting of the Fifth Amphibious Corps (2nd, 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions), First Corp (25th, 33rd and 41st Infantry Divisions) and Eleventh Corps (1st Cavalry, Americal and 43rd Infantry Divisions), in reseve would be the Ninth Corps (77th, 83rd and 98th Infantry Divisions. Army reserve would consist of the 40th Infantry Division and the 158th Regimental Combat Team.

The initial forces for Operation Coronet would be the Eighth Army, consisting of the Tenth Corps (6th, 31st, 81st Infantry Divisions) , Thirteen Corps (3rd and 6th Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions) and the Fourteenth Corps (32nd 93rd,75th Infantry Divisions) as well as the Tenth Army, consisting of the Third Amphibious Corps (1st, 4th and 6th Marine Divisions) and the Twenty-Fourth Corps (37th, 38th. 96th Infantry Divisions). Force reserve would be the 11th Airborne Division. Follow-up forces would consist of the First Army
(2nd, 8th, 9th, 24th, 28th, 69th, 76th, 87th, 89th, 104th Infantry and the 101st Airborne Divisions).

The Commonwealth would be represented by three divisions (2nd British,
7th Australian, and 5th Indian and the 3rd Commando Brigade); these are very suspect and any specific knowledge would be gratefully included!

[dragoon500ly]

Operation Downfall was actually implemented, in part. In March, 1945 Operation Starvation, the mining of the Japanese coastal waters was launched. This was designed to isolate Japan from the rest of its empire and to paralyze much of its transport. Even through the mining campaign sunk very few ships, it was effective in that the IJN had to mount minesweeping operations for several days prior to any convoy, this would alert American reconnaissance aircarft and air strikes would sunk yet more of Japan's shrinking minesweeper force

Starvation cut Japan from its overseas supply of resources. The lack of oil crippled the IJN and their air forces. Because of fuel limitations, the Japanese could not train their pilots, and major fleets were forced to remain in port, to be raided at will by American air power. Food shortages led to general malnutrition in the civilian population.

At the same time, the B-29 force launched the first of its incendiary attacks against industrial cities. They destroyed the centers of Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka and Yokohama in massive firebombing raids which killed over 300,000 civilians.

Beginning in May 1945, Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet was ordered to "attack Japanese naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards and coastal objectives." The Third Fleet, with the attached British Pacific Fleet commenced operations on July 1, 1945. First gaining air superiority by destroying 550 Japanese aircraft in air-to-air combat and in raids on their airbases. Airstrikes were also launched in the warships of the IJN, this resulted in the loss of many warships and effectively ended the threat of the IJN. THe Americans and the British also used naval gunfire to bombard Japanese coastal fortifications.

[dragoon500ly]

X-Day for Operation Olympic was to be November 1, 1945.

Third Fleet had the mission of suppress any remaining Japanese airpower and disrupting their communications from July 28 to October 3rd, 1945. Then they would shift to tactical ground support and interdiction missions.

Fifth Fleet would conduct the actual invasion. It would consist of the 3rd, 5th and 7th Amphibious Forces, two groups of fast carriers, a gunfire support force, a covering force and an escort carrier force. The air/naval bombardment of the landing beaches would commence on October 23rd and last until X-Day.

Each of the Sixth's Army corps would be teamed with an Amphibious Force. I Corps and the 7th Amphib would land on the east coast, just south of the city of Miyazaki. XI Corps and the 3rd Amphib would land in Ariaki Bay with the mission of seizing the port of Kagoshima. Fifth Amphib Corps and the 5th Amphib Force would land south of the city of Kushikino and then drive on Kagoshima. The 40th Infantry Division would be used to seize the off shore islands of Kuchinoerabu Shima, Kuro Shima, Kisakaki Shima, Uji Gunto and Koshiki Retto (to be used as radar stations and to shelter fleet units) The final objective line of Operation Olympic would run from the city of Tsuno on the east coast to the city of Sendai on the west coast. The Ninth Corps would stage a diversionary landing off Shikoku on X-Day to draw Japanese reserves and then land on Kyushu around November 4 and remain in reserve.

