Second Battle for Berlin: December 1996

[dude_uk]

So how does this factor into WW3?

So with the combined forces of NATO and a now hostile East-Germany. The Soviets then add to this by trying to take West-Berlin. What's the logic in this?

The timeline says 'a week of bitter of street fighting' (I doubt the Allies can hold off longer than that).

Adding this puts further strain on France not intervening, its very hard for them to withdraw from NATO when the Soviets are shooting at their soldiers. Unless they withdraw? Leave the US and UK in the lurch?

Thoughts?

[Webstral]

By December, the West Germans have lost the initiative and are losing the struggle. Of course, the US, UK, and Canada get involved at this point and change the whole equation of the war.

The v1 chronology implies without actually stating so that the NATO offensive across East Germany is a relatively slow affair. I think that terribly unlikely. The Pact has exerted itself to the max to contain the West Germans. By sheer weight of numbers, they have held and started to push back the Bundeswehr. Suddenly, the weight of ten fresh heavy divisions hits the Pact. Just as significantly, the USAF in Europe is added to the equation. It’s hard to see that the outcome isn’t a disaster for the Pact. Whatever happens in Berlin, a powerful NATO thrust across the North German Plain north of Berlin would reach the Oder in short order. Obviously, this won’t be a complete recreation of Operation Desert Storm, but the quality, quantity, and freshness of the NATO mechanized formations can’t help but completely unhinge the Pact defenses.

I see the Pact withdrawing into Czechoslovakia, since the USAF will close the Oder crossings until NATO forces reach the river near the Baltic. Then NATO forces will roll up the left bank of the river, threatening Pact forces in central East Germany with encirclement. The Pact forces will fall back to the south. NATO won’t make too strenuous an effort to encircle and destroy large numbers of Pact formations because the civilian leadership wants simply to finish the fighting in East Germany. In the interests of re-establishing peace and commerce after the forcible reunification of Germany, they are content with pushing the Pact off German soil instead of killing or capturing Pact troops en masse.

[HorseSoldier]

NATO, especially US, prep for the entering the war may have initially been hamstrung by a fear that ramping up could, in itself, trigger a nuclear exchange, so the other NATO nations that joined the West Germans may have been launching from more of a standing start than anyone at the tactical/operational level would have liked.

Possible idea to explain what happened, anyway.

On the fight for Berlin, I'd say the French must have pulled out. Alternately, the .sovs could have ignored the French sector with French troops still in it, but if France wanted to stay out of the war, pulling their troops before the battle for Berlin kicked off would be a much preferable course of action. They could certainly spin it in domestics politics as not running away, but rather continuing their policy of not supporting German reunification by force.

[mikeo80]

So how does this factor into WW3?

So with the combined forces of NATO and a now hostile East-Germany. The Soviets then add to this by trying to take West-Berlin. What's the logic in this?

The timeline says 'a week of bitter of street fighting' (I doubt the Allies can hold off longer than that).

Adding this puts further strain on France not intervening, its very hard for them to withdraw from NATO when the Soviets are shooting at their soldiers. Unless they withdraw? Leave the US and UK in the lurch?

Thoughts?

There is one option that I have not noticed in this discussion on the fate of Berlin. With France needing a safe out for the war, the French soldiers in West Berlin could have been under orders to "stand down".

France wants nothing to do with a re-united Germany, having lost to them three times in seventy years. (Franco-Prussian War, WWI, WWII)

However, with Germany "re-united" under Soviet rule, the French realize that the Soviets would need 10-20 years to fully integrate Western Germany onto Eastern Germany.

Anything could happen in those years. For certain, France gets rid of the hated US and UK troops posted in West Germany/Belgium/Netherlands. This goes a long way to freeing up French troops to be down sized to support France's social spending. Also, France becomes the defacto "leader" of Western Europe. France also becomes a viable voice in the "neutral" countries of the world. I could see some sort of loose confederation between France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. Spain, Italy and Portugal could be persuaded to join.

My $0.02

Mike

[Webstral]

US Army Vehicle Guide leaves room for the idea that the US Army was not poised at the border waiting for the word to go. In the following short list, two dates follow each listed formation. The first date is the border crossing, and the second date is when the formation went into combat.

1st AD: 12/5/96, 12/6/96
1st CD: 12/10/96, 12/15/96
2nd AD: 12/3/96, 12/7/96

3rd AD: 12/5/96, 12/11/96
1st ID: 12/4/96, 12/8/96
3rd ID: 12/3/96, 12/7/96

4th ID: 12/7/96, 12/11/96
8th ID: 12/5/96, 12/10/96
2nd ACR: 12/3/96, 12/7/96

3rd ACR: 12/7/96, 12/12/96
11th ACR: 12/2/96, 12/5/96

So, of the US combat formations listed in US Army Vehicle Guide, none were present on East German soil prior to 12/2. None were in combat against Pact forces until 12/5. Four divisions went into action between 12/6 and 12/8. Three more divisions first saw action on 12/10 and 12/11. 1st Cavalry Division first saw action on 12/15.

There are a couple of explanations for this. One is that the USAEUR was behaving as though there was no plan to enter combat in East Germany. This is reasonable. However, the commanders would have thought this one through and made some plans to organize movement to the front in keeping with an operational plan. Even if Anglo-American forces had occupied positions at their start lines, they would have been organized into echelons. The dates for formations entering combat seem to support two corps-sized efforts each with two divisions up and one to two divisions in follow-on. The forward divisions may have fought for 3-4 days before being fought out, at which point the second echelon would have been passed through to maintain the momentum.

[Webstral]

According to NATO Vehicle Guide, Canadian 4th Mech Brigade crossed the East German border on 12/9 and entered combat on 12/12.

British Army
1st AD: 12/10/96, 12/12/96
2nd AD: 12/10/96, 12/12/96
3rd AD: 12/9/96, 12/10/96

5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards: 12/96, actual date of first combat unknown
The Royal Hussars: 12/96, actual date of first combat unknown

So we basically have the equivalent of four more divisions entering combat between 12/10 and 12/12. When one takes into account the additional three US heavy divisions that also enter combat in this timeframe, it seems likely that a major operation exploiting one or more breakthroughs by the first echelon of the NATO attack beginning 12/6 and expanding through 12/8.

