View Full Version : The United States Army in World War Two
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:13 AM
So why this thread? It is estimated that of all of the millions of Americans who served in World War Two, roughly a million are still alive. The end of the Greatest Generation approches. In part this is to honor the courage and sacrifice those who stepped forward to save a world gone mad.
Another part is that the way that the Army of United States organzied itself from its negelected pre-war start into one of the mighest armies in history can give insight into how the US would have approached World War Three.
Unless other stated, sources include “Hitler’s Last Gamble” (Trevor Dupuy); “Battle of the Bulge” (Steven Zaloga); “Battle of the Bulge” (Danny Parker); “Battle of the Bulge” (Hugh Cole); “A Time for Trumpets” (Charles MacDonald); “US Army Order of Battle in WWII” (Shelby Stanton); “US Army Handbook 1939-1945” (George Forty); “The Armies of George S. Patton” (George Forty); “Dirty Little Secrets of World War II” (James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi); “Citizen Soldiers” (Stephen Ambrose); “Band of Brothers” (Stephen Ambrose); U.S. Infantry Weapons of World War II (Bruce Canfield); “The American Arsenal” (Ian V. Hogg)
Enjoy!
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:17 AM
By September of 1945, the United States Army was perhaps the strongest in the world, numbering 8,300,000 out of a total of 12,350,000 of the U.S. Armed Forces. It was only exceeded in manpower by the Russians, and it led the world in weaponry, strategic mobility and logistic capabilities. Winston Churchill described it thus:
“I saw the creation of this mighty force, victorious in every theater against the enemy in so short a time and from such a very small parent stock. This is an achievement which the soldiers of every other country will always study with admiration and envy.”
“But that is not the whole story, nor even the greatest part of the story. To create large armies is one thing, to lead them and to handle them is another. It remains to me a mystery as yet unexplained how the very small staffs which the United States kept during the years of peace were able not only to build up the Armies and the Air Force units, but also to find the leaders and vast staffs capable of handling enormous masses and of moving them faster and further than masses have ever been moved in war before.”
When compared to the pitifully inadequate state of the U.S. Army in 1939 (sixteenth in size, right after Romania), most of whose units were still trained in the combat methods of 1918, rather than those needed to meet the oncoming onslaught that the Germans were prepared to unleash, then the true magnitude of this achievement can be seen in its proper perspective.
On June 30, 1939, the U.S. Army was made up of three elements. The Regular Army consisted of 187,893 men, including 22,387 men in the Army Air Corps. This force manned 9 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, and a single mechanized cavalry brigade. The National Guard totaled 199,491 men forming 18 infantry divisions. All of these units were at minimal peacetime strengths, available equipment was sorely lacking, and most of what was available was either obsolescent or obsolete. The Regular Army was well trained, but the training of the National Guard was regarded with suspicion by their regular counterparts, as they only drilled for only forty-eight evenings a year and attended a mere two weeks’ of field duty every summer.
The third element of the Army was known as the Organized Reserves. Although this only existed in the mobilization plans, it provided a pool of over 100,000 trained officers, mostly graduates of the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps, it was to prove to be a invaluable asset to the Army when the expansion program began.
On September 8, 1939, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency, which raised the strength of the Regular Army to 227,000, although this was mostly taken up by enlarging the garrison in Panama and increases in the Army Air Corps. The National Guard was also authorized to recruit to a strength of 235,000. These were small concessions, but they did enable the General Staff to establish several tactical corps headquarters and enough army troops to create a fully functioning field Army. This was followed in April 1940 by the first corps maneuvers to be held since 1918, and in May 1940, corps vs. corps exercises took place, testing new weapons and tactics. The emergency proclamation permitted the expansion of the officer corps, by allowing the assignment of reserve officers to active duty as well as emergency expenditures that were used to purchase badly needed motor transport.
On August 27, 1940, Congress authorized the induction of the National Guard into federal service for a period of twelve months and then increased the authorized strength of the Regular Army. The new Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall ordered a reorganization of the infantry division moving from the old four regiment ‘square’ division and into the new three regiment ‘triangular’ division, allowing for greater maneuverability and flexibility. Once the new organization had been fully tested in the Spring 1940 maneuvers, all divisions, including those of the National Guard, were reorganized as triangular.
During May and June of 1940, the Germans swept across Europe, eliminating France as a world power and leaving Britain to stand alone, facing imminent invasion. The gravity of the situation finally struck home with the people of the United States. The public began to demand urgent and enormous increases in the armed forces. On September 16, 1940, the first peacetime draft in US history was passed by Congress. However, the draftees were limited to one year of service. The Selective Service Act authorized the strength of the Army to be raised to 1,400,000 men, of which 500,000 were to be Regulars, 270,000 National Guard and 630,000 Selectees. A month later, in public buildings all over the country, men between the ages of 21 and 35 began registering under the new law. Between October 1940 and July 1941, 17,000,000 men were registered, but of these, only 900,000 were permitted by the SSA to be inducted for service in the Army. General George C. Marshall appeared before Congress on August 7, 1941 and Congress approved (by one vote) an indefinite extension of service for the Guard, draftees and Reserve officers.
By the summer of 1941, the Army had increased eightfold and had almost reached the new ceiling of 1,400,000 men. The ground force in the continental United States now consisted of four armies, containing nine corps and made up of 29 divisions, plus overseas garrisons. The picture on new equipment and weapons was still far from good, due to the President’s lend-lease policy, assisting Britain and any other effective enemies of Germany, even at the expense of American rearmament.
On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the United States of America was dramatically brought into the war with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. The first bombing run was made at 0755 hours and was over with within two hours. The U.S. Pacific Fleet lost 18 warships, including eight battleships sunk or damaged, 188 aircraft had been destroyed and 3,581 service members killed or wounded. This attack, followed by the declarations of war by Germany and Italy, involved the United States in a global conflict the likes of which had never been seen before. There was now much to do and precious little time to do it in. Mobilization had to be completed as quickly as possible, so as to develop the full potential of the whole of the country. Men had to be inducted and trained, industrial capacity and output expanded and all military facilities increased to unheard-of proportions.
During this initial period of the war, the U.S. was forced to stand on the defensive and endured many humiliations at the hands of the Axis powers because she was too impotent to strike back. All of the nations efforts were directed to the rapid deployment of the available men and equipment in an effort to slow the momentum of the enemy attacks. At the same time protected lines of communications had to be established around the world, while a vast expansion of the military establishment was begun. It took the U.S. eight months to accumulate the weapons and equipment needed, to train the men that were needed initially and then to transport them to the various theaters where they could be employed in offensive operations against the enemy. The end of this end of this initial phase was marked by the first U.S. amphibious assault in August 1942 against the Japanese, at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.
In spite of these measures, expansion was slow. By December 31, 1941, 24 days after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Army consisted of 1,685,403 men ( including 275,889 in the Army Air Corps) in 29 infantry, 5 armored and 2 cavalry divisions. While an increase of 433% in two and a half years was a magnificent achievement, shortages of equipment and trained personnel were serious. Over the next three and a half years, the Army would expand by an additional 492%, to a total of 8,291,336 men in 89 divisions: 66 infantry, 5 airborne, 16 armored, 1 cavalry and 1 mountain division.
On December 16, 1944, 43 of these divisions were deployed in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), including 2 airborne, 10 armored, and 31 infantry divisions. At the same time, an additional 16 divisions were preparing to join them. One armored division had already deployed to Europe and was on its way to the front, and one airborne division was in England, awaiting shipment to France, these would be committed into the fighting by January 16, 1945. One airborne, 3 armored and 7 infantry divisions were completing training in England or in the United States in anticipation of deployment to the ETO.
The Chief of the Army Ground Forces, Lieutenant General J. Lesley McNair was the final decision maker on Army organization. He campaigned tirelessly to reduce overhead in US divisions, insisting on as much streamlining as possible. There were two reasons for this approach. First, shipping space was a premium for not only combat but support units, and all supply items (including food to feed the population of Britain) had to be shipped from the United States to England. Second, McNair and other planners realized that the US manpower pool was not inexhaustible. Industry and farming in the US, as well as the massive expansion of the Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Corps all absorbed vast numbers of men. The Victory Program of September 25, 1941 called for an Army of 213 divisions, this goal was never even close to being achieved; it proved difficult to man the 89 divisions that were eventually fielded
An adjunct to McNair’s efforts to streamline the division was his effort to pool all non divisional combat assets in the Army into homogeneous battalion-sized units. Pooled units were to be held by corps/armies and were to be attached to divisions as required. Artillery, engineers, armored, tank destroyers, antiaircraft artillery and infantry units were all components of the pool.. Group and brigade headquarters units were created to control manageable aggregations of the large number of pool units.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:20 AM
By the end of December 1941, the U.S. had activated 29 infantry, five armored and two cavalry divisions. Of these, only two were deployed outside the continental United States, the remaining 34 were all short of equipment and only 17 had received sufficient training to be considered ready for combat (had all of the necessary equipment been pooled, then there would have been enough equipment to equip five infantry and two armored divisions). The initial plan (the Victory Plan) called for an army of 200 divisions, with an immediate target set to raise 72 divisions by the end of 1942.
The original mobilization and expansion plan had been carefully worked out in the inter-war years, in its simplest terms it had the following main features:
a. Regular Army units would be brought up to full TO&E scales.
b. The National Guard would be inducted into Federal service and its units brought up to full TO&E strength.
c. The Organized Reserve would be activated.
d. The training cadre for each of these new units would be drawn from existing units.
e. Enlisted and new units would be brought up to full strength by voluntary recruitment or draft and before assignment would be brought through a basic training course at replacement training centers.
f. Officers for these new units would be drawn mainly from the Officer’s Reserve Corps to supplement the cadre officers.
g. Armies would be brought to full strength and activity and would be responsible for the preparation of tactical units for combat.
h. A General Headquarters, United States Army, would be activated as the high command of the field forces.
By July 1940, the nucleus of a General Headquarters had been established with the initial task of organizing and training the field forces within the continental Untied States. This meant that General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, now assumed a second major post, as Commanding General of the Field Forces. This was a formal appointment only and the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Major General Lesley J. McNair exercised day-to-day control (on Marshall’s behalf). General McNair was a strong opponent of too much specialization, believing that “special” units usually lacked basic military skills. He also hated the waste of men and material and was especially watchful and highly suspicious of any proposed changes to the Tables of Organization and Equipment.
The War Department planned to activate three to four divisions each month, starting in March, 1942. It would use the cadre system with experienced personnel being drawn from an existing division to form the organizing and training nucleus of a new one. These cadre had to attend special training at the service schools, while the divisional commander and his staff had to attend the Command and General Staff School. Most of the remaining officers would be assigned, directly from the officer candidate schools and the enlisted men from replacement training centers. General McNair opposed this policy as he felt that the new divisions should be built upon men who had just finished their basic training, but the sheer scale of the expansion plan meant that this was impossible to achieve. The War Department allowed only 10-12 months for a division to be formed, staffed, equipped and trained to combat readiness. This period consisted of 17 weeks for establishing the initial organization and completing basic training; 13 weeks for unit training up to regimental level and 14 weeks of combined arms tactical training, to include at least one divisional level exercise.
With such a tight schedule, problems soon emerged. There were severe equipment shortages, so that divisions would be activated with insufficient equipment for proper and realistic training. A system of priorities were worked out, with the categories A, B and C being allocated to the divisions. Those due for immediate shipment to a combat zone received Priority A (their full TO&E organization of personnel and equipment). Priority B units received up to 50% of their authorized RO&E and Priority C units were at 25% or less of their authorized TO&E. On numerous occasions, divisions would receive their A priority so close to their embarkation date, that they did not have time to train with their new equipment. In spite of these problems, the mobilization proceeded at a murderous pace and by the end of 1942, virtually all of the ground combat units had been mobilized. All told, the Army mobilized only 91 divisions (compared to 313 for the Germans, 120 Japanese, 550 Russian and 50 British), just under 50% of the original GHQ estimates. However, these divisions were all maintained up to strength throughout the war, in spite of heavy casualties, a major achievement when the student realizes that by early 1945, 57 infantry regiments in 19 different divisions had suffered between 100% and 200% casualties! With only three exceptions, none of the divisions activated after Pearl Harbor saw combat prior to 1944.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:21 AM
Ground combat in World War II called for many complex and technical skills. An infantryman, just to name one example, had to be able to use and maintain any number of different weapons. He had to have a good grounding of camouflage and concealment; of mines and bobby traps; of patrolling; map reading; AFV and aircraft recognition; how to use captured enemy equipment; how to deal with POWs; of field hygiene and first aid; of how to live under primitive conditions for extended periods of time. All of these skills were essential for the soldier and they had to be taught to the soldiers from scratch. They also had to be taught how to become a member of a team, be it of a rifle squad, a tank or gun crew. Mobile warfare required a high standard of physical fitness and mental alertness and intelligence, skill and stamina were need for both personnel survival and eventual victory on the battlefield.
BASIC TRAINING
The only military training establishments in the inter-war years were the General and Special Service Schools, small organizations with the task of training very limited numbers of key individuals. The much larger task of basic training of the newly enlisted soldiers was left to the units. With the onslaught on new selectees, this system was unacceptable. In 1940, the War Department organized the Replacement Training Centers (RTCs) all over the United States. The mission of the RTC was to provide a steady flow of trained men to the tactical units, thus relieving those units of their training burdens during mobilization and combat. By March, 1941, there were twelve RTCs: three for the Coast Artillery, one Armor, one Cavalry, three Field Artillery and four Infantry. During 1941, these RTCs trained over 200,000 men. With the declaration of war, the RTCs had to fulfill two missions: first to supply “filler replacements” to occupy initial vacancies in units being activated or brought up to strength; secondly, to provide “loss replacements” for units already in training or engaged in combat. More RTCs were established to cover the new “arms” such as Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Tank Destroyer. They trained the newly inducted men in basic military subjects and in the elementary specialist techniques of their arm of service. Courses initially lasted for 12 to 13 weeks, but immediately after Pearl harbor, many RTC programs were cut to 8 weeks. This did not last for long and by the fall of 1943, with a few exceptions, all courses had been fixed at a 17 week period.
SERVICE SCHOOLS
Between July 1940 and August 1945, some 570,000 men completed courses designed to give them the necessary skills for a wide variety of jobs ranging from, for example, infantry battalion commander to anti-aircraft control technician. The Army Ground Forces operated eight schools, four (Cavalry, Coast Artillery, Field Artillery and Infantry) had been formed during the inter-war years and, until the March 1942 reorganization, had been controlled by the chiefs of their respective arms. The remaining schools, established to teach new skills and tactics were Armored, Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Tank Destroyer and Parachute (this was really more than a service school, as all airborne training required specialized training, in effect it was both a school and an RTC).
OFFICER TRAINING
Future officers were trained an selected for commissions in a sub school of each of the service schools known as Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). The mission of the OCS was to convert enlisted men into combat officers to meet the mobilization requirements that could not be filled by Regular, Reserve of National Guard officers. These sources varied from 12 to 17 weeks and trained the candidates in the basic duties of a junior officer of there particular branch, and evaluated whether or not they were fit to recommended for a commission. By 1942, the OCS also took on the task of training the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps (ROTC) who had left college to enter the Army before completing their full ROTC course. This later group represented about one-tenth of all OCS graduated from the AGF schools and thru received Reserve commissions after graduation. When the Army began to mobilization in 1940, it had only some 14,000 regular officers, by the end of 1943, an additional 19,000 National Guard officers were in Federal Service, some 180,000 officers had been drawn from ROTC and nearly 100,000 civilians had received direct commissions (slightly less than half as doctors, dentists and chaplains, the rest in technical and administrative posts). Another 300,000 new officers had been commissioned from OCS or aviation cadets. There was additional pressure, especially from the Army Service Forces, to increase the length of the OCS course to six months, but this was never approved and no major changes were ever made to the course. AGF always maintained that the mission of OCS was to provide the initial and individual phases of officer training, which was then continued when he arrived at his unit.
TACTICAL TRAINING
GHQ developed a program of tactical training which included the phases of small unit training (the coordination of the various weapons of the regiment and the division) and large scale maneuvers. This program remained virtually unaltered throughout the war. This program included proficiency tests at every stage, and an emphasis on elementary training and general proficiency before advancing to specialized training. Maneuvers were conducted with the fewest possible frills and stressed realistic battle simulation, meticulous umpiring and immediate debriefs so that the maximum amount of benefit could be gained by all taking part. A rough idea of the distribution of training time suggested for an infantry division was: 13 weeks of individual training; 5 weeks for unit training; 4 weeks for combined arms training; 7 weeks for maneuvers. and a 6 week period of post-maneuver training.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:34 AM
When General Marshall assumed his position of Chief of Staff in 1939, the Army was operating under its inter-war organization and plans, both of which were hopelessly antiqued. During the 1920s-30, the War Department had operated under the assumption that any future war would be fought in a manner similar to that of World War One, thus using similar command and management techniques. Needless to say, this theory was wrong. One of General Marshall’s first tasks was to adopt the Army’s pre-war structure to a constantly changing world situation. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, General Marshall was even more determined to discard the creaking, old-fashioned structure and create a new one which would be capable of dealing with modern, global war.
Among the many assumptions of the pre-war War Department was that any war would be fought in a single theater of operations and that the Chief of Staff would automatically take to the field as Commander in Chief. It was also anticipated that the President and the Secretary of War would follow the Great War practice and delegate their authority to the professional military officers. This as latter assumption could not have been more wrong as President Roosevelt, in his role of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, chose to play an active part in directing the military. Indeed, General Marshall soon found himself in the role of the President’s advisor on military strategy and operations.
By the end of June 1943, the Army had expanded to over 5,000,000 men. This unbelievable expansion caused a fundamental reorientation within the War Department and they way in which it conducting its business. Various services and supply agencies had to be integrated into the command organization, in order to insure the efficient assembling in the U.S. of all the means of waging and its transportation and distribution to the combat areas overseas. This not only required an enormous training organization to train the ever growing new army, but for this to be done in an orderly and efficient manner, centralized under one authority. Early in 1942, after over a year of exhaustive study, a committee headed by General Joseph T. McNarney completed a plan that established three great commands under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff. These were to be known as: the Army Air Forces (AAF), the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and the Services of Supply, latter called the Army Service Forces (ASF). This was approved by the President on March 9, 1942. To give an idea of the scale of these commands, a decision was made in the summer of 1943 to expand the Army to an effective strength of 7,700,000. In 1945, the operating strength was 8,300,000, but this figure included 600,000 ineffectives (500,000 undergoing hospitalization or in the process of being discharged as unfit for active or limited service). Another 100,000 were en-route overseas as replacements, making up the 600,000 total. The following table shows the breakdown of the 7,700,000 effectives between the AAF, the AGF, the ASF and the Theater Forces (personnel directly attached to the theater HQs and the major command installations worldwide):
Army Ground Forces 3,186,000
Army Air Forces 2,340,000
Army Service Forces 1,751,000
Theater Forces 423,000
The Army Air Forces are a work in progress at this time, but a brief look is included. The 1942 reorganization carried previous reorganizations to their logical conclusion, establishing them as an entirely separate command from the ground forces. They now had their own Air Staff, with its own chief, General Henry H. Arnold. It administered its own personnel and training, it organized and supported the combat air forces employed in all theaters of war and exercised considerable influence over both strategic and operational planning. When World War Two began in 1939, the Air Corps had a strength of less than 24,000. By 1945, the Army Air Forces had a strength of nearly 2.4 million. The United States produced nearly a quarter of a million aircraft. Following the end of the war, it would take another two years for the AAF to achieve completely separate and equal status, as the United States Air Force, with General Henry H. Arnold at its first five-star general.
The Army Service Forces have always been the unsung heroes of World War Two. A detailed list of their organization, and units, and indeed, all of their duties would require several books. In summary, they were responsible for the supply, equipping and movement of troops both at home and overseas; for food, clothing, equipment, ammunitions and the medical services; for road, rail and sea transportation; for personnel records and the mail service; they coordinated the production requirements of military munitions in the U.S.; the actual issue of weapons and equipment; plus everything else that affected the efficient and regular maintenance of this equipment; and the steady stream of supplies to all theaters of war. They were also responsible for many aspects of the troop’s morale, such as movies, educational programs and newspapers. Their supply lines extended for over 56,000 miles and they had authority over the seven technical services, eight administrative services, nine corps areas (later called service commands), six ports of embarkation and nine general depots. HQ ASF was responsible for coordinating the work of all this and for the very first time, full recognition was given to the vital importance of logistics and to the tremendous advantages which could be gained by concentrating logistics operations in a single command. How well the ASF fulfilled their mission can be measured by the fact that there were no major supply failures during the course of the war. Troops were successfully transported all over the world and no battle or campaign was lost through a major logistic failure.
For planning purposes and distribution, supplies were broken down into five classes:
Class 1: Those supplies used up at a regular rate, regardless of conditions, principally food.
Class 2: Items (including clothing and weapons) for which there was a laid down scale of entitlement by units and individuals.
Class 3: All classes of petroleum, oils and lubricants, known collectively as POL.
Class 4: A miscellaneous category, used to cover everything not covered elsewhere.
Class 5: Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents.
While the requirements of the different theatres varied with local conditions, it took, on average, 1,600 tons of supplies daily to maintain a divisional slice. This slice consisted of a full strength division, plus a proportional share of all the necessary supporting and service troops, plus two air wing slices, making a total of 500,000 men in all. This 1,600 tons was broken down into: 1,100 tons of all types of dry cargos, 475 tons of POL products and 25 tons of vehicles. Out of this total, 595 tons went to the combat zone for the ground forces, 65 tons for the air forces and 365 tons went into the divisional area. On average each man assigned to Europe received 66.81lbs of supplies per day (67.4lbs in the Pacific). In the ETO, this was broken down into 7.7lbs of rations (6.71lbs in the PTO), 0.426lbs of clothing and equipment (1lb in the PTO), 7.821lbs of construction materials (11.9lbs in the PTO) and 3.64lbs of ammunition (5.14lbs in the PTO).
The Army Ground Forces is the real subject of this paper. During the war HQ AGF administered 230,000 officers and 4,194,000 enlisted men. The AGF suffered 80% of the Army’s battle casualties, took part in more than forty amphibious landings and captured over 3.5 million prisoners. A total of 92 divisions were activated before and during the war. In 1940, there was only eight Regular Army and Philippine divisions active, between 1940 and 1942, another 65 divisions were activated. 90 divisions were prepared for combat and 88 of these were actually committed. In spite of heavy casualties in some divisions, the AGF maintained them all at or near their TO&E strength.
NON DIVISIONAL UNITS, HEADQUARTERS AND THE STAFF
NON DIVISIONAL UNITS
Fewer than half of the tactical troops of the AGF were actually organic to divisions, instead, they were in non divisional combat and service units. On March 31, 1945, the AGF had 1,468,941 personnel assigned to non divisional units and 1,194,398 personnel assigned to divisions. Typically, these non divisional units were grouped at three levels; Corps, Army and GHQ Reserve. In the early years of World War Two, each army and corps had its TO&E organization, for example:
Type Army (July 31, 1942):
Antiaircraft: 1 Brigade
Chemical Warfare: 1 Maintenance Co., 1 Depot Co., 1 Impregnation Co., 1 Lab Co., 3 Decon Cos.
Engineers: 3 General Service Regts, 6 Engnr Bns, 1 Depot Co., 1 Topographical Bn, 1 Water Supply Bn, 4 Lt Ponton Cos., 2 Dump Truck Cos., 1 Camouflage Bn, 1 Maintenance Co., 2 Hvy Ponton Bns.
Medical: 3 Medical regts, 1 Vet Co., 4 Surgical Hospitals, 10 Evac Hospitals, 1Conv Hospital, 1 Lab, 1 Supply Depot.
Military Police: 1 MP Bn
Ordnance: 2 Ammunition Bns, 1 Maintenance Bn
Quartermaster: 3 MM Bns, 1 Motor Trans Co, 1 Trk Regt, 6 Service Bns, 1 Gas Supply Co., 1 Car Co, 1 Depot Co.
Signal: 1 Construction Bn, 1 Photo Co., 1 Pigeon Co., 1 Radar Intercept Co., 1 Operations Bn, 1 Depot Co.
Tank Destroyers: 3 TD Bns
Aviation: 1 Observation Group
Type Corps (July 31, 1942):
Divisions: 3
Antiaircraft: 1 Regt
Chemical Warfare: None
Engineers: 2 Combat Regts, 1 Corps Topographical Co
Medical: 1 Medical Bn
Military Police: 1 MP Co
Ordnance: 1 maintenance Bn
Quartermaster: 2 Trk Cos., 1 MM Coy, 1 Gas Supply Co., 1 Service Co.
Signal: 1 Signal Bn
Tank Destroyers: 5 Bns
Aviation: 4 Observation Squadrons
The AGF was never happy with this rigid system, feeling that the “type” concept set up false preconceptions with regards to tactical and logistical operations. What was needed was a far more flexible system, and while AGF plans were never officially approved, it did go into piecemeal effect in 1943. This plan did away with all organic corps and army troops, and made all non divisional units part of the GHQ Reserve. The only elements retained by corps and army were those over which they needed to exercise proper command, headquarters and signal personnel. Troops were grouped in the smallest and most efficient size possible (usually battalion sized). These units would then be assigned, as needed to the corps and army. Brigade and regimental levels of command were abolished.
In their place was organized the “Group”. Group headquarters were activated in the ratio of one to every four/five battalions. Group headquarters were supposed to avoid administration, being tactical headquarters, being responsible solely for training and combat operations. Battalions would deal directly with army on administrative matters.
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
The United States Army maintained three levels of field command above the division, Corps, Army and Army Group. Twenty eight corps were organized during World War Two, including four converted from armored corps. A listing of all the corps is as follows:
I Corps
Papua; New Guinea; Luzon
I Armored Corps
Casablanca; French Morocco. Deactivated following the TORCH landings.
II Corps
Algeria-French Morocco; Tunisia; Sicily; Naples-Foggia; Rome-Arno; North
Apennines; Po Valley
II Armored Corps
Redesignated as XVIII Corps in 1943
III Corps
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
III Armored Corps
Redesignated as XIX Corps in 1943
IV Corps
Rome-Arno; North Apennines; Po Valley
IV Armored
Redesignated as XX Corps in 1943
V Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
VI Corps
Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; Southern France; Ardennes-Alsace;
Central Europe
VII Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
VIII Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
IX Corps
Pacific Theater without inscription
X Corps
New Guinea; Southern Philippines; Leyte
XI Corps
New Guinea; Southern Philippines
XII Corps
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XIII Corps
Rhineland; Central Europe
XIV Corps
Guadalcanal; Northern Solomons; Luzon
XV Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XVI Corps
Rhineland; Central Europe
XVIII Airborne Corps
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe. XVIII Corps was redesignated
as XVIII Airborne Corps, August 25, 1944.
XIX Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Central Europe
XX Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XXI Corps
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XXII Corps
Rhineland, Central Europe
XXIII Corps
European Theater without inscription
XXIV Corps
Leyte; Ryukyus
XXXVI Corps
Continental United States (to be deployed with Operation CORNET)
One of the driving purposes of the battalion and group system was to keep down the size of headquarters staffs, reducing the routine administration they had to deal with, thus keeping them as tactical as possible. The TO&E of a Corps Headquarters (January 19,1945) shows that less than 200 men served in the headquarters.
Corps Headquarters
Entire HQ: 196
Commander and Aides: 4
General Staff Section: 60
Engineer Section: 12
Signal Section: 10
Chemical Warfare Section: 5
Adjutant-General’s Section: 28
Inspector-General’s Section: 7
Judge Advocate-General’s Section: 5
Finance Section: 8
Medical Section: 9
Ordnance Section: 18
Quartermaster Section: 9
Special Services Section: 4
Chaplain’s Section: 6
Public Information Section: 11
The Field Army (to give it its full title), was composed of a headquarters, two or more corps as well as the necessary support and service units needed to achieve its mission. Unlike the corps, the army was both a tactical and an administrative organization. In administration and supply, it bypassed corps HQ and to a certain extent, the division as well. It was responsible for the normal distribution of food, fuel and ammunition. The army would push its supply points forward to easily accessible positions for the trucks of the user units. Army personnel would sort and load supplies into unit loads and place them on their trucks. In order to give an idea of the number of administrative units, the following is a listing of units assigned to the US Third Army (November 10, 1943):
Corps: 5
Divisions: 19
Antiaircraft: 2 Brigade HQ, 4 Group HQ, 8 Bns
Armored: 2 Group HQ, 13 Tank bns
Cavalry: 1 Brigade, 3 Mechanized Regts
Chemical: 5 Decon Cos, 1 Depot Co., 2 Chemical Mortar Bns
Engineers: 9 Group HQ, 1 Sep Bn, 24 Combat Bns, 1 Topographic Bn, 1 Water Supply Bn, 2 Camouflage Cos, 1 Depot Co, 1 Depot Trk Co, 3 Lt Equip Cos, 5 Lt Ponton Cos., 5 Maintenance Cos, 4 Treadway Bridge Cos.
Field Artillery: 16 Group Hqs, 4 Observation Bns, 40 Field Artillery Bns
Infantry: 2 Infantry Regiments
Medical: 5 Grp HQ, 2 Ambulance Bns, 9 Medical Bns, 1 Gas Treatment Bn, 2 Ambulance Cos, 14 Clearing Cos, 28 Collection Cos, 1 Depot Co, 1 Sanitary Co, 3 Vet Cos, 6 Evacution Hospitals, 2 Labs, 2 Vet Evac Hospitals
Military Police: 3 MP Bns, 2 MP Cos.
Ordnance: 2 Ammunition Bns, 1 Ordnance Bn, 20 Group HQ, 8 Ammunition Cos, 8 Depot Cops, 2 Evac Cos, 7 Hvy Auto Maint Cos, 10 Hvy maint Cos, 4 Hvy Maint Cos (Tank), 1 Lt maint Co, 1 AA Maint Coy, 19 Med Auto Maint Coys, 13 Med Maint Cos.
Quartermaster: 1 Trk Regt, 13 Group HQ, 2 Gas Supply Bns, 1 Service Bn, 1 Ster Co, 4 Bakery Cos, 3 Car Cos, 4 Depot Cos, 2 Laundry Cos., 6 Pk Trs Cos, 5 Railhead Cos, 1 Salvage Collection Co, 24 Troop Transport Cos, 33 Trk Cos.,
Signal: 6 Signal bns, 2 Construction Bns, 2 Operations Bns, 1 Construction Coy, 1 Depot Co, 2 Pigeon Cos, 1 Photo Coy, 2 Repair Cos, 2 Radio intercept Cos
Tank Destroyers: 7 Group HQ, 21 TD Bns
Miscellaneous: 7 Bands, 14 HQ Special Troops, 1 MRU (fixed), 4 MRU (Mobile)
The Army Headquarters (TO&E of October 26, 1944) had the following assigned personnel:
Entire HQ: 778
Commander and Aides: 7
General Staff Section: 180
Engineer Section: 72
Signal Section: 73
Chemical Warfare Section: 26
Adjutant-General’s Section: 91
Inspector-General’s Section: 18
Judge Advocate-General’s Section: 9
Finance Section: 25
Medical Section: 61
Ordnance Section: 55
Provost Marshal’s Section: 9
Quartermaster Section: 83
Special Services Section: 3
Chaplain’s Section: 7
During the Second World War, the AGD organized eleven armies:
First Army
European Theater of Operations
Second Army
Continental United States (Training)
Third Army
European Theater of Operations
Fourth Army
Continental United States (Training)
Fifth Army
European Theater of Operations
Sixth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Seventh Army
European Theater of Operations
Eighth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Ninth Army
European Theater of Operations
Tenth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Fifteenth Army
European Theater of Operations
The largest headquarters was the army group, which would control several armies. The army group was primarily a tactical headquarters, that eased the burden of the theater commander by reducing the numbers of commanders that he had to directly deal with. During World War Two, the United States Army formed only three army groups: the 12th (General Omar N. Bradley); the 6th (General Jacob L. Devers) and the 15th (General Mark W. Clark).
Only one superior headquarters was ever established to control the Army Groups, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHEAF) was commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower and commanded the Allied military efforts in the ETO. At its peak, SHEAF had some 6,000 personnel assigned.
THE STAFF
At the top of any of the major headquarters was the commanding general; normally a major general commanded a corps, a lieutenant general an army and a full general an army group, but this pattern was not always followed. No matter his rank, the commander was ultimately responsible for everything that went on in his command. He was assisted by his Chief of Staff (COS) who was the chief assistant and the coordinator of the staff. The COS had, in turn, a deputy chief of staff. Beneath them were the staff, who were comprised of two groups (and their responsibilities):
The General Staff:
Chief of Staff; G-1 Personnel; G-2 Intelligence; G-3 Operations; G-4 Supply and G-5 Civil Affairs and Military Government.
The Special Staff:
Adjutant-General; Artillery; Antiaircraft; Chaplain; Chemical Warfare; Engineer; Finance; HQ Commandant; Inspector-General; Judge Advocate; Medical; Ordnance; Provost Marshal; Public Relations; Quartermaster; Signal; Special Services and Tank Destroyers.
Each of the General Staff sections, at army level, was lead by an assistant chief of staff in the rank of colonel. The Special Staff sections was led by either a colonel or a lieutenant-colonel.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:36 AM
“Armor as the ground arm of mobility, emerged from World War II with a lion’s share of the credit for the Allied victory. Indeed armor enthusiasts at that time regarded the tank as being the main weapon of the land army" (US Army Lineage Series: Armor-Cavalry).
The first armored formations larger than brigades were formed on July 15, 1940 when the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions were activated. The Armored Force was expanded by 3 additional divisions in 1941; nine in 1942 and two in 1943. The initial divisional organization was tank-heavy, with one three regiment armored brigade (a total of 6 light and 3 medium battalions, with 368 tanks) and a single two battalion armored infantry regiment. Field tests and reports on early operations soon proved that this organization was too cumbersome and efforts to streamline the armored division began. The March 1, 1942 reorganization replaced the armored brigade with two “combat command” headquarters, armored strength was reduced to two three-battalion regiments (with one light and two medium tank battalions each) and the armored infantry regiment was expanded to three battalions. This became known as the “heavy” armored division. Combat experience resulted in another major organizational change on September 15, 1943. The existing heavy armored divisions were reorganized to the new “light” division organization. By August 1944, all armored divisions were organized as lights, except for the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions, which retained the heavy organization. All tank battalions in the light divisions and in the separate tank battalions were organized similarly, in theory, they were interchangeable, in practice, they never were exchanged.
The light armored division was organized with a Divisional Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two Combat Command Headquarters (known as CCA and CCB), a Reserve Combat Command (CCR), three tank battalions (each of one light and three medium tank companies), three armored infantry battalions, thee armored field artillery battalions, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron, an armored engineer battalion as well as divisional services. The division was commanded by a major general, the combat commands by a brigadier general (the assistant division commander) and two colonels. The division included 77 light tanks, 168 medium tanks, 18 assault guns, 17 M-8 HMC, 54 M-7 HMC and 54 armored cars. Total personnel strength was 10,754 men.
The heavy division organization was almost the same, except that the three tank battalions were replaced by two three-battalion tank regiments (first battalion was made up of three light tank companies and the second and third battalions each had three medium tank companies) and the three armored infantry battalions were organized as a regiment under a single regimental headquarters. While the light division had 3 light and 9 medium tank companies, the heavy had 6 light and 12 medium tank companies. The heavy division’s equipment included 158 light tanks, 232 medium tanks, 25 assault guns, 17 M-8 HMC, 54 M-7 HMC, and 79 armored cars. Total personnel strength was 14,664 men.
Separate tank battalions were standardized as medium battalions, which were identical to those in the light armored division or as light battalions, which were identical to the light tank battalions of the heavy armored division. The medium tank battalions fielded 17 light tanks, 54 medium tanks, and 6 assault guns. Personnel strength was 724. The light tank battalion of three companies, fielded 56 light tanks and 3 M-8 HMC. Personnel strength was 532 men.
Normally, one armored division was assigned to a corps. An additional armored group headquarters would be assigned to control any separate tank battalions assigned to the corps. In practice, the massing of these separate battalions was rarely done in the ETO, the armored groups were therefore administrative units only, although ETO practice was to assign these organizations to the armored divisions to augment the capabilities of the combat commands.