Operation Olympic never came to be. The US became the first and only country to denote atomic weapons in wartime. On August 6th, 1945, the city of Hiroshima was struck and then, on August 9th, 1945, the city of Nagasaki was struck. Japan offered to surrender on August 10th. The offical ceremony ending the war took place on September 2, 1945 with the signing of the surrender document onboard the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

It is perhaps a final bit of irony that the Japanese did not surrender unconditionally. The Allies agreed to allow Emperor to remain on his throne, although without any real power.

sources used include "Operation Downfall" "Samurai Sunset" and "Death is Lighter Than a Feather."

[Raellus]

There's a logical fallacy here that I'd like to point out. I don't think one can justify the killing of Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by arguing that the Japanese [military] killed many civilians throughout Asia. The women and children and senior citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weren't the ones killing civilians in China and elsewhere, so they didn't really "earn" the fate that befell them. Most people wouldn't argue that Yugoslavian or French or Ukranian or Polish (etc.) civilians deserved to get shot by the Nazis as reprisals for partisan actions. That, in most people's minds, would constitute a clear war crime. Unfortunately, this standard gets tossed out the window when it could be applied to "enemy" civilians. I guess that I just don't believe in collective punishment.

From the standpoint of projected military and civilian casualties for planned invasion of the Home Islands, I can understand the reasoning to drop the bombs. Preserving the lives of American and Allied servicemen that surely would have perished during an invasion of the Home Islands is certainly a logical rationale. Considering that the Japanese high command was actively mobilizing civilians, including women and children, to participate in the defense of the Home Islands, civilian casualties in Japan would likely have been much higher than the toll exacted by the atomic bombings. In that sense, the bombings most liklely saved many Japanese civilian lives. There's a cold mathematical logic there that it is difficult to argue against.

That said, I wish a purely military target was selected for the first bombing, instead of a civilian population center. I think that would have been the more ethical path to tread.

To complicate things further, a secondary motive of the bombings was to demonstrate American power to the emergent Soviet Union. That this display cost tens of thousands of third party civilian lives is kind of messed up.

[dragoon500ly]

Casualties overall for the allies would have been staggering. So high, infact , that some believed ( like the Japanese high command as far as I know) that a truce or peace with some sort of acceptable terms would be possible for Japan.The allies had to take into account their public opinion back home as well as the military realities. This meant that they also had a timelimit to consider to see the victory through.

The inital estimates for Operation Olympic placed the losses at 32% of the assault force.

Total Allied losses for Operation Downfall for all services, ran as high as 350,000 killed/wounded/missing. Estimates for the Japanese military ran into at least 800,000 k/w/m with another 1.2-2 million civilian losses.

I don't envy the decision that President Truman had to make, there is no doubt, that at the time, he made the only decision possible, ironically to destroy two cities so suddenly and in such a frightful manner that even the Japanese military had to admit that the war was lost.

Nowdays, it is popular to proclaim that his decision was based on racism and that more "humane" methods of fighting would have brought the Japanese to the peace table...etc, etc, ad nauseum and so forth.

But if one bothers to ask the GIs who were destined to disembark on X-Day..."When the bombs were dropped, I knew that the war would end and I would live."

[StainlessSteelCynic]

There's a logical fallacy here that I'd like to point out. I don't think one can justify the killing of Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by arguing that the Japanese [military] killed many civilians throughout Asia. The women and children and senior citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weren't the ones killing civilians in China and elsewhere, so they didn't really "earn" the fate that befell them. Most people wouldn't argue that Yugoslavian or French or Ukranian or Polish (etc.) civilians deserved to get shot by the Nazis as reprisals for partisan actions. That, in most people's minds, would constitute a clear war crime. Unfortunately, this standard gets tossed out the window when it could be applied to "enemy" civilians. I guess that I just don't believe in collective punishment.

From the standpoint of projected military and civilian casualties for planned invasion of the Home Islands, I can understand the reasoning to drop the bombs. Preserving the lives of American and Allied servicemen that surely would have perished during an invasion of the Home Islands is certainly a logical rationale. Considering that the Japanese high command was actively mobilizing civilians, including women and children, to participate in the defense of the Home Islands, civilian casualties in Japan would likely have been much higher than the toll exacted by the atomic bombings. In that sense, the bombings most liklely saved many Japanese civilian lives. There's a cold mathematical logic there that it is difficult to argue against.