Without knowing where the front line trace was leading up to the US offensive, it’s hard to do anything more than conjecture as to the shape of things. However, it seems reasonable to believe that the West Germans would have made every effort to keep their lines relatively straight as they fell back so as to avoid presenting tempting salients. SACEUR would have wanted to exploit the armor friendliness of the North German Plain for offensive operations while exploiting the defensive advantages offered by the terrain in the south. This may help explain the gaps between US Army units crossing the frontier and their first action. I imagine UD forces attacking on a four-division front through Magdeburg with the intent of having the right flank of the offensive skirt the northwest shoulder of greater Berlin. The second echelon, or a portion thereof, would have continued the offensive on a northeasterly axis past Berlin and to the Oder River. Pact forces left in Mecklenburg would have been cut off from resupply except by air. Once these forces were dealt with, Anglo-American divisions could have been reoriented to face south along an arc north of Berlin. An attack south along the left bank of the Oder would have been able to use the river to protect the left flank of the drive while inviting the Pact to allow some of its forces to be encircled at Berlin. In general terms, NATO (including West German forces) might then have pressed south to squeeze the Pact out of East Germany.

[Webstral]

One of the important unanswered questions is how the Pact is handling reinforcing Pact ground forces in Germany. When I wrote Storm in Germany ages ago, I envisioned a combination of more-or-less complete formations moving forward as well as masses of men from other divisions sent forward as replacements. In keeping with the Soviet doctrine of fighting a division until it was combat ineffective (30-50%), then withdrawing it for reconstitution with replacement men and machines, the formations of GSFG would be rotated through reconstitution centers behind the line. It’s hard to say how many fresh Soviet divisions would have been moved into East Germany during the fighting in Oct-Nov 96, other than the handful mentioned in the v1 chronology.

By the same token, it’s hard to say how many Polish formations would have been involved. (I don’t have the Eastern Europe Sourcebook, which I suspect details such things.) The same question of fresh formations v reconstituted formations comes into play, though. I’m very much inclined to think that the Soviets would have fed replacements into the formations in combat at the best possible rate while assembling intact divisions in the operational rear for a counterstroke once the West Germans had been fought to a standstill. It’s possible that this counterstroke was underway when the Anglo-Americans got involved.

There’s also the question of what was going on between the time the first US Army formation crossed the border and the first combat action between US and Pact forces. 11th ACR claims this honor, having crossed the border on 12/02 and started fighting on 12/05. By the time the first American combat unit entered East Germany, there would be no more question in the minds of the Soviets that the US was entering the ring, so to speak. So what happened in the air?

In my mind, leading up to the Anglo-American involvement there was an agreement of some sort that defined a Pact ability to hit targets in West Germany germane to the war effort free from NATO interference. After all, if the war was a West German coup de main, then the West Germans should be available for Pact counteraction. It would be hard for the US to defend the airspace above West German air bases while claiming to be on the sidelines.

As a result, there probably would have been regular attacks by the SAF and its allied against West German targets. NATO air defenses would have tracked them, of course. It goes without saying that all targeting data would have been transmitted to the West Germans in real time. The inbound Pact strike craft would have had USAF/RAF escorts to ensure that there were no attempts to hit non-German NATO targets. Over the course of nearly two months of war, the Pact would have become habituated to being tracked and escorted en route to their targets in West Germany.

At the right moment, the USAF and RAF would have bushwhacked the Pact. The escorts would have opened up on the communist fliers in a sort of Red Pearl Harbor. Of course, some sort of provocation would have to be fabricated ahead of time. This would not be hard. Essentially, though, the story would be that the Soviets violated the agreement, leading to the NATO air defenses destroying all hostile aircraft in West German airspace. A quick 100-200 victories later, the USAF begins its German version of Operation Desert Storm. During the interim between 12/01 and 12/05, two US Army corps move up to the start lines with their armored cavalry regiments in the lead. The Pact forces in East Germany, having relaxed their guard a bit against air attack as a result of the destruction of the Luftwaffe and sheer exhaustion, would be superb targets during the first couple of hours of the Anglo-American air offensive. After 4-6 days of softening, the American first echelon goes in.

Where the Pact forces are at this point is an excellent question.

[dude_uk]

So you suggesting that the Soviets attempt to take West-Berlin as an attempt to avoid encirclement by Anglo-American Forces?

Once the UK-US get involved, its game over for pact in East-Germany. All that time watching the West Germans will have been spent in target acquisition and training. When the Western Allies move, they will MOVE. They have know for a while, where and how to make the pact bleed best.

[mikeo80]

So you suggesting that the Soviets attempt to take West-Berlin as an attempt to avoid encirclement by Anglo-American Forces?

Once the UK-US get involved, its game over for pact in East-Germany. All that time watching the West Germans will have been spent in target acquisition and training. When the Western Allies move, they will MOVE. They have know for a while, where and how to make the pact bleed best.

I have a different view on the US/UK/Canadian offensive.

I do not think they had a CLUE what to do. As I read NATO defense plans, (At least the public ones) Every thing that the US/UK/WG etc planned was the carefull retreat with attempts to BLEED the Warsaw Pact at EVERY chance. Then drop back to the next firing position. And the next. and so on until the WP was stopped by attrition. THEN the NATO troops would go over to the offensive. This also allowed for Reforger to occur. The US Army/Air Force would have been re-enforced by Reforger, and then able to go on the offensive.

The opportunity placed at their feet by the West German Army was something the rest of NATO had no way to react to except by striking as fast and as far as they could with what they had on hand.

Something else to consider in the NATO offensive. France steps out. Belgium and Netherlands are neutral, but still in NATO. Italy flips over to WP. THe southern flank of NATO is now a REAL mess. As I read NATO, all the Italians had to do was hold the WP in the Alps. Maybe with a tie in to the Swiss defensive positions.

My $0.02

Mike

[dude_uk]

The adjustment for CAN/UK/US from the defensive battle they have prepared for fifty years and the now offensive war they have trained for. Will be a shock, but surely they will have contingencies, plans will have implemented and discussed the moment the Soviets went to China?

[dude_uk]

Oh and after a week of fighting street-to-street, house-to-house, what do you think the effective fighting strength of the Berlin Brigades are?

[HorseSoldier]

Probably no accident that the Berlin brigades don't appear in the T2K orders of battle.

[mikeo80]

Oh and after a week of fighting street-to-street, house-to-house, what do you think the effective fighting strength of the Berlin Brigades are?

I would think after the all out attack by Warsaw Pact forces, the Berlin Brigades are either at zero, or 20-30 max hiding in basements, or whatever cover they can find.

My $0.02

Mike

[Webstral]

So you suggesting that the Soviets attempt to take West-Berlin as an attempt to avoid encirclement by Anglo-American Forces?

No. Quite the opposite. If the Soviets do go after West Berlin, they will start the offensive the moment NATO enters the fight. If it does take a week for them to capture West Berlin, the job will be done by the time the US Army reaches the outskirts of Berlin. After that, NATO will try to avoid the meat grinder of urban combat by encircling Berlin while driving the Pact out of the rest of the country. If the Pact chooses to defend Berlin with significant forces, they will be isolated inside Berlin.

[Rainbow Six]

Probably no accident that the Berlin brigades don't appear in the T2K orders of battle.