Theoretically, armored divisions were to act as the maneuver reserve for the corps and were to be employed to break through enemy fronts ruptured by the infantry divisions. The armored division was then to be used to conduct deep pursuit of the enemy once the front was broken through. In practice, the width of the front meant that armored divisions were often used in defensive roles, for which they were not designed. A critical weakness was the fact that the infantry component of the division was too small to withstand the attrition of long-term defense or offensive missions.
In spite of its flaws, the flexible organization of the armored division permitted it to be adopted to may situations. Typically, CCA and CCB acted as headquarters to which battalion task forces were assigned. US armored tactics stressed the combined arms approach. Cross-attachments of tank and infantry companies into battalion task forces and company combat teams were a routine practice. While the Reserve Combat Command was not intended as a combat unit, with the addition of an armored group headquarters, CCR was often used as a third combat element.
Forty separate armored battalions served in the ETO. They were normally assigned on the basis of one per infantry division. However, not all infantry divisions had a tank battalion attached. In theory tank battalions could be assigned to an armored group headquarters, in practice, this was seldom done. Usually when a separate tank battalion was assigned to an infantry division, it retained that affiliation throughout the war. As a result, many infantry divisions developed a high degree of coordination with their associated tank battalions.
The standard US medium tank was the M-4 Sherman. The Sherman was designed in April 1941 and the first prototype was completed that September. Following testing, it was standardized for production in October 1941 with production beginning in early 1942. At the time, the Sherman was highly advanced; however, under the drive of wartime experience, tank design was evolving rapidly; thus the armor and firepower of the Sherman, adequate for the conditions of 1942 and 1943, were insufficient by 1944. The tank was originally designed with a short-barreled, medium-velocity 75mm gun. The armor piercing capability of this piece was adequate to penetrate the German PzKpfw MkIII and MkIV at the time, As the new Panther tank entered production, the Sherman could knock out the tank by attacking from the flanks and rear, its frontal armor was impervious to the 75mm APC round. The Tiger could only be destroyed by firing into its rear.
By late 1944, the 75mm gun was being replaced by a long-barreled, high-velocity 75mm gun (commonly called the 76mm) with good penetration and increased accuracy. But supplies of the up-gunned Sherman were short and the older 75mm gun remained in service until the end of the war. The combination of weak armor protection, and a poor gun was only partially made up for by the Sherman’s mechanical reliability, its high speed electric-hydraulic turret traverse and its numbers.
A number of Shermans were designed or specially equipped for specialized roles. These included standard M-4s equipped with dozer blades, mine-clearing tanks, recovery vehicles and an assault gun variant armed with a 105mm howitzer. Six M-4 assault guns were assigned to the assault gun platoon of the standard tank battalion headquarters company. A important variant was the M-4A3E2 “Jumbo”. This was a standard M-4 that was fitted with additional armor, substantially increasing its protection. The Jumbo was, in fact, better protected than the German Panther, although the Panther was fitted with a superior cannon. The M-4A3E2 was built in limited numbers (254). In the ETO, Ordnance workshops, working with armor plate produced by French steel mills or with salvaged armor, converted a number of M-4s to the Jumbo standard. It is uncertain exactly how many were available in Europe (Third Army workshops alone converted some 200 Shermans by December 1944), but, despite their small numbers, the Jumbo helped even the odds in tank-vs.-tank combat. The Jumbos were scattered throughout the ETO; Most of the armored divisions had 20-30; separate tank battalions would field a platoon of 4-5.
The standard light tank was the M-5 Stuart. It mounted a 37mm cannon and was lightly armored. Like the M-4, the M-5 had a number of variants, most important of which was a Howitzer Motor Carriage. The M-8 HMC was equipped with a 75mm howitzer and was found in the cavalry reconnaissance squadrons and in the armored infantry battalions. The usefulness of the M-5 had long been in question and it was slowly being replaced by the M-24 Chaffee, which had heavier armor and a 75mm cannon. Those units equipped with the Stuart were mostly used as reconnaissance units or as escorts for convoys. So light was the Stuart’s armor, and so underpowered was its 37mm gun, that they were seldom deployed in the front line.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:40 AM
An important adjunct to the armored formations was the Tank Destroyer Force. The example of the awesome power of the German Blitzkrieg in 1940 resulted in the creation of separate antitank battalions within the US infantry Division in 1940. In 1941, General McNair decided that the ideal method of countering massed armored formations would be to deploy a highly mobile reserve of antitank guns, grouped at the corps or army level. As a result, the antitank battalions were removed from their divisions and, in an effort to foster an aggressive image of their role, were renamed tank destroyer (TD) battalions.
The first TD battalions were all self-propelled, a collection of 37mm armed weapons carriers (the M-6 Fargo) and old French 75mm field guns mounted on half-tracks (the M-3 Gun Motor Carriage). Following the Tunisian campaign a number of TD battalions were converted from SP to towed guns. This was a deliberate imitation of German practice. Unfortunately, it was not realized at the time that the Germans made extensive use of towed antitank weapons only because of necessity; they desired SP carriages for all of their antitank guns but had insufficient means to produce them.
By 1944 the error had been recognized. Towed guns had proven to be too heavy and immobile for efficient use in a mobile combat environment. By late 1944 many of the towed TD battalions in the ETO were being reconverted to SP guns as the weapons became available.
Tank Destroyer Battalions were all organized with three companies, each equipped with twelve guns, for a total of thirty-six in the battalion. The guns employed by the TD battalions in late 1944 included the M-5 3-inch towed gun; the M-10 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage, the M-18 76mm Gun Motor Carriage and the M-36 90mm Gun Motor Carriage. The M-10 was the first standardized self-propelled TD gun, it was lightly armored, its chassis was a variant of the standard M-4 tank and it had poor cross-country mobility and speed. By late 1944 it was being replaced by the new M-18. While still lightly armored and with a open-topped turret, its improved suspension system gave it excellent cross-country mobility and impressive speed (it was the fastest AFV in the world until the introduction of the M-1 Abrams in the 1980s). Its 76mm gun was an improved long-barreled design that had greater hitting power than the 3-inch gun. The M-36, which was deployed in July 1944, was the most powerful antitank weapon in the US arsenal. Experience with heavy German armor had showed that the 75mm, 3-inch and 76mm series of weapons had insufficient penetrating capability. The M-36 was a stopgap measure. It was a marriage of the M-10 chassis with the powerful 90mm gun. With the newly developed high-velocity armor-piercing (HVAP) round, the 90mm was easily capable of defeating current German armor, if it could off the first hit. Unfortunately, there were few of these weapons available in late 1944.
Like the mass employment of separate armor battalions, the deployment of the tank destroyers in mass to defeat enemy armored attacks was never actually practiced. Fifty-six TD battalion eventually served in the ETO. However, a number were inactivated so as to provide personnel for infantry replacements, and others served in other roles. In the Ardennes campaign the Third Army deployed one TD battalion as an augmentation to the army’s Military Police force. One TD battalion was normally assigned to each division: SP battalions were always assigned to armored divisions, while infantry division might have either a SP or a towed battalion attached.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:40 AM
CAVALRY
Reconnaissance duties in the US Army were performed by mechanized cavalry units. Normally a corps would have a mechanized cavalry group assigned to it. This consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company and two mechanized cavalry squadrons. Squadrons were organized with three cavalry troops, each equipped with thirteen M-8 armored cars and jeeps; an assault gun troop with eight M-8 HMCs and a light tank company with seventeen M-5 light tanks. The heavy armored division’s armored reconnaissance battalion and the light armored division’s cavalry reconnaissance squadron, mechanized were almost identical (adding a fourth cavalry troop). Infantry divisions each had a single cavalry reconnaissance troop. In addition, the heavy armored division’s two armored regiments had a reconnaissance platoon attached to regimental headquarters; tank battalions had a reconnaissance platoon in the battalion headquarters, while towed TD battalions had a reconnaissance platoon in each TD company.
The cavalry groups were often attached either in whole or by squadron to divisions, but would also operate independently under direct control of a corps. For most missions, the group would be augmented by corps or divisional tank, tank destroyer, engineer and/or artillery assets.
Interestingly, the cavalry groups were almost never called to perform their primary duty; post-war analysis showed that pure reconnaissance missions accounted for only 3% of their activities. The remaining 97% of missions assigned to cavalry groups were as follows: Defensive operations made up 33%; special operations (mobile reserve, rear area security and operations as an army information service); made up 29%; security missions (blocking, screening, flank protection, maintaining contact between units and filling gaps) made up 25% and offensive operations made up 10%.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:46 AM
“During World War Two new terrains, new climates, strange weapons and unfamiliar peoples acted upon the American infantryman. These destroyed thousands of men, put a lifelong mark on others, and changed somewhat the techniques of fighting on foot; nevertheless, in spite of everything, the basic characteristics of the infantry hardly shifted. Foot soldiers continued to be the only carriers of weapons who, in theory, were never exhausted, could always go another mile, and who can be counted upon to move across any terrain in every quarter of the globe.” (US Army Lineage Series The Infantry).
World War Two saw the US infantry at its largest expansion in its illustrious history. By 1945, some 317 regiments of infantry of various types had been activated. These included 3 mountain, 12 glider and 16 parachute regiments as well as 99 separate battalions. Among these where 6 Ranger battalions, the 1st Special Service Force and the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), who became better known by their nickname of “Merrill’s Marauders”.
Another new type of infantry were the new armored infantry battalions. They differed from the normal infantry only in that they were provided sufficient organic transport to move all of its personnel and equipment in a single lift. Unlike truck-mounted infantry, their half-track vehicles were capable of cross-country movement as well as lightly armored.
In World War II, the infantry also had units made up exclusively by Americans of different racial or ethnic extraction. These included Native American, Negro, Puerto Rican and Filipino units as well as the 442nd Infantry Regiment of America-born Japanese and the 99th Infantry Battalion of Norwegian Americans.
As well as the massive expansion of personnel, World War Two also brought a bewildering increase of weapons, resulting in the infantryman having to be capable of effectively using such weapons as mines, booby traps, various types of grenades, bazookas and flame throwers, as well as carbines, rifles, machine guns and mortars. Battlefield communications, based on sound-powered field telephones had evolved by the end of the war with no less than eight radio sets being assigned to the rifle company. Finally, the infantry had to learn a new method of war, the amphibious assault on hostile shores.
Forty-two infantry divisions eventually served in the ETO. The first permanent divisional organizations in the Regular Army had appeared in World War One. Nine of the divisions organized continued to exist (at very reduced strength) through the 1920s-30s. These divisions were the so-called “square”, that is, their basic infantry component were four three-battalion infantry regiments organized in two brigades. This organization was felt to be un-necessarily cumbersome and soon after the Army’s expansion began in September 1939, the divisions were re-organized into a “triangular” three-regiment organization. Other minor changes, mainly to reduce personnel overhead were made in 1939 and the in the spring of 1944.
The 1944 infantry division had, in addition to its three infantry regiments, four artillery battalions (three 12-tube 105mm light howitzer battalions and one 12-tube 155mm medium howitzer battalion), an engineer battalion, a cavalry reconnaissance troop and division service troops. The division was commanded by a major general with a brigadier general as assistant divisional commander and a second brigadier general as division artillery commander. Total personnel strength in the division was 14,043.
Each of the infantry regiments had a headquarters and headquarters company (which included a ammunition and pioneer [A&P] platoon and an intelligence and reconnaissance [I&R] platoon; three battalions (each with a headquarters and headquarters company [including a antitank gun platoon], three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company), a cannon company (with six 105mm howitzers), a antitank company (with nine 57mm antitank guns, in three-gun platoons and a mine platoon) and a service company. Total personnel strength of a infantry regiment was 3,118 men.
Within the three infantry regiments, the smallest sub-unit was the rifle squad of 12 men, armed with 10 M-1 Garand rifles, one M-1918A2 Browning Automatic Rifle and one M-1903 Springfield rifle fitted with a grenade launcher. Three squads made up a platoon and three rifle platoons and a heavy weapons platoon formed a rifle company. The weapons platoon was equipped with two .30-caliber M-1919A4 light machine guns, one .50-caliber M-2HB heavy machine gun, three M-2 60mm mortars and three M-9 Bazookas. Total strength for a rifle company was 193 personnel. A battalion would contain three rifle companies, as well as a heavy weapons company equipped with six M-1 81mm mortars, eight .30-caliber M-1917A1 water-cooled heavy machine guns, three .50-caliber M-2HB heavy machine guns, and seven bazookas. The HQ Company of the battalion contained an anti-tank platoon of three 57mm antitank guns. The infantry battalion would have 871 personnel assigned to it.
The infantry division did not, in theory, have sufficient vehicles to execute long-distance motor marches. Normally six Quartermaster Truck Companies were attached to a division to allow it to conduct rapid road movements. However, in emergencies, the vehicles of the artillery battalions, plus those of the standard division attachments (tank, tank destroyer and antiaircraft artillery battalions) were enough to allow most divisions to make fairly lengthy motorized movements.
The triangular organization allowed the division commander to deploy tactically with three regiments in line abreast or with two forward and one in reserve. Official doctrine even allowed for an offensive operation with one regiment on the line and two in reserve. The triangular organization of the regiment, battalion, company and platoon allowed the similar deployment at each of the division’s various echelons. In combat, the infantry regiments were often augmented with the attachment of one of the division’s 105mm howitzer battalions and by an engineer, medical, tank and/or TD company. Such an augmented regiment was known as a Regimental Combat Team (RCT).
There were also non divisional infantry regiments and battalions (including the Ranger battalions), organized exactly as their divisional counterparts. These units were usually used for rear area security (one such regiment was deployed in France with the mission of cracking down on the thefts of material from Allied convoys and supply dumps), or were used to augment divisions on line.
AIRBORNE INFANTRY
Starting from a test platoon, the U.S. created an airborne force that eventually totaled five divisions, as well as several independent regiments and battalions. The organization of the US airborne division underwent many official (as well as semiofficial and unofficial) changes during the war.
Originally, the division was triangular with two two-battalion glider infantry regiments (1,605 men ea), one three-battalion parachute infantry regiment (1,985 men), a airborne engineer battalion (with two glider and one parachute company), a antiaircraft/antitank battalion (three AAA and three AT companies), two glider and one parachute artillery battalions (armed with 16 75mm pack howitzer) and divisional services. This organization was soon changed to one glider and two parachute infantry regiments.
There was always a problem of how to arm these troops, as they were transported by air and weight was at a premium. In addition, the airborne troops had practically no motor transportation, everything had to be carried or towed. The parachute infantry company had 130 men, equipped with 12 M-1919A6 light machine guns, 3 60mm mortars and 3 bazookas. The parachute infantry platoon had 36 men with 2 M-1919A6 machineguns, 1 60mm mortars, 1 bazooka, 1 sniper rifle, 22 rifles and 14 carbines. In contrast, the standard rifle company had 193 men, 15 Browning Automatic Rifles, 2 M-1919A4 light machine guns, 1 M-2HB heavy machine gun and 3 60mm mortars. The infantry platoon had 41 men, 3 BARs, 37 rifles and 1 carbine. First appearances show that the paratroopers enjoyed heavier armament than the infantry, but appearances are deceiving. The regular infantry had more heavy weapons, and the transport to carry them and their ammunition available from the battalion and regimental heavy weapons units than the paratroopers. By the end of 1944, the parachute infantry companies were reorganized and reequipped. Each company now had 176 men, 9 M-1919A6 machine guns, 9 BARs, 3 60mm mortars and 3 bazookas. The parachute infantry platoon now had 49 men, 3 M-1919A6 machine guns, 3 BARs, 1 60mm mortar, 1 bazooka, 39 rifles and 10 carbines.
The initial combat experiences of the 82nd Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy demonstrated that the glider regiments were too weak. As a stopgap, the separate 401st Glider Infantry Regiment was split with one battalion being assigned as the 3rd Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division and one battalion as the 3rd Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division. In addition, the infantry component of the two divisions was increased for the Normandy Invasion by the attachment of two non divisional parachute infantry regiments (the 501st and 506th) to the 101st Airborne Division and with a single regiment (the 508th) to the 82nd Airborne Division. These attachments became semi permanent. The 17th Airborne Division (formed with two three-battalion glider regiments and a single parachute regiment) was reinforced by the attachment of the 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment when it reached the ETO. Thus, all of the ETO’s airborne divisions had, in effect, four infantry regiments, although strengths differed slightly between the divisions. Their authorized strength (plus attachments) on December 16, 1944 were as follows: 17th Airborne Division: 12,967; 82nd Airborne Division: 12,921; 101st Airborne Division: 12,335.
As with the regular infantry, there were a number of separate glider and parachute infantry regiments and battalions. As the war progressed however, these separate units were disbanded, in order to provide badly needed replacements for the depleted airborne divisions.
ARMORED INFANTRY
The armored infantry battalion in the armored division (as well as the usual separate formations) was organized with a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies and a service company. The battalion was very strong with 1,031 men. Unfortunately, much of the battalion’s manpower was absorbed in drivers and maintenance personnel for its extensive collection of vehicles. The battalion had seventy-two half-tracked personnel carriers, fifty-six other vehicles and three half-track mounted 81mm mortars. Its weapons inventory, in addition to the SP mortars, included nine 60mm mortars, three M-8 HMCs, nine 57mm antitank guns, forty-nine .50-caliber HMGs, and seventy-four M-9 bazookas, as well as numerous individual automatic weapons. In comparison, a regular infantry battalion had 894 men, with forty-one vehicles (none armored), six 81mm mortars, six 60mm mortars, three 57mm antitank guns, six .50-caliber HMGs and twenty-nine bazookas.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:50 AM
“I do not have to tell you who won the war, you know our artillery did.” (General George S. Patton).
In World War One, the artillery arm of the US Army had fought in Europe equipped entirely with French and British weapons. There are many reasons for this; the need for standardization in Allied arms, lack of shipping space and lack of industrial capacity (in the short time available before the war ended) in the United States. Another factor was that many ordnance specialists in France and Britain felt that the indigenous US gun designs were not up to war-tested European standards. As a result, several years after the war, the US Army Chief of Staff (General Charles P. Summerall) established a board of review to examine the army’s ordnance requirements for the future. The Westervelt Board report was impartial and farsighted and it had dramatic consequences for the Artillery Branch in World War Two. The board recommended that the standard divisional artillery piece be increased in size from 75mm to 105mm, while the general support weapon was to be standardized as a 155mm howitzer. Furthermore, the 120mm corps-level general support gun was to be discarded in favor of a new 155mm gun. In addition, the board recommended that designs should be begun for heavier supporting pieces of the most modern type, suitable for rapid motorized road movement. Finally, improvements in artillery communications and fire control methodology were recommended.
The financial climate of the 1920s and 1930s delayed the development and deployment of such an improved artillery system. But innovative Artillery and Ordnance officers continued to experiment with new gun designs and doctrine. As a result, when the Army began its expansion in the late 1930s, much of the necessary background work to modernize the artillery was already complete. Designs had been completed and prototypes developed for most of the guns and howitzers that were to see service during the war.
Divisional pieces included the M-1 105mm howitzer and the M-1 155mm howitzers, both were excellent weapons, with good range and, particularly in the case of the 155mm, excellent accuracy. Other new weapons included the M-1 75mm pack howitzer and the M-3 105mm howitzer; both were lightweight and relatively short-ranged, but were ideal for use by airborne forces. The M-3 105mm howitzer also saw use in the infantry regiment’s cannon company. The armored division’s artillery was equipped with an SP version of the M-1 105mm, the M-7 Howitzer Motor Carriage “Priest”.
Non-divisional artillery included battalions equipped with these same weapons, as well as other, heavier pieces. A companion to the 155mm howitzer was the 4.5-inch gun. The tube was of British design and manufacture, the carriage was that of the 155mm howitzer. The 4.5-inch gun was not well liked by US artillerymen. The shell (also of British manufacture) was of low-grade steel, thick-walled and with a small bursting charge. Its range was insufficient to compensate for the relative ineffectiveness of its round. A the war’s end it was immediately withdrawn from service.
A much better weapon was the M-1 155mm gun. This combined long range, accuracy and hitting power with a very well designed, highly mobile carriage. It was one of the best weapons in its class in World War Two. The M-12 155mm Gun Motor Carriage was an interesting amalgam of the old and the new. This did not utilize the modern M-1 155mm gun, but rather the older, shorter-range, French-designed GPF developed during World War One. The Ordnance Department had experimentally mounted GPFs on obsolescent M-3 Lee tank chassis in 1942 and, after tests, 100 M-12s were built, only to have the AGF declare in October 1943 that there was no requirement for it. The M-12 languished in storage until early 1944, when urgent requests from England for a heavy SP gun resulted in 74 being rebuilt. Seven field artillery battalions preparing for the invasion were equipped with the M-12. Its mobility fully compensated for its shorter range. Heavier supporting pieces were the M-1 8-inch howitzer, the M-1 8-inch gun and the M-1 240mm howitzer. The 8-inch howitzer was mounted on a carriage adapted from that of the 155mm gun and was renowned for its accuracy and hitting power.
The 8-inch gun and its companion piece, the 240mm howitzer came into service in late 1943. When organized, the first 8-inch gun battalion was hastily rushed to Italy as a counter the deadly, long-ranged German 170mm gun. After a few teething troubles, the 8-inch gun proved to outrange the German piece, was as accurate, and fired a more lethal shell. The 240mm howitzer was the heaviest artillery piece fielded by the United States in World War II. Designed to batter fortifications, it proved to be invaluable in the fighting along the Westwall during the fall of 1944, but its numbers were limited.
All US field artillery battalions were organized with three firing batteries, each battery usually only having four tubes. Batteries in the armored field artillery battalions had six M-7 HMCs each. The 240mm battalions had only two tubes per battery. Divisional artillery was controlled by the division’s artillery headquarters, usually commanded by a brigadier general. Nondivisional artillery battalions were initially organized as two-battalion regiments. However, in 1943, the regiments were eliminated, the regimental headquarters battery reorganized as artillery group headquarters and the battalions became independent. Artillery Groups were normally assigned to a corps, which in turn, often attached them to divisions. Usually two to four battalions were assigned to a group, which was under the command of a colonel. Artillery Brigades were also created as headquarters formations in 1943. It was initially planned that an artillery brigade would control two or more groups, although this was rarely done in practice. Often, the brigade was used to control the heavy artillery of a field army, for example, the 32nd Field Artillery Brigade controlled all 8-inch and 240mm battalions in the First Army. An artillery brigade was usually commanded by either a colonel or a brigadier general.
Unlike German artillery, US artillery was highly mobile. The towed 105mm howitzer battalions used two-and-a-half-ton trucks as prime movers. Five-ton trucks were used to pull the 155mm howitzers. The other towed howitzer battalions were either truck drawn or, more frequently, were equipped with fully tracked M-4 (13-ton) or M-5 (18-ton) high-speed tractors as prime movers. Even the howitzers of the airborne divisions were motorized, towed by the jeep.
All in all, the US artillery arsenal was at least as well designed as, if not better than, most of its German counterparts. Adding immeasurably to the effectiveness of the US artillery was a communications and fire-control system that had no equal in the world. Forward observers of the individual artillery battalions; supported by the personnel from divisional headquarters batteries, artillery brigade and group headquarters batteries, and by the highly skilled, specialist field artillery observation battalions (which were assigned on the basis of one per corps), had access, via powerful radios or extensive telephone landlines, to a formidable array of weaponry. The highly redundant observation and signal system meant that, even when all other contact between front-line units and their headquarters was lost, the artillery communications net usually remained open.
Perhaps, most important, and making the US artillery the best in the world in World War Two, was a fire-direction system that had been developed at the US Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, between the wars. This was a highly refined development of the crude system pioneered in World War One. This sophisticated system permitted rapid engagements of targets and allowed the coordination of fires of many units from many widely separated firing positions. One of the most deadly tactics employed by the artillery was the Time-On-Target (TOT) concentration, the massing of fires from a large number of firing batteries, from several battalions, onto a selected target in which the times of flight from each battery were carefully calculated so that the shells form all landed on the target at nearly the same moment. The effect of a TOT was devastating both psychologically and physically to an unprepared enemy.
Further enhancing the deadliness of the US artillery was the deployment in December 1944 of the new proximity fuse. Also known by its code name of VT (for variable-time) or POZIT, the proximity fuse contained a tiny radar that triggered reliable detonation of the round in the air, prior to impact with the target. This significantly simplified and enhanced the lethality of “time fire” or “air bursts” by significantly augmenting the lethality of the individual round on targets on the ground. By the end of 1944, the German Army had developed a quite reasonable fear of the deadly US artillery, a fear only matched by their fear of the omnipresent Allied air forces. Germans who had faced the more numerous Soviet artillery were unanimous in declaring that US artillery, even though less numerous, was far more deadly.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:53 AM
Antiaircraft artillery was descended from the Coast Artillery Corps, and did not gain a separate identity until 1943. Antiaircraft units, like the tank destroyer, had been massively expanded in the wake of the German blitzkriegs of 1939 and 1940. Hundreds of battalions were formed in 1940-43, but many were made redundant by the almost complete Allied air superiority of 1944. Many battalions were disbanded in order to provide replacements for the infantry. However, every division had a antiaircraft battalion attached. These towed battalions consisted of four batteries equipped with a total of sixty-four weapons, equally split between the M-1 40mm Bofors gun and the M-55 quad .50-caliber machine gun mount. The armored divisions had a self-propelled antiaircraft battalion attached. Like its towed counterpart, the SP battalion had sixty-four pieces divided into four batteries. Half of these were the M-15 Machine Gun Motor Carriage which consisted of a 37mm gun and two .50-caliber machine guns. The other thirty two mounts were the M-16 MGMC, each carrying a M-55 mount fitted to a halftrack. Heavy antiaircraft support was provided by the gun battalions, which deployed sixteen 90mm guns in four batteries. The 90mm gun was an accurate, high-velocity piece, full capable of engaging ground targets. It was similar in performance to the famous German FLAK 88, and, in some ways, was its superior (its data transmission system, automatic fuse-setter, and high-speed automatic rammer were second to none in design and performance). Enhancing the lethality of the 90mm was the proximity fuse, which had originally been designed for antiaircraft use as well as the use of portable early-warning and fire-control radar sets.
Towed battalions assigned to divisions were all designated as mobile, which meant that there was a full complement of prime movers for the guns. Some antiaircraft battalions were designed as semi-mobile, which meant that there was only one prime mover per two or three guns. Semi-mobile battalions were intended for the static defense of installations.
Automatic weapons battalions were normally assigned directly to a division or were part of an antiaircraft artillery group, which consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery and two or more attached battalions. Groups assigned to a corps usually consisted entirely of automatic weapons battalions, but occasionally had one or more gun battalions. Most gun battalions assigned to groups were held directly under an army headquarters. Separate from army control were the antiaircraft battalions of the IX Air Defense Command. This had originally been part of the Ninth Air Force but had been detached in August 1944 and placed directly under SHAEF control. The IX Air Defense Command was tasked with the security of the various air bases and other rear-area installations scattered throughout Belgium, France and Luxembourg. Most of the semi-mobile battalions in the ETO were assigned to the IX Air Defense Command.
The increasing threat of the German V-1 weapons to the port of Antwerp in the fall of 1944 gave the IX Air Defense Command a new mission. The Allies deployed large numbers of antiaircraft artillery units in a corridor (soon known as buzz-bomb ally) that extended north from the town of Elsenborn, Belgium almost to the sea. This massive concentration of guns was to prove a fortuitous and welcome addition to the Allied defense in the early days of the Battle of the Bugle.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:54 AM
It is perhaps fitting that the U.S. Army, with an officer corps heavily influenced by the teaching at the United States Military Academy (the first engineering school in the United States), should be lavishly equipped with engineer troops and equipment. Every division was supported by a three-company combat engineer battalion, which was capable of performing most engineering tasks (including demolitions, obstacle emplacement, fortification and light bridge building) for the division. When necessary, a division’s engineers were augmented by additional combat engineer battalions from corps or army. Corps battalions were assigned to the command of an engineer group headquarters, which consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, an engineer light equipment company and two to six engineer battalions. There are usually two to four engineer groups per corps and army. Combat engineer battalions tended to have a high esprit de corps; they rightly considered themselves to be elite specialists. In an emergency, the combat engineer battalion could act as infantry and did so frequently.
In addition to the combat engineer battalion there were also various bridging units; heavy ponton battalions (1-3 per army), light ponton companies (1-2 per group), and treadway bridge companies (usually one per armored division, but held at army level). The remainder of the engineer corps was made up of various specialist companies (such as heavy equipment companies, topographical and maintenance companies) and engineer general service regiments. These engineer general service regiments were indeed specialists, capable of building roads, airfields, bridges, and other permanent structures and were lavishly outfitted with heavy construction equipment, but, unlike, the combat engineer battalions, were neither well equipped nor trained for infantry action.
Some 40% of the Corps of Engineers were serving with the AGF, another 40% with the ASF and the remaining 20% with the AAF. By June 1945, 89 divisional combat battalions, 204 non-divisional combat battalions, 79 general service regiments and 36 construction battalions were in service.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 10:55 AM
Communications within the U.S. Army was provided primarily by radio, secondarily by telephone, and lastly by motorcycle dispatch riders and runners. U.S. radios were well designed and were found at all echelons from platoon up. The small tactical radios (the famous handi-talkies and walkie-talkies) were short ranged and of temperamental reliability, but had no counterpart in any other army. The larger sets used by battalion and above were very well built FM units, that suffered from a common limitation: all were subject to line-of-sight performance, in hilly or heavily forested terrain, their performance was severely degraded. The standard field telephones (including sound-powered phones) worked well in a static situation, although their telephone lines could be easily cut during artillery barrages.
A typical infantry division included some 1,500 Signal Corps personnel, who were responsible for all communications within the division. A field army would have a HQ signal service company; a signal operations battalion, one or more construction battalions that laid telephone cable and wire installations down to corps level and back to army rear HQ; one or more signal radio intelligence companies, a pigeon company and a signal photographic company, as well as a signal repair company and a signal depot company which would deal with the supply and maintenance of the signal equipment for the field army. An example of their scale of work would be that of the signal en of the U.S. Third Army, in their 281 days of active campaigning, they laid 16,000 miles of telephone wire, repaired and rehabilitated 4,000 miles of French and German wire and over 36,000 miles of underground cables. Their Message Center alone, handled a total of 7,220,261 code groups, while the forward and rear echelon switchboard operators handled an average of 14,000 calls per day.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:00 AM
An examination of the European Theater of Operations logistics operation best illustrates the U.S. approach to logistics. By 1944 the U.S. transportation and logistic network was heavily strained by limitations resulting from the lack of available ports and damage to the road and rail system in Europe. Rear area communications and transportation were the responsibility of the Communications Zone (COM-Z), under the command of the irascible, autocratic and efficient Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee (better known as “Jesus Christ Himself Lee”). COM-Z moved supplies from the ports to the forward supply depots within the geographic limits of the COM-Z (roughly 100 miles behind the front lines). The supplies would then be picked by the Quartermaster truck companies of the field armies and dispersed to the main army supply dumps and to the corps forward supply dumps. Corps and army truck units and divisional organic transportation would then move the supplies forward to the divisional units. Ammunition supply was performed in a similar manner, but its transportation and distribution was the responsibility of the Ordnance Corps. On many occasions, divisions or lower echelon units would draw their supplies directly from the main supply dumps, bypassing the intervening chain.
With so much of the French road and rail network damaged or destroyed, novel methods were adopted to insure that the supplies were brought forward as quickly as possible. One example was the Red Ball Express which used a one-way loop highway system, in which roads were reserved exclusively to Red Ball vehicles. At its peak (August 29, 1944), Red Ball Express had 132 truck companies, running 5,958 trucks and delivering 12,342 tons of supplies per day. Air resupply was also used, when the U.S. Third Army was pushing into Austria and Czechoslovakia, some 22% of its POL and 11% of its rations were delivered by air between March 30 and May 8, 1945.
During the September and October operations, Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) had been in short supply, but in December, the near-static front, combined with the opening of the cross-Channel pipeline and its extension across France, had allowed for the stockpiling of huge quantities of POL.
Although POL supplies were no longer a problem in the ETO, ammunition was a nagging worry to Allied planners. In the early stage’s of the Army’s expansion there were plans calling for a high priority of 105mm artillery shells of all types as these were the standard divisional field piece. Ammunition for the heavier guns had been accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the need for the more unwieldy big pieces. Congressional criticism of the large overstock age of all types of artillery ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943 had forced the Army to scale back production. As a result, by late 1943, priorities had changed. Many ammunition plants were retooled for other types of ordnance production while some 105mm production lines were closed completely. Events in France and Germany changed all of these assumptions as Allied staffs in Europe discovered that the determined German resistance encountered in Normandy and the Westwall had placed a premium on all types of ammunition, just as stockpiles of the 105mm rounds, already short after the Normandy campaign, had almost disappeared. Rationing was introduced and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized; two field artillery battalions were re-equipped with German field pieces. By January 1, 1945, stockpiles of 105mm ammunition had fallen to a twenty-one day supply (2,524,000 rounds). This dire situation has exacerbated by the miserable flying weather that prevented Allied airpower from filling in the gap. Emergency measures taken in the theater and in the United States improved matters, but shortages of artillery ammunition were to remain a problem until the end of the war.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:01 AM
At the start of the war, the Chemical Warfare service consisted of 1,128 personnel, by 1943 its strength had risen to 69,790 men. Their initial mission was to defend against enemy gas attack and to be ready to retaliate efficiently. This meant having defensive chemical equipment, such as protective masks and clothing, as well as offensive material, such as toxic agents and the necessary weapons and munitions to deliver them. While World War Two was, fortunately, a non-gas war, the need to always be prepared was present throughout the war. Instead of gas weapons, other chemical weapons were deployed, such as large and small area smoke generators, flamethrowers and incendiary devices. While the Chemical Warfare Service deployed a number if specialized units, such a chemical laboratories, decontamination (loved by the front line troops when they were used to provide hot showers), processing, maintenance and service companies; the most common CW unit’s were: Smoke generator companies, these produced an artificial fog, by the condensation of water and oil; Chemical Mortar Battalions, armed with the rifled 4.2-inch mortar and capable of firing toxic chemical, HE and smoke bombs, these battalions, few in number and greatly overworked became a favorite weapon of the infantry, able to place heavy and accurate fire on targets up to 5,000 yards downrange; Portable and mechanized flamethrowers. These were employed more frequently in the Pacific than in the European theaters.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:02 AM
The strength of the QM company in the infantry division was 186 personnel and consisted of three truck platoons and a service platoon. Each truck platoon had 29 personnel who operated 16 2 ½-ton trucks, which drew Class 1 and Class 3 supplies daily from the army truck heads and distributed them to the vehicles of the combat units at divisional distribution points. The service platoon (49 men), manned the distribution point and transferred the supplies. Whenever possible, men of the service platoon also went with the trucks to the army truck heads to help load supplies as this saved valuable time, and it was time, not tonnage, that was the main limiting factor in all QM truck operations. Using trucks going back to collect rations for such extra purposes as evacuating POWs and salvage, was necessary, but placed an extra strain on drivers. Relief drivers could seldom be found, the service platoon was also responsible for collecting salvage, sorting laundry, operating showers, assisting grave registration units as well as a hundred other essential jobs. During combat operations, when supply lines lengthened and thousands of addition combat troops were attached to the division, the organic QM company couldn’t cope, so the corps would, whenever possible, loan extra troops from its service company to help the hard-pressed divisional companies. Each armored division went into combat with two QM truck companies, one used to haul regular supplies and one hauling POL products. The airborne division had a QM company with a strength of 87 men and 15 jeeps and trailers until 1944. During ground combat, after link up, a standard QM truck company would be attached to support the division. In late 1944, the airborne QM company was increased to a strength of 208 men, this was simply the permanent combination of the old airborne QM company and the attached truck company.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:03 AM
To keep the vehicles rolling, each infantry division had a Ordnance Light Maintenance Company (a Ordnance Maintenance Battalion was assigned to each armored division). Battlefield recovery of disabled equipment was a unit responsibility as were basic repairs and routine maintenance. Units were expected to carry out vehicle maintenance to the very limit of their tools and the skill of their mechanics. Many units were happy to do this, rather than lose their vehicles to another unit. Thus the divisional unit was deliberately designed to undertake only 60% of the third echelon repairs required during quiet periods and only 30% during combat. The infantry division company had 147 personnel assigned, while the armored division’s battalion had 762.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:04 AM
In the divisions, the medical personnel were divided into two types; those that were permanent assigned to all major units and provided the immediate first aid and casualty evacuation to the battalion or regimental aid stations. These were backed up by the divisional medical battalion. These personnel assisted the unit medics in collecting the wounded and transporting them to the unit aid stations. They also evacuated the wounded on up the chain to the clearing stations and then on to the evacuation hospitals which were operated at army level. Divisional medical officers either worked at clearing stations during operations or reinforced the regimental and battalion aid stations. One clearing company could be attached to each of the three regimental combat teams.