That said, I wish a purely military target was selected for the first bombing, instead of a civilian population center. I think that would have been the more ethical path to tread.

To complicate things further, a secondary motive of the bombings was to demonstrate American power to the emergent Soviet Union. That this display cost tens of thousands of third party civilian lives is kind of messed up.

The inital estimates for Operation Olympic placed the losses at 32% of the assault force.

Total Allied losses for Operation Downfall for all services, ran as high as 350,000 killed/wounded/missing. Estimates for the Japanese military ran into at least 800,000 k/w/m with another 1.2-2 million civilian losses.

I don't envy the decision that President Truman had to make, there is no doubt, that at the time, he made the only decision possible, ironically to destroy two cities so suddenly and in such a frightful manner that even the Japanese military had to admit that the war was lost.

Nowdays, it is popular to proclaim that his decision was based on racism and that more "humane" methods of fighting would have brought the Japanese to the peace table...etc, etc, ad nauseum and so forth.

But if one bothers to ask the GIs who were destined to disembark on X-Day..."When the bombs were dropped, I knew that the war would end and I would live."

I understand and empathize with the sentiments expressed here about both sides of the war in the Pacific but unfortunately as Raellus stated, there is a cold mathematical logic applied.
This has to be the case if the war was to be concluded without a vastly extended casualty list on both sides. No matter what, the atomic bomb was going to be used and used for the reasons others here have pointed out - to be really simplistic, Japan was the giant and the atomic bomb was the giant killer.

Unfortunately for civilians, a military target would not have been a sufficient demonstration of the power of the 'bomb'. The Japanese had many bases and could probably afford to lose half a dozen without destroying their will to wage war. But cities, cities were manufacturing the goods that ALL the bases needed to survive. It's not enough to kill the enemies soldiers, you have to kill his ability to wage war. It means destroying cities and it means civilians will get killed but a leader of a nation at war cannot afford to think of the enemy civilians and really, they cannot afford to think of the lives of individual soldiers from their own forces.

They have to think of the majority and only the majority. The emotional burden from thinking otherwise would crush the spirit of many people but a leader at war cannot afford this luxury. It's a vile notion and I despise the rationale that "the ends justifies the means" but the fact remains - to stop the enemy, you have to stop their ability to wage war and at that time, the quickest way to do so was to destroy their workforce and further, their will to fight.

[Adm.Lee]

But if one bothers to ask the GIs who were destined to disembark on X-Day..."When the bombs were dropped, I knew that the war would end and I would live."

Interestingly, I've seen one different opinion. George MacDonald Fraser, a British infantryman in Burma, related in his memoir Quartered safe out here. He thought that if he had posed the option to his squadmates, "Another campaign for us, or hundreds of thousands of enemy civilians dead?" they would have grumbled and complained, but made the effort. Now, that's 50 years later, and his opinion projected onto others, but there it is.

[headquarters]

Interestingly, I've seen one different opinion. George MacDonald Fraser, a British infantryman in Burma, related in his memoir Quartered safe out here. He thought that if he had posed the option to his squadmates, "Another campaign for us, or hundreds of thousands of enemy civilians dead?" they would have grumbled and complained, but made the effort. Now, that's 50 years later, and his opinion projected onto others, but there it is.

They probably would agree with dropping the bomb.

[headquarters]

I guess the topic is an example of a grey area when it comes to morals and ethics etc etc

We could put together an argument pro and an equally compelling one con.

War crimes committed by both sides gets me down a bit. I prefer thinking of the purely military operations with purely military targets and objectives - not the horrible truth that in war the various sides will target the enemy where it hurts the most - his women and children - to subdue him.

This could of course end the war - which is good. Then again attacking the women and children is evil.

Just my two cents - and I of course see that I didnt invent gunpowder here..

Thanks Dragon for the facts and info . Very interesting to see the actual numbers.

[dragoon500ly]

The Imperial Japanese Army fielded several types of infantry divisions during World War II. The "Standard" Infantry Division had a TO&E strength of 20,000 personnel; transport was provided by some 7.500 horses; armament wise, this division was equipped with 9,000 rifles, 382 light machine guns, 340 grenade launchers, 112 heavy machine guns, 22 37mm/47mm anti-tank guns, 18 70mm battalion guns, 12 65mm regimental guns, 36 75mm field guns and 7 tankettes.