The British Berlin Brigade is briefly covered in the Survivor's Guide to the United Kingdom.

A pre war unit based in Berlin as part of the 1945 treay arrangements, the Brigade took heavy losses in the battle for Berlin and has been used as a reserve force since that time.

Subordination: BAOR
Current location: Braunschweig, Germany
Manpower: 400
Tanks: 1 Scimitar, 1 Fox

There's a brief passage in General Sir Richard Dannatt's biography about his service with the Berlin Brigade in the late 70's. He mentions that his Battalion (1 Green Howards) were located at Montgomery Barracks in the suburb of Kladow, and were right up against the border with East Germany. Dannatt suggests that if Warsaw Pact forces ever came over the border the Kladow Battalion probably wouldn't be able to hold out for long, but he states "the rest [of the Berlin Brigade] had a rather more robust defensive plan." (full passage can be found on pages 72 - 73 of "Leading from the Front".)

[Webstral]

The opportunity placed at their feet by the West German Army was something the rest of NATO had no way to react to except by striking as fast and as far as they could with what they had on hand.

Certainly, the situation in Germany is outside the scope of what was planned for. On the plus side, REFORGER can proceed at a leisurely pace without interference. In the seven weeks following the start of the war, stocks can be shipped to Europe and moved forward. From the standpoint of the American commanders, it’s almost ideal. However, as the war drags on the West Germans are going to require more and more support from the other allies. West German stocks of fuel and ammunition are going to run pretty low after a month of intensive operations. Fortunately, NATO ammunition is more-or-less standardized.

An interesting question is that of consumption by the West Germans versus the carrying capacity of trans-Atlantic convoys. With seven weeks between 07 OCT and 01 DEC, there is plenty of time to assemble shipping for the job. Still, I don’t have a good grasp of the numbers.

The pause between the unavoidable NATO triumph in East Germany and the action in Poland may have as much to do with logistics as politics. After four days of fighting in the Gulf, US forces were running low on some key items. Had the war gone on for another week, there could have been some real bottlenecks affecting the performance of American forces. I expect that the appropriate lessons would have been learned, resulting in somewhat greater stocks of these sensitive items. Still, no matter how you slice it the ability of modern combat units to consume ammunition and spare parts greatly outpaces the peacetime production of these commodities. After two months of fighting by the West Germans and several weeks of fighting with UK, US, and Canadian forces added in, the on-hand stocks in Europe might very well be depleted. It simply might not be possible to press on into Poland until April for reasons of supply, regardless of political considerations.

[kato13]

No. Quite the opposite. If the Soviets do go after West Berlin, they will start the offensive the moment NATO enters the fight. If it does take a week for them to capture West Berlin, the job will be done by the time the US Army reaches the outskirts of Berlin.


In the GDW Third World War gaming series, It usually would take a Cat A combined arms army two weeks to clear out Berlin (If NATO could give air support). The unit proficiency, and defensive advantages of being in a major city would usually keep the Berlin brigades alive and that army tied up until week 3.

I actually rescued 2 of the brigades once (UK and FR IIRC) when the Pact player concentrated almost all reinforcements to other fronts (to get Middle East oil) and played a defensive war in Europe. That actually mimics the T2k scenario better than the straight cold war ones (with the exception of France still being in the fight)

I think the DC group had some very detailed plans for war-gaming this scenario using those rules, maybe someday we will see what they come up with.

[mikeo80]

Web,

The numbers I am going to use are out dated. However it should give you an idea of just how much supply was needed by NATO during the first and second offensive of WWIII.

In WWII, The Allied quartermasters had 28 divisions on the field during the breakout and race to the Seine after D-Day. For offensive operations, each division required 750 tons of supplies per week per division. That is 21000 tons of supplies per week. The French Rail system had been systematically wrecked prior to D-Day. To try and ofset this logjam, and until the Allies could capture Antwerp, the Red Ball Express was created to try and close the gap. At its' peak, the Red Ball was operating over 5900 trucks and delivering 12,000 tons of supplies per week.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Ball_Express

Now we move to the late 20th century. We have seen that the American/British/Canadian offensive consisted of approximately eight divisions. However these are M1A1's, Chieftains and Centurians. Not to mention whatever the German army committed with their Leopard II's.

I would also point to the real world of Desert Storm. During the height of Desert Shield, the Navy logistics was moving 42 thousand tons of cargo into Saudi Arabia PER DAY. This does not include the efforts of the Air Force and the nationalized civilian aircraft.

http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/ds4.htm

Web, I think that this give some idea of what amount of supplies Reforger would have to provide to resupply the West Germans and keep the Nato offensive moving forward.

Hope this helps.

My $0.02

Mike

[Raellus]

Woud Soviet commerce raiders (subs, primarily) begin attacking convoys carrying supplies to Europe before U.S. and other NATO forces began military operations against PACT forces in East Germany? How might the loss of a few heavily laden supply ships impact the speed of the NATO drive across Germany and into Poland?

[mikeo80]

Woud Soviet commerce raiders (subs, primarily) begin attacking convoys carrying supplies to Europe before U.S. and other NATO forces began military operations against PACT forces in East Germany? How might the loss of a few heavily laden supply ships impact the speed of the NATO drive across Germany and into Poland?

IMHO, no. At least not at first. Reforger is going to take time to organize. As was stated earlier, the first Nato attack is December. There is a time frame during which the West German Army is the only offensive threat to the Soviet Army.

Also, given Desert Storm as a measuring stick, a few ships will hurt, but not stop Reforger. At the height of the logistical effort into Saudi, the Navy has 220 ships moving 24/7. Of course Desert Storm was operating in 100% Western controlled seas.

Would the Soviets like to shake THAT particular stick? Hard to tell. The Russian navy came out to play ONLY when USN moved into northern seas. Subs, different again, but are the Russians willing to poke that stick into USA's eye.

IMHO, as Reforger gathers, you would see unprecidented ASW efforts to let Soviet subs KNOW that "I see you" in that eternal game of blind mans bluff that is sub warfare.

My $0.02

Mike

[Webstral]

Thanks, Mike. Some great material there.

Woud Soviet commerce raiders (subs, primarily) begin attacking convoys carrying supplies to Europe before U.S. and other NATO forces began military operations against PACT forces in East Germany?

Only if they were ready to go to war with NATO as a whole at that point. The boys in the Kremlin would know that the Americans would consider this an act of war. CINC GSFG would point out that the addition of the remaining forces of NATO to the fighting in Germany would exacerbate the balance of forces problem. There was no point in sinking a few or a couple dozen supply ships in the Atlantic if the prompt entrance of NATO into the equation ended up costing the Pact their hold on East Germany.