Medical evacuation within the combat zone was by litter, jeeps and ambulances. Air evacuation could also be made by liaison plane or light transport. Surface evacuation from the combat zone was the responsibility of the combat zone commander, it did not matter I the evacuation was by road, rail or sea. Three types of hospitals were assigned to armies; these included evacuation, convalescent and portable surgical. In the combat zone, there were four types of hospitals; these included field, convalescent, station and general. Evacuation hospitals funneled all casualties from the front on their way to the communications zone. These would be located 12 to 30 miles from the battle front, on good roads and near airfields, railways and waterways. Portable surgical hospitals (of 25 bed capacity) were mobile units used to reinforce divisional clearing stations by providing immediate surgical treatment for patients too seriously wounded to be moved to the rear.
Those casualties who could be returned to their units in a short period of time remained at convalescent hospitals in the army area. Field hospitals were mobile hospitals, capable of giving station hospital type of care in the field whenever there was a temporary need. Station hospitals were fixed units which served a limited assigned area only. These did not usually receive patients from the combat zone. General hospitals were also fixed units capable of supporting 1,000-2,000 patients at a time, providing complete care for all cases in the theater. Air evacuation to the U.S. was the responsibility of Air Transport Command, but the ComZ had to arrange for the patient’s arrival at airfields and care for them until they boarded the aircraft.
The chief surgeon of the theater prepared the general plan for evacuation and hospitalization of the sick and wounded. The system was based on upon the premise that it was the responsibility of rearward units to relieve forward units of their casualties; there was also a laid down number of days that patients should be held in a particular theater for treatment before evacuation to the U.S.. Due to a lack of fixed hospital facilities in the South-West Pacific, South Pacific and North Africa, this was fixed at 90 days. For the European Theater of Operations and all other theaters, this was initially fixed at 180 days and later reduced in late 1944 to 120 days.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:05 AM
By late 1944, a severe problem in the U.S. Army in general, and in the forces in Europe in particular was the manpower shortage. The prewar plans to expand the Army to 213 divisions were never met, a total of 89 divisions were eventually formed. In addition, prewar planning for replacements was found to be totally inadequate. The causes were many; U.S. industrial and agricultural manpower requirements could only be partially met by bringing women into the workforce, the Army was segregated, with Negro manpower restricted to non-combat units and a few independent combat units; the Army was forced to fight a two-front war; fear of the blitzkrieg had resulted in a huge expansion of the antiaircraft artillery and tank destroyer arms; and the requirements generated by the massive expansion of the U.S. Navy and the Army Air Force had further reduced the available manpower pool, By the end of 1944, the results were nearly catastrophic for the Army.
The lack of Infantry replacements was the most serious problem. For example, on December 8, 1944, the Third Army was short 11,000 infantrymen. Now this number represents only 4% of the quarter-million-strength of the Third Army. But 11,000 infantrymen was equal to the strength of some fifty-five rifle companies (the rifle strength of two infantry divisions) or about 15% of the infantry combat power of the army.
To meet this problem, the army resorted to a number of expedients; many antiaircraft and tank destroyer battalions were disbanded and their personnel reassigned to the Infantry; rear areas were combed of non-essential personnel; air cadets were transferred to the Infantry; the Army Specialized Training Program, which allowed selected enlisted men to gain a college education was canceled and their personnel found themselves transferred to the Infantry; finally, divisions not yet deployed in the theater were ruthlessly stripped of men. Nevertheless, the problem persisted and was only solved by the collapse of Germany.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:07 AM
U.S. Army doctrine, as developed during the prewar and early-war expansion, emphasized mobility and combined-arms in both attack and defense. Mobility was achieved by the development of reliable, robust armored and soft-skin vehicles. Unfortunately, in the case of tanks and tank destroyers, thickness of armor (and thus weight) was sacrificed in the interest of mobility to the detriment of the combat effectiveness of U.S. armored vehicles in tank-versus-tank combat. This flaw was exacerbated by General McNair’s belief (later proved to be fundamentally unsound) that the armored division would not be required to engage and destroy enemy armored formations, since this was the mission of the tank destroyers. Rather he visualized the armored divisions as a cavalry force to exploit gaps opened in the enemy lines by the tank-supported infantry division. The major flaw in this concept was that the lightly armored TD battalions were unable to engage and destroy enemy armor when attacking in mass, even when the TDs were deployed in concealed defensive positions. While the tank destroyers on defense were often capable of delaying and occasionally blunting armored attacks, it was found that they could rarely defeat them. Instead of operating in an independent antiarmor role, TD units were often semi permanently attached to infantry and armored divisions, while armored divisions were required to assume defensive as well as offensive missions. Necessity forced the armored divisions into all types of offensive missions. Thus the concept of the armored division as an exploitation rather than an assault forces disappeared.
In theory, the standardization in the organization of the combat arms facilitated the cross-attachment of units into combined-arms team. The close cooperation required of combined arms required extensive training and combat experience to be effective. Unfortunately, the prewar and early war training for combat was often little more than an exercise in the movement of troops to contact than an actual rehearsal for combat. Poor training habits carried over into combat, often actions on the battlefield were dictated by rote rather than by common sense. U.S. tactics, at best, were often mechanical and even worse, predictable. This, and the lack of a coherent doctrine for cross-attachment, resulted in mishmashes of units, confusion, and blurred (and even, destroyed) chains of command. As a result, the introduction of a ‘green” U.S. division into combat often resulted in disaster rather than success. Eventually, combat experience and unnecessary casualties forced commanders to change the emphasis in the training program. By December 1944, costly experience allowed most new divisions to make an easier transition to the realities of combat, but problems still persisted.
The U.S. Army had both strengths and weaknesses. The majority of its weaknesses were attributed to its massive expansion between 1939 and 1945. Its strength were the results of years of hard work by a relatively few dedicated professionals in the 1920s and 1930s, work that was performed by men who were almost completely unrecognized outside of their professional community.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:09 AM
In 1941, the U.S. Army was, after years of peacetime garrison soldiering, ill prepared to cloth and equip its soldier for battle all over the world under all types of climatic conditions. Uniforms at the start of the war were still very similar to those worn by the doughboys of the AEF in World War One, the most recognizable items beginning its headgear, either the British designed Brodie helmet or the Campaign Hat. By 1944, however, the U.S. soldier was undoubtedly the best and most sensibly dressed of all the combatants, thanks to the care put into designing his clothing and equipment. For example, the U.S. was the first military to issue its soldiers with separate clothing to fight in as well as for parade and garrison duties. While the British Army had to make the best of its battledress for virtually every activity, the American combat jacket was the first real attempt by any nation to design a special item of clothing, just for battle. Even the Germans had to fight in a tailored, badged and braided tunic for most of the war. Another milestone was the principle adopted of providing layers of clothing so that the same basic combat uniform could be worn in winter and summer, with or without woolen liners, sweaters, hoods, etc. which were worn when necessary.
TEMPERATE DRESS
The GIs non-combat service dress consisted of an open-necked tunic with four straight flapped pockets, a pair of straight trousers, brown leather boots or shoes, plus either a peaked cap or the envelope type “overseas” cap. All clothing was olive drab in color, but varied considerably in tone. Shirts and ties ranged from olive to light tan. Officers wore a similar service dress, but with a dark worsted wool band around each cuff, which was the mark of an officer, regardless of rank. Later in the war, the “Ike” jacket was also worn by soldiers. This resembled the British battledress blouse, but had many variations in color, style and cut. This was the uniform the GI wore on and off duty.
For battle, the GIs wore the M-1 steel helmet. The helmet was composed of three parts; the outer steel shell, painted olive drab and sometimes worn with a scrim net (for holding camouflage material) and fitted with an adjustable chin strap (modified for airborne use with an additional chin strap). This fitted snugly over the top of a composite liner of similar shape (but slightly smaller size), with an internal cradle of web straps to grip the head. The third element was an olive knit wool cap, known as a “beanie” designed to be worn under the helmet, but often worn without as it made a comfortable, warm, but casual form of headgear. The outer helmet was an ideal wash basin, cooking pot, an emergency entrenching tool, in fact its uses were legion, depending only on the inventiveness of the wearer!
Shirts were olive drab flannel with attached collars and two patch pockets, usually worn open at the neck. Over the shirt was worn the M1941 Field Jacket, which was hip length or the M1943 Field Jacket which was thigh length. The M1943 was superior, being windproof, waterproof and tear resistant (the M1941 was windproof only). With concealed zip fasteners, four large pockets and able to use a button-in liner and hood for winter use, the M1943 jacket was excellent. Calf-high canvas leggings were initially worn with the brown leather boots, but these were replaced by a new boot which appeared in 1944. This had a built in leather gaiter, which was fastened with two leather straps and buckles. In 1945, yet another high boot appeared, which like the paratrooper’s boot on which it was modeled, laced all the way up to the lower calf.
Miscellaneous clothing included long greatcoats and raincoats, high necked pullover sweaters, scarves and balaclava helmets, herringbone twill overalls (for mechanics and armored personnel), rubber overshoes, and olive wool or brown leather gloves. In addition to their crash helmets, armored crewmen wore the highly sought after “tankers” jacket. Improvised white snow camouflage hooded jackets and over-trousers were used, but were not in general issue. The two piece tropical camouflage uniform was worn in the ETO in the summer of 1944, but was unfortunately very similar to the German Waffen-SS camouflage jackets, leading to several friendly fire incidents.
TROPICAL DRESS
The GIs of the peacetime Pacific garrisons wore the normal hot weather service uniforms, consisting of a shirt and trousers in light tan or khaki drill material which was known as “chino”. This was unsuitable for battlefield use, but a satisfactory jungle uniform did not go into production until nearly the end of the war; so several interim solutions had to be found. The first was the olive green twill fatigues, which replaced the old prewar blue working denims. The first real jungle suit was introduced in 1942 and consisted of a baggy, one piece overall, camouflaged on one side in jungle colors and either plain tan or camouflaged in sandy browns on the other. The latter was intended for beach or open country wear. This garment was very unpopular as it required to the soldier to virtually undress to wash or use the latrine, so a two piece version was introduced. However, the camouflage pattern made the wearer easier to see when he was moving and it was replaced in 1944 by a herringbone twill two piece olive drab green jungle suit, which was the most common only worn combat suit for the rest of the war. A new lightweight jungle suit, made of olive green poplin was introduced in the spring of 1945. Camouflaged helmet covers were worn with all of these jungle suits.
SPECIALIZED CLOTHING
Armored Units
In addition to the normal issue of clothing, armored crewman were issued with four special items during the war; a World War One pilot’s type of fabric tight fitting helmet with housings for earphones (universally disliked by everyone!). Next was a composition crash helmet with a padded and ventilated top and ear pieces which was generally liked and worn in preference to the steel helmet. One piece olive drab herringbone twill overalls were universally worn from 1942 onwards, in two slightly different versions. The last was the zipped tankers jacket which was a much sought after item. It was warm, comfortable and weatherproof and fitted with a zip fastener, knitted cuffs and waistband.
Airborne Units
The steel helmet, designated the M1C was modified so that it could act as a crash helmet as well as providing battlefield protection. This included the fitting of additional web strap on the inside and a molded chin cup. Special airborne combat jacket and trousers were worn, both in light brown. The jacket had four large patch pockets with flaps and it was fastened by a full length, covered, heavy duty metal zip. The collar was fastened at the neck by press studs, as were the cuffs. Airborne combat trousers were similar to the normal combat ones, but had extra large and very distinctive pockets on the thighs, which made them baggy. Airborne jump boots finished off the basic outfit and were one of the most distinctive marks of the airborne soldier. Paratroopers went into combat laden down with equipment. Donald Burgett of the 101st airborne gave a listing of his equipment in his book “Currahee!”:
“My personal equipment consisted of one set of OD’s worn under my jump suit, helmet, boots, gloves, main chute, reserve chute, Mae West, rifle, .45 automatic pistol, trench knife, jump knife, hunting knife, machete, one cartridge belt, two bandoliers, two cans of machine gun ammo totaling 676 rounds of .30 ammo, 66 rounds of .45 ammo, one Hawkins mine capable of blowing the track off of a tank, four blocks of TNT, one entrenching tool with two blasting caps taped on the outside of the steel part, three first-aid kits, two morphine needles, one gas mask, a canteen of water, three days supply of K rations, two days supply of D rations, six fragmentation grenades, one Gammon grenade, one orange smoke and one red smoke grenade, one orange panel, one blanket, one raincoat, one change of socks and underwear, two cartons of cigarettes and a few other odds and ends.”
Personal Equipment
The GI was issued a set of webbing to carry his combat gear. Three types of belts were issued, these were all wide webbing belts, secured in front by a blackened metal buckle. The cartridge belt had two sets of five thin webbing pouches (one on either side of the buckle), each pouch would hold one clip of ammunition. The magazine belt had three larger pouches on each side of the buckle, each holding two BAR magazines. Finally the pistol belt was a plain belt. All three belts had a row of metal eyelets along the top and bottom that allowed a wide variety of equipment pouches to be secured to the belt, these included canteens, entrenching tools, and first aid pouches as well as numerous extras. A set of webbing shoulder straps were issued. These would cross diagonally in the center of the back, then be passed vertically over the shoulders and then divided into two narrower sections. These were both fastened to the top row of eyelets or one set would be passed under the arm and attached to the pack harness. Riflemen were also issued a bayonet, this would either be clipped to the cartridge belt or to a special pocket on the left side of the pack.
Additional items carried would include one or more ammunition bandoliers (carrying another six clips of rifle ammunitions, leather binocular cases, canvas map cases and the gas mask carrier. Another item that was carried was the musette bag which could be slung from one arm and carried essential supplies. All of these items had regulation places to be carried, but the GIs often worn their equipment as they pleased, not to mention adding items of enemy equipment to their personal gear.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 11:15 AM
Before World War Two, the U.S. Army divided its subsistence requirements into three types of rations. The Garrison Ration, the Field Ration and the Iron Ration. The Garrison was issued to the permanent mess halls. It was primarily composed of about 70% fresh foods. The Field Ration consisted of non-perishable goods such as canned meat, vegetables and fruit as well as dry foods. The Iron Ration consisted of cans of stew or hash and crackers that would provide one or two meals for a soldier that he could keep in his pack.
By the 1930s, while the U.S. was preparing for its expansion, it took the time to reorganize its food supply. Under the new system, the Garrison Ration became “Field Ration A” and the Field Ration became “Field Ration B”, while the Iron Ration became “Field Ration C”. The rations stayed mostly the same.
During the Africa landings, the U.S. troops were issued the British “Compo Ration” and came to love its variety. The Compo Ration was basically a box filled with a variety of cans of food, this was its greatest attraction. The British simply made sure that each box had a balance of meat, vegetables, bread and condiments. The Compo entered service, replacing the “Field Ration B”. This was also known as the “10 in 1” ration (this provided two hot and one cold meals for ten men for one day).
The Field Ration C was developed in 1939 and was intended to be issued for units in actual combat when no mess facilities were available. The C was packed in six small cans, three containing the meat (M) items and three the basics (B items). The ration was designed to be palatable hot or cold. The initial M items were corned beef hash; beef stew; and chicken & vegetables. The B items included crackers, premixed & compressed cereal, powdered coffee, cubed sugar and chocolate coated peanuts or chocolate drops.
A major problem with the first version of the C Ration was its meat components. The C Ration was never intended to be issued for more than three days, hence the limited selection. Troops in combat found themselves living on C Rations for weeks at a time, and to add insult to injury, when the troops were rotated out of the front line and were able to go to proper messing facilities, they were greeted with duplicates of the hated meat component in the first B Rations.
By 1944, the C Ration had reached a new level. The original title of “US Army Field Ration C” was abandoned and the new title “Ration Type C, Assembly, Packaging and Packing” was adopted. The new C Ration now consisted of three cans of basic (B items), three cans of meat (M items) and one accessory pack. Six combinations of components or menu arrangements were specified in order to provide a wider variety. Six B items were listed, two each for breakfast, dinner and supper. B item components varied in accordance with a grouping that would fit the meal, including crackers, compressed and premixed cereal, chocolate-coated peanuts or raisins, powdered coffee, granulated sugar, lemon/orange or grape drink powder, hard candies, jam, peanut butter, cocoa beverage powder and caramels. The accessory packet included nine “good commercial quality” cigarettes, halazone water-purification tablets, a book of matches, several sheets of toilet paper, chewing gun and a can opener. The M items included: meat & beans; meat & vegetable stew; meat & spaghetti; ham, eggs & potatoes; meat & noodles; pork & rice; frankfurters & bans; pork & beans; ham & lima beans; and chicken & vegetables.
The final version of the C Ration started being issued in April 1945. It contained more improvements resulting from combat experiences. Hard candy and the chocolate coated peanuts and raisins were deleted from the B Items because of their poor keeping quality and a fudge disc and a cookie sandwich was substituted. Salt tablets were added to the accessory pack. Sugar tablets were substituted for the granulated sugar packets. Beef stew was added to the M Items. The halazone tablets were deleted from the accessory pack. Finally the accessory pack was divided into two packets, first named the “long pack” and the “short pack” and later called the “accessory pack” and the “cigarette pack”. Gum, toilet paper, can opener, granulated salt, salt tablets and wood spoons were included in the long pack. The short pack consisted of a pack of nine cigarettes and a book of matches.
Upon the entry of the U.S. into World War Two, there was an avalanche of enthusiasm for special troops. Each of these special units demanded their own types of rations. The paratroopers asked for concentrated “Parachute Rations”, the jungle units wanted a “Jungle Ration” and the mountain troops wanted a “Mountain Ration”. Each of these special rations were assigned a letter (running from “E” to “J”) while they were being developed.
The Subsistence Branch tried to fulfill the orders flowing into it, but the requests were coming in faster than they could develop and test rations to meet these ever increasing requirements. The final blow came when the European Theater of Operations asked for a “Assault Ration” for the troops to carry when they were assaulting beaches. Enough was enough! The Subsistence Branch stopped working on all of these special rations. And the decision was made to develop one concentrated ration that would take the place of the parachute, jungle and assault rations. This was called the “Field Ration K”.
The K Ration was designed to meet the need for an individual, easy to carry ration that could be used for combat operations. It was noted for its compactness and superior packaging and was acknowledged as the ration that provided the greatest variety of nutritionally balanced components within the smallest package.
The prototype K Ration was designed as a pocket ration for paratroopers. Two menus were originally developed, one with pemmican (dried meat pounded into a powder and mixed with dried fruit and then melted together), crackers, a peanut bar, a meat preparation and orange drink powder. The second consisted of pemmican crackers, a D-bar, a meat preparation and grape drink powder. It was later redesigned into a three meal menu which contained common items as pemmican crackers and chewing gum. In addition, the breakfast unit contained malted milk tablets, canned veal loaf, powdered coffee and sugar cubes; the dinner unit had dextrose tablets, canned ham spread, and bouillon cubes; the supper unit had a D-bar, sausage, lemon drink powder and sugar cubes.
Due to the success of this ration, it was adopted for all-service use as the “Field Ration, Type K”. Further development led to no less than seven revisions before the final World War Two specifications. During this period, the variety of crackers was increased, newer and more acceptable meat products were introduced, malted milk tablets and D-bars gave way to a variety of confections, additional beverage components were provided and cigarettes, matches, salt tablets, toilet paper and wooden spoons were added as accessory items.
The cartons containing the individual meals were also subject to several changes. The first cartons were coated inside and out with a thermoplastic compound. Later, they were wax-coated on the outside only, wrapped in waxed paper and then coated with a commercial product made from “unmilked crepe rubber and blendeded waxes” specified not to melt at 135 degrees nor “crack, chip or otherwise become separated” from the carton at minus 20 degrees below zero. Other types of packages were tested, including a “thread opening fiber bodied can with metal ends.” The wax impregnated materials prevailed, and the ultimate requirements were for the familiar wax-coated inner carton inside a second carton labeled and colored to indicate whether its contents were breakfast, dinner or supper.
The final version consisted of:
The Breakfast Unit which contained a canned egg and meat product (chopped pork and egg yolk or chopped ham and egg), crackers, a compressed and premixed cereal bar, powdered coffee, a fruit bar, chewing gum, sugar tablets, four cigarettes, a book of matches, water purification tablets, a can opener, several sheets of toilet paper and a wooden spoon.
The Dinner Unit had a canned cheese product (processed American cheese; processed American cheese with bacon; or processed American & Swiss cheese), crackers, a candy bar, chewing gum, a packet of lemon, orange or grape drink powder, a packet of granulated sugar, salt tablets, four cigarettes, a book of matches, a can opener and a wooden spoon.
The Supper Unit included a canned meat product (pork with carrot and apple or beef & pork loaf), crackers, bouillon powder, hard candy, chewing gum, powdered coffee, a packet of granulated sugar, four cigarettes, a book of matches, can opener and a wooden spoon.
The crackers, beverages, sugar, fruit bar, candy, gum and spoon were packaged in a laminated cellophane bag while the canned meat and cheese products were placed inside a chipboard sleeve-type box. The two units were assembled and sealed in a waxed carton enclosed in a no waxed outer carton labeled with the K Ration design and color. Twelve rations were placed in a fiberboard box which was over packed in a nailed wooden box for overseas shipment.
The first emergency ration, developed in 1932, consisted of a twelve-ounce bar of equal parts of bitter chocolate, sugar and peanut butter. Although palatable, the bar had poor keeping qualities and was thirst-provoking and meet with poor acceptance. While it did not progress beyond the experimental stage, it did provide the groundwork for experiments on a concentrated ration in 1935.
Originally called the Logan Bar in recognition of Colonel Paul Logan, then head of the Subsistence Branch. The Logan Bar was designed to provide the highest possible caloric value in the smallest package and yet retain sufficient palatability to be used daily. The ingredients were chocolate, sugar, oat flour, cacao fat, skim milk powder and artificial flavoring. Three four-ounce bars (each wrapped in aluminum foil and then over wrapped and sealed in parchment paper, constituted the ration.. In spite of the requirement that it qualify for continued daily use, the Logan Bar was never considered to be anything other than suitable for emergency rations. Each four ounce bar provided 770 calories.
Legbreaker
12-18-2012, 04:33 PM
BRILLIANT work there! Love it!
Hell of a solid read though!
Adm.Lee
12-18-2012, 05:07 PM
No arguments from me about anything you've got so far.
"There's a war to be won" by Geoffrey Perrett-- a very good single-volume history of the US Army in WW2.
"The GI offensive in Europe: the triumph of American infantry divisions 1941-1945" by Peter Mansoor
I probably can come up with a bunch more: the South Pacific and the 1944-45 campaigns have been favorites of mine for a long time.
dragoon500ly
12-18-2012, 08:05 PM
And I've trimmed over 40 pages from this. Truelly, the best works to study the subject is the US Army's "Green Books" the 32 volume study of WWII written by some of the foremost historians of the 1940s-50s. Problem is, tis a very dry read!
dragoon500ly
12-20-2012, 07:50 AM
The standard first-aid packet held a bandage, an envelope of sulfanilamide powder and 5 sulfadiazine tablets. These were held in a tinned-metal container that kept the contents fairly waterproof. This was carried in a rectangular-shapped web pouch that was usually suspended from the right front of the cartridge belt.
To use, the GI would remove the metal tin from his pouch, break the seal, one the envelope of sulfa powder and sprinkle it on the wound, place and then tie the bandage and then take the sulfa tablets.
The parachutist’s first-aid packet was a waterproof package that held a bandage, an envelope of sulfanilamide powder, 5 sulfadiazine tablets, a tourniquet, and a morphine syrette. The paratroopers would normally tie this package to the front or back of their helmet or on the right front suspender. This was also issued to assault troops during the Normandy and Southern France landings as well as during some of the heavier fighting in the fall/winter of 1944. Most infantry commanders frowned on this, due to the misuse of the morphine syrette.
The medic would normally be issued an extra canteen and cover (for casualties) and were authorized to use either the pistol belt or the BAR magazine belt (its larger pouches would allow for more medical supplies to be carried). In addition, two aidman’s bags would be issued, each would carry: 12 3-inch gauze bandages; 12 small field dressings; 3 triangular bandages; 1 2oz metal bottle filled w/alchol; 3 tourniquets; 2 boxes of 5 morphine syrettes each; 6 2oz shackers of sulfanilamide powder; 6 iodine swabs; 1 2oz box with 50 sulfadiazine tablets; 1 roll of 1-inch adhesive tape; 1 pencil, 1 thermometer and several injury tags.
mikeo80
12-20-2012, 11:14 AM
Excellent Articles!!!!
Great Reading!!!
My $0.02
Mike
dragoon500ly
12-22-2012, 07:55 AM
The use of edged weapons for combat purposes has its roots in ancient history. For thousands of years, swords, daggers, spears, pikes and other weapons were the main weapon of the foot soldier. With the introduction of firearms, the use of edged weapons waned, but never disappeared. In their early years, firearms were single shot weapons that were cumbersome and time consuming to reload. The bayonet was an important adjunct to the musket as it transformed a unloaded weapon into an effective spear-like weapon. Other edged weapons, such as swords, lost their usefulness as weapons and became little more than symbols of rank or authority.
With the introduction of metallic cartridges and breech-loading, repeating rifles, bayonets became less important. By the start of the 20th-Century, most “modern” military minds believed that the day of the bayonet was gone. The first American military rifle of the 20th-Century, the M-1903 Springfield, was designed with a flimsy rod bayonet instead of the robust knife-bayonet of its predecessor, the .30-40 Krag rifle. But one of the first wars of the 20th-Century, the Japanese-Russian War of 1905, saw numerous occasions in which bayonets were used. This caused the War Department to reconsider and the M-1903 was redesigned to accept a standard knife bayonet.
With the outbreak of World War One, the bayonet was soon proven to be an important infantry weapon, indeed, with the troops settled into bloody and frustrating trench warfare, the bayonet was used in brutal, close-quarter combat and along with numerous designs of specialized combat knives.
The standard bayonet for the M-1903 Springfield rifle was the M-1905 bayonet with a 16-inch long blade. It was built from 1905 to 1920 and then again from 1942 through 1943. Some 1,540,578 were built during the Second World War alone, an additional 1,007,671 were modified into M-1 bayonets (having 6-inches of blade ground off).
In World War One, production of the Springfield was not able to keep up with the rapid expansion of the U.S. Army, resulting in a need to secure another source of rifles. The British government had contracted with three American firms to produce the Pattern 1914 .303-caliber rifle, with the British contracts ending as the U.S. was entering the war, it was decided to modified the P14 rifle in the .30-06-caliber as a supplement to the M1903 rifle. This was the M-1917 rifle and was the most widely issued rifle in the AEF. The
M-1917 bayonet was also adopted. This had a 17-inch blade, and was not manufactured during WWII, but 2,500,000 WWI were reissued during WWII. Besides being used on the M-1917 rifle, it was also issued for use with the various shotguns that were used.
The M-1905 bayonet could be used with both the M-1903 Springfield as well as the new M-1 Garand rifle, but its long blade came in for criticism as it was cumbersome and uncomfortable for troops riding in vehicles. The decided to reduce the blade length down to 10-inches and the M-1 bayonet entered service in 1943. Produced from 1943-1945, some 2, 948,648 were built as well as 1,007,671 modified from M-1903 bayonets.
With the introduction of the M-1 Carbine, there became a need for a bayonet for the new weapon. The M-4 Bayonet-Knife was designed to fill the need for both a bayonet and a combat knife. This entered service in 1944 and some 2,260,519 were made by 1945. The modification of the M-1 Carbine to accept the new bayonet lagged well behind production and only a handful were actually issued to the troops in WWII.
The last of the WWII issue bayonets was the M-1941 Johnson Rifle Bayonet. The unusual recoil operated action of the Johnson required that the barrel slide back and forth with each shot. If a standard knife-bayonet was attached to the barrel, the weight would cause the weapon to malfunction. The bayonet would have to be very light in weight. The result was a all metal bayonet with a simple triangular blade and grip forged from a single piece of steel. The blade was only 6-inches long and it weight only 1/3 of a pound. The Marines who used the Johnson Rifle derisively referred to its bayonet as a “tent peg”. It was withdrawn from service well before the end of the war. Some 70,000 were produced, but less than 2,000 were ever issued.
dragoon500ly
12-23-2012, 07:51 AM
The term “combat knife” was never an official designation in WWII, although several types of knives were designed and procured for use as combat weapons. In addition, numerous civilian hunting and pocket knives were used by the GIs throughout the war. This chapter is concerned only with those knives actually designed and issued for combat uses.
At the time of the America’s entry into WWII, the only knife designated as Standard Issue was the M-2 Pocket Knife, this was a simple folding design with two knife blades and a can opener.
At the start of the war (for the US), requests flooded the Ordnance Department for combat knives to be issued to special purpose troops, such as paratroopers and Rangers. The Army issued some 139,000 M-1918 Mark I Trench Knives from storage for use. There were no plans to reintroduce this knife back into production because it was not an effective combat weapon, in spite of its fearsome appearance. This was a brutal weapon with a 7-inch, double-edged blade, a heavy brass grip with a “knuckle” hand grip (the outer edges of the knuckles were fitted with cone-shaped points, as well as a larger cone on the pommel designed as a “skull crusher”. With its limited utility as combat knife (it could only be used in clenched-fist attacks) as well as its requirement of a large amount of brass, the M-1918 was soon withdrawn from service.
In December of 1942, the Army issued a requirement for a new combat knife with a 6.75-inch blade, leather handle and a steel pommel. This was standardized in January 14, 1943 as the Trench Knife, M-3. It was designed as a strong and rugged knife, yet capable of being efficiently mass produced. Some 2,590,247 were built between 1943 and 1945. The M-3 soon proved to be very popular with the troops and was later chosen to be redesigned with a bayonet attachment point as the M-4 Bayonet-Knife.
dragoon500ly
12-29-2012, 08:45 AM
During World War One and Two, most of the European armies viewed handguns, primarily as badges of rank for officers. The U.S. military viewed the handgun as a valuable weapon in its own right and issued pistols and revolvers in greater numbers than most other nations of this period.
This is not to suggest that all, or even most, of the servicemen of World War Two were armed with handguns. In the U.S. Army handguns were widely issued to officers, non-commissioned officers, members of crew served weapons, aviators, tankers as well as a variety of other types of personnel.
The various Tables of Organization and Equipment did not call for the wide-spread issue of handguns. The basic theory being that the primary weapon was the rifle or carbine. In real life, most infantrymen felt otherwise and it was not unusual for many GIs to obtain (by fair means or foul) a handgun of some type. Officially the tolerance to this practice varied depending on the attitude of the commanding officer. During training or when stateside, the regulations were strictly enforced. In combat situations, it was left to the officer in charge. As one combat veteran stated, “We were too busy trying to stay alive to worry about whether or not somebody was supposed to be carrying a pistol.” Another veteran stated, “The attitude has always been, ‘If I get in a jam bad enough to need my pistol, I can always worry about regulations after I have survived.”
Not all of the handguns used unofficially were government issue weapons. A number of privately procured pistols and revolvers, as well as battlefield captures found their way into the combat zones regardless of the regulations are were put to good use.
Not all handguns found themselves used in anger, many soldiers carried a pistol for a much needed measure of security. As stated by Colonel John George in his Book “Shots Fired in Anger.”
“My own pistol was a constant source of comfort to me after dark and I always had it in my hands. There is no room in a foxhole to wield a rifle against an assailant who is inside the hole with you. The only answer is a pistol.”
The need for handguns in modern warfare has been the subject of hot debate over the years. People in and out of the military have argued that a handgun is not a valid weapon for a infantrymen. Most combat veterans have an entirely different opinion…
“Theorists have been knocking down handgun usefulness for centuries, and staff officers, officially armed with handguns, have been taking them away from GIs for just as long, and the ever practical fighting soldier has continued to beg, borrow, or steal a handgun for his personnel protection right up to this day…The remarkable thing is just how often you can turn a soldier upside down, and---WHOOPS!---a loaded pistol falls out before the loaded dice, both being carried to glean some slight advantage from a not too munificent fate.”
“The bayonet has been reduced to the size of a heavy hunting knife, and bayonet practice is kept on the training schedule as a morale-building factor. Now I ask you: throw a bayonet, scabbard, and the front stud from the end of your rifle on a scale and balance it against…a handgun, loaded mind you---and I’ll eat my hat if the handgun doesn’t weigh less!”
Without question, the most famous United States military handgun of the 20th Century is the Model of 1911 .45 pistol and its variants. Produced by the legendary John M. Browning and developed by the Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company, the M1911 is known to several generations of Americans as the “.45 Automatic” or simply, the “.45.”
The M1911 was developed in response to serious problems encountered with the .38 caliber revolvers used in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War and in the subsequent Philippines Insurrection. The .38 Long Colt cartridge failed miserably in combat, and the situation was so bad that the antique .45 caliber Model of 1873 Single Action Army revolver was recalled from storage, refurbished and reissued for use. The old black powder .45 Colt cartridge was a formidable man-stopper, although the antiquated single action design left much to be desired.
With the end of the Philippines Insurrection, the War Department requested a replacement for the unsatisfactory .38 caliber revolvers. The government actually wanted to get away from revolvers in general and sought a semiautomatic pistol chambered for the .45 caliber cartridge. After extensive trails, the Model of 1911 Pistol, chambered for the .45 Automatic Colt Pistol (ACP) cartridge was adopted.
The M1911 pistol was manufactured by Colt from 1911 onwards and by the Springfield Armory in 1914 and 1915. By the time of the American entry into World War One, the small pre-war Army and Navy had been equipped with the M1911 and production had slowed to a trickle. With the rapid expansions of the American military machine, the demands for pistol production soon overwhelmed the available supply. Colt stepped up production of its pistol, but the Springfield Armory was overloaded with production of the M1903 rifle. Plans were quickly made to produce the M1911 by other firms. However, the only other company to turn out the M1911 in any real numbers was Remington-UMC, which produced 21,000 M1911s during WWI.
By the time of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, 60% of the Doughboys in France were armed with the M1911. The Colt proved to be an outstanding military handgun, where its potent short range stopping power and reliability proved invaluable. After the war, many M1911s found their ways stateside in the duffle bags of the AEF, but there remained adequate numbers in inventory to meet the needs of the postwar U.S. military.
During the inter-war years the decision was made to modify the original Colt design by changing the configuration of the trigger, hammer and grip as well as slight modifications to the frame of the M1911. The M-1911A1 was adopted into service in June of 1926.
Upon the entry of the U.S. into World War Two, Colt stepped up its production of the M1911A1 as well as awarding contracts to several other companies to produce the M1911A1 in bulk, these were:
Remington-Rand 900,000
Colt 400,000
Ithaca Gun Company 400,000
Union Switch & Signal 50,000
Singer Company 500
In addition many M1911s were pulled out of storage and were rebuilt or overhauled by the Ordnance Department (this consisted of replacing worn parts and refinishing the pistol with the standard Parkerizing finish).
A leather hip holster, the Model of 1912, was adopted soon after the introduction of the M1911. This had a full flap and was made with either the standard grommet or a swivel attachment. The swivel attachment was soon removed from service (following WWI). Altogether some 3,000,000 M1912 holsters were made during WWII. Another holster issued with the M1911 was the M-7 Shoulder Holster. This was used by aviators, tank crewmen and by many officers. The last accessory issued with the M1911A1 was the magazine pouch. This canvas webbing pouch held two spare magazines under either a double fastener flap (the 1918 issue) or a single fastener flap (WWII issue). Both saw service in WWII.
The M1911 and M1911A1 have often been criticized as being heavy, awkward and inaccurate, these comments are true, to a certain extent. The M1911 is also very reliable and possessed of a great deal of stopping power and, in the end, that was what the GI was looking for.
After World War Two, the M-1911A1 served with the post-war U.S. military into the 1980s. It is interesting to note that no M-1911A1 has been manufactured since 1945. The ones in service have been extensively rebuilt, multiple times.
dragoon500ly
12-30-2012, 08:09 AM
When the United States entered World War One, it found itself with an inadequate supply of the M-1911 pistol. While other firms were tooling up to produce the weapon, other sources of handguns were needed to help alleviate the critical shortage.