The "Strengthed" Infantry Division had a TO&E strength of 29,408 personnel; transport was provided by 9,906 horses and 502 motor vehicles. Weapons included 10,000 rifles, 405 light machine guns, 457 grenade launchers, 112 heavy machine guns, 72 20mm anti-tank rifles, 30 37mm/47mm anti-tank guns, 36 70mm battalion guns, 24 75mm regimental guns, 12 75mm field guns, 24 105mm howitzers, 12 150mm howitzers, 20 light tanks, 48 medium tanks and 13 tankettes.

The final type of Infantry Division was the "Strengthed (Modified) Division. Its TO&E strength was 24,600 men; transport was provided by 7,930 horses and 284 motor vehicles. Armament included 10,000 rifles, 411 light machine guns, 453 grenade launchers, 114 heavy machine guns, 78 20mm anti-tank rifles, 18 37mm/47mm anti-tank guns, 36 70mm battalion guns, 12 75mm regimental guns, 24 75mm field guns, 12 105mm howitzers and 6 tankettes.

[rcaf_777]

The Commonwealth would be represented by three divisions (2nd British, 7th Australian, and 5th Indian and the 3rd Commando Brigade); these are very suspect and any specific knowledge would be gratefully included!

Canada's Force would have been the Canadian Army Pacific Force

Canadian Army Pacific Force

The Canadian Army Pacific Force was raised in 1945 as a field force intended to participate in the last phase of The War Against Japan, an anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in the last phase of the Second World War. The CAPF was based on an infantry division structure, however, to increase operability with the Americans, certain units bore US organizational structures and names. As well, Canadian units went into training with US weapons to ease logistical concerns.

Major General Bert Hoffmeister was named to command the division, and the three Infantry Regiments (the equivalent of a Canadian brigade) had battalions bearing the name of those infantry battalions that had fought with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Europe. These would formed as 2nd or
3rd Battalion, the 1st being the ones that did fight in Europe.

Detialed Order of Battle can be found here

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/canadianarmypacificforce.htm

[dragoon500ly]

Flipping through a variety of military histories, I don't believe that there has ever been a war in which the civilians did not suffer to some degree, but the advent of the 20th Century has seen the concept of "Total War" which seeks to not only to defeat the enemy military on the field but to destroy his means to resist and to damage his will to continue to resist.

Americans like to delude themselves that we "fight fair", that we only "fight other soldiers", that "we use every means to avoid civilian losses", nothing can be further from the truth. Using B-17s (or B-52s) to target factories that manufacture war material is a great idea, but too many factories have neighborhoods nearby that house the workers and their families...and bombing from the air is not quite as accurate as we like to believe it is. And the Air Force is not the only service with this problem. Don't forget that in the Normandy fighting, the US Army reduced the town of St. Lo to rubble in an effort to blast its defenders out of their positions, just to name one example out of thousands.

In the US, the President simply issues broad guidelines to the Joint Chiefs and it is their responibility to issue the necessary orders to the theater commanders and so forth. Truman was faced with the hardest decision that any President ever had to make, not only did he have to make the decision to use atomic bombs, he also had to approve the target list. Based on the information that he had at the time, based on the ruthlessness that the Japanese military had shown, based on the willingness of Japanese civilians to kill themselves rather than endure capture at the hands of the Americans, faced with the predicted losses that the invasion of Japan would have meant, not only to the Allies, but to the Japanese as well, he made the decision to target two, untouched cities as a demonstration that the Allies were willing to reduce Japan to ashes. Faced with the prospect, finally, the Japanese made the decision to accept the offer and surrender.

Right or wrong, his decision has been blasted for the sixty odd years since he made it. It has become popular nowdays to mock Truman, to proclaim him a racist willing to end the war, now matter how many Japanese he had to kill and so on. Even serious scholars are willingly to follow the current fad and damn him as the man responsible for directly ordering the deaths of civilians in the most horrific manner possible.

For myself, I can only sit back and wonder at the courage he showed, at his willingless to make a decision to end the most terrible of wars at any cost, and above all the manner that he lived out the rest of his life, certain that he made the only decision possible.

[ArmySGT.]