On the other hand, the Soviets would have known that the US was resupplying West Germany. They might have tried claiming that shipments of arms and ammunition constituted active support for West Germany. Therefore, Soviet naval forces should have been free to intercept shipping bound for West Germany. The US could have gotten around this by landing arms and ammunition elsewhere in Western Europe. And again, torpedoing American vessels in international waters would give the US its casus belli—something best avoided, since the Soviets were not prepared to bring a conventional war in Germany to a successful conclusion until the end of November.

[mikeo80]

Thanks, Mike. Some great material there.

You are most welcome. I have been praticing the ancient art of Google-Fu.

My $0.02

Mike

[Graebarde]

One thing that is NOT considered is REFORGER, the fall exercise, is just winding down as the war starts! That means there is a US division on the ground already. Yeah they are 'war torn' and need R&R, but they are still there when the Germans jump.

MOST of the equipment for the divisions filling V, VII, III corps is already IN Europe and the troops come by AIR, not sea. Equivalent of 13 brigades including the ACav regt for III corps come in along with corps artillery. POMCUS was alive and 'well' at that time in V1 at least.

I have participated in the logistics side of FIVE REFORGERS, and must admit the retrograde operations were real clusters, especially when they sent divisions such as the 'hundred and worst' that had NO clue as to how things were done.

Had the wall not come down when it did, ODS would not have gone off as it did, since there is NO way they would have stripped VII corps to go to the gulf.

(note this is my opinion guys, it's up to the HoG to determine how it goes in their game world.)

[Raellus]

Only if they were ready to go to war with NATO as a whole at that point. The boys in the Kremlin would know that the Americans would consider this an act of war. CINC GSFG would point out that the addition of the remaining forces of NATO to the fighting in Germany would exacerbate the balance of forces problem. There was no point in sinking a few or a couple dozen supply ships in the Atlantic if the prompt entrance of NATO into the equation ended up costing the Pact their hold on East Germany.

On the other hand, the Soviets would have known that the US was resupplying West Germany. They might have tried claiming that shipments of arms and ammunition constituted active support for West Germany. Therefore, Soviet naval forces should have been free to intercept shipping bound for West Germany. The US could have gotten around this by landing arms and ammunition elsewhere in Western Europe. And again, torpedoing American vessels in international waters would give the US its casus belli—something best avoided, since the Soviets were not prepared to bring a conventional war in Germany to a successful conclusion until the end of November.

I agree. But if the Soviets believed that the U.S. was sending additional units/material to Europe with the intention of joining the fight, it might pay to strike first. Why give the Americans the opportunity to reinforce their forces already in Germany? If the Soviets could send a brigade's worth of Abrams to the bottom of the Atlantic before they could get their treads on German soil, why wait? IRL, the Soviets had high level agents deep in NATO until the Cold War ended; they could have let the Kremlin know in advance that the United States was seriously considering jumping into the conflict on the side of the Germans. The Soviets would have had intelligence letting them know when the ships were leaving, from what ports, and bound for what European harbors; presumably, the Red Fleet would have had submarines prepositioned to intercept those vessels. Yes, it's a risky escalation, but if the Soviets believe the U.S. is about to enter the war, I believe they would give the green light to preemptive strikes.

[Webstral]

US Army Vehicle Guide tells us that 1st CD, the balance of 2nd AD, 4th ID, and 3rd ACR deployed to Europe by air before the end of November, 1996 and took over equipment stored in POMCUS sites. The next division to go is 5th ID, which starts deploying in December. Since 11th ACR crosses the border on 02 DEC 96, it’s a reasonable bet that 5th ID starts deploying after US-Soviet hostilities commence. An argument could be made that no replacement equipment goes across—just fuel, ammunition, and spares to sustain the existing forces in the event of “untoward developments”. In other words, Washington isn’t going to let the USSR capture West Germany in the event the West German bid for reunification fails, but (in October and November) the US isn’t going to participate, either.

Naturally, the Soviets are incensed. I picture Sauronski advocating for an all-out effort by the forces in place around the world almost as soon as the West German offensive kicks off. Danilov says no. While he despises American skullduggery in standing on the sidelines while the West Germans attempt a reunification by force, he recognizes that it’s going to be hard enough to contain the Bundeswehr without the other NATO allies. Going to war with NATO means bringing in NATO forces already in-theater. This will not improve the correlation of forces in Germany.

Sauronski points out that until the Northern Fleet closes the North Atlantic to traffic from North America, the Americans will be at their liberty to build a second strategic echelon in West Germany. Whether one believes that the US was taken by surprise by the West German move or has retained its peacetime deployments as part of the deception plan, on 02 DEC 96 the US Atlantic Fleet is not deployed to block the GIUK Gap. The time to move the Northern Fleet attack subs is that moment. If they wait, NATO will gain the upper hand in the North Atlantic without firing a shot.

Further, Sauronski says, Soviet and allied forces around the world are in a better position to pursue goals in their respective parts of the world than the Western powers are. Transcaucasus Front has forces on-hand on the Iranian border. Iraq can send forces into Kuwait in a matter of days. North Korea can attack from a standing start, while the US will have to choose between reinforcing Europe, Korea, or the Middle East. The longer the Soviets wait, the more powerful the Western allies will become in the theaters of conflict.

Acknowledging that Sauronski is correct that time can work to the favor of the US, Danilov reminds his comrades that the West German attack on the DDR does not invoke the mutual assistance clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. An attack on US shipping in the North Atlantic, on the other hand, definitely constitutes an attack on a signatory. The same is true of an attack on Norway. Attacking US forces in international waters almost certainly will bring in every other NATO party. As it stands, several NATO members are openly questioning the actions of the FRG. Why, Danilov asks, would we settle the matter of involvement for the other members of NATO? Let the political situation brew for a bit, and perhaps some members of NATO may become convinced that they should sit out Germany’s mad war. Given another 3-6 months of mobilization time, the USSR will be in a far better position to seek reparations—after the invasion of East Germany has been repulsed.

In order to maintain the fiction that the US isn’t party to war in Germany, the White House may agree not to ship new heavy formations to Europe. A host of other arrangements will have to be made so that the Soviets can take those actions necessary to defend a Warsaw Pact signatory against foreign aggression without attacking the forces of nations not involved in the aggression. The Soviets hate it, but the unhappy fact remains that it quickly becomes clear that defending East Germany against the West Germans is going to require an all-out effort. They can’t afford to have the other European powers getting involved. Thus, they agree to a set of restrictions and conditions on their attacks against targets in West Germany in the interests of keeping the conflict limited and localized.