While Colt was ramping up production of the M1911, as well as machine guns, the company already possessed the necessary tooling and fixtures to manufacture its large double-action revolver, the New Service. This was the same basic revolver adopted by the Army as the Model of 1909 and chambered for the .45 Long Colt cartridge. The Ordnance Department requested that Colt produce this revolver, as a limited standard, but to chamber it for the .45 ACP round. Since the ACP round is rimless, it was necessary to devise a method of loading this round into a revolver’s chambers and allow for its extraction. The solution was a simple sheet-metal stamped half-moon shape that held three rounds. The modified revolver was adopted as the Colt Model of 1917 and some 150,000 were built between October of 1917 and December of 1918.
The firm of Smith & Wesson also had the capacity to build a version of its large frame revolver, chambered for the .45 ACP round. Smith & Wesson produced 153,000 copies during WWII. This was adopted as the Smith & Wesson Model of 1917.
While the M-1911 was the preferred issue, the M1917 revolvers proved themselves to be powerful and reliable revolvers. Due to the shortages of the M1911, many M1917s found themselves used in the trenches.
After the war, the M1917 revolvers were retired into the war reserve stockpile. Official records show a total of 188,120 were still available by December 7, 1941.
With the outbreak of WWII, the M1917s were pulled out of storage and refurbished. The M1917s did not see much frontline service, there were adequate numbers of the M1911A1 available, and the revolvers were mostly reserved for stateside duties or for personnel such as the Military Police. The use of these obsolescent, but still serviceable handguns allowed for more M1911s to be shipped to the combat theaters. Still, some 20,993 revolvers did make it into the hands of combat units.
The M-1917s were issued with the Model of 1909 leather holster, which had a large leather flap that fastened to the body of the holster. The holster was a cavalry pattern (butt forward). The M1909 was modified in 1941 and reissued as the M-2 holster, the holster was redesigned slightly to allow it be worn on the hip in either butt forward or butt to the rear configuration. A canvas webbing pouch that held three sets of half-moon clips was also issued. This pouch had three pockets, each holding one set.
The official use of the M-1917 revolvers ended in May of 1945, when the Ordnance Department ordered that no more would be repaired or refurbished. It was decided to declare the M1917 as Obsolete and disposed of to reduce any further need for repair parts. The Army’s Provost Marshal General’s office requested and obtained permission to stockpile a small number of M1917s for use by Military Police units. This stockpile was latter eliminated after the Korean War.
dragoon500ly
01-06-2013, 11:45 AM
The rifle was the basic weapon for most of the U.S. Army of World War Two. Indeed, the term “Rifleman” was virtually synonymous with “Infantryman” during the war.
The U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, Model of 1903
Known to several generations of soldiers as the “Springfield 03” or more simply as the “03” this is one of the most famous U.S. military rifles of all time. It was adopted just after the turn of the century in response to problems with the Spanish-American War issue .30-40 Krag-Jorgenson rifle. This was the standard U.S. issue from 1903 until its replacement by the M-1 Garand in 1936.
As originally issued, the M1903 had an unusual integral sliding rod bayonet instead of the normal knife-bayonet. It was also chambered for the Model of 1903 cartridge (the .30-03) which had a round nosed bullet. After a short period of service, it was noted that both the rod bayonet and the M1903 cartridge had several deficiencies. In 1905, the rod bayonet was replaced by the Model of 1905 Knife-Bayonet. In 1906, the original M1903 cartridge was replaced by the improved Model of 1906, featuring a pointed (spitzer) bullet. This became the famous .30-06 cartridge and was the standard cartridge of U.S. military rifles and machine guns for the next fifty years.
The M1903 was built at the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts with the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois gearing up for production shortly thereafter. Between 1903 and 1936, total production was 1,900,000 with a further 1,415,593 being built between 1940-1045.
Besides its wide-spread use in World War One, most people are not aware of the role that the Springfield played in World War Two. Most of the USMC’s early campaigns were fought with the M1903. The Army used the M1903 throughout the Philippines campaign prior to its surrender. The Springfield was also used during the North African and Sicily campaigns as well as in Italy and France. During World War Two, the ‘03 was generally utilized due to a shortage of the M-1. Even when other weapons were available, the ‘03 remained the weapon of choice for many troops due to its reliability and greater inherent accuracy. Not only did the ‘03 serve in frontline fighting on all fronts, it was widely used as a training rifle.
A large number of M-1903 rifles were fitted with grenade launchers and remained in the hands of frontline troops long after other ‘03s were replaced by M-1s (due to the issues with the development of a grenade launcher for the M-1).
The M-1903 rifle and its numerous variants were declared as Limited Standard in November of 1944. This meant that the weapons currently in service would remain for use as needed, but no new procurement would be undertaken.
The original M-1903 remained in production from 1903 to 1914 and resumed in 1917 to 1936.. With the outbreak of World War Two, the decision was made to resume mass production of the ‘03. Machine tooling from the Rock Island Arsenal were transported to the Remington plant and production resumed in 1940. This was the Remington M-1903 Rifle.
As the demand for rifles increased, Remington began to run into problems with the worn-out equipment provided by Rock Island Arsenal. Remington engineers working with the Ordnance Department proposed several time-cutting changes, modifications to the stock and eliminating non-essential parts. This rifle entered production in 1941 and was designated the U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M-1903 (Modified).
While the changed to the modified ‘03 did result in faster production, further changes were needed, mainly this was the replacement of the M1905 rear sight with a simple stamped metal adjustable rear sight that would attach to the rifle’s receiver, rather than the rear of the barrel. This sight saved production time and was actually a better battle sight than the original. In May of 1942, this became the U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, Model of 1903A3. In addition to the replacement of the rear sight, a longer hand guard (covering the former rear sight, the M1903A3 introduced many stamped metal components. The fit and finish of these war production rifles were a far cry from the high standards of the pre-WWII ‘03s, but they were still serviceable, with strong actions. The M-1903A3 was also built by the L.C. Smith & Corona Typewriter Company in February of 1942.
Early in WWII, the Army was faced with a serious shortage of sniper rifles. While the development of a sniper version of the M-1 was underway, the Ordnance Department directed Remington to design a variant of the M1903A3 into a sniper rifle configuration. With slight modifications to the receive, the U.S. Rifle Caliber .30, M-1903A4 (Sniper’s) was born. This was a M1903A3 with no front or rear sights and fitted with a Weaver 330C telescope (later designed by the Army as the M73B1) and a Redfield “Junior” scope mount. The Redfield sight was attached to the receiver ring and the existing rear sight base and the bolt handle was modified to clear the sight.
The M-1903A4 proved to be somewhat of a disappointment as a sniping rifle. The primary cause was the use of commercial components not designed for the rigors of combat. The Weaver telescope was found to be too delicate for service use and the lack of iron sights prevented the rifle from being used as a normal rifle if the telescope was damaged. Some 28,365 were produced Nevertheless, the M-1903A4 served throughout the war.
Two additional versions of the M1903A4 were produced especially for use by the USMC, they differed only in the type of scope fitted. The M-1903A5 was fitted with a Winchester A5 scope and dated from the First World War. They were considered to be serviceable sniping rifles. The M-1903A1 fitted with the Unertl Sniper Scope entered service in WWII, replacing the M1903A5 and serving the USMC well after the Korean War. Neither version saw any service with the Army (although you can see the M1903A1/Unertl scope in “Saving Private Ryan”).
dragoon500ly
01-06-2013, 07:11 PM
The U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, Model of 1917
During World War One, the U.S. was faced with a serious shortage of rifles. Fortunately, there was a source of slightly obsolete but thoroughly serviceable rifles available to the government. These were the
U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, Model of 1917, more commonly known as the Enfield or the U.S. Enfield.
The M1917 was a slight modification of a British design that was being manufactured in the U.S. under contract for the British Army. Known as the Pattern 1914, this caliber .303 weapon was produced by the firms of Winchester, Remington and Eddystone. The U.S. entered WWI when these firms were completing their contracts with the British government. Since the Springfield Armory and the Rock Island Arsenal were unable to meet the demand for rifles, even with greatly expanded production schedules, it was decided to utilize the factories and trained work forces that had successfully manufactured the P14 rifle to produce a version chambered for the standard American .30-06 cartridge. Thus the M1917 was born and some 2,422,529 were built in between 1917 and 1919. By the time of the Armistice, the majority of the soldiers and marines in the American Expeditionary Force were armed with the M1917.
The M1917 was a reliable and satisfactory rifle. It was a bit longer and bulkier than the M1903, and its sights were capable of windage adjustments. But for battlefield purposes, its sights were actually superior to those of the M1903. The Enfield was equal or superior to any of the rifles used by our allies or adversaries and compared very well to the ‘03 as a combat rifle.
With the end of World War One, there was some thought to standardizing the M1917 as the replacement for the M1903. However, for several reasons, including the ‘03s superiority as a match rifle, it was decided to retain the M1093 and retire the M1917 to the war reserve stockpile. When England became involved in the Second World War and faced the threat of German invasion, weapons were desperately needed to arm the hastily formed Home Guard units. Thousands of American weapons, including large numbers of M1917 rifles, were sent under the Lend-Lease Program. In addition to the shipments to England, M1917s were shipped to China. The Chinese military made extensive use of the Enfields.
The U.S. M1917 rifles were issued to a large number of the British Home Guard units and had a red band painted around the upper part of the sore grip to indicate that the weapon used the .30-06 and not the British .303 round.
War Department records also indicate that thousands of M1917s were shipped to the Philippines during the late 1930s. In 1939, the War Department declared the M1917 as Limited Standard which meant that no more would be produced and it would be issued if weapons classified as Standard were not available.
After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military rapidly increased its rush to rearm. In order to free up M1903s and M1s for the frontline troops, the M1917s were pulled from the reserve stockpiles, sent to a limited refurbishing and issued as training rifles. Some M1917s saw service overseas in the North Africa campaign and with service troops in the Italian campaign.
The M1917 rifle was declared as Obsolete on October 3, 1945 and soon afterwards, the remaining U.S. inventory was sold off under the auspices of the Department of Civilian Marksmanship were the M1917 enjoyed a new life as a hunting and sporting rifle throughout the 1950s and 60s.
dragoon500ly
01-07-2013, 08:27 AM
The U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M-1
The U.S. service rifle most closely associated with World War Two is the M-1 Garand (named after its inventor, John C. Garand). The M-1 was the end product of development and experimentation conducted during the 1920s and 30s at the Springfield Armory. The rifle went through several design changes during this period. This included a change from primer to gas operation and the substitution of the standard .30-06 cartridge for the .276 caliber round originally conceived for use with the weapon. On January 9, 1936, the M-1 was adopted as the new service rifle.
The first production M1s came off the production line in late 1937 and limited numbers were manufactured for the next couple of years. The original M-1 utilized a gas system which trapped the escaping gas at the end of the muzzle which, in turn operated the mechanism.
In early 1940 this system was changed to a port drilled to bleed off the necessary gas. This increased the rifle’s reliability and made for a better combat weapon. This improved gas system was used on all M-1s from early 1940 until the end of production in 1957. The early M-1s saw combat service in the Philippines in 1942. While these early weapons were never recalled, as they were returned to the depots for refurbishment over the years they were converted to the new system.
Prior to Pearl Harbor, even though the U.S. was in the process of building up its military arsenal, thousands of M-1s were sent to Great Britain under the Lend-Lease Program.
During World War Two, the M-1 was manufactured by the Springfield Armory and later the civilian firm of the Winchester Repeating Arms Company, total production of the M-1s by Winchester totaled some 513,880 M-1s before its contract ended in 1945. By the end of the war, total M-1 production came to 4,028,375 rifles.
While the M-1 was a superb battlefield weapon, many pre-war veterans were skeptical of the rifle when it was first introduced. Semiautomatic military rifles were somewhat of a novelty in the late 30s and early 40s and the M1s reliability and accuracy were often questioned. The M1 also had its share of developmental problems that had to be corrected. The Johnson rifle came onto the scene at about the same time that the M-1 was experiencing its early problems. Many people were convinced that the Johnson was superior to the Garand and subsequent events led to a Congressional investigation that was clearly and firmly decided in favor of the M-1.
The U.S. was the only nation involved in World War Two that issued a semiautomatic rifle in any appreciable numbers. This gave the American soldier a distinct advantage in many combat encounters. The firepower and reliability of the Garand saved many of our soldier’s lives and took a greater toll of our enemy than would have been the case if our infantrymen had been armed with the typical bolt action rifle. Other nations used some semiautomatic rifles very sparingly, but these did not have any significant impact. The Soviet Tokarev and the German G41 and G43 were not in the same league as the M-1 and saw only limited use during the war.
While the M-1 had an outstanding record of service, it was not without its faults. Some issues, such as the “Seventh Round Stoppage” and the adoption of the improved gas system were taken care of before the Garand’s widespread issue. Other problems took longer to solve, if they were solved at all. The rifle’s en bloc clip-loading system came in for its share of criticism; as quoted from “The Book of the Garand by Julian S. Hatcher”;
“The clip, as it is now designed, is a waster of ammunition. When one, two or three rounds have been fired, the user naturally wants to replenish his magazine so that he will have the full eight rounds ready for the next target, or perhaps for a Banzai charge. But after one or more shots have been fired, it is so difficult to reload that the remaining four, five or six rounds are invariably fired at once, and a fresh clip is inserted. Such excessive firing wastes ammunition, and discloses positions, especially at night. The Garand clip-loading system should be replaced by a magazine similar to tone on the BAR or the carbine.”
One of the design features of the Johnson rifle that found favor with its supporters was its rotary magazine, which could be easily and quickly topped off. The M-1’s successor, the M-14, was equipped with a detachable box magazine.
Another frequently lodged complaint against the M1 was its weight of almost 10 pounds, a full pound and a half more than the M1903. Soldiers having to carry the rifle on training marches or in non-combatant roles, frequently complained about its weight. On the other hand, soldiers using the M-1 in combat situations rarely complained about how much the rifle weighed. Actually, the rifle’s weight was not excessive for a full power service rifle and actually helped to dampen the weapon’s recoil.
One problem that was never totally solved was the Garand’s tendency to freeze under certain conditions of prolonged exposure to rain. A special lubricant was developed and issued that assisted in reducing this problem. Small containers of the grease would be carried in the rifle’s butt trap. When applied to the camming surfaces of the bolt, the problem was lessened.
Another problem was the finish on the gas cylinder. Since this item was made from stainless steel, it could not be blued or parker zed and a paint-like coating was applied. This did not prove to be very durable and it quickly wore off under adverse conditions and exposed the shiny gas cylinder, something that was less than desirable in a combat rifle. The formulation of the coating was improved which helped a great deal, although the problem was never totally eliminated.
The original rear sight of the M1 wound not hold its adjustment very well. By late 1942, a locking bar (which could be tightened after adjustment) was adopted. Right before the end of World War Two, a improved rear sight was standardized, which eliminated the needed for the locking bar.
All of the above criticisms have merit, but there are some that frankly, leave one wondering about the so-called experience of its maker. For example, some people complained about the so-called “M1 Thumb”. This occurs when the user presses down on the follower to release the bolt and does not remove his thumb in time and the bolt slams forward on the helpless digit. This is the result of carelessness or ignorance and is a suitable punishment for someone playing around with a weapon when not properly trained. Another ridiculous rap against the M1 was the alleged defect of the distinctive pinging noise caused by the ejection of the M1’s empty clip after the last round has been fired. It has been suggested that American soldiers were killed because this noise signaled their enemy that the weapon was empty and the <insert nationality of the enemy> would then be able to charge across open ground and kill the helpless GI before he could reload. Whoever dreamed up this idiotic scenario obviously didn’t know the first thing about combat! The typical battlefield was a deafening place and it would be all but impossible for anyone even a few yards away to hear the ejection of the clip. Even if someone did hear, an experienced M1 could reload his weapon within 2-4 seconds. Finally, isolated duels between two enemies were, at the very least, rare. Even if the soldier with the empty rifle couldn’t reload in time, there were fellow GIs all too willing to do in the enemy.
Numerous changes occurred during the M-1’s WWII production run. Some of these improved the weapon’s performance, while others were designed to either speed up production or reduce costs.
Even with the faults outlined above, the M-1 was undoubtedly the best general issue rifle of World War Two and its performance in that conflict speaks for itself.
M-1 Sniper Rifles
It was always intended to field a sniper version of the M-1, but its clip loading system effectively ruled out a conventional telescope and mount. As an interim weapon, the M1903A4 was adopted with off the self commercial scopes and mounts. There were two sniper versions of the M-1 that saw service.
The M-1C entered service in June of 1944 and some 8,000 were produced by the end of the war. Only a handful of M-1Cs saw combat service in WWII, mostly in the Pacific Theater of Operations. It was fitted with a commercial telescope and mount manufactured by the Griffin & Howe company. This was an offset that allowed the clip to load and eject and could be quickly removed without effecting the zero of the scope.
The M-1D did not enter service until the Korean War, although prototypes were built in 1945. This used a different design of mount than the M-1C.
dragoon500ly
01-09-2013, 08:29 AM
The Model of 1941 Johnson Rifle was the only semiautomatic rifle other than the M-1 Garand to be fielded by the United States during World War Two. Unlike the M-1, the Johnson was procured in extremely limited numbers and saw only a modicum of combat use. The Johnson rifle was the brainchild of Melvin M. Johnson, a Marine Corps Lieutenant who was assigned as an observer at Springfield Arsenal during the development work on the Garand and its chief competitor, the Penderson. Johnson was charged with evaluating both weapons and his final report concluded that each rifle had inherent design flaws and neither could be mass-produced.
In 1935, Johnson began work on a semiautomatic rifle design of his own, which he believed would be an improvement over both the Garand and Penderson rifles. He initially started with a retarded blowback mechanism, but soon settled on a recoil-operated mechanism. While widely used in shotguns and low-powered rifle designs, a recoil operated mechanism was a bit of a novelty for a military rifle. Johnson’s original prototype was a strange combination if miscellaneous parts that included the barrel of a M1903 rifle, a hammer from a Browning shotgun and a firing pin fashioned from a knitting needle.
In spite of its crude components, Johnson’s recoil operated rifle showed promise and a more refinanced prototype was built. This rifle was extensively tested and validated Johnson’s basic design. A light machine gun was also developed based on the same recoil operated mechanism.
By late 1937, Johnson was working in conjunction with the Marlin Firearms Company and had further refined the design. Marlin built four rifles to be used for formal governmental testing. Not much is known about these four rifles except that they were recoil operated and used a vertical feed magazine. After further design refinements, Johnson gave an informal demonstration at Fort Benning in June of 1938. This successful demonstration convinced the Army to schedule a comprehensive Ordnance Department test of the design at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in August 1938.
The Aberdeen tests compared the Johnson rifle with the newly adopted Garand. The results were generally favorable to the Johnson design, but several weak areas were pointed out. Johnson immediately began work on the changes that included the substitution of a rotary magazine instead of the vertical feed type; a bolt with eight locking lugs to improve strength and accuracy and a barrel that could be easily removed. The firm of Taft-Pierce Company manufactured seven military-style rifles as well as a number of Johnson rifles in sporting configuration. These finely finished rifles featured a detachable box magazine rather than the rotary type, however, sales were quite low due to the unusual design and the extremely high price.
The Ordnance Department tested the improved Johnson rifle in December of 1939. Over 6,000 rounds were fired through one of the test rifles with only 12 stoppages. This extensive testing revealed that the design had some excellent features and functioned satisfactory. However, some short comings were noted, these included concerns about the strength of the magazine body, the overall length of the receiver and the fact that the rifle would not function reliably with a bayonet attached. The Ordnance Department released its report on the testing on February 23, 1940 and it concluded that the Johnson rifle was not materially superior to the M-1 Garand and that no additional consideration be given to the rifle. The report stated that “…in spite of its alleged mechanical and manufacturing advantages, it did not warrant further consideration as a replacement for the M-1 rifle.”
Such a negative conclusion would have permanently closed the door on Johnson’s goal of having his rifle adopted by the United States. However, as fate would have it, at exactly the same time that the Johnson was being tested, the new M-1 was coming under a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. While the M1 had its share of teething problems during the early production that took some time to be ironed out. These early problems were brought to light when 200 M-1s were supplied to the participants at the 1939 National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio. The experienced shooters who fired the Garand quickly became aware of the problems. When the Ordnance Department representatives were questioned about them, they became uncooperative and claimed that the shooters did not know how to properly handle the rifle. Needless to say, this did not go down well with the shooters and, from the a public relations standpoint, the Ordnance Department dropped the pooch. When staff members of the National Rifle Association were refused a request to examine and test some M-1s, it was felt by many that the Army must be hiding something about its new rifle. Articles critical of the M-1 begin to appear in “American Rifleman” and other media sources. At the same time, the “American Rifleman” published several articles that cast the Johnson rifle in a very favorable light.
The Garand-Johnson Controversy reached its peak in early 1940. A Congressional committee threatened to halt funding for continued production of the M-1 unless it could be clearly shown that the weapon was satisfactory for military use. A shoot-off between the Garand and Johnson rifles was held on May 5, 1940, which was attended by a number of high ranking officials, including senators and military officers. This final test revealed that both rifles were satisfactory for military use. The Senate Appropriations Committee decided that there was no real difference between the two rifles and as the Garand was already in production, there was no need to start production of a second service rifle.
A further nail in the Johnson rifle’s coffin was a USMC trail in late 1940 where the Johnson, the Garand and a design by Winchester were tested against a control M1903. The Marines concluded that none of the semiautomatics were sufficiently superior to the ‘03 to warrant adoption. The Johnson placed second behind the Garand.
In spite of his rifle being rejected by the Marines, Johnson redoubled his efforts to interest other nations in his rifle In spite of its rejection by the Army and the Marines, the Johnson did possess some excellent design features:
1) A rotary magazine that could be loaded with the bolt closed and could be easily topped off by either single rounds or by means of the M1903’s stripper clip.
2) The barrel was easily removable, thus making the rifle very attractive for airborne operations.
3) The Johnson demonstrated excellent accuracy and strength due to the bolt’s eight locking lugs.
4) The straight line stock allowed for better control when firing since the recoil force was in a straight line, a feature later adopted by later designs.
5) The Johnson was designed to be manufactured on general production tooling in small to medium machine shops.
By early 1941, Johnson had completed further refinements to his rifle and he named the latest version the Model of 1941 Rifle. He marketed his design to several foreign governments before finally achieving a order of 70,000 rifles by the Netherlands government in late 1941. The Dutch needed these rifles to arm their troops defending the Netherlands East Indies (Java and Sumatra). The only modification that the Dutch requested was that the rear sight be graduated in meters rather than in yards.
Johnson did not possess any manufacturing equipment so he entered into an agreement with the Universal Windings Corporation. This joint venture was based in Cranston Rhode Island and incorporated as the Cranston Arms Company.
The M1941s started coming off the production lines in the summer of 1941 and were shipped to the Dutch as soon as sufficient quantities were on hand. Unfortunately, by the time that the East Indies were overrun in early 1942, only a few thousand rifles had been shipped. Roughly half of the ordered had been shipped from the factory, but not yet delivered. The Dutch government in exile stored those rifles that had been delivered in an overseas location, were they were stored until 1953 and then sold to Winfield Arms.
By this time, the United States had entered World War Two and all branches of the armed services were clamoring for modern military rifles. The USMC had changed its mind about adopting the M-1 Garand, but current production had already been allotted t the Army. The Marine Corps Equipment Board decided to purchase the Johnson rifle for issue to the newly formed First Parachute Battalion. The Para-Marines and their Johnson rifles did see action in the Solomon Islands. Overall, the Marines considered the Johnson to be a delicate weapon and it was withdrawn from service as soon as adequate numbers of M-1s were available. In addition to its use by the Marines, the Johnson was also issued to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). All told only a couple of thousand of the 70,000 Johnson rifles made during the war were used by the U.S. military. Another 1,000 rifles were re-chambered in 7mm and sold to the Chilean Navy and the Israelis made a small number ( some 2,000) of Johnson rifles for their own use.
Graebarde
01-09-2013, 12:07 PM
A very informative thread and much appreciated. It's interesting to note that the ones who use the tools in combat are usually not the ones that make all the claims it's not good or some such: ie pistols, the long bayonets, and weights of the weapons. Funny how combat changes one's thinking eh?
dragoon500ly
01-09-2013, 05:51 PM
A very informative thread and much appreciated. It's interesting to note that the ones who use the tools in combat are usually not the ones that make all the claims it's not good or some such: ie pistols, the long bayonets, and weights of the weapons. Funny how combat changes one's thinking eh?
Hmmmm, hang around the VFW and listen to the old timers debating the merits of the '03, M1 and the M14, just be prepared to duck when you mention the Mighty Mattel!!
Front line troops do tend to get a "mite" attached to their rifle!
dragoon500ly
01-12-2013, 07:42 AM
Only one U.S. military weapon rivaled the M-1 Garand in numbers produced and widespread use during World War Two. That weapon was the M-1 Carbine. It had originally been conceived and adopted as a new class of weaponry, the light rifle, and eventually was manufactured in greater numbers than any other American military firearm, including the M-1 Garand.
The carbine began its development soon after the end of the First World War when the concept of a light rifle had been explored. Wartime experience had shown that the weight and power of a full-bore military rifle was not always necessary in some combat applications. Development in the inter-war years, however, proceeded at a snail’s pace.
The success of the German Blitzkrieg in 1939-40 and its use of rapidly moving mechanized columns and vertical envelopment by airborne troops had made it apparent that the old ideas of fixed fortifications and static battle lines were outmoded. Under the doctrines of war, rear echelon troops that were essentially non-combatants could, in theory, become engaged by hostile forces at any moment. Clearly, weapons (other than the traditional pistol) were needed to arm these personnel. At the same time, it was recognized that arming these solders with service rifles, submachine guns or automatic rifles, heavy and bulky weapons, would hinder the performance of their assigned duties.
The light rifle design was re-evaluated. In addition to arming the rear echelon troops, a satisfactory light rifle could also be issued to such personnel as officers, Signal Corps troops, and crew-served weapons teams, giving them a more useful weapon than a pistol. It was also felt that a satisfactory design would not only take the place of the pistol, but would also serve as a replacement for the submachine gun.
In June of 1940, the War Department issued broad specifications to civilian and Ordnance Department designers. The new carbine was to weigh no more than five pounds, be capable of semi or full automatic fire and have an effective range of 300 yards. The War Department also required that the weapon be chambered for a new .30-caliber rimless round based on the Winchester .32-caliber Self Loading Cartridge. After several rounds of testing, on September 29, 1940, the Winchester design was declared the winner. The Ordnance Department chose to call the new weapon the Carbine, Caliber .30, M-1, the new carbine was a semiautomatic design that used a 15-round detachable box magazine.
As Winchester began to gear up for production, the War Department realized that demand for the new weapon would soon outpace Winchester’s production capacity. In order to pave the way for other companies to manufacturing carbines, the manufacturing rights were purchased for the sum of $868,000.
General Motor’s Inland Manufacturing Division was granted a contract for production on November 24, 1941. The first M-1s were delivered in August 1941 with Winchester’s first delivers occurring in October of 1941. With the entry of the U.S. into World War Two, the already high demand for the carbine increased dramatically and it was soon apparent that very large numbers of the carbine would be needed.
The War Department organized the Carbine Industry Integration Committee to coordinate production. So successful was the committee’s work that by mid-1945, 6,221,220 M-1 carbines were manufactured.
All told 10 firms were granted carbine production, only one of which was unable to successfully complete its contract. The firms involved in production represented a cross section of American industry:
(1) Winchester Repeating Firearms Company, New Haven, Connecticut. A total of 828,059 carbines were built, some 13.5% of the total production.
(2) Inland Manufacturing Division of General Motors, Dayton, Ohio. A total of 2,632,097 were built, representing some 43% of total production.
(3) Underwood-Elliot-Fisher, Hartford, Connecticut. They built a total of 545, 616 carbines, some 8.9%.
(4) Rock-Ola Manufacturing Corporation, Chicago, Illinois. They produced some 3.7% or 228,500 carbines.
(5) Quality Hardware Machinery Corporation, Chicago, Illinois. They produced some 359,666 carbines, 5.9% of the total.
(6) National Postal Meter, Rochester, New York. A total of 413,017 were built, some 6.8% of the total.
(7) Irwin-Pederson Arms Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan. The only contractor unable to complete their deliveries, delivering only some 1,000 M-1s, less than 0.01% of the total.
(8) Standard Products, Port Clinton, Ohio. Representing roughly 4% of the total, this company built 247,100 carbines.
(9) International Business Machines, Poughkeepsie, New York. IBM turned out 5.7%, 346,500 carbines.
(10) Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors, Saginaw and Grand Rapids, Michigan. They took over the Irwin-Pederson contract and built some 517,212 carbines, about 8.5% of the total.
So how good was the M-1 Carbine? No less a personage than the legendary Lieutenant Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller stated…”I considered it to be an excellent combat weapon and can see no need for retaining submachine guns and pistols in combat units if they were armed with M-1 rifles and M-1 Carbines.”
The carbine was considered to a light, handy, powerful, and reasonably accurate weapon. In certain situations it was considered to be a superior weapon than the M-1 rifle.
It seems that among World War Two veterans, even those who used the weapon in actual combat situations, there was little middle ground regarding their opinion; they either loved it or hated it.
While the carbine’s critics certainly had legitimate complaints regarding its relative lack of power, range and accuracy; it should be pointed out that Carbine was never intended to replace the rifle. It was always intended to replace the pistol, and in that role, it was a superlative weapon.
The only variants of the M-1 Carbine was the M-1A1, a folding stock variant intended for use by airborne troops. Some 140,591 were built during World War II by the Inland Manufacturing Division of General Motors. It was used in virtually every U.S. airborne operation of the war.
During the war, several issues were identified. The initial rear sight was a simple L-type flip sight that were set for 150 and 300 yards, it had no windage adjustment. This was replaced in 1943 with an adjustable rear sight. The push button magazine release was often mistaken for the safety, this was replaced by a rotary safety. There was no provision for mounting a bayonet. A wider front band assembly was designed and the M-4 Bayonet-Knife was adopted, but this was not issued until 1944-45.
In 1945, a selective fire version of the M-1 was designed. The Carbine, Caliber .30, M-2 featured the bayonet lug and a new 30-round magazine, but was not available in time to see combat. The M-2 saw service in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
The final version of the M-1 Carbine was the T3 Carbine which limited service in the Pacific in 1945. This featured a modified receiver fitted with an infrared night vision scope.
dragoon500ly
01-12-2013, 06:24 PM
Not all of the combat weapons employed during World War Two were made in such large quantities like the M-1 Rifle and the M-1 Carbine. Another much less known, but equally interesting weapon is the combat shotgun. The role of the shotgun in WWII is not widely known, for instance, many veterans of the ETO seldom encountered shotguns, while veterans of the Pacific were well aware of the shotgun’s role in the war and its value in many combat situations.
The American use of shotguns in a military application is as old as the history of the United States. During the Revolutionary War, multiple buck and ball loads were commonly used in the smooth-bore muskets of the day. Shotguns were used in the Seminole Wars, and the War with Mexico. During the Civil War, the double-barrel shotgun was widely used by both sides. During the Indian Wars, many troopers carried their trusted shotguns into battle.
While many shotguns found their way into combat, they were never officially adopted and all were privately procured. This was the situation when the United States became entangled in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War of 1898. The standard issue Krag rifle and the .38 Colt revolver were found to be lacking in stopping power. The shotgun was seen as an ideal weapon and the government purchased a quantity of the new Winchester Model 1897 repeating slide action shotgun, which immediately proved their value.
When the United States entered World War One, the Army found itself fighting a bloody, stalemated trench war. The War Department determined that a specialized weapon was necessary for the fighting and a combat version of the shotgun was developed that was capable of mounting a bayonet.
The Winchester Model 1897 shotgun was selected as the basis for the new weapon. It was modified by the addition of a ventilated metal hand guard and a bayonet adapter that was capable of being used with the M1917 Enfield bayonet. The new weapons was then adopted as the Trench Gun, Model of 1917.
Winchester delivered 20,000 trench guns to the Army during the First World War. Several thousand more were purchased from sporting good wholesalers and converted at government arsenals. To supplement the Winchester contract, the government also purchased Remington Model 10 shotguns.
The German reaction against the trench gun was very strong. The German government announced that the use of the shotgun was banned under the rules of international warfare and threatened to execute any American captured with such a weapon, or even the ammunition, in his possession. The American government quickly responded with a firm promise of very strong and swift retaliation, and the matter was dropped with the exception of some propaganda outbursts.
In addition to the trench guns, the government also acquired riot guns for the issue of prison camp guards as well as long barrel shotguns, used to train aircrew in trap shooting (and teaching the fundamentals of leading a target).
In the inter-war years, the trench guns continued to provide service in the various “Banana Wars“, China and other hot spots around the world.
In 1940, a survey of the shotguns in the U.S. arsenal showed only 21,187 shotguns on hand, many of these were the long-barreled shotguns used for training airmen. Most of the trench guns were quite well worn and replacements were needed. Since Remington had stopped production of the Model 10 several years earlier, only the Winchester Model 97 was available in any appreciable numbers.
On August 7, 1941, the Ordnance Department ordered the following shotguns as standardized for combat and training: Winchester Model 97; Winchester Model 12; Ithaca Model 37; Remington Model 31A and the Savage M620. The Army specified that the shotguns were to have 20-inch barrels and be fitted with ventilated hand guards and a bayonet attachment. In addition to the new production trench guns, a variety of riot guns were ordered, again for MP and prison guard use.
During the Second World War, the standard 12-gauge shotgun sun was made of cardboard. These suffered from moisture problems which caused the cardboard to swell and not chamber in the shotguns. In late 1944, the decision was made to order all-brass shotgun shells, but these did not arrive in the PTO until the end of the war.
Adm.Lee
01-12-2013, 11:51 PM
It seems that among World War Two veterans, even those who used the weapon in actual combat situations, there was little middle ground regarding their opinion; they either loved it or hated it.
I've heard that, too. Does anyone have any similar info on the M2 carbine? I never heard much about that one, and it seemed like a neat weapon to me, sort of a proto-assault rifle. The v2.2 stats aren't too bad. I think if I had a Merc character, I'd see about arming with one.
dragoon500ly
01-13-2013, 09:12 AM
I've heard that, too. Does anyone have any similar info on the M2 carbine? I never heard much about that one, and it seemed like a neat weapon to me, sort of a proto-assault rifle. The v2.2 stats aren't too bad. I think if I had a Merc character, I'd see about arming with one.
The M-2 really earned its reputation in the Korean War, both the CCA and the NKPA used large numbers of Soviet SMGs and in short range fights, were able to overwhelm the Garand. The M-2 had the advantage of a more powerful cartridge and greater range than the SMGs. It is estimated that by the middle of the Korean War, roughly half of U.S. infantrymen were carrying M-2s.
During the Vietnam War it was widely issued to the SVNA, who preferred over the Garand, the light-built SVN soldiers were better able to handle its recoil than a full-fledged .30-06.
Adm.Lee
01-13-2013, 07:19 PM
The M-2 really earned its reputation in the Korean War, both the CCA and the NKPA used large numbers of Soviet SMGs and in short range fights, were able to overwhelm the Garand. The M-2 had the advantage of a more powerful cartridge and greater range than the SMGs. It is estimated that by the middle of the Korean War, roughly half of U.S. infantrymen were carrying M-2s.
During the Vietnam War it was widely issued to the SVNA, who preferred over the Garand, the light-built SVN soldiers were better able to handle its recoil than a full-fledged .30-06.
I knew it was used in Korea and early in the VN War, but it hasn't seemed "famous" to me from there, so to speak.
At least until the AR-15/M-16 came along, it seems. I can't recall right now, was the M-2 at all considered as a competitor to the Stoner designs when they came along? Seems to me it was dropped PDQ rom the US arsenal when the M-14 came along?
FWIW, I now remember the M-2 was one of the weapons in the arsenal of my brother's 12" GIJoe back in the '70s, I can remember the bigger magazine. Mine had a white-stock M-1 Garand.