Today in WW II: 23 Aug 1939 Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia sign a mutual non-aggression pact [Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement] with secret clauses giving the Soviets access to the Baltic states.

[Webstral]

I know a lot of people call into question the use of the Bomb on two Japanese cities. One has to wonder, though, whether it would be better to kill ten or a hundred times as many women and children in a more decentralized fashion. There is every reason to believe that the fighting for the Japanese home islands would have been every bit as bloody as Okinawa. The death toll among Japanese civilians would have been catastrophic—even compared to the death toll from strategic bombing to that point. A million American soldiers, a half-million British soldiers, four million or more Japanese soldiers, and 10 million or more Japanese civilians… To me, there’s no real choice. If you can save these lives by taking 100,000 in a spectacular fashion, take the 100,000 and call it bargain.

[Targan]

A million American soldiers, a half-million British soldiers, four million or more Japanese soldiers, and 10 million or more Japanese civilians…

I'd like to think that the ANZACs would've been there too. Maybe not though, MacArthur basically froze us out near the end of the war. He had Aussie troops conducting operations in side theatres that were basically a waste of time. He obviously didn't think our guys rated. Try telling that to the men that fought on the Kokoda Trail, basically holding back the Japanese alone and buying time for Australia until the US committed troops.

[dragoon500ly]

I'd like to think that the ANZACs would've been there too. Maybe not though, MacArthur basically froze us out near the end of the war. He had Aussie troops conducting operations in side theatres that were basically a waste of time. He obviously didn't think our guys rated. Try telling that to the men that fought on the Kokoda Trail, basically holding back the Japanese alone and buying time for Australia until the US committed troops.

No argument from me! The ANZACs more than earned their reputation as Fighting Bastards!

[headquarters]

Opinions vary of this man - he did abandon his troops after the PI was overrun in 1942. He also advocated using nuclear weapons in Korea in 1951.

All in all - I think he had good taste in sunglasses ;)

[HorseSoldier]

Off topic, but this seems odd --


The Canadian Army Pacific Force was raised in 1945 as a field force intended to participate in the last phase of The War Against Japan, an anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in the last phase of the Second World War. The CAPF was based on an infantry division structure, however, to increase operability with the Americans, certain units bore US organizational structures and names. As well, Canadian units went into training with US weapons to ease logistical concerns.

The commonality of equipment makes sense. I have to wonder at the politics that might have gone into the Canadian military adopting US terminology for the division involved. I've read that during the early Cold War there was tension between Francophone elements who favored emulating the US military format and Anglophone elements who liked the British traditions. An early example of that?

[rcaf_777]

Would be that much of an issues many americans prior to 1941 and served the Canadian Military and many Canadian served with the 1st Speical Service Force durring the War

[Raellus]

I'd like to think that the ANZACs would've been there too. Maybe not though, MacArthur... obviously didn't think our guys rated. Try telling that to the men that fought on the Kokoda Trail, basically holding back the Japanese alone and buying time for Australia until the US committed troops.

I want to preface this post by admitting that I don't know a whole lot about Australia's military involvement in WWII. I'm not trying to stir up drama here, or insult anyone. I want the Australian perspective on this issue and that's why I'm posting this here.

In his history of the final year of the Pacific theater, Retribution, Max Hastings, a British historian, gives a scathing assessment of many Australian units in the Pacific theater, claiming that they fought neither hard nor well. He attributes this to the fact that the British sent the best Aussie units to fight in North Africa and Italy, leaving less well equipped, trained, and motivated troops behind to defend Australia. These units would later be sent to New Guinea and elsewhere in the PTO to fight the Japanese and, with a few notable exceptions, they did not perform particularly well. Hastings goes on to rip MacArthur for his costly vanity project of retaking the Philippines.

He also rips the Australian dockworkers for striking multiple times throughout the war, serious hampering Allied logistics.

How are these two issues seen by Australians? Is there anything there or is Hastings so sort of Australiophobe?

[weswood]

IMO, the whole not attacking civilians idiology came about because of WWII. During and prior to that war even civilised nations attacked civilian populations. I'm not as educated as a lot on this board but the bombing of Berlin by the Allies and the bombing of London comes imediately to mind. As far back in American history, during the French & Indian War, one of our early presidents had a reputation for destroying indian villages to deny thier fighters shelter & supplies. Even as far back as the first century of Christianity the Vikings had a reputation for sacking Churches, IMO because there were few warriors and good loot in them.