[Panther Al]

US Army Vehicle Guide tells us that 1st CD, the balance of 2nd AD, 4th ID, and 3rd ACR deployed to Europe by air before the end of November, 1996 and took over equipment stored in POMCUS sites. The next division to go is 5th ID, which starts deploying in December. Since 11th ACR crosses the border on 02 DEC 96, it’s a reasonable bet that 5th ID starts deploying after US-Soviet hostilities commence. An argument could be made that no replacement equipment goes across—just fuel, ammunition, and spares to sustain the existing forces in the event of “untoward developments”. In other words, Washington isn’t going to let the USSR capture West Germany in the event the West German bid for reunification fails, but (in October and November) the US isn’t going to participate, either.

Naturally, the Soviets are incensed. I picture Sauronski advocating for an all-out effort by the forces in place around the world almost as soon as the West German offensive kicks off. Danilov says no. While he despises American skullduggery in standing on the sidelines while the West Germans attempt a reunification by force, he recognizes that it’s going to be hard enough to contain the Bundeswehr without the other NATO allies. Going to war with NATO means bringing in NATO forces already in-theater. This will not improve the correlation of forces in Germany.

Sauronski points out that until the Northern Fleet closes the North Atlantic to traffic from North America, the Americans will be at their liberty to build a second strategic echelon in West Germany. Whether one believes that the US was taken by surprise by the West German move or has retained its peacetime deployments as part of the deception plan, on 02 DEC 96 the US Atlantic Fleet is not deployed to block the GIUK Gap. The time to move the Northern Fleet attack subs is that moment. If they wait, NATO will gain the upper hand in the North Atlantic without firing a shot.

Further, Sauronski says, Soviet and allied forces around the world are in a better position to pursue goals in their respective parts of the world than the Western powers are. Transcaucasus Front has forces on-hand on the Iranian border. Iraq can send forces into Kuwait in a matter of days. North Korea can attack from a standing start, while the US will have to choose between reinforcing Europe, Korea, or the Middle East. The longer the Soviets wait, the more powerful the Western allies will become in the theaters of conflict.

Acknowledging that Sauronski is correct that time can work to the favor of the US, Danilov reminds his comrades that the West German attack on the DDR does not invoke the mutual assistance clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. An attack on US shipping in the North Atlantic, on the other hand, definitely constitutes an attack on a signatory. The same is true of an attack on Norway. Attacking US forces in international waters almost certainly will bring in every other NATO party. As it stands, several NATO members are openly questioning the actions of the FRG. Why, Danilov asks, would we settle the matter of involvement for the other members of NATO? Let the political situation brew for a bit, and perhaps some members of NATO may become convinced that they should sit out Germany’s mad war. Given another 3-6 months of mobilization time, the USSR will be in a far better position to seek reparations—after the invasion of East Germany has been repulsed.

In order to maintain the fiction that the US isn’t party to war in Germany, the White House may agree not to ship new heavy formations to Europe. A host of other arrangements will have to be made so that the Soviets can take those actions necessary to defend a Warsaw Pact signatory against foreign aggression without attacking the forces of nations not involved in the aggression. The Soviets hate it, but the unhappy fact remains that it quickly becomes clear that defending East Germany against the West Germans is going to require an all-out effort. They can’t afford to have the other European powers getting involved. Thus, they agree to a set of restrictions and conditions on their attacks against targets in West Germany in the interests of keeping the conflict limited and localized.


^ This.


That is about as perfect a summation as I can think of for what the thinking was in the Kremlin in the time period between the Germans Going East, and the involvement of NATO.

Its reasonable, and logical. A case where while all the options are bad, but this is the least bad of the bunch, and doesn't leave the Sovs wide open any more than they have to be while preserving the options for action in other theatres.

[Raellus]

Web, I think your assessment is very reasonable, logical, and well-written. I can definitely envision the Soviets taking a more conservative, wait-and-see approach, especially because it looks like the PACT forces in East Germany were on the ascendency after the initial shock of the G.D.R. surprise attack. I took a look at the v1.0 timeline and roughly a month-and-a-half elapses between the Bundeswher invasion of East Germany and the U.S. intervention.

I hope you don't think that I am arguing alternative interpretations simply for the sake of arguing. I'm just sort of thinking "out loud", as it were, and playing a bit of the devil's advocate. Nowhere in canon does it mention Soviet naval units attempting to interdict shipments of men and material to Europe so I realize that I am going out on a rhetorical limb here. I guess I'm not so much arguing what happened in the T2K timeline- your interpretation fits canon very well- but what the Soviets would have/should have done if such a scenario had actually taken place. Consider this an alternative alternative history.

I understand that the Soviet regime had changed from the 1984 government that nearly ordered a nuclear strike on the U.S. (this decision resulted from misunderstandings stemming from the NATO Able Archer wargame); it just strikes me as somewhat uncharacteristic that the Soviets would not act more forcefully to the unprovoked West German attack on their WTO ally. I imagine that they would assume- incorrectly, but still- that the GDR was acting with the blessing, if not at the direction of, the U.S./NATO. For a signatory NATO member to act unilaterally in such a fashion would have been very difficult for the premiere/politburo to believe/accept. For them to sit on their hands while the U.S. reinforces its position in Europe just seems very un-Soviet. We're talking about a nightmare scenario here for the Soviets- once again, Germany is playing the aggressor and making itself a clear and present danger to the security of Mother Russia. In fact, with their forces stretched thin in Europe and scattered all over east and central Asia, I could even see the Soviets resorting to the nuclear option earlier than they did in the T2K timeline- in fact, nearly as soon as U.S. forces cross the frontier into East Germany.

That said, I would like to reiterate that I think your assessment/interpretation of what happened between October 7th and late November, 1996 (in the T2KU), is very well thought-out and corresponds closely to what's established in the official v1.0 timeline; I am more than content to accept and use what you've outlined in my T2KU.

[Graebarde]

SNIPPED

For them to sit on their hands while the U.S. reinforces its position in Europe just seems very un-Soviet. We're talking about a nightmare scenario here for the Soviets- once again, Germany is playing the aggressor and making itself a clear and present danger to the security of Mother Russia. In fact, with their forces stretched thin in Europe and scattered all over east and central Asia, I could even see the Soviets resorting to the nuclear option earlier than they did in the T2K timeline- in fact, nearly as soon as U.S. forces cross the frontier into East Germany.
.

I agree with this whole heartedly. While nobody wanted to unleash the genie, I think the Soviets would not wait until the horde was at their border to do so. WMD were always a part of their tactical doctrine of the time in western Europe from what I've read since the wall went down, and we always assumed the case when I served in Germany as well as later. Better to use the nukes to disrupt the attack on GERMAN soil, or Polish, than Mother Russian soil. But that is not what the designers wanted I guess.

[Adm.Lee]

Wandering back to Berlin and a possible Soviet assault, there may be forces that we are not accounting for. My best friend back then was stationed in Berlin, and he'd noticed that there were a lot of German police in the city, well-stocked with antitank weapons and organized into platoons and companies. In his opinion, there was at least a shadow battalion of German light infantry to help defend the city.