Legbreaker
01-13-2013, 10:18 PM
This is an interesting site with this page specifically dealing with the M1 carbine and variants in service: http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/m1carbin.htm
dragoon500ly
01-19-2013, 09:01 AM
Of all the weapons of World War Two, the most iconic is the legendary Thompson submachine gun. The brainchild of a distinguished Ordnance Department officer, who retired in 1915, John Taliaferro Thompson was also a key player in the development of two other legendary American weapons, the M-1903 Springfield rifle and the M-1911 pistol. He was recalled to active duty in 1917 and named as Director of Arsenals and charged with supervising small arms production. The results of Thompson’s work was very impressive and he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. He was released from active duty in December of 1918.
After his retirement, Thompson remained interested in the development of improved military weaponry. He designed a semiautomatic rifle that was ultimately passed over in favor of the M-1 Garand.
Thompson was also very interested in the concept of a “trench broom” (as he called it), which would be ideal for close-quarter combat. He recognized that the .45 ACP cartridge (which he had been instrumental in having adopted in 1911) would be ideal for such a weapon.
While working on his semiautomatic rifle design, Thompson had become enamored with a locking mechanism developed by a U.S. Navy officer, John B. Blish. The Blish principle utilized a sliding wedge as a locking device. Thompson chose to adopt the Blish locking mechanism for his trench broom gun, which he eventually renamed a submachine gun.
With Thompson’s reputation, it was not difficult for him to obtain financial backing for his new gun. He was able to assemble a talented team of designers and began to work in earnest. In 1919, the new firm of Auto-Ordnance was at the fore-front in the development of a American submachine gun.
The prototype weapon was tested by the government on April 27,1920; the Springfield Armory ran the weapon through a variety of tests, most impressive was a string of 2,000 rounds being fired, with only one stoppage. The Army test was quickly followed by a Marine test with equally impressive results. The new weapon was given a public showing at the National Matches in August of 1920 and impressed the crowed to no end.
The new weapon was given the designation “Thompson Submachine Gun, Model of 1921”. While the Army and the Marines tested the weapon, the weapon was not adopted due to budgetary reasons. Auto-Ordnance demonstrated the weapon to several foreign governments, who were all impressed by the weapon, but orders were not forthcoming. The company then switched to commercial sales, where it had better luck, although sales were never very high. The Thompson eventually gained a reputation as a gangster weapon due to its widely publicized use in the hands of the notorious criminals of the era. Sales to law enforcement agencies increased as many municipalities, as well as the FBI, who felt obliged to obtain Thompsons so as not to be outgunned by the crooks.
The Marine Corps also obtained several hundred M1921s for use in Nicaragua, where the weapon proved quite valuable in jungle fighting. A number of Thompsons were also obtained for the use of Marines guarding the mail during a rash of armed robberies. The Navy also obtained M1921s and issued them for use on some of its vessels, particularly the Yangtze River gunboats patrolling Chinese waters.
In 1928, the Navy decided to official adopt the Thompson, but asked for several modifications. The Navy wanted a lower rate of fire than the M1921
(600rpm vs. 800rpm), a horizontal foregrip replacing the vertical handgrip and a Cutts compensator. This feature had been available by special order since 1926. It helped to hold down the muzzle during firing by deflecting the muzzle blast upwards. With these changes, the “U.S. Navy, Model of 1928” was adopted. An order for 500 was placed with Auto-Ordnance which, with the previous 340 M1921s were sufficient for Navy and Marine needs for the current time.
By the late 1920s, the Army was in the process of acquiring mechanized vehicles such as tanks and scout cars to reequip the Cavalry. It was recognized that the Thompson would be ideal for use in such vehicles and in March of 1932, the Army standardized the weapon as “Non-Essential Limited Procurement”. In September of 1938, the Thompson was changed from Limited Procurement to Standard and received the designation of Submachine Gun, Caliber .45, Model of 1928A1.”
The M1921, M1928 and M1928A1 all used either 20-round box magazines or a 50-round drum magazine. A very heavy and cumbersome 100-round drum magazine was available as a commercial product, but none were ever procured by the government.
In June of 1939, the Army placed an order for 950 Thompsons, Auto-Ordnance licensed this contract to the Savage Arms Company while they purchased a old brake-lining factory in Bridgeport, Connecticut and renovated it as a arms making facility, in anticipation of increased orders. By late 1940, the demand for Thompsons had skyrocketed. In 1940 alone, the Army placed orders for 20,405 additional M1928A1s and in early 1941, orders topped 319,000 weapons. Many of these initial weapons were intended for Lend-Lease as the Army was slow to purchase Thompsons for their own use, since it was felt that the new M-1 Carbine would replace the submachine gun. After Pearl Harbor, however, it was decided that both weapons were needed and by February 1942, some 500,000 M1928A1 Thompsons had been produced.
The Thompson submachine gun had acquired the nickname “Tommy Gun” early in its life and the name stuck with the weapon. Auto-Ordnance recognized the value of the name and soon patented it. Thompsons were referred to as Tommy Guns both in and out of military service and the term is almost generic for all submachine guns.
The Thompson had the great advantage of being the only submachine gun in mass production in any of the allied nations during the early days of World War Two. It quickly earned a reputation was a reliable, hard-hitting weapon; but faced with an ever-increasing demand, Auto-Ordnance searched for ways to simplify the Thompson and increase its rate of production. The first candidate for redesign was the finely made, fully-adjustable Lyman rear sight. This required a great deal of machining time was quite expensive. Realistically, the sight was superfluous and overly complicated for use on a short-ranged weapon. In December of 1941, it was replaced by a simple stamped sheet metal peep sight that was not capable of adjustment. This change speeded up production and reduced the cost of the weapon, but did not materially effect the usefulness of the Thompson.
Another feature that was changed was the deletion of the barrel cooling fins. These were finely finished on the commercial Thompsons but as military production continued, the fins were first squared-off and then eliminated altogether. Again, this had little impact on the gun’s performance further reduced the cost and speeded up production.
Another shortcut was the elimination of the checking on the safety and fire selectors levers. These were replaced by simple stick-type levers. While not as easy to manipulate as the early levers, once again, it eliminated machining time and further reduced costs.
The M1928A1 Thompson was manufactured in greater numbers than any other variant with some 562,511 being produced between 1940 and 1943. Of these, some 300,000 were supplied to allied nations via Lend-Lease.
Even with these modifications, the basic mechanism remained unchanged from the M1921. In order to make a significant impact on manufacturing time and cost, all aspects of the weapon had to be re-evaluated. The Savage engineering team proposed a radical redesign that centered around the elimination of the Blish locking device. The Blish lock had always been considered to be of dubious value and required a great deal of manufacturing time. Savage proposed a simple straight blowback system that worked quite well in tests. In spite of initial resistance by Auto-Ordnance, the advantages of the blowback design were to great to overlook and a prototype was tested in early 1942. The new design functioned every bit as well as the M1928A1 and had the advantages of being cheaper and taking less manufacturing time. The Submachine Gun, Caliber .45, M-1 was adopted in April of 1942.
The M-1 had several changes: it a straight blowback design. The cocking handle was moved from the top of the receiver to the right side. The Cutts Compensator was eliminated. The removable buttstock of the M1928A1 was replaced by a permanently attached stock. The ability to use the 50-round drum was eliminated, only box magazines could be used.
The M-1 Thompson was placed into production as soon as the M1928A1 contracts ended. It was produced in the lowest numbers of any of the variants, with some 285,480 being made from early 1942 to early 1943.
The M-1 Thompson was further simplified by the substitution of a fixed firing pin on the face of the bolt rather than the separate hammer used with the M1928 and M1 models. This was adopted as the Submachine Gun, Caliber .45, M-1A1 in October of 1942. A major change was the introduction of stamped metal guard “ears” on either side the of stamped rear sight to protect it from damage.
Almost twice as many M-1A1s were produced with some 539,,142 being built by the time production stopped in 1944. In addition, a number of M-1s were converted into M-1A1s at ordnance depots and arsenals.
The elimination of all of these features had no real impact on the performance of the Thompson. Likewise the fact that the simplified Thompsons could not use the 50-round drum magazine had no real impact. In spite of its capacity, the drum magazine was considered to be awkward, heavy and prone to rattle, all undesirable traits in a combat weapon. In order to compensate for the loss of the drum’s firepower, a 30-round box magazine was issued and this could be used with all models of the Thompson.
The Thompson was a reliable weapon, able to function surprisingly well even when quite dirty. At close range, the .45 ACP round was a proven man-stopper and the rapid rate of fire, which could make control difficult, could place a lot of lead on target when necessary.
In spite of its overall good reputation, there were a number of problems. At 10 pounds, the Thompson was heavier than the M-1 Garand. Its pistol-caliber round resulted in a short effective range. But perhaps the most serious drawback was its lack of penetrating power. The .45 ACP round simply would not penetrate trees, roots and the sides of dugouts to anywhere near the degree that the .30-06 round could, this was vital in jungle warfare.
Just how good was the Thompson? Even though the Thompson was replaced by the M-3 and M-3A1 submachine guns following World War II, many soldiers carried it throughout the Korean War as well as the Vietnam War. Sixty years after the end of World War Two, many veterans consider the Thompson as one of the best weapons of the war. As one GI stated “My Thompson never let me down, it saved my life more than once.” No better praise can be given to any military weapon.
dragoon500ly
01-20-2013, 08:05 AM
In February of 1941, even while plans were underway to increase production of the Thompson submachine gun, the Ordnance Department began a search for a new submachine gun. Twenty foreign and domestic designs were tested at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Surprisingly, the highest rated foreign submachine gun was the British Sten. Indeed, the Sten scored higher than the Thompson in such areas as simplicity, accuracy, weight and reliability. In addition, the Sten also had the very large advantage of being cheaper and faster to produce than the Thompson.
The highest rated domestic design was submitted by George J. Hyde. The Hyde gun was not as easy to produce as the Sten but required markedly less production time and cost than the Thompson. Since the Hyde gun showed some promise, the Ordnance Department negotiated a contract with General Motor’s Inland Manufacturing Division to work with Hyde in refining the design. After several prototypes were completed, in April of 1942, the Hyde gun was adopted as the “U.S. Submachine Gun, Caliber .45, M-2” and was given the designation of Substitute Standard. Since GM was heavily involved in production of the M-1 carbine, the firm could not start production of the M-2. In July of 1942, a contract was awarded to the Marlin Firearms Company. However, due to a combination of problems including difficulties in acquiring the necessary raw materials and some inherent design bugs, the M-2 never made it into production and the project was scrapped in early 1943.
dragoon500ly
01-23-2013, 06:03 PM
When it became apparent that the M-2 design would not work out, the Ordnance Department began a search for a replacement design. After extensive study of the British Sten, the Ordnance Department announced a program in October of 1942 for “an all-metal gun, fabricated as far as possible from stamped parts to permit speed and economy of production and to require a minimum of machine operations and use little or no critical metals…A full automatic weapon with a low cyclic rate.”
George Hyde submitted a totally different design that met all of the above parameters. The new gun would be lighter and more compact than the Thompson and would be constructed of chiefly of stamped metal, thus overcoming the raw materials problem encountered with the ill-fated M-2. The new gun could be made for $20.00, a fraction of the cost of even the simplified M-1/M-1A1 Thompson, and it required less manufacturing time. The new design was even more reliable than the Sten. Since it was an unusual and crude appearing weapon, especially when compared to the Thompson, the gun managed to offend the sensibilities of traditional-minded military personal. With this in mind, the Ordnance Department stated the obvious when it summed up the gun’s test report “…in modern warfare, there are other criteria than mere appearance.”
The new submachine gun was formally adopted on December 24, 1942 as the “Submachine Gun, Caliber .45, M-3”, only two months after the initial design was submitted. General Motor’s Guide Lamp Division, which had extensive experience in metal stamping fabrication, was selected to manufacture the new submachine gun and production was underway by the summer of 1943.
The M-3 had a number of excellent features in addition to its ease of manufacture. The low cyclical rate of 400rpm made the gun easier to control. The weapon’s straight line of recoil also aided in controlling the weapon in automatic fire. A ejection port cover helped keep out a great deal of dirt and mud and the gun’s general loose tolerances allowed for operation, even when the weapon was dirty. All in all, the M-3 was more reliable than the Thompson under adverse conditions.
The new weapon was only issued with a 30-round box magazine. The M-3 was only capable of automatic fire; however, with its slow rate of fire, an experienced user could squeeze off single shots without much trouble.
In the latter part of 1943, the M-3 began to be issued to the troops, its reception was not enthusiastic. The gun looked peculiar when compared to traditional and well-machined weapons, such as the Thompson. The M-3 earned many nicknames, but the most common one was the “grease gun”, given the weapon’s uncanny similarity to the mechanic’s lubricating tool of the day. The M-3 was produced in fairly large numbers with some 605,664 being built between 1943-1945. All were made by Guide Lamp.
In spite of the M3’s good traits, there were a number of problems. It had poor balance which made it awkward to an inexperienced user. The magazine proved to temperamental and was not as reliable as the Thompson’s magazine. In February of 1944, changes were made to correct several issues. These included a reinforced rear sight, a strengthened magazine catch, a higher grade of metal for the locking lever and a redesigned bolt retracting lever.
While these changes helped, in April of 1944, a program was initiated to design additional modifications aimed at further increasing the weapon’s utility and ease of manufacture, these included:
1) The ejection port was enlarged.
2) Since the retracting handle had proven to be troublesome, it was eliminated and a finger hole added to the bolt which allowed the bolt to be pulled back to the cocked position.
3) Disassembly grooves were added to the barrel to assist in removal.
4) The cover spring was made stronger.
5) The wire buttstock was redesigned to allow it to be used as a barrel removal wrench and as a magazine filler.
6) The grip contained an oil can with a larger capacity.
7) A guard was added to the magazine release catch to prevent accidental release of the magazine.
The changes were significant enough to require a designation change. The newly modified weapon was adopted in December of 1944 as the “Submachine Gun, Caliber .45, M-3A1.” and was classified as Standard. The M-3 was reclassified as Limited Standard in April of 1945. Few M-3A2s were produced during World War Two, with only some 15,469 being built by 1945.
When the M-3 was first issued, the GI viewpoint of the weapon was negative. But as the soldiers gained combat experience with it, their viewpoint changed. The M-3 proved to be at least as reliable as a Thompson and had the advantage of being lighter and more accurate when fired. With the end of World War Two, the Thompson was withdrawn from service, while the M-3 soldiered on well into the 1990s…not a bad record for weapon that hasn’t been manufactured for over 40 years!
dragoon500ly
01-23-2013, 07:40 PM
World War One was the first conflict in which automatic weapons played a major role. The heavy toll that machine guns had on both sides forces a revision in tactical thinking and improved weaponry to counter this new threat.
While the unwieldy, crew-served heavy machine guns of the day were brutally effective in fixed, defensive positions, there was also a need for an automatic support weapon that was light enough to be carried and operated by one man. Such a weapon would dramatically increase the firepower of an infantry squad. So desperate was the need for such a weapon that engineers on both sides labored to come up with suitable designs.
When the U.S. entered the war, so severe was the lack of modern weapons that the U.S. Army had to adopt many French designs. One of these was the French “Fusil Mitrailleur Modele 1915”, more widely known as the Chauchat. This automatic rifle was used extensively by both the French and Americans and while it filled the role of an automatic rifle, it was a poorly designed, and even more poorly constructed weapon that earned one of the worst reputations of any military weapon of the 20th Century.
Clearly, a better designed weapon was sorely needed.
Legendary gun inventor John Moses Browning stepped up to the task. He had conceived a automatic rifle design several years prior to World War One, but he had not fully developed the concept into a working model. With the U.S. entry into the war, Browning resumed work on his automatic rifle and he had a hand-built prototype ready less than a month after the U.S. declaration of war. In May, 1917, the War Department created a board to test several automatic rifle designs. Browning’s design was the clear winner, and it was adopted and rushed into series production. While Colt had developed the design, so back logged were they that the could produce the rifle. In World War One, the Winchester Repeating Arms Company and the Marlin-Rockwell Corporation were the prime contractors for the new automatic rifle.
Adopted as the “Browning Machine Rifle, Model of 1918”, the new rifle entered production in December of 1917. Soon after it entered service it was soon widely known as the Browning Automatic Rifle or even more simply, as the BAR.
The M1918 BAR was a beautifully crafted weapon with a massive receiver machined from a solid steel bar. It was finished in commercial grade blue and had a good quality walnut stock. It was capable of both semi- and fully-automatic operation and it could fire at the rate of 500 rounds per minute. It weighed only 16 pounds, it was chambered for the powerful .30-06 cartridge and used a 20-round box magazine.
The initial “role” for the BAR was to deliver “marching fire” to keep enemy soldiers suppressed as our infantry advanced across No Man’s Land. BARs saw their first combat action in July of 1918 and it gained immediate popularity with the Doughboys. As soon as the British and French saw the new weapon, Washington was deluged with requests for the BAR to be sold to the allies. These requests were denied until our troops had been fully equipped. Sufficient numbers (43,368) of the BAR did not become available until November of 1918.
After World War One, the BAR was adopted as the armed forces standard automatic rifle where it served around the globe in the various hot spots of the inter-war years; where it cemented its already formidable reputation. In 1922, the Army developed a lightweight version as the Model of 1922, intended for use by the cavalry. Only a few hundred were ever built and the M1922 was removed from service before several years before the Second World War.
In June of 1937, the M-1918A1 entered service, this was a modification of the basic M-1918. These consisted of a folding bipod along with a hinged butt plate to assist in keeping the weapon on the shoulder when fired. The M1918A1 was capable of selective fire like the M1918. The weight was increased to 18.5 pounds. No M1918A1 BARs were manufactured, being converted from existing stocks of the M1918, the exact numbers modified are unknown but is believed to not have very large.
The final mass produced version of the BAR was the M-1918A2 which was adopted in 1940. It was similar to the existing M1918/M1918A1 with the following modifications;
1) A folding bipod, adjustable for height with skid-type feet was mounted on a new flash hider. The M1918 did not have a bipod, while the M1918A1 had spiked feet and was mounted on the gas cylinder.
2) A removable monopod butt rest was added when first adopted, although this feature was soon dropped from use.
3) The M1917 Enfield sight used on the M1918/M1918A1 was replaced by a new sight, very similar to that used on the M-1919A4 machine gun.
4) The fore-end was cut down in height in order to expose more of the barrel surface as an aid in cooling and to help prevent charring of the wood in sustained fire.
5) Guide ribs were added in front of the magazine well to assist with the insertion of magazines
6) A folding butt plate assembly similar to the M1918A1 was utilized.
7) The M1918A2 was not selective fire, with the adoption of the M-1 Garand, it was no longer felt that the semi-automatic feature was needed. It was replaced with a selector that allowed a slow rate of fire (300-450rpm) and a high rate of fire (500-650rpm).
These improvements raised the weight of the M1918A2 to 20 pounds.
The first M1918A2s were modified from M1918 BARs, a total of 181,380 M1918s (virtually the entire World War One and inter-war production) were converted by 1943. So great was the need for the M1918A2, that International Business Machines (OBM) and New England Small Arms were awarded contracts. During the period 1941-1945, some 208,380 M1918A2s were delivered to the government.
With the pressure of increased demand, the Ordnance Department soon was seeking means to speed up production. Lower grades of steel and other manufacturing shortcuts were tried out. The original fore-end was replaced with a shorter one. The monopod butt rest was dropped. A plastic buttstock was substituted for the walnut stock. Later in the war, a carrying handle was mounted on the barrel to assist in carrying the BAR. But as soon as the BAR reached the hands of the troops, and the troops entered combat, many of these features soon found themselves “damaged in combat” or “combat-lost” as the troops stripped the BAR back into its original 1918 version.
Originally, the TO&E for an infantry squad called for one BAR to provide the squad with automatic fire support. As the war progressed, many infantry squads obtained additional BARs by every possible means. By the end of the war, there were reports of squads with as many as 4-5 BARs.
The popularity of the BAR was due to several reasons. The main reason was that the .30-06 round has superior power and penetrating ability than the .45 caliber round of the submachine gun. The BAR combined firepower with reasonable portability and good accuracy. It complemented the M-1 Garand.
The BAR was not a perfect weapon. It did not have a quick-change barrel, which led to problems with overheating in the sustained fire role. Its 20 pound weight was hated. The limited capacity of the 20-round magazine was disliked, but its placement under the receiver prevented a larger capacity magazine from being used.
The Ordnance Department was well aware of the BARs shortcomings and there were several attempts to design a replacement. One of the first was a plan to produce the British Bren light machine gun in the
.30-06 caliber, testing did not reveal a sufficient improvement to warrant the replacement of the BAR. The second was a plan to produce the German MG-42 in .30-06. While being several pounds heavier than the BAR, the MG-42 had many desirable qualities, utilizing a belt-feed and featuring a quick-change barrel. It is a little known fact that during World War Two, the Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors actually hand-built two prototypes of the MG-42, chambered in .30-06. Both weapons were tested but were unsatisfactory and the project was dropped. It was later discovered that the project engineers had not allowed for the difference in the sizes of the German 7.92mm round and the American .30-caliber. In any event, many features of the MG-42 were utilized on the BAR’s successor. The M-60 machine gun.
The M1918A2 BAR soldered on throughout World War Two and into the Korean War. It was retained in U.S. service until 1957 and the weapon saw service during the Vietnam War. The Browning Automatic Rifle’s reputation as a classic American combat weapon is secure.
dragoon500ly
02-03-2013, 08:37 AM
The only other weapon similar to the BAR that was fielded in World War Two by the U.S. Army was the Model of 1941 Johnson Light Machine Gun. In spite of its name, the design was technically classified as an automatic rifle. Invented by Melvin M. Johnson ,designer of the Model of 1941 Johnson Rifle. Like the rifle, the Johnson Light Machine Gun shared many similarities, it was even produced by the same firm---Cranston Arms Company.
Like the Johnson Rifle, the Johnson LMG utilized the same short-recoil operation and the receivers and other features were vary similar. The LMG was capable of semiautomatic operation as well as full automatic (rate of fire could be varied from 300-900 rpm). In order to decrease muzzle rise, the gun was designed to have a straight line recoil thrust that necessitated a high front sight. The rear sight was capable of fine adjustments and could be folded down when not in use. A bipod was fitted that could also be folded back when necessary.
In addition to its novel recoil operated mechanism, the M1941 LMG had several innovative and useful design features. It weighed (without magazine) only 12.3 pounds. The weapon fed from a 20-round detachable box magazine that was inserted into the left side of the receiver. Additional rounds could be added from the right side of the receiver, either by single rounds or via the five-round ‘03 stripper clip, without removing the magazine. This enabled several rounds to be inserted while keeping the balance of the magazine in reserve. Another valuable feature was the fact that the feed lips that guided the cartridges into the chamber were an integral part of the receiver. Since the feed lips were machined from solid metal, they were not subject to deformation and subsequent misfeeding as were other conventional detachable box magazines.
Another interesting feature was its ability to fire in the semiautomatic mode from a closed bolt and in the fully automatic mode from an open bolt. This gave the advantage of increased accuracy when firing semiautomatic but allowed the cooling effects of open bolt operation to prevent “cook offs” from an overheated chamber when firing full automatic.
Like the M1941 Rifle, the M1941 LMG’s barrel could be quickly and easily removed. This eliminated one of the BAR’s major liabilities of a permanently attached barrel. With the M1941, extra barrels could be carried, which allowed the weapon to have a greatly increased sustained fire capability when compared to the BAR.
Like the M1941 Rifle, orders of the LMG were mostly placed by the Netherlands government, but, as the case with the Johnston Rifle, few were delivered prior to the capture of the Dutch East Indies. The balance of the order was embargoed in order to keep them out of the hands of the Japanese.
The Ordnance Department tested five M1941 LMGs in August of 1942, but no recommendations for their adoption was forthcoming. Since the Marines were unable to get sufficient BARs for their use, conducted a series of tests of the M1941 LMG which led to the procurement of a number that were issued to the Para-Marines and Raiders. Following this, the Marine TO&E of 1942, called for 87 Johnson Light Machine Guns to be issued. By most accounts, the M1941 LMG was generally popular with the Marines who used them.
In addition to its use with the USMC, the Johnson LMG was also issued to the Army’s First Special Service Force. The FSSF had airborne operations as part of its training and the Johnson LMG attracted attention due to its ability to be dissembled into a small package (it has been reported that the FSSF was able to trade a quantity of the new RS explosive compound to the USMC in exchange for 147 M1941 LMGs).
The FSSF is the only Army unit known to have used the Johnson LMG, although it has been reported (without any written confirmation) that the Army Ranger battalions may have also used the weapon. By all reports, the M1941 LMG was well liked by its users.
During the Second World War, some 10,000 M1941 Johnson LMGs were manufactured, all by the Cranston Arms Company, with only a few hundred ever being issued to Army and Marine units.
In spite of its popularity with many of its users, not everyone was enamored with the Johnson LMG. Among the many issues was the lack of a suitable means to carry the Johnson’s 20-round curved magazine. Since the Johnson was a non-standard weapon, such accoutrements as magazine belts were not procured. In addition the side mounted magazine’s tendency to unbalance the weapon by placing more weight on the left side. The high front sight also came in for criticism due to its snagging on vines and undergrowth when moving through the jungle.
There was no formal evaluation of the durability of the Johnson LMG during World War II. But there are reports that the LMG was a bit too fragile and delicate for extended military use. The long unsupported barrel and some internal components were not durable enough for the rigors of combat. There were also reports of the weapon jamming during extended periods of firing.
An improved version of the M1941 LMG was designed to eliminate some of the defects of these defects. The improved weapon was tested at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in December of 1943 and it was revealed that functioning was “generally very satisfactory under normal conditions, but unsatisfactory under adverse conditions of mud, cold and dust…”
Further development led to the M1944 Johnson LMG which was thoroughly tested by the Marine Corps Equipment Board, who recommended it for adoption as a replacement for the BAR. This was rejected by the Commandant in July of 1944 as it was felt that the height of a war was not the time to “change horses in the middle of a stream”. It was also noted by the Commandant that “the Marine Corps was a customer of the Ordnance Corps in small arms matters, and consequently is reluctant to adopt an automatic rifle which is not Army standard.” However, the Marines did not close the door on the M1944 LMG, stating “the Corps desires to lend impetus to the continued development of the Johnson Light Machine Gun, and stands ready to perform such functions in that connection as may be considered desirable.”
The Army placed an order for ten M1944 LMGs for testing, these weapons were not delivered until June 1945 and the war ended before any extensive evaluation could be conducted.
Further development work was ultimately ended in the post-war glut of surplus weapons. By the late 1940s, Johnson dropped any further development of his machine gun.
dragoon500ly
02-12-2013, 07:48 AM
The first machine gun in U.S. Army service was the mechanical, multi-barreled Gatling Gun which was issued in 1-inch, .50-caliber and .45-70 calibers. Never purchased in large numbers, these weapons served in the latter part of the Indian wars and during the Spanish-American War.
The first true machine gun to see service was the M-1895 Colt machine gun, more commonly known as the “Potato Digger” due to the unusual action of its gas return lever. These first saw service in the Boxer Rebellion and later the Spanish-American War. Originally, these were chambered for the 6mm, then the
.30-40 Krag round and, later, the .30-06 round. The M1895 was never officially adopted by the Army, instead being used as “test” weapons.
In 1904, the Army adopted the Maxim machine gun as the M-1904. In the pre-World War One years, some 300 were delivered, followed by another 12,000 during World War One. But in World War One, the need for machine guns so far outpaced production, that the U.S. Army had to purchase several thousand machine guns from the French for use by the AEF.
Enter John M. Browning.
Browning recognized in 1901, that there was a need for a truly modern, American machine gun. He did initial work on a recoil operated weapon, but his design was never fully developed. The Ordnance Department tested his design in 1917 and found it to be an outstanding design. It was adopted as the M-1917 machine gun. The firms of Remington, Colt and New England Westinghouse built some 68,389 during World War One, with some 30,582 serving in France.
The M-1917, like most of Browning’s designs was noted for its simplicity and reliability. Compared to its contemporaries, the Browning was very easy to disassemble with only a simple combination tool. This feature impressed the ordnance officers at the weapons test. There is a little known story that goes;
“One of the guns at the trails was accompanied by a formidable kit of tools in a box. An officer asked Mr. Browning where the tools for the Browning gun were and where did he want them put. Mr. Browning smiled a sad sort of smile and reached into his vest pocket and pulled out a device the size of a fountain pen. With this device and an empty shell, he dismounted the Browning gun and put them back together again.”
With the end of World War One, the Army evaluated the M-1917 and suggested some improvements to correct weaknesses in the design.. The M-1917A1 was adopted in 1920. Nearly all of the 68,000 WWI M-1917s were modified to the M-1917A1 standard. Many of these modified weapons saw service with the British in the early days of World War Two.
The M-1917A1 .30-caliber water-cooled machine gun was designated as a heavy machine gun. The gun (with water) weighed in at 41 pounds, while its tripod added another 52.15 pounds, all told it weighed a hefty 93 pounds in its firing position, NOT including water cans, ammunition boxes and other accessories. The typical method of feed was by a 250-round fabric belt, this was latter replaced after WWII by a disintegrating link belt. Rate of fire was between 450-600 rounds per minute.
In spite of its weight and bulk, the M-1917A1 was widely used in all theaters. Its performance was outstanding and it proved to be one of the most reliable weapons of its type ever fielded.
Its sustained fire capability was impressive due to its water-cooled system. On numerous occasions, the
M-1917A1 delivered sustained fire lasting for hours. It was the workhorse of the Army’s and Marines through out WWII and into the Korea War.
However, the M-1917A1 was not with its faults. The heavy weight of the weapon restricted it to fixed, defensive positions. It could not be rapidly deployed forward to support fast-moving infantry assaults, this restricted its use in the miserable terrain of the Pacific Theater. Although it saw much more service in the European Theater due to the scale of vehicular mobility.
During World War II, some 53,859 M-1917A1s were built.
Neal5x5
02-12-2013, 05:19 PM
If you ever happen to pass through Ogden, Utah, (along US I-80) take the time to visit the John Browning Museum. They have a replica of Browning's workshop, as well as a fantastic assortment of original firearms and prototypes in various stages of assembly. For a gun enthusiast, it's just a shade below visiting Mecca.:)
dragoon500ly
02-19-2013, 08:36 AM
While the M-1917/M-1917A1 was considered to be an outstanding design, it was recognized early on that the disadvantages of its water-cooling system and the resulting weight precluded its use in an offensive role. It was a search of lightweight machine guns to equip aircraft and the fledging tank corps that brought about the next evolution in U.S. machine guns.
The Ordnance Department started its search by modifying a M-1917 by stripping the water jacket and decreasing the length of the barrel down to 18 inches. World War One ended before the result could see any combat testing, but it was adopted as the Caliber .30 Browning Tank Machine Gun, Model of 1919. In order aid the cooling of the barrel, a perforated metal jacket was fitted around the barrel and an optical sight and ball mount added for use in a tank (along with a lightweight tripod for dismounted use).
Some 2,586 M-1919s were converted from existing M-1917 guns and it remained the Army’s standard tank co-axial weapon well into the 1930s. Of interest was that almost all of the M-1919s were converted into
M-1917A1s prior to World War Two.
While the M-1919 was intended as an armor weapon, its usefulness as an infantry weapon was obvious. In the early 1920s, several M-1919s were modified for infantry use by removing the ball mount and substituting a more durable tube sight. Development work lasted for a decade, but it was later adopted as the
M-1919A1 in 1931.
Since the M-1919A1 was a makeshift design, problems soon arose with the weapons sights, barrel and tripod. Nevertheless, the M-1919A1 validated the concept of a lightweight .30-caliber air-cooled machine gun for infantry use. An improved variant, the M-1919A2 was developed for use by the cavalry, but was not totally acceptable to the Army. Only a small (unknown) number were every converted. Reportedly, several M-1919A2s saw action in the early days of World War Two in the Philippines.
By the late 1920s, the Army was committed to the idea of an air-cooled .30-caliber machine gun for the infantry. And an evaluation was performed to test the modifications recommended to improve the earlier weapons. The M-1919A3 was developed to test the modifications. This testing process confirmed several weaknesses in the M-1919A3 design and only 75 were ever purchased. A modified M-1919A3, that incorporated the beast features of the earlier designs and added improvements; including a 24-inch barrel, new sights and an improved tripod.
The refined design was adopted in the mid-1930s as the M-191A4. Initial production was extremely low, a total of 389,251 M-1919A4s were built during World War Two, with the Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors producing the largest number.
The M-1919A4 weighed in at 31 pounds (the M-1917A1 at 41 pounds); its lightweight M-2 tripod weighed in at a mere 14 pounds, while the M-1917A1’s tripod weighed in at 52.15 pounds. Both weapons used the same 250-round fabric belt (later replaced by a disintegrating link belt). Rate of fire for the M1919A4 was a steady 400-550rpm. While it was not as capable as the M1917A1 in the sustained fire role, the M1919A4 was much more portable and more easily concealed. The M-1919A4 was issued at the rate of two per rifle company’s weapons platoon.
The M-1919A4 saw service throughout World War Two, the Korean War and into the early days of the Vietnam War. A large number were converted to the standard NATO 7.62x51mm round.
Even with the success of the M1919A4, there remained a gap in between this weapon and the squad’s BAR. In 1940, the Ordnance Department issued a directive calling for a machine gun weighing 22 pounds or less. While several foreign designs were tested, none were adopted. Front line troops asked for a machine gun, fitted with a bipod and buttstock and a carrying handle. The Ordnance Department added these requests to a standard M1919A4 that had been retrofitted with light weight parts, creating the M-1919A6. Some 43,479 were built throughout WWII and the Korean War. The M1919A6 could also be used with the M-2 tripod. Soldiers who had used both weapons did not consider the M1919A6 to be sufficiently lighter and handier than the M1919A4.
Webstral
02-19-2013, 11:39 AM
You're really putting in the work, dude. Thanks for the sweat and toil. I'm enjoying reading this work immensely.
dragoon500ly
02-20-2013, 08:30 AM
Beyond a shadow of a doubt, one of the most formidable and versatile infantry weapons of World War Two was the famous Browning .50-caliber machine gun. During the war, the .50-caliber served in a variety of roles ranging from aircraft armament to ground combat use. Its effectiveness has made it one of the most widely used weapons of the American military (not to mention that it is still in service!).
Like the M-1917A1, the .50-caliber machine gun has its roots back in the First World War. When the American Expeditionary Force entered combat, one of the weapons in the German arsenal that our troops did not have was the 13.2mm antitank rifle. This massive, bolt-action weapon was developed by the Germans to counter Allied tanks. The lightly armored tanks of the time were highly vulnerable to this large caliber, high velocity cartridge.
Since the Germans were beginning to deploy tanks against the Allies, the AEF needed a comparable weapon to counter this new threat. In April of 1918, the AEF requested a machine gun firing a cartridge comparable to the German 13.2mm round. It was felt that a machine gun would be more effective than a bolt-action rifle.
The task of developing such a cartridge fell to the Winchester Repeating Firearms Company. Ballistic testing confirmed that a .50-caliber cartridge would be the optimum size (comparable to the 13.2mm which is .53-caliber). The resulting cartridge bore a strong appearance to a greatly scaled up .30-06 round. Preliminary testing revealed some ballistic shortcomings and additional development was need to make it acceptable.
While Winchester worked out the problems with the cartridge, the Ordnance Department looked for the best type of machine gun to use the round, so they approached John M. Browning. Browning stated that he could scale up his M-1917 action to fire the new .50-caliber cartridge. Working in conjunction with the Colt’s Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company, Browning tackled the project and had a prototype weapon ready for testing on November 12, 1918. Unfortunately, the Armistice occurred on November 11, 1918, so the new weapon saw no combat service.
Development work on the machine gun continued after the war and the Frankford Arsenal took over the refinement of the .50-caliber cartridge. The revised round was significantly more powerful than the original Winchester design. The new round fired a massive 700 grain bullet at 2,800 feet per second, which equaled or excelled the performance of the original German 13.2mm round. Unfortunately, the power of the revised .50-caliber round presented some problems including the fact that its recoil could shake apart Browning’s basic machine gun mechanism apart. To counter this problem, Browning developed a hydraulic buffer which eliminated much of the recoil stress and could also be adjusted to control the rate of fire to some extent.
Extensive testing of the new machine gun and cartridge began in 1919 and continued for almost two years. This in-depth testing showed the excellence of the weapon and it was formally adopted as the Model 1921. This used the basic Browning recoil-operated mechanism (with the new buffer system) and utilized the basic type of water-cooling. Both the Army and the Navy adopted the M-1921 (although none were procured for issue until 1925). Between 1925 and 1934, only 1,000 M1921s were delivered. Although intended as an antitank weapon, it was also utilized as an anti-aircraft weapon.