I think WWII was a turning point for civilised people, they (we) saw the horror of women & children killed not just during attacks but from diseases and starvation afterward. Note that I say civilised nations, there's still some out there that are bugfuck crazy.

[Jason Weiser]

I want to preface this post by admitting that I don't know a whole lot about Australia's military involvement in WWII. I'm not trying to stir up drama here, or insult anyone. I want the Australian perspective on this issue and that's why I'm posting this here.

In his history of the final year of the Pacific theater, Retribution, Max Hastings, a British historian, gives a scathing assessment of many Australian units in the Pacific theater, claiming that they fought neither hard nor well. He attributes this to the fact that the British sent the best Aussie units to fight in North Africa and Italy, leaving less well equipped, trained, and motivated troops behind to defend Australia. These units would later be sent to New Guinea and elsewhere in the PTO to fight the Japanese and, with a few notable exceptions, they did not perform particularly well. Hastings goes on to rip MacArthur for his costly vanity project of retaking the Philippines.

He also rips the Australian dockworkers for striking multiple times throughout the war, serious hampering Allied logistics.

How are these two issues seen by Australians? Is there anything there or is Hastings so sort of Australiophobe?

Rae,
I try not to take anything Hastings says too seriously. His book on Normandy was kinda insulting where he asserted the Germans were the finest army in the world at that point. I suppose in 1941, they were. But by 1944? Their finest was making all kinds of fatal land deals on the Eastern Front and what was left was concentrated in the Waffen-SS and select units. The rest? Pick from Soviet and Polish POWs, older reservists, the lame and the sick and occupation troops. And the way he denigrated all the Allies, well, John Keegan was so maddened by it, he wrote Six Armies in Normandy as a response. Much better book IMO.

[dragoon500ly]

When I bought Hastings book, I was hoping for a detailed look into the British Army during the battle, its a decent overview of that. but Hastings pretty much blows off the accomplisments of the US Army, indeed, one is left with the opinion that if that idiot Eisenhower had simply shown the good sense to anoint dear Monty as ground forces commander, the war would have been over in time for the August holidays.

Objective he is not.

Jason, buddy, ole pal, you owe me for a new keyboard, read your tag line just as I was taking a sip of coffee.....;)

[HorseSoldier]

IMO, the whole not attacking civilians idiology came about because of WWII.

There's variation both through history and from culture to culture. In Europe, the idea that you didn't target civilians (at least not white, European civilians -- mileage may vary out in the colonies . . .) got established, I think, during the 1700s, and got more mileage in the century of relative peace between Napoleon and WW1. Part of the propaganda that justified the UK entering the war was how savage the German military was being to Belgian and Dutch civilians (which was deemed outside the pale of acceptable, civilized behavior, not just an aspect of how the game was played).

Obviously, things got notably nastier in WW2 and generated intensification of that sentiment. The big innovation evolving out of WW2 in this field is probably the idea of a world community that will hold combatants individually criminally accountable for actions that fall outside accepted wartime behavior.

[Raellus]

When I bought Hastings book, I was hoping for a detailed look into the British Army during the battle, its a decent overview of that. but Hastings pretty much blows off the accomplisments of the US Army, indeed, one is left with the opinion that if that idiot Eisenhower had simply shown the good sense to anoint dear Monty as ground forces commander, the war would have been over in time for the August holidays.


I don't know about the Monty thing. Hastings was pretty critical of Monty in Armageddon (his history of the last year of WWII in Europe), and his portrayal of Monty's handling of the multiple offensives around Caen during the Normandy campaign in Overlord was none too flattering either.

On a side note, reading Hastings' Overlord in high school (thank goodness for that free period) is what turned me on to WII.

I just want to know what Australians think about his accusations. I've read nothing but good things about the Aussies in North Africa and Anthony Beevor (in his recent single volume history of WWII), gives them props for their near superhuman efforts on the Kokoda trail. Heaven knows that not all American units peformed admirably during the war- we kind of bungled our way through North Africa and it was touch-and-go a couple of times in Italy- so I'm not trying to stir up trouble here along national fault lines. I'd just like the Australian POV on the matter.