He altered his copy of SPI's Berlin '85 game to account for these, and it was very much a standoff of the Soviets.

In some playings of either VG's NATO, or GDW's TWW games, I've flown the German parachute brigades into the city to help stall a Soviet or Polish attempt to attack it. Even without those reinforcements, it's generally a 3-week battle of attrition to take West Berlin, and that will shatter a Soviet or Polish army that one needs much more at the front.

[Graebarde]

Wandering back to Berlin and a possible Soviet assault, there may be forces that we are not accounting for. My best friend back then was stationed in Berlin, and he'd noticed that there were a lot of German police in the city, well-stocked with antitank weapons and organized into platoons and companies. In his opinion, there was at least a shadow battalion of German light infantry to help defend the city.

He altered his copy of SPI's Berlin '85 game to account for these, and it was very much a standoff of the Soviets.

In some playings of either VG's NATO, or GDW's TWW games, I've flown the German parachute brigades into the city to help stall a Soviet or Polish attempt to attack it. Even without those reinforcements, it's generally a 3-week battle of attrition to take West Berlin, and that will shatter a Soviet or Polish army that one needs much more at the front.

It wasn't only in Berlin that the German's had the paramilitary forces. I think you're spot on with the idea the Berlin Police would become light infantry. Berlin would be a hard nut to crack for WP. It would definately eat up resources for the WP unless they just backed off and turned it into rubble with a nuke.

[Raellus]

If the Soviets are adopting a more conservative strategic approach to the fighting in Europe, why would they launch a full scale attack into W. Berlin? Why not just besiege it and pick away at the periphery? The Soviets know how costly urban fighting can be. The first Berlin Blockade didn't work because the U.S. was able to supply it by air. This would not be possible in a T2K WWIII scenario. I would imagine that a decent siege would require fewer forces and result in fewer casualties than a full scale urban assault. Thoughts?

[raketenjagdpanzer]

If the Soviets are adopting a more conservative strategic approach to the fighting in Europe, why would they launch a full scale attack into W. Berlin? Why not just besiege it and pick away at the periphery? The Soviets know how costly urban fighting can be. The first Berlin Blockade didn't work because the U.S. was able to supply it by air. This would not be possible in a T2K WWIII scenario. I would imagine that a decent siege would require fewer forces and result in fewer casualties than a full scale urban assault. Thoughts?

The Soviets are trying to destroy NATO. They've gotten the edge on the Germans at this point and are smashing everything they can.

Frankly I'm surprised there's been no mention of the USSR using non-persistent chemical weapons. Given the number of low and enclosed spaces in a modern city that'll make defending urban areas a LOT less tenable.

[HorseSoldier]

And there's always the specter of political imperatives overriding military strategy for a symbolic objective like Berlin.

[Webstral]

I know it looks like I hijacked the thread about Berlin to talk about the bigger picture. However, I think decisions about Berlin fit into a larger context.

The challenge with predicting how the Soviets react to any stimulus is the fact that very few people make the important decisions. Personality and background become very important. All of the outcomes we have described certainly are possible. I argue for what is likely and supports the existing chronology, but a variety of outcomes at any juncture is possible.

Apart from the fact that the chronology doesn’t support a nuclear action in December 1996, I think there is good reason for the Soviets to hold off on nuclear action. They have a massive conventional military. Although there are some real short term challenges presented by the situation in East Germany, the situation is very far from lost. Even if NATO captures East Germany, the place is so thrashed that it will be a generation before it’s any use to them. In the meantime, there’s Poland. Why else did Stalin capture Poland and install a communist regime except to give the Soviet Union room to fight? Massive treasure and effort have gone into building a conventional military capable of winning an all-out conventional war in the medium term. Why throw all that away for a premature roll of the nuclear dice? Better to use Poland the way Poland was always intended to be used—as a buffer and battlefield—than risk nuclear destruction in Russia before a clear necessity has been demonstrated. It’s never too late to annihilate the world, but it’s possible to move too early.

Berlin is a special case. Urban fighting is consumptive of manpower. As stated, though, Berlin has a political value. I can see the Soviets going either way. The generals would argue that letting mechanized forces become bogged down in street fighting is wasteful. The Party people would argue that taking West Berlin and ruining it in the process will drive home the costs of war to the West regardless of the outcome of the fighting. The Party types would argue that the Westerners need to be shown that the Reds are neither afraid of suffering casualties nor afraid to inflict them as necessary.

The use of chemical weapons is an important issue deserving of discussion. Loss of life is going to be gargantuan. This presents the Soviets with some problems. How can they claim to be defending fellow communists from capitalist aggression while slaughtering East German civilians by the hundred thousand?

[raketenjagdpanzer]

The use of chemical weapons is an important issue deserving of discussion. Loss of life is going to be gargantuan. This presents the Soviets with some problems. How can they claim to be defending fellow communists from capitalist aggression while slaughtering East German civilians by the hundred thousand?

Probably throw out some lie about the civilians in Berlin being effective hostages of the illegal military clique of counterrevolutionary running dog lackey junta puppet regime, or blame the chemical weapons use on NATO outright.

At this point they've bombed entire populations out of existence all through Manchuria, why should they care what the world thinks about a few hundred thousand more dead? Forty-five years prior they killed 30m of their own and the world didn't bat an eye. Blame it on NATO (one way or the other), win, write history any way they want.

[Webstral]

Forty-five years prior they killed 30m of their own and the world didn't bat an eye.

I’m not sure the world knew what was happening inside the borders of the world’s least open society.

At this point they've bombed entire populations out of existence all through Manchuria, why should they care what the world thinks about a few hundred thousand more dead?

As a practical matter, not all dead people are equal. I know it's awful to say, but dead peasants in Manchuria play differently in the West than dead Germans. With the Black Winter behind them, the West Germans have at least a scrap of credibility in the idea that they are liberating fellow Germans who are being held thrall by foreign masters. If the Soviets are ready to go to war with all of NATO, then they don't need to care what the voting population of NATO countries thinks. If they want to limit the conflict, then the answer "F*** you, we'll gas as many people as we damned well please," is of limited utility. The French may not love the Germans, but they don’t want to see millions slaughtered by nerve agents, either. There comes a point where public opinion in the West will swing in favor of what the West Germans are trying to accomplish just because the TV screens have been filled with images of East German children dead from nerve, blood, or blister agent exposure.