During this period the only major problem to arise was with the charging handle, which proved to be rather difficult to manipulate. An improved design was developed in 1930 and the revised weapon was named the M-1921A1. The new charging handle was retro-fitted to the weapons previously manufactured.
As the Army began to consider the eventual necessity of changing from the old horse equipment to mechanized equipment, the type of armament for tanks and other vehicles was carefully evaluated. Since the M-1921A1 was the standard antitank weapon, it was natural for that weapon to be considered for such use. However, the water-cooling mechanism was both heavy and bulky and so a request was made for an air-cooled version.
In order to compensate for the removal of the water-cooling mechanism, a heavier, 36-inch barrel was designed. This weapon proved to be what the Army was looking for and the “Caliber .50 Machine Gun, Heavy Barrel, M-2” was born.
In addition to its use on vehicles the M-2HB was equipped with a heavy tripod (the M-3) for ground use. In order to achieve the maximum possible performance of the .50-caliber cartridge, the barrel length was increased from 36-inches to 45-inches. The greater weight of the new barrel lowered the rate of fire. The basic M-2HB weighed in at 81 pounds and the M-3 tripod added an additional 44 pounds. The M-2 could be feed from either side of the receiver. It had a rate of fire ranging from 450-550 rounds per minute and had an effective range of 2,500 yards.
While production was ramping up for the M-2HB, it was also decided to improve the M-1921/M-1921A1 by replacing its bulky water-feed mechanism with a streamlined version. This adopted in 1933 as the “Caliber .50 Machine Gun, Water Cooled, M-2”. The M-3 weighed in at 100 pounds and the water jacket added another 21 pounds. It was typically mounted on the M-3 anti-aircraft mount which weighed 380 pounds when set up for action. The “Water Chest, M-3” was also, but weighed in at 74.5 pounds when filled. Due to its extreme weight, the M-3 was not used in the infantry role, being used instead as an anti-aircraft mount in fixed, fortified weapons. In such a role it was very effective because it could fire long bursts without danger of over-heating. Some 82,500 water-cooled M-2s were built during World War Two.
The M-2HB saw widespread use in every theater of the war, total production was 1,964,418, three quarters of which were modified for aircraft use by adding a perforated cooling jacket to the barrel. The M-2HB was unquestionably the best weapon of its type field by either side during World War Two. After the war, it remained the standard heavy machine gun of the U.S. military and provided honorable service in Korea and Vietnam, with only minor changes to its World War II configuration.
Even more remarkably, the M-2HB is still the stand heavy machine gun of the U.S. military today! As one author so aptly stated “There isn’t a machine gun that has received more heartful appreciation from its uses and fear from its victims…than Mr. Browning’s caliber .50 shooting machine.”
Seventy-four years after its adoption, John Browning’s classis design soldiers on.
dragoon500ly
03-20-2013, 10:33 AM
The evolution of warfare in the 20th Century had resulted in ever-increasing challenges for the infantrymen. Beginning in the First World War, the average soldier was faced with stopping weapons that were unimaginable less than a decade earlier. For example, tanks and airplanes made their debut during World War I and the introduction of these weapons caused the armies of both sides to look for ways to counter the new threats.
The United States developed the .50-caliber machine gun during the 1920s and 1930s in order to provide the infantry with an effective antitank and antitank weapon. When compared to the lightly armored tanks of the period, this weapon was considered to be an adequate weapon. This remained the case until virtually the time of America’s entry into the Second World War.
The overwhelming success of the early German victories of 1039-1940 was due in large measure to the innovative and aggressive use of armored units. The U.S. Army recognized that it was unprepared to deal with the technology of modern armored warfare. With the advent of heavier armor, it was apparent that the standard antitank weapon, the .50-caliber machine gun, was totally inadequate. Clearly, a new type of antitank weapon capable of being used by an infantryman was desperately needed.
The weapon that is now commonly known as the bazooka was the result of a fortuitous and timely combination of two divergent technologies. The individual most responsible for the development of the bazooka was Leslie A. Skinner. The son of an Army surgeon, Skinner was born in 1900. He had a fascination with rockets since his early teens and had built a number of working models. He was appointed to West Point and was commissioned in the U.S. Army in 1924. He transferred to the Ordnance Corps in 1931 and was assigned to develop rockets fired from airplanes. Skinner was in the enviable position of having his vocation and avocation coincide. Skinner left his duties in 1933 to study for a year at M.I.T. and returned to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in mid-1943. He continued his experiments with rockets and often used his own money to fund the research. He was transferred to Hawaii in 1938 and his rocket research came to a halt until he was reassigned to Aberdeen in November of 1940. By this time, the German onslaught in Europe was in full force and the Ordnance Department wanted Skinner to concentrate on the task of developing an antitank weapon using his rocket research. Skinner had the good fortune of having a capable assistant assigned to the project, Lieutenant Edward G. Uhl. Skinner and Uhl began testing a prototype design in early 1942, which comprised a simple metal tube with an electrical firing system operated by two flashlight batteries. Skinner’s design overcame the typical problem common to other experimental antitank weapons being tested, that of excessive recoil. Since the tube was open at both ends, the rocket’s exhaust gases were vented out of the bank and the recoil problem was minimal. The new rocket launcher worked well but the weapon had one severe problem. It could not operate with an explosive charge large enough to penetrate a tank’s armor. As stated in the book “There’s a War to Be Won,”
“By the spring of 1942, Skinner and Uhl had broken the back of every obstacle but one; they didn’t have an effective warhead. They had a rocket that flew straight and true. What they didn’t have was a weapon.”
Even as Skinner was working on his rocket launcher, a totally unrelated Ordnance Department project was underway. In late 1940, a young Swiss engineer, Henry H. Mohaupt, approached the Ordnance Department with a proposal for a new type of antitank explosive. Mohaupt’s design was based on a previously discovered, but unrefined concept of the shaped charge. This type of warhead focused an explosive charge on a single concentrated point and allowed a relatively small amount of explosive to punch a hole through armor. Subsequent testing convinced skeptical Ordnance people that the concept worked. Since the threat of German tanks loomed large at this time, a crash program was started to develop an antitank grenade based on the shaped charge concept. In late 1941, on the eve of the U.S. entry into World War Two, the “Grenade, High-Explosive, Antitank, M-10” was adopted. Unfortunately, it was impossible to hand throw this three-pound grenade so an effort to develop a spigot-type discharger was started. This proved to be unsuccessful as the angle of trajectory was unsuitable. The only means left to project the M-10 was either via the rifle grenade launcher or by fitting a launcher to the standard .50-caliber machine gun. The extreme recoil generated by firing the rifle grenade version often resulted in the shattering of rifle stocks and at least two reported instances of the soldier’s shoulder as well), so severe was the recoil force that even the .50-caliber’s tripod was bent. While the Ordnance Department labored to develop a suitable projector, production of the M-10 continued.
As Skinner was working on a suitable warhead for his rocket, he came across some M-10 grenades at Aberdeen and it quickly became apparent that this was the solution that he was looking for. The M-10 grenade weighed three pounds and could penetrate about 80mm of armor. Skinner and Uhl fashioned the first projectiles from dummy M-10s found on the Aberdeen ranges and added a rocket motor and fins. In April of 1942, the Frankford Arsenal built a launcher based on Skinner’s design. The prototype had a 54-inch long tube which was 2.36-inches in diameter. The inside diameter of the tube was dictated by the outside diameter of the M-10 grenade. The length was calculated as the minimum needed to allow the rocket motor to completely burn out before leaving the tube.
Skinner and Uhl took their new weapon to be tested at Aberdeen and, as luck would have it, they arrived as a demonstration of various other antitank weapons was in progress. A moving tank was used as a target, and Skinner and Uhl quietly took up a position at the end of the firing line. Uhl had fashioned a crude sight from a piece of wire he found on the ground. As the tank approached them, Uhl fired a rocket and hit it. Before the tank could turn around, Skinner had reloaded and Uhl hit it with the sound round. Excited Ordnance officials quickly converged on the pair and were soon firing the new rockets as well. The result was that the new launcher was ordered into priority production.
It was also noted that when Skinner’s superiors at the Ordnance Department discovered that he didn’t “go through channels,” he “…found himself the guest of honor at a private, very through chewing out covering all the bases from lack of loyalty too insubordination.”
The new weapon was standardized on June 30, 1942 as the “Launcher, Rocket, Antitank, M-1” and the rocket as the M-6. The weapon was soon dubbed the “bazooka” since it had some resemblance to a musical instrument used by a well-known radio comedian of the day, Bob Burns. The term bazooka was never officially adopted, but it quickly caught on and was universally used throughout the war.
The General Electric Corporation was selected to build the new weapon and on May 19, 1942, the firm was given a purchase order to “design, develop and produce” 5,000 bazookas in 30 days. This was a month prior to the official adoption of the bazooka. GE accepted the order even though it would normally take at least six months to accomplish. General Electric’s Bridgeport Works tackled the job and within 24 hours, the first design drawings were finished. Four days later, several test models were in the hands of the Army for evaluation and by the end of May, 20 test models had been completed. The testing took two weeks before approval was given to start production. This left only eight days to manufacture the 5,000 bazookas. GE worked feverishly to complete the order. Steel was delivered from Pittsburgh by truck drivers working around the clock, and some material was delivered by aircraft. It is reported that an Army Ordnance officer working on the project was bringing a trunk load of bazooka stocks to the factory in his automobile and was stopped for speeding by a state policeman. When the policeman learned of the nature of the delivery, he provided a personal escort to the plant.
While General Electric was producing the M-1 launcher, the firm of E.G. Budd Company was working on its contract to make 25,000 M-6 antitank rockets and 5,000 M-7 practice rockets.
The Army desperately needed the bazookas in the hands of the troops soon to be sent to North Africa and every possible effort was made to speed production. As stated in the book “Men and Volts at War,”
“As the bazookas came off the line they were hustled into waiting Army trucks, and were on their way to a port of embarkation before the stain on the gunstocks was dry. The last of the 5,000 bazookas of this big job came off the line on the eighth day with 89 minutes to spare before the expiration of the Army’s time limit.”
The initial order for 25,000 M-6 rockets was increased in June of 1942 to 75,000 rockets. Also in July, the number of bazookas on order was increased to 75,000 with delivery to be made before the end of the year.
The M-1 bazooka weighed approximately 18 pounds and was 54-inches long with a 2.36-inch bore and was remarkably similar to Skinner’s original design. A front sight was welded on the barrel near the muzzle and could be used from either the left or right sides. It had four aiming points corresponding to 100, 200, 300 and 400 yards. The rear sight was a simple metal leaf. Two hand grips were welded to the bottom of the tube. The rear grip contained the trigger and electrical contact switches. A wooden shoulder stock was fastened to the bottom of the tube, held two dry-cell flashlight batteries in a sliding compartment. One battery provided the power necessary to ignite the rocket and the other was a spare. A circuit tester consisting of a single small light bulb was placed on the left side of the stock that could be used to check if the electrical firing systems was operational. This proved to be a valuable feature since malfunctions due to weak batteries were common.
The M-6 antitank rocket had a wire taped to the outside of the body that was fastened to a contact box on top of the bazooka’s tube. An electrical charge carried by this wire ignited the rocket motor. The M-6 was equipped with a safety pin that was removed prior to placing the rocket into the tube. This was necessary as an armed rocket could be easily detonated by dropping it. A bazooka team consisted of two men, the gunner and his loader. Basic ammo load consisted of two bags that each held three rockets.
The new bazookas were soon aboard troop ships headed for North Africa. The new weapons was classified as Secret and given the code name of “The Whip”. Virtually none of the troops had seen, or even heard of this mystery weapon prior to loading. Initial training took place on the transports and was handicapped by a shortage of manuals and qualified instructors. In spite of this lack of training, the bazooka was used during the landings at Oran, Algiers and Casablanca. Stories quickly made the rounds of the foxholes, including one about a soldier firing a single rocket at a small coastal fort and forcing the surrender of its garrison. Other stories went the rounds about tanks exploding from a single hit or a turret being knocked completely off of a tank. Another, often repeated story was the surrender of ten German tanks after the commander witnessed a tree shattered by a bazooka rocket, which caused him to assume his command was under attack by 155mm artillery. How many of these stories are true will never be known with any degree of certainty, but the stories are impressive and raised the troop’s confidence in the new weapon.
Needless to say, serious problems began to appear soon after the M-1 saw combat. Malfunctions were common, particularly with the rocket. It spite of the stories circulating among the troops, the commanding general of the Army’s Armored Command in Tunisia noted that “…could not find anyone who could say definitely that a tank had been stopped by bazooka fire.”
In September of 1942, 600 bazookas were shipped to the British in Suez for use by the Eighth Army. After a demonstration, the British concluded that “…the weapon was not suitable for desert warfare, since the desert provided none of the concealment that the bazooka operator needed to hide him from small-arms fire until the tank came close enough for his rockets to be effective.” The bazookas were never issued and were place in storage.
The bazooka was demonstrated to Soviet observers in May of 1942. They immediately requested a large shipment. Little is known of the Soviet’s use of their bazookas, but it is known that the Germans captured several. They copied the design and increased the size of the rocket to 88mm, and the resulting weapon was known to the German troops as the “Panzerschreck.”
So severe was the malfunction problem, that the War Department suspended its issue in May of 1943 until an evaluation could be conducted and improvements made. The evaluation centered on the unreliability of the M-6 rocket. The contact wire taped to the outside of the rocket body was easy to damage. High temperatures affected the reliability of the motor, resulting in a premature explosion. The bazooka itself was criticized for the exposed contact box and the lack of any sort of shield to protect the gunner from unburned exhaust. A redesign of the rocket motor and a change in the composition of the propellant fuel fixed the rocket issue and protective gloves and face mask were issued for the gunner. Such problems were understandable in a weapon that was rushed into production without the normal testing process.
While the Ordnance Department tinkered with the design, the Army high command was demanding a return of production of the bazooka, taking the viewpoint that infantry with a bazooka was much better than infantry without a bazooka.
The improved bazooka was adopted in July 1943 as the M-1A1. The changes include replacing the contact box with two spring contacts. Eliminating the front hand grip. The center of the tube was reinforced with wire for some 20-inches in order to increase its strength. Finally a removable truncated conical wire flash screen was added to the front of the tube to protect the face of the gunner. The M-6 rocket was replaced by the M-6A1 rocket which replaced the outside contact wire with an internal contact wire. These changes eliminated the major problems of the bazooka and the weapon began to be issued in large numbers.
Although the improved M-1A1 solved many of the earlier problems, there were still issues that need to be corrected. The electrical firing system still had problems, especially in the Pacific Theater. Corrosion of the firing mechanism due to the constant dampness was an ongoing problem. A percussion firing system using a .410 gauge shotgun shell was tested, but eventually, electro-plating of key parts was implanted.
Perhaps the greatest drawback of the M-1 and M-1A1 bazookas was their 54-inch tube was cumbersome to carry through heavy undergrowth and was unsuitable for airborne operations. At the urging of the Airborne Command, the M-9 bazooka, a launcher that could broken down into two separate components was adopted for service in October of 1943. In addition, the battery firing system was replaced by a trigger-operated magneto, the wooden shoulder stock was replaced by a metal, two-position, shoulder rest and a safety switch was added. Troop trials showed that the coupling mechanism was not as sturdy as necessary and was further modified and entered service as the M-9A1. The rockets were further modified with reshaped ogives to lower the angle of effective impact and cylindrical fixed fins to increase stability in flight. The cones in the warhead were changed from copper to steel, which improved armor penetration by 30%. In addition, better waterproofing of the fuse assembly increased reliability under inclement conditions. This was adopted as the M-6A3.
The M-9/M-9A1 was much easier to carry as it could be disassembled into two sections, which could then be clipped together for carrying. The M-9/M-9A1 weighed 15.87lbs was 5 feet, 1 inch in length when assembled and 2 feet, 7.5 inches long when disassembled.
For much of its service life, the bazooka used crude metal sights, these did not allow for precise sighting and were prone to damage. An optical ring sight was designed for the M-9, but its construction required the use of optical calcite, which was in short supply. A marginally improved metal sight bar with a rear peep sight was designed and in service by January of 1944. In August of 1944, a much improved optical reflecting rear sight that did not use any scare materials was developed and entered service as the T-90 by September of 1944.
General Electric remained the primary producer of the bazooka for much of the war until June of 1944, when the small firm of Cheney Bigelow Wire Works of Springfield, Massachusetts was awarded a contract for M-9A1 launchers. By May of 1945, GE had produced some 450,000 bazookas (all variants) and Cheney Bigelow about 40,000 M-9A1s. Philco Corporation Metal Products Division had also manufactured a number of bazookas in WWII, but the exact number has never been confirmed.
The last major variant of the bazooka consisted of a tube constructed of aluminum that reduced the weight down to 10.88 pounds. This was later standardized as the M-18 and was slated to replace the M-9A1. GE was working on the initial order of 500 M-18s when the war with Japan ended.
The 2.36-inch bazooka M-1/M-1A1/M-9/M-9A1 saw widespread use throughout the war. While generally effective, it was not always equal to the tasks at hand. As an antitank weapon, it met with mixed success. It was relatively effective against the earlier German tanks and was normally devastating against the lighter Japanese tanks. As the Germans fielded tanks with heavier armor, the bazooka often proved inadequate. With the thicker armor protecting the front, sides and turret, the GIs had to attempt their engagement with shots at the rear of the tank, down through the thinner deck armor, or use the rocket to knock off a tread or otherwise disable a tank without destroying it. The bazooka was also used to engage enemy bunkers and other emplacements.
In spite of its problems, the bazooka was a very important infantry weapon for the U.S. military. It was arguably the best weapon of its type fielded in quantity by any nation with the exception of some of the German designs. Perhaps the greatest compliment to the bazooka was that paid by the Germans, who copied the design.
By October of 1944, it was recognized that the 2.36-inch rocket could not penetrate heavy armor, the development of a larger 3.5-inch rocket was stated and was standardized after the end of the war as the M-20. This version saw use in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and can still be found in service in many third world countries.
Perhaps the best description of the bazooka and its impact could be found in “There’s a War to be Won”:
“It (the bazooka) had its flaws and limitations, to be sure, but it was a remarkable weapon for all that. Skinner and Uhl had done what hardly seemed possible---they had put a man on an equal footing with a tank.”
dragoon500ly
12-22-2013, 08:26 AM
The War Department used five basic classifications of hand grenades, as follows:
1) Fragmentation: These contain an explosive charge within a metal body and are designed to break up into fragments intended to inflict casualties upon the action of the bursting charge. They have a killing range of 5 to 10 yards and stray fragments are dangerous up to 50 or more yards.
2) Offensive: These contain an explosive charge in a paper body and are designed for demolition effect and to stun the enemy in enclosed places, so that the thrower can charge while the enemy is in a dazed condition.
3) Chemical: These contain a chemical agent designed to produce a toxic or irritating effect, a casualty effect, a screening or signal smoke, an incendiary action or combinations of these.
4) Practice: These contain a reduced charge for safe use in training.
5) Training: These contain no explosive charge or chemical and are made for use in throwing practice.
Each type of grenade was designed for a specific purpose and therefore differed somewhat in configuration and appearance. The chief parts of the hand grenade are the fuse, the filler and the body. The most critical component of the grenade was the fuse. Most U.S. grenade fuses of WWII were of the automatic/timed type. This meant that the grenade was exploded after a specific lapse of time, not on impact, and that the fuse begin its timing process automatically as the grenade left the thrower’s hand.
American hand grenades had a safety lever that was secured by a safety pin. Once the pin was removed, the lever was held in place with the hand and when thrown, the lever was released. This caused an internal striker to set off the primer, which in turn, ignited the time fuse. After a pre-set period of time, the grenade exploded. The typical time delay used was from four to five seconds from the time the safety lever was released, although some specialized grenades used a much shorter time fuse.
There were two basic types of time fuses used in World War II hand grenades: the detonating fuse (which contained a small amount of explosive material that would set off the bursting charge) and the igniting fuse (which contained a burning compound that worked by igniting the buster charge).
Grenade, Hand, Fragmentation Mark II
The most widely used fragmentation grenade was the Mark II, an improved version of the Great War Mark I.
The Mark II weighed about 21 ounces and used a TNT filler. Since TNT was in short supply in the early days of the war, an explosive filler compound consisting of 25% nitrostarch, 34% ammonium nitrate and 40% sodium nitrate was used. As TNT production caught up with demand, this was substituted for the nitrostarch compound.
The standard fuse used was the M64A. This fuse was generally reliable, when used, it produced a flash, a report and some smoke and sparks, which allowed an alert enemy to spot the location of the thrower. The improved M204 fuse eliminated this problem and came into service in 1944, both types of fuse were used until the end of the war.
The body of the Mark II was made of cast iron with serrations designed to produce more lethal fragments upon detonation. The Mark II, due to its explosive filler was initially painted bright yellow (indicating a HE filler) which led to its nickname of “lemon”. Needless to say, it was soon realized that yellow could be far more easily spotted in combat and the change was made to a OD green with two narrow yellow bands (and the new nickname of “pineapple“). The range of the Mark II was dependent upon its thrower, but 35 to 40 yards was considered the maximum range. As the fragments could be dangerous out to 50 yards, the GI was trained to keep down until after their grenade had exploded. The time delay was from 4.0 to 4.8 seconds, but experienced GIs were soon cutting fuses down to 3.0 seconds.
While the Mark II outwardly resembled the Mark I, its performance was markedly increased due to the use of high explosive fillers. A typical Mark I would produce about 50 fragments, while the Mark II would produce about 1,000 fragments.
A later variant of the Mark II was the mark IIA1. This was similar to the Mark II, but used the improved M204 fuse. It differed from the Mark II in that it had one yellow band rather than two, in all other functions, it was identical to the Mark II.
Grenade, Hand, Offensive, Mark III
Designed to produce a concussive effect in enclosed spaces, the offensive grenade did not produce the cloud of fragments that the Mark II did.
The Mark III and Mark IIIA1 weighed about 14 ounces and was constructed of a pressed fiber body with sheet metal ends and was filled with TNT. It used the same types of fuses as did the Mark II/MkIIA1. The body was painted yellow with the type, model and lot numbers stenciled on the side in black ink.
Offensive grenades saw little use during WWII.
Grenade, Hand, Fragmentation, T-13
A little-known and seldom used grenade was the T-13 “Beano”. This baseball-shaped grenade was designed for use by the OSS. It was fitted with an in-flight arming fuse that was designed to arm itself after the grenade had traveled at least 25 feet; then grenade would then explode on impact. The sole producer of the Beano was the Eastman-Kodak Company. Performance of this grenade was very erratic and, like all impact grenades, was inherently dangerous to the user. It was reported (but not confirmed) that some T13 grenades were issued during the Normandy campaign.
Grenade, Hand, Incendiary, Frangible, M1
Another type of grenade that saw little use during WWII was the M-1 Frangible Grenade. This was essentially nothing more than a self-igniting version of the Molotov Cocktail. A glass bottle was filled with a mixture of gasoline and alcohol and a glass tube filled with chromic anhydride was attached to the outside of the bottle. When the bottle was thrown against an object, the bottle and tube would break and the gasoline would be ignited by the chemical reaction between the alcohol and the chromic anhydride. A latter version was the M-3 frangible grenade, which was improvised from any type of bottle. The problem with these grenades were that they were dangerous to produce, ship and store. They were discarded in 1943.
Grenade, Hand, Incendiary, AN-M14
Production of this grenade started in 1942 and sufficient supplies were on hand by 1943 to discontinue their production since relatively few of these were issued. Better known as the “Thermite Grenade” it was most often used for destroying enemy artillery pieces by igniting a grenade in the breech mechanism, which would fuse the breech block closed and render the piece inoperable.
The AN-M14 had a smooth sheet metal body and was painted blue-gray and had “TH INCENDIARY”, the lot number and one band stenciled in purple ink. The grenade weighed 32 ounces and was equipped with either the M200A1 or M200A2 igniting fuse with a 2.0 second time delay.
Grenade, Hand, White Phosphorus, M-15
While the chief purpose of the WP grenade was as a smoke producing agent, it also was used to inflict casualties on enemy soldiers. Burning phosphorus could only be extinguished by cutting off all oxygen to the pellets, producing severe burns.
The M15 was made of a smooth sheet metal body, with a filler of white phosphorus, in appearance it was very close to the AN-M14 grenade. The M15 weighed 31 ounces and used the M-6A3 detonating fuse with a 4.0-4.8 second delay. The grenade was painted blue-gray with “WP SMOKE”, and a single band in yellow on the body. Its burst radius was approximately 25 yards and it burned for 50-60 seconds.
Grenade, Hand, Colored Smoke, M-16
Grenade, Hand, Colored Smoke, M-18
The most widely issued type of signal munitions of World War II were the smoke hand grenades. Development of these munitions began in September of 1942 upon the request of Army Ground Forces as a means to identify troop positions. Chemical Warfare Service Engineers developed the prototypes from the M-7 chemical warfare grenade. It has been reported that CWS representatives contacted Hollywood special effects people to assist in this project due to their experience with the use of colored smoke in movies.
The first type was standardized in April of 1943 as the M16. This grenade was made in six colors: red, orange, violet, black, yellow and green. When ignited, it produced a cloud of smoke for about two minutes. While this grenade worked well, a thicker cloud of smoke was desired and an improved version was developed and adopted as the M-18. The M-18 gave off a more dense volume of smoke than did the M16, although its durations was only for about one minute. Eight colors were originally developed, but this was later changed to only four: red, green, yellow and violet. Both grenades had a smooth sheet metal cylindrical body with wither an M200A1 or M200A2 igniting fuse. They weighed about 17 ounces. The body was painted blue-gray and had the lot number, model and one band painted in yellow. The top of the grenade was painted to indicate the color of the smoke.
Grenade, Hand, Red Smoke, AN-M2
Grenade, Hand HC Smoke, AN-M8
This grenade was intended primarily for screening troops. It produced a large cloud of red smoke for about two and a half minutes. It was similar in appearance and function to the M-18, including the same type of body and igniting fuse. The AN-M2 was stenciled in yellow on the body “SMOKE RED”, the date of filling and one band.
Another type, which was used to produce a thick cloud of white smoke was the AN-M8. Externally similar to the AN-M2, it differed by the markings on the body “HC SMOKE” and lot number and one band stenciled in yellow.
Grenade, Hand, Gas, Irritant, CN-DM, M-6
Grenade, Hand, Gas Irritant, CS , M-7
One little known and seldom used grenade as the Gas, Irritant. This type is more commonly known as a tear gas grenade and its official function is simply listed as “harassment”. It is intended to incapacitate the enemy by strong irritating fumes. Two basic types were fielded in World War II. The first was the M-6, which had a smooth cylindrical sheet metal body and an M200A1 or M200A2 igniting fuse. It was filled with the chemical CN-DM which emitted noxious fumes for up to 60 seconds. It was painted blue-gray and had “CN-DM GAS” and a single band painted in red on the body.
The second grenade was the M-7 which was virtually identical to the M-6 except the filler was pure CS gas. It was marked on the body in red with “CS GAS: and a single red band.
Both grenades saw very limited service during the war in persuading reluctant enemy soldiers trapped in bunkers, caves or buildings to surrender. Most often, however, the enemy refused requests to surrender and fragmentation and white phosphorus grenades were used with much more permanent results.
Training and Practice Grenades
Since hand grenades are quite dangerous weapons to untrained users, much emphasis was placed on safe training techniques. Since the thought of a bunch of raw recruits on the range with live grenades was enough to turn even veteran drill instructors pale…training grenades were developed. These grenades were of the same configuration, size and weight as the service grenades, but replaced the high explosive fillers with a reduced charge of black powder and the iron filling plug was replaced by a cork plug that was easy to blow out. The resulting cloud of black powder allowed the thrower to simulate a grenade explosion at little risk to themselves. These grenades were painted blue to help distinguish them from service weapons.
Practice grenades were even simpler, being solid cast iron copies with, at most, a removable pin. Their solid construction allowed the training of green recruits with no fear of injury.
dragoon500ly
12-22-2013, 08:38 AM
The United States Army ended the Great War with the French-designed V-B rifle grenade launcher as standard. The V-B utilized a cup type launcher fitted to the on the M-1903/M-1917 rifle. The V-B grenade had a hole through the middle which allowed the use of standard rifle ammunition. The bullet passed through the hole and the gas generated by firing propelled the grenade to a maximum range of 200 yards.
While the V-B launcher saw wide-spread use during World War One, there were problems. The loose fit between the launcher and the rifle often caused inaccuracy and loss of range. In addition, manufacturing errors sometimes resulted in V-B grenades with off-center holes and premature explosions could result.
The V-B launcher remained in U.S. service until 1924, when it was restricted to firing pyrotechnic shells and it was declared obsolete in 1928.
Work on a replacement for the V-B continued at a snail’s pace during the 1930s, mainly due to elements in the Army that disputed the need for a rifle grenade launcher. By 1940, the war raging in Europe confirmed the need to propel grenades for loner distances than hand throwing. Early experiments with the M-1 Garand resulted in numerous failures and the decision was made to design a grenade launcher for use with the service bolt-action rifles.
The M-1 Grenade Launcher/The M-2 Grenade Launcher
Adopted in 1941, the M-1 launcher was designed for the M-1903 rifle while the M-2 was designed for the M-1917 rifle. Both clamped to the end of the barrel by means of a clamp secured by a wing nut. The tube was about 7.25-inches long and weighed 9 ounces. The tube had a series of raised rings on the outside surface which were used in conjunction with the angle of elevation to determine range. With a grenade in place on the tube, the greater number of rings exposed, the shorter the range. A special grenade cartridge was used to fire the grenade. Both launchers could be easily removed and then allow the firing of normal ball ammunition.
The initial production concentrated on the M-2 launcher due to the decision to transfer large numbers of the M-1917 rifle to the United Kingdom as part of Lend-Lease (some 31,980 prior to December 1941). With the entry of the U.S. into the war on December 8, 1941, the War Department ordered a switch in production to the M-1 launcher. Production of some 63,360 in January 1942 and another 55,040 in February met the U.S. Army’s foreseeable needs and production was shifted back to the M-2 launcher. The last of the M-2s rolled off the production line in July 1942 with some 112,327 completed. Production shifted back the M-1 launcher until May of 1943, when some 322,892 were completed (and a further 39,793 M-2 were converted into M-1s).
In U.S. service, the M-2 was mostly used for training and practice. The M-2 was declared obsolete of in September 1944.
The M-1 Launcher remained in service throughout the war for two reasons: first the M-1 Garand Rifle was in short supply prior to mid-to-late 1943, so the M-1903 was often the only rifle available to many troops. Secondly, the problems encountered with developing a satisfactory grenade launcher for the Garand was never solved during the war. A launcher was eventually adopted, but the rifle could not fire service ammunition with the launcher fitted. Even when production of the Garand caught up to demand, many soldiers preferred the M-1903/M-1.
The M-7 Grenade Launcher
While the M-1 and M-2 Launchers were in production, development was underway for a launcher that could be used with the semiautomatic M-1 Garand rifle. A number of developmental models were tested before the T14 was standardized as the M-7 in February, 1843. The M-7 clamped the M-1 rifle’s bayonet lug by a hinged clamp and had a stud that fitted into the rifle’s gas cylinder valve screw to hold it open and vent excess gas. This prevented the M-1 rifle from operating in the normal semiautomatic mode with the grenade launcher attached. A special type of valve screw was issued with each M-7 along with an instruction sheet. The original type of screw (B147851) remained open after the launcher was removed and closed after a live round was fired. A improved version (B7310079) was adopted in January 1945 which closed immediately upon the launcher being removed from the rifle. The special valve screw was necessary in order to “bleed off” the excess gas generated by the grenade launching cartridge that would otherwise wither blown up or otherwise seriously damaged the rifle.
Total production of the M-7 came to be some 795,699 by August 1945.
The M-7 worked reasonably well, but had the unpopular handicap of not allowing the M-1 rifle to fire in the semiautomatic mode with the launcher attached. Since the soldier would not want to keep the launcher attached to his rifle any longer than necessary, they typical employment method became to fire the grenade and then quickly remove the launcher so that the rifle could be fired immediately. This led to large numbers of the M-7 being dropped in the heat of battle and not being retrieved later. The high production numbers reflect as the War Department tried to keep up with combat losses.
An improved M-7A1 launcher was developed in July of 1945. This was functionally similar to the M-7 but had the advantage of allowing the M-1 rifle to fire normally while the launcher was in place. A total of 72,000 were produced by August 1945, but were never issued.
M-8 Grenade Launcher
While work was underway on the M-7 launcher for the M-1 rifle, a launcher was being developed for use with the M-1 carbine. While the carbine was never intended for use with a grenade launcher, the problems with the M-1 rifle’s launcher gave urgency to the development of one for the carbine.
The carbine’s gas system actually made the design of a suitable grenade launcher much easier than for the Garand. A launcher, very similar to the M-1 and M-2 launchers that clamped to the end of the barrel (and held in place by a wing nut) was developed. Since the venting of excess gas was not necessary, the carbine could function in the semiautomatic mode with the launcher in place.
The carbine grenade launcher was standardized as the M-8 in February of 1943. A total of 385,165 were produced by August 1945. While the M-8 proved to be popular with the troops, the M-1 carbine had never been intended to withstand the stresses of firing a rifle grenade, split or broken stocks were common. The M-1A1 carbine could only be used to fire a rifle grenade by folding the stock, pointing the pistol grip upwards, with the rear of the stock firmly on the ground, even doing this still left a chance of the stock being bent under the force of firing.
Grenade Launching Ammunition
In order to launch rifle grenades, special ammunition was needed that could develop sufficient gasses to propel the rifle grenade. Grenade launcher ammunition looked somewhat like blank ammunition, but could be identified by their crimped necks.
Cartridge, Rifle Grenade, Caliber .30, M-3
The M-1, M-2 and M-7 launchers utilized the M-3 grenade cartridge to launch rifle grenades. The M-3 was loaded with five grains of very fine black powder and 40 grains of smokeless powder. This load could propel the standard M-9A1 antitank grenade with a velocity of 180 feet per second. The M-3 cartridge was issued in ten round cartons.
Cartridge, Rifle Grenade, Carbine, Caliber .30, M-6
The carbine’s M-8 launcher was used with the M-6 grenade launching cartridge. This round was loaded with one grain of 60mm mortar ignition powder and 20 grains of smokeless powder. This could propel the M-1 grenade adapter at a velocity of 145 feet per second. The M-6 cartridge was packed in cartons holding six rounds.
Cartridge, Grenade, Auxiliary, M-7
In order to increase the range of a rifle grenade, a auxiliary cartridge was developed. This small cartridge could be inserted into the grenade launcher tube prior to placing a grenade on it and was ignited by the firing of the grenade cartridge. The use of the M-7 increased the velocity of the grenade by 40-90 feet per second and increased the range by 60-100 yards. Since the use of M-7 markedly increased the recoil, its use in the carbine was restricted to emergencies only. The M-7 quickly gained the nickname of “the vitamin pill”.
Rifle Grenades
There were two basic types of rifle grenades. The first consisted of adapters that held a standard hand grenade. The second consisted of grenades specifically designed as rifle grenades.
M-1 and M-1A1 Grenade Projection Adapters
The M-1 Grenade Projection Adapter was designed to hold a standard Mark II fragmentation hand grenade. It secured the grenade by means of four retaining claws that grasped the grenade’s serrations. One of the claws also mounted a metal arming clip into which the grenade’s safety lever was fitted and held in place (the M-1A1 was similar, but used only three claws). Both adapters were about seven inches in length.
The adapters were simple and effective in their use. The Mark II grenade was inserted into the adapter and the safety lever inserted into the arming clip. The grenade’s safety pin was pulled (but the arming clip held the safety lever securely in place). When the grenade was fired from the launcher, the arming clip was sheared away, thus releasing the safety lever. The timing fuse then exploded the grenade. By using the adapter, the Mark II could be used to inflict enemy casualties by effective air bursts.
Due to the heavy recoil generated by the rifle grenade and the fact that a curved trajectory was usually the most effective, the butt of the rifle was placed on the ground for firing. Regulations called for the rifle grenade to be launched with “…the butt turned sideways to avoid stock breakage.”
The M-1 and M-1A1 adapters saw much use during the war. With practice, a soldier could fire fragmentation grenades with surprising accuracy for a distance of almost 200 yards.