[Targan]

Before I start I should say that Legbreaker is probably much better equipped than me to comment about Australia's WWII history. Also bear in mind that culturally, Australians and New Zealanders tend to celebrate the underdog (indeed, that's partly why we get so excited about events such as the Olympics, because on a per-capita basis we tend to do very well in the medal counts).

It's true that the best ANZAC forces were sent to Africa early in the war. Some were brought back to counter the rising threat of the Japanese but 2 big problems affected our ability to counter Japanese advances in the South Pacific. The first was that the bloody British gave up Singapore without a fight and we lost thousands of troops to Japanese prison camps (where they were used as slave labor and most of them were starved, worked and beaten to death) as a result.

Secondly, especially during much of the Kokoda Track campaign, most of the Australian troops involved against the Japanese in New Guinea were militia (what we now call the Army Reserve). Australia's Army Reserve forces these days are pretty good, especially for part timers, but back then they were sorely under-trained and under-equipped.

I think Wikipedia does a pretty good job of describing the Kokoda Track campaign in a nutshell: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokoda_Track_campaign.

We fought a series of delaying actions over the mountains of New Guinea against Japanese who were much better equipped and more experienced and we still fought them to a standstill. At the time all that stood between the Japanese completely controlling Papua and then probably beating the hell out of Australia's northern communities were afew battalions of militia. I can't begin to imagine what a bummer it must've been, slogging through tropical jungle and mud IN THE MOUNTAINS! Much of the fighting was virtually face-to-face. The engagement distances weren't much further than muzzle flash and bayonet tip.

Australian forces have a long history of doing more with less, much like our British counterparts. I'm actually kind of amazed that the Australian Army is still a highly effective force because, unlike during WWI and WWII when most Australians were tough-as-nails country boys who grew up shooting and riding and roaming the bush, most Aussies these days are soft, pudgy, weak urban dwellers.

Here's a quote from Wikipedia's entry on the First Battle of Kokoda:

"Although the defenders were poorly trained, outnumbered and under-resourced, the resistance was such that, according to captured documents, the Japanese believed they had defeated a force more than 1,200 strong when, in fact, they were facing only 77 Australian troops."

That is an example of the "underdog" status that we Aussies tend to worship. The Gallipoli campaign and the Battle of Long Tan are other good examples. We don't necessarilly have to win a battle for it to be glorified in Australian history, we just have to "punch above our weight" :D

[Adm.Lee]

In his history of the final year of the Pacific theater, Retribution, Max Hastings, a British historian, gives a scathing assessment of many Australian units in the Pacific theater, claiming that they fought neither hard nor well. He attributes this to the fact that the British sent the best Aussie units to fight in North Africa and Italy, leaving less well equipped, trained, and motivated troops behind to defend Australia. These units would later be sent to New Guinea and elsewhere in the PTO to fight the Japanese and, with a few notable exceptions, they did not perform particularly well. Hastings goes on to rip MacArthur for his costly vanity project of retaking the Philippines.

He also rips the Australian dockworkers for striking multiple times throughout the war, serious hampering Allied logistics.

How are these two issues seen by Australians? Is there anything there or is Hastings so sort of Australiophobe?

I'm not an Australian, but a Pacific War student. It's kinda true, but not the whole truth.

The NZ (Wellington, IIRC) dockworkers' union were definitely not feeling any urgency in July '42, when the Marines needed to combat-load their ships before the Guadalcanal landings. Marines had to take over the docks. I'm not aware of any other incidents, that may have been the most serious.

Australia raised, IIRC, roughly 3 divisions before 1942, and two of those went to the Mediterranean, another went down at Singapore, so that left scattered small militia units to get overrun by the Japanese. If there had been more (and air cover) to make a real fight of Rabaul, that could have changed the course of the war. When those troops came back to fight on New Guinea, they struggled with the harsh terrain and slim logistics, but IMO they put in a better record than the green Americans in late 1942.

After that, it seems like MacArthur did his level best to sideline the Australians. It got to the point where there were Australian staff officers and units assigned to the Sixth US Army, so he created "Alamo Force", using only American elements to do all the same things that Sixth Army was supposed to do.