The Soviets can’t help but be mindful that Western assistance brought unwelcome results in China from late 1995 onward. I’ve never gotten back to Operations Tchaikovsky I and II, but in a nutshell Western volunteers take to the skies to help defend southern China against the SAF. Western-made SAM and radar begin appearing in southern China, too, manned by people who do not look Asian. (Think Flying Tigers) Once they start using chemical weapons in the DDR, the US almost certainly will provide the West Germans with the means to respond in kind. The replacements flooding into the DDR will be especially vulnerable because they will either be new recruits rushed through training or reservist rushed through a refresher. My sphincter tightens just thinking about getting onto a chemical battlefield in second-rate Soviet gear after hasty training. The Soviets might not care about East German casualties, but the East Germans will. It’s going to be hard to keep the East Germans sitting on the sideline while the one party who starts the war with chemical weapons uses them willy-nilly. Also, once the Luftwaffe drops the Oder River bridges in the initial offensive, an air bridge is going to be needed to bring in men. Persistent lethal agents here will very badly disrupt the reinforcement effort. Also, it stands to reason that once the US provides the West Germans with the means of chemical warfare, targets in Poland and Czechoslovakia will be available for action. Polish and Czechoslovak morale will be affected. Heck, if the Soviets use chemicals against targets in West Germany, it stands to reason that similar targets in Belarus are open for chemical attack. It all gets sticky very, very quickly.

For this reason, I see chemical use in Europe operating much the same way as in China. After an initial surge of gratuitous use, the Soviets see good reason to curtail use. Non-lethal agents continue to enjoy widespread use, since they impose many of the same burdens on combat troops as persistent agents minus most of the negative side effects. But lethal agents have serious downsides on the battlefield and politically. They might just change public opinion in France, Italy, etc.

Blame it on NATO (one way or the other), win, write history any way they want.

There’s only so much chemical use you can blame on NATO. NATO isn’t going to lay down persistent agents at a half-dozen Luftwaffe bases in West Germany for the sake of blaming it on the Soviets. NATO isn’t going to gas the Bundeswehr rear areas, either. The West Germans, who are invading to reunite the country, are not highly motivated to kill half the population of East Germany—even if they had chemical weapons.

[mikeo80]

A few thoughts on WMD and the Soviet Union in T2K.

I think it is evident that the Soviets do not give a tinkers damn about world opinion on who they kill. In both V1.0 and v2.2, the Soviets cross the nuclear threshhold first. China is devistated first. Then, once Nato gets right up to Soviet border, Europe is started on.

The nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR is not detaled as to who fired what and when at the respective mainlands. We are only told that "small" nukes are used against each other. The really BIG ones used to dig out missle silos and what have you are left on the ground.

Given this background, IMHO, if the Soviets thought that persistant chemical or biological weapons would give them an edge, the order would be passed QUICKLY from the C4I of Moscow to what ever unit needed to pull the trigger.

My $0.02

Mike

[Webstral]

I think it is evident that the Soviets do not give a tinkers damn about world opinion on who they kill.

I think that’s an interpretation. The Soviets may not care about the humanitarian outcome of their actions, but these are people who are constantly thinking about the big picture in terms of their security and relationship with the rest of a hostile world. At the risk of oversimplifying the equation, if the use of chemical weapons yields an advantage on the battlefield equivalent to 5 divisions but brings in other nations who field 15 divisions, then the use of chemicals can be seen to be a disadvantage. The generals don’t think this way, but the Party people do. The real question is, what is the perception at the top?

In both V1.0 and v2.2, the Soviets cross the nuclear threshhold first. China is devistated first. Then, once Nato gets right up to Soviet border, Europe is started on.

Well, of course the Soviets go nuclear first. I don’t know the v2.2 history at all, so I’ll just talk about v1. In the v1 chronology, the trigger for nuclear action is the crossing of the Soviet-Polish border by German troops in July, 1997. The subject of regime change is never brought up in the v1 chronology, but over the past few years there seems have been some consensus about the idea that in late 1989 Gorbachev gets replaced by a new cabal of neo-conservatives in Moscow. I believe that another regime change occurs when the Americans cross the East German border. The new regime fights the war conventionally through 1997. Once NATO forces cross the Soviet border, the regime leadership decides that they have to do something drastic before there’s another coup. In short, the Kremlin goes nuclear to save their own skins.

Note, though, that while the Chinese get hit hard right off the bat, NATO gets gentler treatment. NATO has the ability to hit back just as hard. So even when the Soviets cross the nuclear threshold, the intent is to use just enough nuclear firepower to shift the balance in their favor. They don’t launch an all-out attack on the US because in the end they don’t want to see the Soviet Union reduced to a glass parking lot. The Soviet Union falls, but this is a result of miscalculation, not an all-out nuclear exchange.

The same logic can be applied to chemical weapons. Where the use of chemical weapons yields an advantage, the Soviets will use chemical weapons. Where the use of chemical weapons yields a disadvantage, the Soviets will refrain. As long as the Party is calling the shots, they will consider items like the likelihood of bringing other members of NATO into the war. Soviet doctrine may call for the use of chemicals and nuclear weapons from the get-go in any war, but this is part of the reason why they never invaded West Germany: they believed the use of WMD would get out of hand almost immediately and render the point of the war moot. When presented with the invasion of East Germany by only West Germany, the Soviets are faced with a situation for which there may not be a well-considered doctrine. However, we can count on the Soviets to ask themselves whether a given action is going to be to Soviet advantage on balance or Soviet disadvantage.

[Raellus]

I don't think the Soviets would use NBC right off the bat either. Nothing in canon supports this and, as Web pointed out, such use when immediately up the ante, escalate/broaden the conflict, and invite retaliatory strikes.

Webstral's argument relies heavily on the idea that the Soviets need to be weary of public opinion in the west, lest they inadvertently bring all of NATO into the fighting. It is for this very reason that I don't think an all out assault on West Berlin would serve Soviet strategic interests. Wouldn't video footage of West Berliners killed by artillery and air strikes have the same effect on the rest of the West as video footage of West Berliners killed by chemical agents? I contend that an all out assault on West Germany invites a broader NATO response- one that the Soviets would wish to avoid. If the NATO forces in West Berlin successfully resist an urban assault, the Soviet Union looks weak. If the Soviets succeed, but kill a lot of civilians in the process, they look like the aggressors. A siege accomplishes most of the same goals without an extreme media backlash in the west. Cut West Berlin off, isolate its garrison troops, and concentrate on defeating Bundeswher field formations. A siege would be much easier to justify diplomatically and politically on the world stage than an all out Grozny-style assault. The Soviets might even try to use a besieged Berlin as a honey trap to draw GDR forces on to ground of their choosing. That way, the Soviets could fight a largely defensive battle white they await reinforcements from the east, and still retain some initiative by effectively selecting the primary front.

[Webstral]

I agree that a Pact assault on West Berlin in October or November 1996 is unlikely because such an assault would constitute an attack on North Atlantic Treaty signatories (US, UK, France) not party to the war. Once the US joins the war, though, all bets are off. Then the Soviets are quite likely to handle West Berlin severely. I’m not sure how French troops in West Berlin will be treated, though combat between French and Pact troops seems enormously unlikely. The Soviets might call for the French to report for internment until the current state of hostilities is ended, but this would be a risky move. More likely, the French will be told that if they stand fast in their sector of the city, they will not be touched until the situation resolves itself. Then negotiations regarding the fate of the French sector and the French troops in the sector can take place.