Chemical Grenade Adapter, M-2 and M-2A1
Similar in use to the M-1 and M-1A1, the M-2 adapters were used to fire the colored smoke, offensive and white phosphorous grenades. Both the M-2 and M-2A1 were fitted with three claws and a retaining band, they differed only in the fin assembly fitted.
Functionally, they were used in the same manner as the M-1/M-aA1 adapters.
M-17 Impact Fragmentation Rifle Grenade
The only other type of fragmentation grenade launched from grenade launchers was the M-17. This consisted of a fragmentation grenade similar to the Mark II, but fitted with an impact fuse. The M-17 was designed strictly as a rifle grenade . Due to the inherent dangers of an impact use, few were made and issued.
M-9 and M-9A1 Antitank Rifle Grenade
The M-9 was issued in the early days of the war and was quickly replaced by the M-9A1. The M-9A1 had a sheet metal body and nose that contained a shaped charge similar to that used in the bazooka. The grenade was fitted with an impact fuse and had a safety pin that had to be removed prior to firing. The M-9A1 could penetrate between 3-4 inches of armor. It weighed 1.31 pounds and had a maximum effective range of 250 yards.
The M-9A1 was a simple and effective weapons. The grenade would be fitted onto the launcher at the desired range increment. A safety fin would be removed prior to firing. Unlike the frag and chemical grenades, it was necessary to fire the M-9A1 using a flat trajectory. This meant that the soldier would have to fire the weapon from the shoulder rather than placing the butt on the ground to absorb the heavy recoil.
M-19 White Phosphorus Rifle Grenade
Similar in appearance to the M-9A1, the M-19 had a filler of white phosphorus. Upon impact, it would scatter WP pellets over an area of about 10 yards, igniting spontaneously and giving off a dense white smoke as well as inflicting casualties.
M-22 Colored Smoke Rifle Grenade
The standard colored smoke grenade of World War II. Produced in four colors: red, green, violet and yellow. Fitted with an impact fuse. The M-22 was used for signaling as well as marking targets.
M-23 Colored Smoke Rifle Grenade
Once fired, the M-23 would ignite, leaving a streamer of smoke that lasted roughly 12 seconds, this continuous stream of smoke would burn throughout its 250 yard range. Produced in the same four colors as the M-23.
M-20 HC Smoke Rifle Grenade
Identical to the M-22 grenade in appearance, the chief difference was that the M-20 would produce a cloud of white smoke for about 30 seconds upon impact. As with the An-M8 HC Smoke grenade, the purpose of the M-20 was to conceal troop movements.
M-17A1 Ground Signal, White Star, Parachute Rifle Grenade
M-18A1 Ground Signal, Green Star, Parachute Rifle Grenade
M-21A1Ground Signal, Amber Star, Parachute Rifle Grenade
M-15A1 Ground Signal, Red Star, Parachute Rifle Grenade
This series contained a parachute flare that separated from the case at about 400 feet in the air. It would burn for about 30 seconds and was used for illumination purposes as well as signaling
M-8A1 Ground Signal, White Star, Cluster Rifle Grenade
M-20A1 Ground Signal, Green Star, Cluster Rifle Grenade
M-22A1 Ground Signal, Amber Star, Cluster Rifle Grenade
M-52A1 Ground Signal, Red Star, Cluster Rifle Grenade
This series was used in the same manner as the parachute flares, but contained five pyrotechnic stars that were ejected from the case at about 400 feet and burned for five seconds.
Grenade Launching Sights
Sight, Rifle, Grenade Launcher M-1
In order to improve the accuracy of rifle grenades, several types of auxiliary sights were tested during the war. The first to be standardized was the M-1 sight, designed for use with the M1903 and M1917 service rifles. This was a rather crude sight constructed of two stamped sheet metal front and rear sights that were aligned to achieve the required angle of elevation. The two sight components were fastened to the rifle by springs and attached together by a wire spacer.
The M-1 sight saw very limited use early in the war and proved to be unsatisfactory. It was soon dropped from use.
Sight, Rifle Grenade, M-15
With the failure of the M-1 sight, several other sights were tested with varying degrees of success. The best design was the T59E3, which featured a sighting bar with a leveling bubble and a front post and rear peep sight. The T95E3 could be used with the M1903 and M1 rifles and M1 carbine. A mounting plate was installed on the weapon’s stock by two screws. The sight assembly was attached to the mounting plate and could be elevated or depressed from zero to sixty degrees. The T95E3 was standardized as the M-15 in March of 1944 and some 20,000 were produced.
The M-15 could be used to launch antitank rifle grenades with the peep sight and fragmentation and smoke grenades with the bubble sight.
Recoil Boot
The last item used with grenade launchers was a black rubber recoil boot. The boot slipped onto the butt of the rifle and contained a thick rubber pad. It could be used with the service rifles, but could not fit the carbine stock. It was designed to help cushion the heavy recoil of the rifle grenade when fired from the shoulder. It also lessened the chances of the stock breaking when the butt of the rifle was placed on the ground.
dragoon500ly
12-24-2013, 08:59 AM
Mortars filled the gap between grenades and artillery. They were used to provide fire support when artillery either wasn’t available or couldn’t be moved up fast enough to support rapidly moving troop advances. As the Ordnance Chief remarked “Comparing weight of material to ammunition delivered on the target, mortars are the most efficient of weapons.”
Often called “The Infantryman’s Artillery”, the mortars of World War Two were basically improved models of the Great War mortars. They were used to provide short range, high-angle trajectory fire in direct support of the infantry.
The basic form of the mortar was designed by Sir Frederick Wilfrid Scott Stokes during World War One. The Stokes Mortar consisted of a smooth bore tube with a fixed firing pin at the bottom of the tube. The tube was fitted into a metal plate that rested on the ground and absorbed the recoil force. The front of the tube was supported by a bipod that was adjustable for elevation and traverse. The Stokes was not fitted with a sight, but was lined up on target by sighting along a white line drawn the length of the tube.
The Stokes weighed in at 110 pounds in the firing position and could be broken down into three loads for carrying: the tube (43 pounds), the bipod (37 pounds) and the base plate (30 pounds).
The mortar bomb used was a simple metal cylinder containing an explosive chare of two pounds of TNT. The entire shell weighed 12 pounds. The Stokes was fired by means of a shotgun-like cartridge that was inserted into the base of the shell and exploded upon impact with the fixed firing pin at the base of the tube. The range was determined by placing a number of small rings (made of silk bags) of explosive propellant (ballistae) around the cartridge container. The more ballistae rings used, the further the range.
With the end of the Great War, an evaluation of the combat use of the Stokes determined that there were two serious deficiencies: lack of range and accuracy, Both of these problems were due, in part, to the firing of a projectile without stabilizing fins from a smooth bore tube. The lack of an effective sight also had a negative bearing on the accuracy of the Stokes.
In the Great War Edgar William Brandt committed his French-based firm to the development of an improved Stokes mortar. Brandt recognized that the basic Stokes was a sound design and he concentrated on improving the unsatisfactory ammunition. He developed a mortar bomb with a streamlined shape and stabilizing fins that proved to be very accurate at ranges from 200 yards to 3,350 yards. In place of the silk bags of the Stokes shell, Brandt introduced celluloid packets or strips, which clipped to the bomb’s fins.
In 1927, the Stokes-Brandt Mortar, Model 1927 was introduced. This 81mm mortar was very similar to the Great War Stokes, but was provided with a collimator-style sight and a spring buffer to reduce the stress of firing on the bipod and sight. The Model 1927 continued to be refined and four were purchased by the United States for testing in 1931. These were designated the Stokes-Brandt Mortar, 81mm, T4. The T4 differed from the M1927 by having a improved bipod, sight and base plate.
While the T4 was undergoing firing trails, the Stokes mortar was redesignated as the Mortar, Trench, 3-inch, Mark I and Mark IA2. Several Stokes mortars saw service in the early days of World War Two (in the Philippines).
In the late 1930s, the United States purchased manufacturing rights from the Brandt Company and standardized the T4 mortar as the 81mm Mortar, M1 with Mount M1. The M1 weighed 136 pounds in its firing position and be broken down into three basic components for transport: the tube (44.5 pounds), the bipod/sight (46.5 pounds) and the base plate (45 pounds).
The M1 81mm mortar was very similar to the older 3-inch Stokes mortar, but had the following differences.
1) The tube was of heavier construction so as to better withstand the higher pressures generated by modern ammunition. The tube was also machined to finer tolerances than was the Stokes mortar.
2) A cross-leveling mechanism was attached to the left leg of the bipod.
3) The clamp that attached the bipod to the barrel was easily adjusted to four different positions.
4) The improved base plate consisted of a pressed steel body with welded braces, flanges and two carrying handles. A socket was welded onto the base plate which had three positions for the spherical end of the mortar tube’s base plate.
5) The M1 mortar was fitted with a greatly improved sight, which included a collimator, elevating and deflection mechanism and longitudinal and cross levels.
The M1’s range varied depending on the type of shell used, with a minimum range of 100-300 yards and a maximum range of 3,290 yards. The sustained rate of fire was 18 rounds per minute, but as many as 30-35 bombs per minute could be fired for short periods of time.
The 81mm mortar could be readily transported by three men, although it was normally transported in a jeep or weapons carrier in the infantry divisions. A number of half-tracks were converted to carry the 81mm mortar and was issued to the armored divisions.
81mm Mortar Ammunition
The M1 was a versatile mortar that could easily fire several types of ammunition.
M43A1 Light HE Bomb
This was the lightest of the 81mm mortar bombs, weighing 6.87 pounds and having a minimum range of 100 yards, and a maximum range of 3,290 yards. Eighty percent of its fragments covered a radius of about 25 yards, which compared favorably with the 75mm howitzer. The M43A1 was fitted with an fast detonating fuse so that the bomb would explode on the surface of the ground.
M45 and M45A1 Heavy HE Bomb
These were the heavier bombs used with the 81mm mortar, weighing 10.62 pounds. The maximum range was 2,558 yards. These bombs had a bursting radius comparable to that of the 105mm howitzer. These bombs were fitted with a delay fuse so that some penetration was possible for demolition use.
M56 Heavy HE Bomb
The heaviest of the 81mm mortar bombs, weighing in at 15.01 pounds. Its maximum range was only 1,300 yards. It was equipped with a fuse that could be adjusted for either super quick or delay operation.
M57 White Phosphorus Bomb
M57 FS Smoke Bomb
M57 HS Persistent Gas Bomb
Both types of smoke bombs weighed about 10.75 pounds and had a maximum range of 2,470 yards. They were intended to lay down covering smoke “in order to hinder enemy observation, either to reduce the effectiveness of hostile fire or to conceal the movements of friendly troops.” The WP bomb also had antipersonnel applications. The Gas bomb was loaded with a irritant tear gas filler, it was seldom used.
M301 Illuminating Bomb
This contained an illuminating compound that burned at 275,000 candlepower for about 60 seconds and had a range of 2,200 yards. The projectile was attached to a parachute which slowed its descent and increased its effectiveness. The M301 had a fuse that could be adjusted with a delay of 5 to 25 seconds after firing.
U.S. mortar bombs were issued assembled as complete rounds with the maximum number of powder increments attached. These were removed as necessary to achieve the desired range. While the system worked well, in general, problems were encountered with the exposed powder increments, particular in the humid climate of the Pacific. When the increments became damp, the range was severely reduced and rounds often fell short, with sometimes fatal results for friendly troops. The solution that was adopted during the war was to order the mortar crews to disposal of any increments that had been darkened by moisture.
The Quartermaster Unit of Fire issue for a single 81mm mortar was 275 rounds. This often proved to be very inadequate, with many reports of the entire daily quota of bombs being expended in as little as an hour. Stocks of 81mm mortar bombs could often run short and emergency resupply would be flown in by air transport. It is interesting that the Japanese and Germans used similar Stokes-Brandt 81mm mortars. There are numerous accounts of U.S. troops using captured enemy mortar bombs in their M1 mortars.
The usefulness of the M1 was simply stated in numerous Army and Marine reports, which referred to it as “the infantry’s artillery.”
dragoon500ly
12-24-2013, 09:00 AM
60mm M-2 Mortar
While the 81mm mortar was undergoing its evaluations in the 1930s, the two major branches of the Army, the Infantry and the Cavalry, considered it to be a very good weapon. However, both branches believed that many missions would not require such a large and heavy weapon and requested a smaller and lighter version of the mortar.
A weapon for use between the effective ranges of the rifle grenade and the 81mm mortar was desired. The Ordnance Department requested that the Brandt Company produce a 42mm mortar for testing, Brandt provided a 47mm model for demonstration. During its tests, it was determined that the weapon was not powerful enough. Consequently, the Ordnance Department acquired eight 60mm mortars from Brandt, which underwent extensive testing.
In February of 1938, the 60mm mortar was adopted as the M2 Mortar. An initial order of 1,500 60mm mortars were place in January of 1940. As requirements for the 60mm increased, some 30,000 were produced by early 1944. As the fighting increased that year, additional orders for an additional 24,250 mortars were placed.
The 60mm M2 mortar was very similar in appearance and construction to the M1 81mm mortar, other than the obvious differences in weight and size. The method of operation was identical. The M2 weighed 42 pounds in the firing position. The overall length was 28.6 inches. Like the M1 mortar, the M2 could be broke down into three pieces: tube (12.8 pounds), bipod and sight (16.4 pounds) and base plate (12.8 pounds).
The initial M2 bipod was replaced by the improved M5 bipod which had an improved traversing and shock absorbing mechanism, as well as a better barrel lock.
The M2 used the same M4 sight as the M1 mortar. The 60mm mortar had a sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute, but could be fired for short periods of time at 30-35 rounds per minute.
There were several attempts during the war to develop an lighter version of the M2 mortar, and while examples such as the M19 saw limited service in the Pacific, the M2 proved itself to be much more accurate and deadly to the enemy.
60mm Mortar Ammunition
The M2 mortar used three types of shells:
M49A2 HE Bomb
This shell weighed 3.07 pounds and had a maximum range of 2,017 yards, although its accuracy was reduced at ranges beyond 1,000 yards.
M302 WP Bomb
This round weighed 4.02 pounds, with a maximum range of 1,100 yards and was used, as with other WP ammunition, to create smoke screens and inflict casualties.
M83 Illumination Bomb
This bomb weighed 3.7 pounds and had a range of 1,000 yards. It would burst at about 800 feet and illuminate the area with 145,000 candlepower for about 25 seconds.
dragoon500ly
12-24-2013, 09:04 AM
4.2-inch Chemical Mortar
The Chemical Warfare Service adopted the M-1 4.2-inch Mortar in 1928. This rifled weapon could drop gas shells at an effective range of 2,000 yards. Limited numbers were procured and its manufacture was suspended in 1935.
With the entrance of the U.S. into the war, the War Department authorized the formation of two chemical mortar battalions. The original M1 was slightly redesigned to increase its effective range to 2,400 yards and was standardized as the M-1A1 chemical mortar. Further testing revealed that if the powder charge was increased by 50%, the mortar’s range could be extended to 3,200 yards. However, the tubes of the M1 and M1A1 could not safely handle the increased pressure and a stronger tube and base plate were adopted. This was designated as the M2. Both the M1A1 and M2 would see service throughout the war.
During the M2s development, it became apparent that the M2 was capable of more than firing gas and smoke shells. The CWS requested permission to develop a HE bomb. In spite of heavy opposition by infantry officers “who felt that the functions of the CWS was confined to gas masks, gas weapons and smelly clothing…”, the CWS got permission to develop the HE bomb. The testing of the new bomb so impressed the review board, that all opposition was overcome and permission to employ the chemical mortar with a HE bomb was forthcoming.
The 4.2-inch mortar first saw combat during the Sicily Campaign were its barrages with the new HE shell were impressive. The weapon saw use in the European and Pacific theaters and by war’s end, some 41,452 4.2-inch chemical mortars had been procured.
4.2-inch Chemical Mortar Ammunition
The chemical mortar used two types of HE shells during the war. The M3 HE Bomb weighed 24.5 pounds and the M4 HE bomb weighed 32 pounds. The various types of chemical and gas bombs weighed between 24.25 pounds and 25.5 pounds. These included WP and several types of irritant and screening gases.
While the 4.2-inch was useful in supporting the infantry, it was not as versatile as the 81mm and 60mm mortars. Ready for firing, the M2 weighed 333 pounds. Like the smaller mortars, the “four-deuce” could be broken down into three loads: tube (105 pounds); bipod and sight (53 pounds) and base plate (175 pounds)---each too heavy to be carried by one man for any distance. The 4.2-inch was most often carried by either a jeep-towed trailer or by a weapons carrier.
During the latter stages of the war, efforts were made to develop larger mortars. Two models, the 105mm T13 and the 155mm T25 saw what could only be described as "in the field test firing" during the Philippines Campaign. While they did deliver impressive amounts of firepower (the 105mm HE bomb weighed in at 26 pounds, with an effective range of 2000 yards. And the 155mm HE bomb weighed 60 pounds, with an effective range of 2500 yards), the sheer weight of the weapons preculuded their use. A review of records shows that the two models fired less than 3,000 rounds, before V-J Day.
Adm.Lee
12-24-2013, 11:06 AM
It's my understanding that a few battalions of 4.2" mortars were used in the early waves of most amphibious landings in the ETO and MTO. They were portable enough to be gotten to the beach on LCVP, and had the firepower and range to be effective while firing from just off the beach.
Having said that, I can come up with zero sources for this assertion at this moment....
dragoon500ly
12-24-2013, 12:44 PM
It's my understanding that a few battalions of 4.2" mortars were used in the early waves of most amphibious landings in the ETO and MTO. They were portable enough to be gotten to the beach on LCVP, and had the firepower and range to be effective while firing from just off the beach.
Having said that, I can come up with zero sources for this assertion at this moment....
The best source for the Normandy landings is "Spearheading D-Day, American Special Units in Normandy" from Histoire & Collections (THANK GAWD! For re-enactors!!!!)
"Much less space was needed to transport the 4.2-inch mortar units than a regular artillery battalion, so a chemical mortar battalion were assigned to the early waves. The mortars would be pulled ashore on small wheeled carts and would be able to be placed into action upon reaching dry land. On Omaha Beach, a major problem was that these powerful mortars needed a minimum range of 550 yards and in some places, the Germans were not pushed back that far until later in the day."
"The 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion was assigned to support the Omaha Beach landings, with A and C companies attached to the 16th Infantry Regiment and B and D companies to the 116th Infantry. The original plans called for the mortars to be landed with the 2nd waves. Due to the confusion on the beach, A and D companies were not landed unitl H+50, B company at H+90 and C company at H+9 hours."
"B Company was mis-landed on Beach Easy Green at about 0930 hours. The company managed to move inland through a uncleared minefield and set up their firing positions. It was not until 1700 hours that they were able to fire thier first fire mission of the day."
"Much of the 81st's equipment was lost during the landings and the troops had to man-carry the mortars and ammunition inland."
"The 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion was assigned to Utah Beach. A company was attached to the 1/8th Infantry, B company to the 2/8th Inf, C company to the 3/8th Inf and D company to the 3/22nd Inf. During the landing, two mortars and two jeeps were lost when an LCVP was sunk, but no personnel drowned."
"A and B companies were landed at H+5- and set up firing positions just behind the sand dunes. They quickly fired some 100 rounds before moving further inland 40 minutes later. C and D companies also landed and set up within the sand dunes, before firing some 40 additional rounds before moving inland."
Hope this helps!
dragoon500ly
01-13-2014, 08:54 AM
For the United States Army, the recoilless rifle did not enter service until the last year of the war. Development of the recoilless rifle started in early 1943 when the Ordnance Department stated researching the recoilless principle. The first pilot model was ready for testing on July 27, 1943. The results of these initial tests led to several modifications and improvements to the prototype. In October of 1943, was designated as the “Rifle, Recoilless,
57mm, T15E1” and went into extensive trails at Aberdeen Proving Grounds that November.
The T15E1 had its trigger and sear enclosed in metal housings. Further testing resulted in the replacement of this method by a firing mechanism connected by wire cables, this variant was standardized as the M-18. The
57mm recoilless rifle was deemed a high priority weapon and was rushed into production.
The M-18 weighed 45 pounds and was just over five feet in length. It could be fired from the shoulder (from an attached monopod/bipod assemble) or from the M-1917A1 .30-caliber machine gun tripod. The M-26 sight was standardized for use with the M-18.
Due to a lack of suitable manufacturing facilities at the time, the first M-18s were built by the Canadian firm of Dominion Engineering Works.
The M-18 fired three basic types of ammunition; these were a HE round that weighed 5.3 pounds and had a range of 4,340 yards; a antitank round (HEAT) that weighed 5.64 pounds with a range of 4,300 yards; and a smoke round that weighed 5.66 pounds, with a range of 4,340 yards.
Due to the problems with the 2.36-inch bazooka’s lack of power in certain situations, a rush shipment of the first 50 M-18s was sent to the European Theater of Operations in March of 1945. The first units to receive the new weapon were the airborne divisions, who loved the light weight and capabilities of the new weapon.
On May 19,1945, a Tenth Army demonstration team arrived on Okinawa after the initial invasion, with two M-18s.
The M-18 recoilless rifle was often packed for parachute delivery in the M-10 Paracrate which contained an M-18 and 14 rounds of ammunition. The M-12 Paracrate was also dropped, which contained an M-1917A1 tripod and additional 14 rounds of ammunition.
A total of 951 57mm recoilless rifles were delivered by the time production stopped in the summer of 1945.
After World War II, the introduction of the 3.5-inch bazooka brought about the end of the M-18s service with the U.S. Army, by the early 1950s the
M-18 was declared Obsolete and was transferred to military aid programs.
The success of the 57mm M-18 proved the validity of the basic design and work began on a larger and more powerful version. In March of 1944, the Ordnance Department began the design work on a 75mm recoilless rifle. The first pilot model was completed and started its test program in September of 1944.
The initial version was designated as the T21. As the testing program progressed, redesigns of the breech were made and this improved variant was standardized as the M-20.
Initial production of the M-20 started in March of 1945 by the Miller Printing Machine Company of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania.
The M-20 weighed 114.5 pounds and was 6 feet, 10 inches in length. The weight prevented the weapon from being fired from the shoulder and the M-20 was designed to be fired from the M-1917A1 tripod.
As with the M-18, the M-20 fired three types of ammunition; the HE round weighed 21.86 pounds and had a range of 7,000 yards; the antitank round (HEAT) weighed 20.54 pounds and had a range of 7,000 yards; the white phosphorus round weighed 22.61 pounds and had a range of 7,200 yards.
While the M-18 performed admirably, it was essentially used as a replacement for the bazooka. The M-20 represented what was considered to be a new class of weapon. It’s accuracy and power was favorably commented on by the infantrymen who had the chance to use the weapon.
One officer of the First Allied Airborne Army in the ETO stated the following:
“Its effective range for direct fire is the limit of visibility. The gun is as accurate as an M1 rifle and a tank can be hit in any desired spot.”
The M-20’s use was not limited to the ETO, as it was used with great effectiveness in the fighting on Okinawa. The same Tenth Army demonstration team deployed with two M-20s as well as two M-18s and used the weapons with great effectiveness. However, its limited numbers led the Ordnance Department to acknowledged that the recoilless rifle did not have any great impact on the outcome of the campaign.
The success of the recoilless rifles saw extensive plans for their deployment for the invasion of Japan.
A total of 1,238 M-20s were produced by the end of the war.
Unlike the M-18, the M-20 saw extensive in the United States Army until well after the Korean War.
dragoon500ly
01-15-2014, 12:42 PM
The use of fire as a weapon dates back to antiquity, but the genesis of the modern portable flame thrower was with the Imperial German Army in the first decade of the twentieth century. The first use of the flame thrower was against French troops at Malencourt in World War One. While the weapon proved terrifying to the French troops, its impact was limited due to reliability problems. The French and British armies rushed to develop their own versions of the flame thrower to counter the German threat. By 1916, both Allied nations had fielded their own versions, but like the Germans, they proved to be unreliable, vulnerable and only useful at very short range.
The United States Army did not field any flame throwers during the First World War and only limited research and development was carried out on such weapons after the Armistice. The R&D program took place under the auspices of the Army’s Chemical Warfare Service. Due to the unfavorable reputation of the weapon at the time, it was often joked that “the Chemical Warfare Service has acquired the habit for a long time of not mentioning the flame thrower at all, unless questions were asked about it.”
While the United States continued its lack of interest, other nations continued to develop flame throwers throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Tank-mount flame throwers were used by the Italians during the Abyssinian War (1935-1936) as well as German versions in the Spanish Civil War in 1937. During the opening days of World War Two, the Germans made use of flame throwers in Poland, Belgium and France.
The effective use of flame throwers as combat weapons was not lost on the U.S. Army and the Chemical Warfare Service was ordered on August 12, 1940 to accelerate its development of a flame thrower for the troops. Much of this developmental work was carried out at the Edgewood Arsenal, adjacent to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds.
The first experimental model was the E1 with the first few pilot models used for testing in the fall of 1940. The weapon had four basic components; a storage system for the fuel; a storage system for compressed gas to propel the fuel; a flame gun and an ignition system. The fuel supply consisted of five gallons of diesel oil, fuel oil or a blend of gasoline and oil. The gas system contained pressurized nitrogen. Both the fuel system and gas system were contained in a single vertical cylinder that held the fuel in one compartment and the gas in a second. A trigger mechanism released the fuel that was propelled by the gas and was ignited by an electrical spark supplied by a battery. The weapon weighed 70 pounds when fully loaded and had a rage from 14 to 21 yards.
Testing revealed that the E1 was cumbersome, heavy and unreliable. The engineers went back to work and the improved E1R1 was tested in March of 1941. The fuel and gas supplies were now in separate tanks as well as being fitted with improved values and a refined electrical system. It weighed 32 pounds empty and 57 pounds fully loaded.
In spite of its marked improvement, the E1R1 was still not a satisfactory weapon. Its range was still limited to between 15-20 yards and its time of use was only some 15-30 seconds. It was uncomfortable to carry and the values could not be easily reached by the operator. But the E1R1 was the only flame thrower in service by December, 1941. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, only 12 E1R1s were on hand.
The first recorded use of a E1R1 took place on December 8, 1942 at Buna Village, Papua. Its user had crawled through the underbrush to a spot some thirty feet from a Japanese emplacement. He fired his flame thrower only to watch a dribble of burning oil land some 15 feet in front of him. Twice more he tried to hit the emplacement, only to watch the flame fall to carry the full distance. Finally, a Japanese bullet glanced off the operator’s helmet, knocking him unconscious.
Hardly an auspicious beginning.
The Chemical Warfare Service continued to push development of a flame thrower and an improved E1R1 was standardized as the M-1 in August of 1941 with series production starting in March of 1942. By the end of year, the M-1 was appearing in the South Pacific. First combat use was on January 15, 1943 on Guadalcanal.
The M-1 was an improvement over the E1R1, but there were still a number of problems with the weapon. As one Chemical Warfare Service document explained:
“One example just received from the States, would function properly and spurt a jet of flame the customary fifteen yards, but its twin might eject a harmless stream of non-burning oil a distance of five yards. Batteries in the ignition circuit deteriorated rapidly in the hot, humid climate; inadequate waterproofing allowed moisture to corrode parts and to short-circuit the electrical system; minute rust holes in the tanks allowed compressed gas to escape and the pressure to drop. Chemical Maintenance Companies had their hands full inspecting, testing, repairing and servicing flame throwers to keep them in proper working order for the troops.”
Needless to say, the GI’s and Marines disliked and distrusted the M-1.
Work continued to increase the effective range of the flame thrower. The Chemical Warfare Service developed napalm as a thickening agent added to gasoline for use in incendiary bombs. Experimentation revealed that the use of a napalm-thickened gasoline mixture in a flame thrower greatly increased its range and lethality. As stated in a CWS report:
“…ordinary gasoline broke into a spray after it left the nozzle of the flame gun and burned itself out in a billow of fire while thickened fuel flew through the air in a compact stream that would ricochet into portholes and stick to flat surfaces.”
However, the new thickened fuel mixture would not work in the M-1. Engineers rushed a series of changes that would allow the M-1 to use the new mixture.
Most of these changes consisted of modifications to the fuel system, including the valves and pressure regulator. The flame gun was also modified to permit operation at the higher pressure required by the use of napalm. The waterproofing of the flame thrower was also improved.
The new weapon was standardized in late 1942 as the M-1A1. Externally, both the M-1 and M-1A1 were virtually identical, but the M-1A1 was a dramatic improvement with an effective range over three times greater than the M-1.
While there were still problems with the flame thrower’s electrical system, the M-1A1 was such an improvement that it was rushed into production with a run of some 14,000 units.
The first combat use of the M-1A1 took place in mid-1943. While generally successful, the problems with the ignition system plagued the weapon. Something better was needed.
M2-2 Flame Thrower
The Chemical Warfare Service continued its efforts to improve the flame thrower. Two improved versions were considered. The E2 featured a waterproofed electrical ignition system and lightweight aluminum tanks. The E3 had a streamlined flame gun, a better fitting backpack carrying system and a pyrotechnic cartridge type ignition system. This consisted of a plastic cylinder, much like a revolver, which held six patches of incendiary material. When the trigger on the front hand grip was pressed, a “match-mixture-coated pin” ignited one of the incendiary patches and the resulting shower of sparks ignited the fuel mixture. Six bursts could be fired before the cartridge had to be replaced. This type of ignition system had superior waterproofing and was more reliable, especially under typical jungle conditions.
Both models had very similar performance and both had an effective range with the thickened fuel mixture of about 60 yards. The engineers felt that the E3 would be a more rugged and reliable system and it was standardized in March of 1944 as the M2-2. The M2-2 weighed 70 pounds fully loaded and had a fuel capacity of four gallons. Some 24,500 M2-2s were built between 1944 and 1945.
The first combat use of the M2-2 was during the fighting on Guam in July of 1944. While the M2-2 was a definite improvement over the previous flame throwers, it still had drawbacks. It was too heavy when fully loaded, uncomfortable to carry for long distances and had a limited fuel capacity. Still it was a reliable weapon and saw service until well after the end of the war.
Targan
01-17-2014, 11:52 PM
The M2-2 Flame Thrower... [snip] was standardized in March of 1944 as the M2-2. The M2-2 weighed 70 pounds fully loaded and had a fuel capacity of four gallons. Some 24,500 M2-2s were built between 1944 and 1945.
The first combat use of the M2-2 was during the fighting on Guam in July of 1944. While the M2-2 was a definite improvement over the previous flame throwers, it still had drawbacks. It was too heavy when fully loaded, uncomfortable to carry for long distances and had a limited fuel capacity. Still it was a reliable weapon and saw service until well after the end of the war.
The US must have provided at least a few to Allied forces in the Pacific because I have seen movie footage of the Battle of Balikpapan in Borneo in 1945 (the Australian 7th Division, with US, UK and Dutch support), the last great Australian amphibious assault of WWII, and there is really clear footage of Australian troops using what looks very much to me as the M2-2 as you've described it. From the range of the flame streams it's clear whatever weapon it is is filled with napalm.
dragoon500ly
01-18-2014, 11:25 AM
The US must have provided at least a few to Allied forces in the Pacific because I have seen movie footage of the Battle of Balikpapan in Borneo in 1945 (the Australian 7th Division, with US, UK and Dutch support), the last great Australian amphibious assault of WWII, and there is really clear footage of Australian troops using what looks very much to me as the M2-2 as you've described it. From the range of the flame streams it's clear whatever weapon it is is filled with napalm.
Should have said the first U.S. combat use was on Guam.
Numbers of the M2-2 were supplied via Lend-Lease to the British (for testing only) as well as the Free French, Russians and the Australians. As to the exact numbers, I've never been able to track down anything saything that a specific number were provided, and the reference works I've accessed as well as the offical records all claim that these were for evaluation only. I was not aware of any combat use by the Australians, any chance that you can provide any further details?
Targan
01-18-2014, 08:50 PM
I was not aware of any combat use by the Australians, any chance that you can provide any further details?
Apologies, I don't have any solid information at all really.
The footage I saw was in a compilation of black and white British newsreel footage in a film called Balikpapan that screened on free to air TV here in Australia on Anzac Day last year. I had a copy saved on my PS3 (which I use for recording TV) but I deleted it after re-watching it recently.
A quick internet search has turned up the following (none of it from the TV film I recorded):
There's US newsreel combat footage of a flamethrower being used at Balikpapan at 1m 16s in this video: Allied troops invade - World War II - Australian 7th Division, Douglas-MacArthur (http://www.criticalpast.com/video/65675072727_allied-troops-invade_World-War-II_Australian-7th-Division_Douglas-MacArthur) . In that footage you can't see who's holding the flamethrower but given that the land combat forces involved were almost exclusively Australian, it's likely that it was an Aussie soldier.
The website https://archive.org/ won't let me link directly to the video, but at 11m 18s of the video July 1945 newsreel: from the Potsdam Conference to the 914mm "Little David" mortar (it includes US newsreel footage filmed at Balikpapan) you can see clearly that it's an Aussie soldier firing a flamethrower. Is it an M2-2?
dragoon500ly
01-19-2014, 03:26 PM
The website https://archive.org/ won't let me link directly to the video, but at 11m 18s of the video July 1945 newsreel: from the Potsdam Conference to the 914mm "Little David" mortar (it includes US newsreel footage filmed at Balikpapan) you can see clearly that it's an Aussie soldier firing a flamethrower. Is it an M2-2?
I'm stuck at work so I can't download much of anything on the computer, but the easy way to tell the difference is that the M-1 flame gun looks like a wand with a lever at the end, the M2-2 has a forward and aft pistol grip on its gun, the nozzle is also a tapered cone.