I presume that after NATO secures East Germany, the French go home. I can’t say this for certain, though. France might insist on adhering to the terms of the 1945 occupation.

[Raellus]

I agree that a Pact assault on West Berlin in October or November 1996 is unlikely because such an assault would constitute an attack on North Atlantic Treaty signatories (US, UK, France) not party to the war. Once the US joins the war, though, all bets are off.

Absolutely.

[dude_uk]

You know Webstral sometimes I just come here to read your wonderful posts. :) Seriously great work. Your Storm in Germany is the foundation for all my own ideas.

I started this thread, because I have been attempting to fill in the blanks of the British army in mid 1997, just before the buckets of sunshine get thrown around. Canon is missing all the support arms, Most of the artillery and all the reserves.

With regards to the Berlin Brigade, I was trying to think of the caveat for it have, whilst I have included it in the ORBAT. I was trying to think of the % that is still around after a week of heavy fighting. Here is what I have:

Berlin Infantry Brigade
29th (Berlin) Signal Regiment - Royal Signals
Berlin Infantry Brigade HQ and 229th Signal Squadron - Royal Signals

D Sqn - 1st Royal Tank regiment
1st Irish Guards
3rd Royal Anglian Regiment
4th The Light Infantry

38th (Berlin) Field Squadron Royal Engineers
7 Flight - Army Air Corps
6th Air Defence Troop, 46 Battery, Royal Artillery
3 Intelligence and Security Company, Int Corps
(Berlin) Ordnance Company, RAOC
62nd Transport & Movement Squadron, RCT
14th (Berlin) Field Workshop REME
2nd Regiment RMP
84th (Berlin) British Military Hospital (Would deploy as Field Ambulance)

[Webstral]

That's right kind of you, dude.

[dude_uk]

I've decided that post Battle for Berlin, the British and U.S Berlin Brigades march 'on paper'. A false army that exists for the Soviet's to worry about.

After a week of street fighting and the possibility of chemical agents (Something I had not considered) does 20% of each one left seem about right?

[Legbreaker]

Could even be less. Take a look at what happened to Lt Colonel Frost's English paratrooper battalion in Arnhem 1944. A smaller number of troops involved, but a similar ratio of defenders to attackers I'd think.

[Rainbow Six]

If it's any help I tried to account for the Berlin Brigade as follows when I put together a global orbat for summer 2000 as part of my alternative survivor's guide:

Armoured Sqn - destroyed during the battle. Handful,of surviving personnel rejoined their parent unit in early 97

Three inf Bns - 1 Kings, 1 R Anglian, 1 Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regt.

1 Kings was hit hardest and was down to an under strength company by early 97. Survivors merged with 5/8 Kings, a TA Bn with BAOR reinforcement role which was then renumbered as the "new" 1st Battalion (thus removing 5/8 Kings from the Army list)

Next hardest hit was 1 RAR which I put down as having 70% casualties. 1 DERR I had with 40% casualties (all back of envelope jottings, no scientific reasoning to them).

1 RAR and 1 DERR were both rebuilt (1 DERR relatively quickly in Germany, 1 RAR rather more slowly in the UK). Once back to full strength they were assigned to other Brigades (1 DERR went to the 5th Division when it was formed).

I didn't go into detail with regard to the various support arms, I just assumed the Berlin units would be disbanded and survivors would be assigned to other units at the start of 97.

Hope that helps...

[HorseSoldier]

With the US Berlin Brigade, I would guess that given the relative commitment to units and sentimentality in the US military that in the aftermath of the battle, any remnants would have been disbanded and surviving personnel primarily used as battle casualty replacements for other USAREUR units. Some personnel fit for duty and guys wounded but eventually able to return to duty might have been posted back to training units or to mobilizing Reserve/Guard units (so participation in the fight could possibly be part of a character or NPC back story). The subordinate battalions might have been slated for reconstitution from scratch back in CONUS and maybe turned up in the order of battle for one or more of the late war USAR light divisions.

[Jason Weiser]

Here is a thought, how much could the Soviets spare to neutralize Berlin? Sure, they're rolling up the Bundeswehr and their East German allies, but that's a rather large fight, and that's before the US, British and Canadians come rolling into the fray. And consider, most Soviet warplans had the East Germans taking primary responsibility for the reduction of West Berlin in the first place. There was a good article in Armor magazine about the whole thing....the title doesn't come to mind.

So, that could leave us with the East German units charged with the reduction of West Berlin are instead fighting it out with the Soviets for control of East Berlin, and then when it spills over and the US/Brits and Canadians join the war, the Berlin Brigade may instead, assault into the East to relieve the East German units still holding out? It would make a very interesting role reversal.

The Soviets cannot spare 20th Guards Army to reduce the traitors in the East, as it's busy trying to hold off the West Germans. So what's left? 1 Motor Rifle Brigade that was the Soviet presence in East Berlin...so any fight for Berlin would probably be bloody and short, once NATO came into the war.

[Raellus]

Jason's assessment is why I think the Soviets would throw a thin cordon around the city to contain its defenders and concentrate its fighting forces further west against the Bundeswehr and, eventually the Americans and Brits. A direct assault would be costly both in terms of men and material, and in the court of public opinion as well. The Soviets can't afford either of those early on, so a siege makes more sense on nearly every level. This is not to say that the besieging force doesn't launch probing attacks or attempt to nibble away at the defenders- given enough time, the defenders would be seriously weakened. I just don't see an all out attack.

[dude_uk]

If it's any help I tried to account for the Berlin Brigade as follows when I put together a global orbat for summer 2000 as part of my alternative survivor's guide:


As ever great thoughts. That seems about right.


Raellus and Jason Weiser great thoughts! A cordon and the occasional raid into Berlin, would sap UK and US strength and morale. Hemmed in the Soviets probably can just use Artillery (Whatever they can spare) which will devastate the Allies.

[boogiedowndonovan]

I'm with Rae and Jason on the Pact not taking out West Berlin.

I'm interested in what West German paramilitary organizations would be available in West Berlin, including the polizei (police).

I found two interesting tidbits, the US had West German nationals serving in the 6941st Guard Battalion and the British had a unit of West Germans attached to 2 Regiment RMP, the 248 German Security Unit.

http://fsbvg.homestead.com/STNews.html
http://www.usarmygermany.com/Units/Berlin%20Brigade/USAREUR_Berlin%20Brigade.htm

Anyone know if the French had any similar organizations in West Berlin? and what about the West Berlin PD?

-bdd