If you are a fan of classic Hollywood movies, the flame thrower most commonly uses is the M2-2, the only film that I've seen with a M-1 is "Saving Private Ryan".
dragoon500ly
01-25-2014, 08:29 AM
Unit Nickname Campaigns
1st Armored Division 'Old Ironsides' Algeria-French Morocco; Tunisia; Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; North
Apennines; Po Valley
2nd Armored Division 'Hell on Wheels' Algeria-French Morocco; Sicily; Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland;
Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
3rd Armored Division 'Spearhead' Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
4th Armored Division Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
5th Armored Division 'Victory' Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
6th Armored Division 'Super Sixth' Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
7th Armored Division 'Lucky Seventh' Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
8th Armored Division 'Tornado' Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
9th Armored Division 'Phantom' Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
10th Armored Division 'Tiger' Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
11th Armored Division 'Thunderbolt' Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
12th Armored Division 'Hellcat' Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace;Central Europe
13th Armored Division 'Black Cat' Rhineland; Central Europe
14th Armored Division 'Liberator' Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
16th Armored Division Central Europe
20th Armored Division Central Europe
dragoon500ly
01-25-2014, 08:33 AM
Unit Nickname Campaigns
1st Cavalry Division 'First Team' New Guinea; Bismarck Archipelago; Leyte; Luzon
2nd Cavalry Division (Colored) European Theater (without inscription)
dragoon500ly
01-25-2014, 08:37 AM
Unit Nickname Campaigns
1st Infantry Division 'Big Red One'
Algeria-French Morocco; Tunisia; Sicily; Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
2nd Infantry Division 'Indianhead'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
3rd Infantry Division 'Rock of the Marne'
Algeria-French Morocco; Tunisia; Sicily; Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; Southern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
4th Infantry Division 'Ivy'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
5th Infantry Division 'Red Diamond'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
6th Infantry Division 'Sightseeing Sixth'
New Guinea; Luzon
6th Airborne Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
7th Infantry Division 'Bayonet'
Aleutian Islands; Eastern Mandates; Leyte; Ryukyus
8th Infantry Division 'Pathfinder'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland, Central Europe
9th Infantry Division 'Varsity'
Algeria-French Morocco; Tunisia; Sicily; Normandy; Northern France;
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
9th Airborne Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
10th Mountain Division 'Mountaineers'
North Apennines; Po Valley
11th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
11th Airborne Division 'Angels'
New Guinea; Luzon
12th Infantry Division 'The Plymouth Division'
American Theater
13th Airborne Division
Central Europe
14th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
15th Airborne Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
17th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
17th Airborne Division 'Golden Talon'
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
18th Airborne Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
19th Infantry Division
American Theater
21st Airborne Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
22nd Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
24th Infantry Division 'Victory'
Central Pacific; New Guinea; Leyte; Southern Philippines; Luzon
25th Infantry Division 'Tropical Lightning'
Central Pacific; Northern Solomons; Guadalcanal; Luzon
Americal Division
Guadalcanal; Northern Solomons; Leyte; Southern Philippines
Philippine Division
Philippine Islands
dragoon500ly
01-25-2014, 08:41 AM
26th Infantry Division 'Yankee'
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
27th Infantry Division 'New York'
Central Pacific; Western Pacific; Ryukyus
28th Infantry Division 'Keystone'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
29th Infantry Division 'Blue & Grey'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Central Europe
30th Infantry Division 'Old Hickory'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
31st Infantry Division 'Dixie'
New Guinea; Southern Philippines
32nd Infantry Division 'Red Arrow'
New Guinea; Southern Philippines; Luzon
33rd Infantry Division 'Prairie'
New Guinea; Luzon
34th Infantry Division 'Red Bull'
Tunisia; Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; North Apennines; Po Valley
35th Infantry Division 'Sante Fe'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
36th Infantry Division 'Texas'
Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; Southern France; Rhineland; Ardennes- Alsace; Central Europe
37th Infantry Division 'Buckeye'
Northern Solomons; Luzon
38th Infantry Division 'Cyclone'
New Guinea; Southern Philippines; Luzon
39th Infantry Division 'Delta'
American Theater
40th Infantry Division 'Grizzly'
Bismarck Archipelago; Southern Philippines; Luzon
41st Infantry Division 'Sunset'
New Guinea; Luzon; Southern Philippines
42nd Infantry Division 'Rainbow'
Rhineland; Central Europe
43rd Infantry Division 'Winged Victory'
Guadalcanal; Northern Solomons; New Guinea; Luzon
44th Infantry Division
Northern France; Rhineland; Central Europe
45th Infantry Division 'Thunderbird'
Sicily; Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; Southern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
dragoon500ly
01-25-2014, 08:46 AM
46th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
48th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
50th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
55th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
59th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
61st Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
62nd Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
63rd Infantry Division 'Blood & Fire'
Rhineland; Central Europe
65th Infantry Division 'Battle Axe'
Rhineland; Central Europe
66th Infantry Division 'Panther'
Northern France
67th Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
68th Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
69th Infantry Division 'Fighting 69th'
Rhineland; Central Europe
70th Infantry Division 'Trailblazer'
Rhineland; Central Europe
71st Infantry Division 'Red Circle'
Rhineland; Central Europe
72nd Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
73rd Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
74th Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
75th Infantry Division
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
76th Infantry Division 'Onaway'
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
77th Infantry Division 'Statue of Liberty'
Western Pacific; Leyte; Ryukyus
78th Infantry Division 'Lightning '
Rhineland; Ardennes; Alsace; Central Europe
79th Infantry Division 'Cross of Lorraine'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
80th Infantry Division 'Blue Ridge'
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
81st Infantry Division 'Wildcats'
Western Pacific; Leyte
82nd Airborne Division 'All American'
Sicily; Naples-Foggia; Normandy; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
83rd Infantry Division 'Thunderbolt'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
84th Infantry Division 'Railsplitters'
Rhineland; Ardennes; Alsace; Central Europe
85th Infantry Division 'Custer'
Rome-Arno; North Apennines; Po Valley
86th Infantry Division 'Black Hawk'
Central Europe
87th Infantry Division 'Golden Acorn'
Rhineland; Ardennes; Alsace; Central Europe
88th Infantry Division 'Blue Devils'
Rome-Arno; North Apennines; Po Valley
89th Infantry Division 'Rolling W'
Rhineland; Central Europe
90th Infantry Division 'Tough Ombres'
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
91st Infantry Division 'Pine Tree'
Rome-Arno; North Apennines; Po Valley
92nd Infantry Division (Colored) 'Buffalo'
North Apennines; Po Valley
93rd Infantry Division (Colored) 'Bloody Hand'
Northern Solomons; Bismarck Archipelago; New Guinea
94th Infantry Division 'Neuf Quatres
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
95th Infantry Division 'Victory'
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
96th Infantry Division 'Deadeye'
Leyte; Ryukyus
97th Infantry Division 'Trident'
Central Europe
98th Infantry Division 'Iroquois'
Pacific Theater (without inscription)
99th Infantry Division 'Checkerboard'
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
100th Infantry Division 'Century'
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
101st Airborne Division 'Screaming Eagles'
Normandy; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
102nd Infantry Division 'Ozerk'
Rhineland; Central Europe
103rd Infantry Division 'Cactus'
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
104th Infantry Division 'Timberwolves'
Northern France; Rhineland; Central Europe
105th Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
106th Infantry Division 'Golden Lion'
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
107th Infantry Division
Planned for activation , but canceled due to manning problems
108th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
119th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
130th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
135th Airborne Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
141st Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
157th Infantry Division
Operation Fortitude deception unit
Adm.Lee
01-25-2014, 05:08 PM
FWIW, I am reading "Marshall and his generals" by Stephen Taaffe this week. It's focused on corps, field army, army group, and theater commanders, and how they were selected and promoted. A lot of names have cropped up that one rarely hears, if ever-- generals who never got the chance to leave the States, or who shipped out with commands but were shouldered aside for someone with more experience.
There's a bit more on the rivalry between Eisenhower and Devers (the latter was able to outmaneuver the former in several instances, which may have rankled Ike).
The system generally would be Marshall sending a list of candidates to the theater commanders when a new HQ was needed, and the men on the spot would select from a list. Sometimes, the chief of staff would indicate his preference, which the commanders might or might not accept.
It's sometimes fascinating to think of the might-have-beens, such as Stilwell or Eichelberger going to North Africa instead of China or the Pacific.
-- Clark going to France instead of sticking it out in Italy,
-- Eisenhower going to Washington as Army chief of staff and Marshall taking the ETO for Overlord.
-- Three generals (Collins, Patch, and Corlett) who had made amphibious landings in the Pacific, taking key roles for D-Day. (Alternately, the Navy bringing Terrible Turner to run Neptune!)
On the whole, I think we can agree that the US Army picked pretty well, most of the higher formation commanders did good work.
dragoon500ly
01-30-2014, 05:51 PM
Marshall always wanted the SHAEF job over Ike, so I can see Ike switching over to Chief-of-Staff, by IRL, Marshall was much more useful to FDR/Truman.
Can you picture MacArthur as SHAEF?
With Clark taking his place in the Pacific?
dragoon500ly
01-17-2019, 11:55 AM
Prepared to be confused.
The U.S. Army entered World War Two with a mixture of obsolescent World War One pieces as well as a small but growing number of new production equipment. I’ll try to explain the major differences where I can. I will not, at this time, go into a detailed description of construction.
Enjoy!
dragoon500ly
01-17-2019, 11:59 AM
The Anti-tank gun is specifically, an artillery piece designed to destroy enemy armor. The towed anti-tank gun is normally used from a static, defensive position. Their initial use started in the later wars of World War One were artillerymen used their field guns and howitzers to defend against attacking enemy armor, and in the interwar years and during World War Two, it was common practice to train artillerymen to engage enemy armor in direct fire. While trained to engage, it was considered to be a waste of artillery resources and personnel to do so. By World War Two, it was the practice to issue anti-tank gun to infantry units, manned by specialist infantrymen.
At the start of World War Two, the most common anti-tank guns were 25mm, 37mm, 40mm (2-pounder) and 45mm. Against prewar tanks, their performance was highly successful, but as newer tank designs were introduced (with increasing armor), the race to design a anti-tank gun to match accelerated. By the mid-war years, anti-tank guns had increased in size to 50mm and 57mm. The earlier weapons were easy to move and to conceal. The new guns required larger trucks to move them and were difficult to conceal, dig-in, withdraw or reposition. As tank armor increased yet again, the drive to introduce still larger calibers increased as well, by the end of the war, the anti-tank gun was almost impractical in their role, and their size, weight and expense was considered a liability.
Meanwhile, the effect of very compact hollow charge warheads was being noted and a number of countries began producing man-portable anti-tank weapons utilizing this ammunition. The development of man-portable, shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launchers began in 1941; most could be reloaded, but a few such as the German Panzerfaust were fired from disposable tubes. Unlike anti-tank guns, their light weight made them easily portable by individual infantrymen on the battlefield, and they offered similar degrees of firepower whilst being quicker and cheaper to produce.
After the war ended, by and large, anti-tank guns disappeared from most Western countries, in favor of shoulder-fired rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and eventually wire-guided anti-tank missiles.
37mm Gun M-3 and M-3A1 on Carriage M4A1
Standard
The 37 mm Gun M3 is the first dedicated anti-tank gun fielded by United States forces in numbers. Introduced in 1940, it became the standard anti-tank gun of the U.S. infantry with its size enabling it to be pulled by a jeep. However, the continuing improvement of German tanks quickly rendered the 37 mm ineffective and, by 1943, it was being gradually replaced in the European and Mediterranean theaters by the more powerful British-developed 57 mm Gun M1. In the Pacific, where the Japanese tank threat was less significant, the M3 remained in service until the end of the war.
Like many other light anti-tank guns, the M3 was widely used in the infantry support role and as an anti-personnel weapon, firing high-explosive and canister rounds.
In addition to its anti-tank role, the M-5 and M-6 37mm guns were used in various vehicles, such as the Light Tank M-3 and M-5, the medium tank M-3 and the M-8 armored car. By the end of the war, some 18,702 M-3/M-3A1 guns were produced.
Weight of the weapon (firing order) was 912lbs, 950lbs in travel order. Elevation and depression ranges from-10 degrees to +15 degrees. Traverse is 30 degrees R/L. Maximum range was 12,800 yards for the HE round and 7,500 yards for the APC round. Maximum armor penetration for the APC round was 2.4 inches at 500 yards. Rate of fire was 15-20 rounds per minute.
Ammunition consisted of the M-74 AP (penetration of 1.42in at 500yds); the M-63 HE shell (containing 1.36oz of flaked TNT); the M-51B1 APC round and the M-2 Canister round (containing 122 3/8-inch steel balls).
57mm Gun M1 on Carriage M-1, M-1A1, M-1A2 or M-1A3
Standard
The North African campaign rapidly convinced the Army that the 37mm gun was too light to be able to successfully engage enemy armor. The decision was made to acquire the British 6-pounder Mark 2 gun and the drawings were received in early 1941 and converted into standard U.S. dimensions, tolerances and threads. It was adopted into service in May 1941. The only major differences between the American and British weapons is that the American version is 16-inches longer and a muzzle velocity about 100fps greater. Total production of the U.S. version was 15,637 pieces.
Weight of the weapon is 2,810lbs. Elevation and depression ranges from +5 degrees to +15 degrees. Traverse is 45 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 10,620yds. Maximum armor penetration is 3.11 inches at 1,000yds. Rate of fire is 12-15rpm.
In U.S. service, the only issued round was the M-86 APC.
As for the multiple carriages…
M-1 is the British carriage with changes in dimensions, clearances and threads to meet U.S. standard methods. It is a two wheel, split-trail type with a curved shield and uses handwheel traversing and elevation gears. It is fitted with commercially available wheels and tires. Limited Standard.
M-1A1 is the M-1 carriage but fitted with combat wheels and tires. Limited Standard.
M-1A2 removes the traversing handwheel and gear mechanism and can be freely traversed on its pintle by the gunner pushing and pulling on his shoulder piece. Substitute Standard.
M-1A3 features a modified lunette and trail lock that allows for a reduced turning circle when being towed. Standard.
3-inch Gun M-5 on Carriage M-1, M-1A1, or M-2
Standard
This is the heavy anti-tank gun that equipped the Tank-Destroyer (Towed) Battalions. It was developed in September 1940 with a demand that it be capable of stopping then known enemy tank. In order to speed development the decision was made to adapt various items then in current supply/manufacture. It consists of the barrel of the AA Gun M-3 fitted to the breech of the 105mm Howitzer M-1 and mounted on adopted Howitzer Carriage M-2. The result was Standardized in December 1941 and placed into production in late 1942. Total production of both types was 2,500 pieces.
Weight in firing order is 4,875lbs. Elevation and depression ranges from+5 degrees to +30 degrees. Traverse is 22.5 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 15,400 yards. Maximum armor penetration is 3.93 inches at 1,000 yards. Rate of fire is 8-12rpm.
Ammunition available consists of the M-42A1 HE shell; the M-79 AP round (armor penetration of 3.93in at 1,000yds); and the M-62A1 APC round.
And the carriages…
M-1 is the standard 105mm Howitzer Carriage M-2 with modifications to the cradle to accept the 3-inch gun tube. It is a split trail, two-wheel carriage fitted with a vertical shield. Limited Standard.
M-1A1 is the M-1 modified by the Tank-Destroyer Board with the shield sloping backwards and fitted with axle stops and firing segments. Standard.
M-2 is exactly the same as the M-1A1 but is of new manufacture instead of being a modified M-1 carriage. Standard.
75mm Gun M-1897A2, M-1897A4 on Carriages M-2A1, M-2A2 and M-2A3
Standard
This is the French 75mm M1897 Field Gun. It is constructed in the U.S., but the French and U.S. parts are interchangeable.
Weight in firing order: 3,400lbs. Elevation and depression: -9 degrees +45 degrees. Traverse is 30 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 13,870yds. Rate of fire is 6rpm.
Ammunition available is the M-48 HE shell; M-72 AP round (armor penetration is 2.7in at 1,000yds); and the M-61 APC round (armor penetration is 2.5in at 1,000yds).
Carriages M-2A1 and M2A2 are designed for high speed towing, they are split trail, two-wheeled designs.
Carriage M-2A3 is a modification of the M-2A1/M-2A2 with improved clearance for the axle.
I've included the 75mm in spite of its intended role as the standard field piece, at least in the early days of the war. While production was gearing up for the new anti-tank guns, the old M-1897A2 and M-1897A4 were pressed into service as anti-tank weapons and were even mounted on the Half Track M-3 as a Gun Motor Carriage.
dragoon500ly
01-17-2019, 12:03 PM
75mm Pack Howitzer M-1A1 on Carriages M-1, M-3A1, M-3A2, M-3A3 and
M-8
Standard
Originally designed for pack transport, animal draft and low-speed towing. Animal was disconnected prior to the war and the special accessories made obsolete. Development started in 1902 and the M-1 was standardized in 1927. Slight changes in the M-1 were later made and this became the
M-1A1. The primary use of this version was in mountainous terrain.
Weight in firing order was 1,269lbs. Elevation and depression ranges from -5 degrees to +45 degrees, Traverse is 3 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 9,760yds and the rate of fir is 6rpm.
Ammunition available includes the M-41A1 HE shell; M-48 HE with Tracer shell; and the M-66 HEAT shell (armor penetration of 3in at howitzer ranges).
The M-1 carriage is a box-trail, two-wheel unit designed for pack transport and low-speed towing. It is equipped with wooden spoked wheels.
M-3A1 carriage is designed for high-speed towing and is a redesign of the
M-1 carriage. It is a split-trail, two-wheeled design. Limited Standard.
M-3A2 basically a M-3A1 carriage that has been fitted with an armor shield. Standard.
M-3A3 this is a M-3A1 or M-3A2 carriage equipped with combat tires. Standard
The M-8 carriage is designed for airborne use and is identical to the M-1 carriage but is fitted for high-speed towing and rubber wheels.
In this version of the pack howitzer, it can be broken down into nine loads for airborne operations. Paracrates M1 to M7 are constructed of plywood, each paracrate designed to accommodate a specific load. When packed, the paracrates are secured to bomb shackles and parachute harnesses by means of a quick release fitting. A standard 24-foot cargo parachute is attached to each load. Paracrates M1 to M5 together with the M9 are fastened together and dropped from parachute racks on the bottom of the transport. Paracrates M6 and M8 are carried as a daisy-chain load inside the fuselage, from which they are pushed out through the door of the airplane.
Paracrate M-1 contains the front trail, front reinforcement, rear reinforcement and a lifting bar. It weighs 326lbs.
Paracrate M2 contains the rear trail, axle, trail handspike, sponge staff, tool box and spare parts. It weighs 274lbs.
Paracrate M3 contains the bottom sleigh and recoil mechanism, aiming circle w/case, and a lifting bar. It weighs 326lbs.
Paracrate M4 contains the cradle and top sleigh. It weighs 331lbs.
Paracrate M5 contains the tube and a lifting bar. It weighs 302lbs.
Paracrate M6 contains the breech assembly and the panoramic telescope w/mount. Weight is 202lbs.
Paracrate M7 contains the two wheels. Wight is 217lbs.
Paracrate M8 consists of a chest holding 8 rounds of ammunition, packed in individual fiber containers. Weight is 290lbs.
Paracrate M9 consists of a cart holding a chest, holding 8 rounds of ammunition, packed in individual fiber containers. Weight is 304lbs.
105mm Howitzer M-2 and M-2A1 on Carriages M-2, M-2A1 and M-2A2
Standard
The standard artillery piece of the U.S. Army in World War Two. The design originated in a report by the Caliber Board in 1919 which made recommendations for future equipment as a result of experiences in France. Development began in 1920 and the Howitzer M-1 was standardized in 1928. No manufacture was undertaken. When the Army began its mechanization, it became necessary to redesign all horse-drawn equipment. The redesign of the M-1 began in 1933 but was then shelved and not restarted until 1936.
Weight in firing order: 4,980lbs. Elevation and depression: -4 degrees to +64 degrees. Traverse is 22.5 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 12,200 yards. Rate of fire is 2-4rpm.
Ammunition includes M-1 HE shell; M-67 HEAT shell (armor penetration is 4.5in at howitzer range; M-60 Chemical Shell (Smoke); M-60 Chemical Shell (WP); M-60 Chemical Shell, Gas (HS); M-84/M-84B1 Shell Chem (smoke).
Carriage M-2 is a prewar design fitted with electric brakes. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-2A1 uses standard brakes. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-2A2 is fitted with a new, larger gun shield, a larger buffer and an enclosed screw traverse. Standard.
105mm Howitzer M-3 on Carriage M-3 and M-3A1
Standard
A lightweight version of the Howitzer M-2 designed for airborne use or for other tasks where light weight is an advantage. It fires the same ammunition as the M-2, except for using a smaller propelling charges. The barrel and breech mechanism are those of the Howitzer M-2,with the barrel reduced in length by 27in.
Weight in firing order is 2,495lbs. Elevation and depression is -9 degrees to +65 degrees. Traverse is 22.5 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 8,295yds. Rate of fire is 15rpm.
The Carriage M-3 is assembled from the 75mm Howitzer Carriage M-3A1 with the 75mm Howitzer Carriage M-8 recoil mechanism. Substitute Standard.
The Carriage M-3A1 is fitted with shields. Standard.
155mm Howitzers M-1917, M-1917A1 on Carriages M-1917, M-1917A1, M-1917A2, M-1917A3, M-1917A4
Limited Standard
The first 155mm howitzers used by the U.S. Army, they were designed and manufactured in France by the Schneider Company. In turn, they were superseded by the M-1918 which was in turn superseded by the M-1 as the standard 155mm howitzer. The M-1917 and M-1918A1 were short, heavy cannons with built-up barrels.
Weight in action was 8,184lbs. Elevation and depression was 0 degrees to 42 degrees. Traverse was 3 degrees L/R. Maximum Range was 12,400yds and rate of fire was 1-2rpm.
Carriage M-1917 was a French manufactured carriage with a box trail, steel-tired wooden wheels and a curved gun shield. Recoil and counter recoil of the howitzer was regulated by a hydropneumatic recoil system, housed in a sleigh to which the howitzer is connected. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A1 this the M-1917 carriage with a straight gunshield, a sight port, rubber-tired wheels and provision for a quadrant sight and a panoramic sight. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A2 when the M-1917A1 carriage is modified with a cradle lock and drawbar for motor draft, it is redesignated as the Carriage M-1917A2. These modifications eliminate the need for a limber. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A3 this modification includes a high speed axle, wheels with pneumatic tires, a drawbar and a cradle traveling lock. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A4 the addition of torque rods to a Carriage M-1917A4 results in the Carriage M-1917A4.
155mm Howitzer M1918 on Carriage M-1918, M-1918A1 and M-1918A3
Substitute Standard
Similar in build, weight, dimensions and ballistics to the M-1917 and M-1917A1. The firing mechanism is of the screw type and is provided with a block-latch assembly as a safety measure.
Weight in firing order: 8,184lbs. Elevation and depression is 0 degrees to +42 degrees. Traverse is 3 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 12,400yds, Rate of fire Is 2rpm.
Carriage M-1918 In its main construction details, this is similar to the Carriage M-1917. The wheels have rubber tires and the shield consists of right and left plates suitably connected together. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1918A1 experiments in 1933 for the purpose of adapting the 155mm howitzer to high speed transport resulted in connecting the carriage to the prime mover by means of a draw bar and in new wheel bearings to reduce friction as well as pneumatic-tired wheels. Limited Standard,
Carriage M-1918A3 this is the Carriage M-1918A1 when equipped with torque rods. Limited Standard.
155mm Howitzer M-1 on Carriage M-1
Standard
The barrel is longer and heavier than the barrels of previous models.
Weight in firing order is 11,966lbs. Elevation and depression is 0 degrees to +65 degrees. Traverse is 26 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 16,000yds. Rate of fire is 2rpm.
Carriage M-1 is interchangeable with the Carriage M-2 used for the Gun 4.5-inch M-1. Length of recoil varies automatically with the elevation and zone of fire. Equilibrators of the spring type neutralize the unbalanced weight of the tube. The carriage has a split trail, pneumatic tires and air brakes. Standard.
8-inch Howitzer M-1 on Carriage M-1
Standard
Based on the British 8-inch Howitzers, Mk. VI, Mk. VII and Mk. VIII-1/2 and issued to the AEF during World War One. The original design started in 1919 but lapsed until resurrected in 1927 as a partner-piece for a new 155 mm gun. It was standardized as 8 inch Howitzer M1 in 1940.
Weight in firing order: 31,700lbs. Elevation and depression: 0 degrees to +64 degrees. Travers is 30 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 18,510 yards. Rate of fire is 1 round in 2 minutes.
240mm Howitzer M-1918M1A1 on Carriage M-1918A2
Limited Standard
Adopted by the AEF in 1918 as the super heavy artillery piece. This is a French manufactured unit. 330 were purchased during World War One.
Weight in firing order: 41,296lbs. Elevation and depression: +1 degree to +60 degrees. Traverse is 10 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 16,400 yards. Rate of fire is 1 round in 5 minutes.
240mm Howitzer M-1 on Carriage M-1
Standard
The 240 mm Howitzer M-1, was a towed howitzer used by the United States Army. The 240 mm M-1 was designed to replace the World War I era 240 mm Howitzer M-1918 which was based on a 1911 French design and was outdated by World War II. The project to replace the M-1918 began in 1941.
It was the largest field piece used by the US Army during the war except for naval ordnance adapted into railway guns. The weapon addressed the requirement for super heavy field artillery capable of attacking heavily reinforced targets like those likely to be found along the Siegfried Line. A total of 315 were produced.
Weight in firing order: 64,700lbs. Elevation and depression: +15 degrees to +65 degrees. Traverse is 22.5 degrees L/R. Maximum Range is 25,225 yards. Rate of fire is 1 round per 2 minutes.
swaghauler
01-17-2019, 09:58 PM
75mm Pack Howitzer M-1A1 on Carriages M-1, M-3A1, M-3A2, M-3A3 and
M-8
Standard
Originally designed for pack transport, animal draft and low-speed towing. Animal was disconnected prior to the war and the special accessories made obsolete. Development started in 1902 and the M-1 was standardized in 1927. Slight changes in the M-1 were later made and this became the
M-1A1. The primary use of this version was in mountainous terrain.
Weight in firing order was 1,269lbs. Elevation and depression ranges from -5 degrees to +45 degrees, Traverse is 3 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 9,760yds and the rate of fir is 6rpm.
Ammunition available includes the M-41A1 HE shell; M-48 HE with Tracer shell; and the M-66 HEAT shell (armor penetration of 3in at howitzer ranges).
The M-1 carriage is a box-trail, two-wheel unit designed for pack transport and low-speed towing. It is equipped with wooden spoked wheels.
M-3A1 carriage is designed for high-speed towing and is a redesign of the
M-1 carriage. It is a split-trail, two-wheeled design. Limited Standard.
M-3A2 basically a M-3A1 carriage that has been fitted with an armor shield. Standard.
M-3A3 this is a M-3A1 or M-3A2 carriage equipped with combat tires. Standard
The M-8 carriage is designed for airborne use and is identical to the M-1 carriage but is fitted for high-speed towing and rubber wheels.
In this version of the pack howitzer, it can be broken down into nine loads for airborne operations. Paracrates M1 to M7 are constructed of plywood, each paracrate designed to accommodate a specific load. When packed, the paracrates are secured to bomb shackles and parachute harnesses by means of a quick release fitting. A standard 24-foot cargo parachute is attached to each load. Paracrates M1 to M5 together with the M9 are fastened together and dropped from parachute racks on the bottom of the transport. Paracrates M6 and M8 are carried as a daisy-chain load inside the fuselage, from which they are pushed out through the door of the airplane.
Paracrate M-1 contains the front trail, front reinforcement, rear reinforcement and a lifting bar. It weighs 326lbs.
Paracrate M2 contains the rear trail, axle, trail handspike, sponge staff, tool box and spare parts. It weighs 274lbs.
Paracrate M3 contains the bottom sleigh and recoil mechanism, aiming circle w/case, and a lifting bar. It weighs 326lbs.
Paracrate M4 contains the cradle and top sleigh. It weighs 331lbs.
Paracrate M5 contains the tube and a lifting bar. It weighs 302lbs.
Paracrate M6 contains the breech assembly and the panoramic telescope w/mount. Weight is 202lbs.
Paracrate M7 contains the two wheels. Wight is 217lbs.
Paracrate M8 consists of a chest holding 8 rounds of ammunition, packed in individual fiber containers. Weight is 290lbs.
Paracrate M9 consists of a cart holding a chest, holding 8 rounds of ammunition, packed in individual fiber containers. Weight is 304lbs.
105mm Howitzer M-2 and M-2A1 on Carriages M-2, M-2A1 and M-2A2
Standard
The standard artillery piece of the U.S. Army in World War Two. The design originated in a report by the Caliber Board in 1919 which made recommendations for future equipment as a result of experiences in France. Development began in 1920 and the Howitzer M-1 was standardized in 1928. No manufacture was undertaken. When the Army began its mechanization, it became necessary to redesign all horse-drawn equipment. The redesign of the M-1 began in 1933 but was then shelved and not restarted until 1936.
Weight in firing order: 4,980lbs. Elevation and depression: -4 degrees to +64 degrees. Traverse is 22.5 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 12,200 yards. Rate of fire is 2-4rpm.
Ammunition includes M-1 HE shell; M-67 HEAT shell (armor penetration is 4.5in at howitzer range; M-60 Chemical Shell (Smoke); M-60 Chemical Shell (WP); M-60 Chemical Shell, Gas (HS); M-84/M-84B1 Shell Chem (smoke).
Carriage M-2 is a prewar design fitted with electric brakes. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-2A1 uses standard brakes. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-2A2 is fitted with a new, larger gun shield, a larger buffer and an enclosed screw traverse. Standard.
105mm Howitzer M-3 on Carriage M-3 and M-3A1
Standard
A lightweight version of the Howitzer M-2 designed for airborne use or for other tasks where light weight is an advantage. It fires the same ammunition as the M-2, except for using a smaller propelling charges. The barrel and breech mechanism are those of the Howitzer M-2,with the barrel reduced in length by 27in.
Weight in firing order is 2,495lbs. Elevation and depression is -9 degrees to +65 degrees. Traverse is 22.5 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 8,295yds. Rate of fire is 15rpm.
The Carriage M-3 is assembled from the 75mm Howitzer Carriage M-3A1 with the 75mm Howitzer Carriage M-8 recoil mechanism. Substitute Standard.
The Carriage M-3A1 is fitted with shields. Standard.
155mm Howitzers M-1917, M-1917A1 on Carriages M-1917, M-1917A1, M-1917A2, M-1917A3, M-1917A4
Limited Standard
The first 155mm howitzers used by the U.S. Army, they were designed and manufactured in France by the Schneider Company. In turn, they were superseded by the M-1918 which was in turn superseded by the M-1 as the standard 155mm howitzer. The M-1917 and M-1918A1 were short, heavy cannons with built-up barrels.
Weight in action was 8,184lbs. Elevation and depression was 0 degrees to 42 degrees. Traverse was 3 degrees L/R. Maximum Range was 12,400yds and rate of fire was 1-2rpm.
Carriage M-1917 was a French manufactured carriage with a box trail, steel-tired wooden wheels and a curved gun shield. Recoil and counter recoil of the howitzer was regulated by a hydropneumatic recoil system, housed in a sleigh to which the howitzer is connected. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A1 this the M-1917 carriage with a straight gunshield, a sight port, rubber-tired wheels and provision for a quadrant sight and a panoramic sight. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A2 when the M-1917A1 carriage is modified with a cradle lock and drawbar for motor draft, it is redesignated as the Carriage M-1917A2. These modifications eliminate the need for a limber. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A3 this modification includes a high speed axle, wheels with pneumatic tires, a drawbar and a cradle traveling lock. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1917A4 the addition of torque rods to a Carriage M-1917A4 results in the Carriage M-1917A4.
155mm Howitzer M1918 on Carriage M-1918, M-1918A1 and M-1918A3
Substitute Standard
Similar in build, weight, dimensions and ballistics to the M-1917 and M-1917A1. The firing mechanism is of the screw type and is provided with a block-latch assembly as a safety measure.
Weight in firing order: 8,184lbs. Elevation and depression is 0 degrees to +42 degrees. Traverse is 3 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 12,400yds, Rate of fire Is 2rpm.
Carriage M-1918 In its main construction details, this is similar to the Carriage M-1917. The wheels have rubber tires and the shield consists of right and left plates suitably connected together. Limited Standard.
Carriage M-1918A1 experiments in 1933 for the purpose of adapting the 155mm howitzer to high speed transport resulted in connecting the carriage to the prime mover by means of a draw bar and in new wheel bearings to reduce friction as well as pneumatic-tired wheels. Limited Standard,
Carriage M-1918A3 this is the Carriage M-1918A1 when equipped with torque rods. Limited Standard.
155mm Howitzer M-1 on Carriage M-1
Standard
The barrel is longer and heavier than the barrels of previous models.
Weight in firing order is 11,966lbs. Elevation and depression is 0 degrees to +65 degrees. Traverse is 26 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 16,000yds. Rate of fire is 2rpm.
Carriage M-1 is interchangeable with the Carriage M-2 used for the Gun 4.5-inch M-1. Length of recoil varies automatically with the elevation and zone of fire. Equilibrators of the spring type neutralize the unbalanced weight of the tube. The carriage has a split trail, pneumatic tires and air brakes. Standard.
You need the M114 155mm Towed Howitzer. It was introduced in 1942 and I was shooting one at Ft. Drum NY in 1992. They are STILL in mothballs with the Army... along with a couple of THOUSAND M2 105mm Towed Howitzers.
dragoon500ly
01-18-2019, 02:32 AM
You need the M114 155mm Towed Howitzer. It was introduced in 1942 and I was shooting one at Ft. Drum NY in 1992. They are STILL in mothballs with the Army... along with a couple of THOUSAND M2 105mm Towed Howitzers.
The M-114 is simply the Korean War vintage M-1A1 155mm howizer. It was renumbered in 1962. Since this work is WW2 oriented, I didn't list either of these.
dragoon500ly
01-20-2019, 07:28 AM
155mm Gun M-1917, M-1918M1 on Carriages M-1017, M-1917A1, M-1918, M-1918A1, M-2 and M-3
Substitute Standard
The M-1918M1 started out as a French design (Canon de 155mm GPF) and served as the French Army’s standard field gun from 1917 to World War Two, it was used by the U.S. Army as the 155mm Gun M-1917. A slightly modified version was adopted by the AEF in 1918 as the 155mm Gun M-1918. It was used by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps as their primary heavy artillery gun until 1942, when it was gradually replaced by the 155mm Gun M-1A1.
Weight in firing order: 23,302lbs. Elevation and depression: 0 degrees to +35 degrees. Traverse is 30 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 20,100 yards. Rate of fire is 4rpm.
155mm Gun M-1A1 on Carriage M-1
Standard
The 155 mm Gun M1 was a 155 millimeter caliber field gun developed and used by the United States military. Nicknamed "Long Tom", it was produced in M1 and M1A1 variants. Developed to replace the Canon de 155mm GPF (M-1917, M-1918), the gun was deployed as a heavy field weapon during World War II, and also classed as secondary armament for seacoast defense.
Weight in firing order: 30,600lbs. Elevation and depression: 0 degrees to +65 degrees. Traverse is 30 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 25,395 yards. Rate of fire is 1rpm.
8-inch Gun M-1 on Carriage M-2
Standard
In 1919, the Westervelt Board described the ideal heavy gun for future development having a bore of 194mm to 8-inches, a projectile of about 200lbs, and a range of 35,000 yards. More striking was that it be must be road transportable. At this time no other country had such a road-transportable field gun. Low-priority design work occurred until 1924. Serious development began in June 1940 of an 8-inch (203 mm) gun that would have a range of 33,500 yards (30,600 m), a road speed of 25 mph (40 km/h), be transported in two loads weighing no more than 44,000lbs and be suitable for rail movement. The gun used the same projectile as the 8-inch coastal gun and the US Navy's 8-inch cruiser gun. Using the same carriage as the 240 mm howitzer M1 eased development, but the gun was very troublesome and was not standardized until January 1942. The main problems were excessive bore wear and poor accuracy, but it was felt that nothing better could be produced in a timely manner. Thus it entered production at a low rate and in small numbers. Only 139 weapon systems were produced before production ceased in 1945.
Weight in firing order: 69,300lbs. Elevation and depression: +10 degrees to +50 degrees. Traverse is 15 degrees L/R. Maximum range is 35,635yds. Rate of fire is 1rpm.
dragoon500ly
01-20-2019, 07:31 AM
In World War One, super heavy artillery was often mounted on railroad carriages for better mobility. This idea fell out of fashion as World War Two started, now the Germans, Russians, and British made limited use of railway guns, the U.S. Army only deployed one model:
8-inch Navy Gun Mark VI, Mod 3A2 on Railway Mount M-1A1
Standard
The 8-inch Navy gun Mk.VI, M3A2 on railway mount M1A1 was a World War II improved replacement for the World War I-era 8-inch (203 mm) M-1888 gun and was used by the US Army's Coast Artillery Corps in US harbor defenses. The guns were also mounted in fixed emplacements on the barbette carriage M-1A1. These guns were US Navy surplus 8"/45 caliber guns from battleships scrapped under the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. Mark VI (also Mark 6) was the Navy designation.
The gun was quickly assembled at the start of World War Two. Its carriage was developed from an experimental 12-inch railway howitzer carriage with all-round rotating mount and outriggers and was designed to track a target ship for seacoast defense. All told, some 32 railway versions and 16 barbette versions were produced. They had a short service life, being cut up for scrap after the war.
Weight in firing order: 230,000lbs. Elevation and depression: +5 degrees to +45 degrees. Maximum range is 32,000 yards. Rate of fire is 2rpm.
dragoon500ly
01-20-2019, 07:38 AM
Coastal defense was the responsibility of the U.S. Army, it was concerned with the operation of mobile anti-ship batteries and fixed coastal fortifications. In the inter-war years and early war years it was also responsible for antiaircraft defense.
6-inch Gun M-1897, M-1900, M-1903, M-1905 and M-1908 on disappearing carriages or barbette mountings.
Standard
As part of the reforms of the Endicott Board, a massive construction program of new breech-loading cannons, mortars and submarine mines was implemented between 1885 and 1905. The 6-inch caliber was chosen, as in many applications, for combining a relatively heavy shell with rapid hand loading. Initially, most of the guns were mounted on disappearing carriages; when the gun was fired, it dropped behind a concrete and/or earthen wall for protection from counter-battery fire, but it was soon discovered that this type of mounting decreased the rate of fire. In 1900 a low profile pedestal mount was introduced. This would later be replaced by a high-angle barbette carriage after World War One.
The following models were used:
Model; Weight; Number Built; Carriage; Max Range; Rate of Fire
M-1897; 16,216lbs; 29; disappearing; 14,600yds; 3rpm
M-1900; 19,968lbs;45; pedestal; 17,000yds; 6rpm
M-1903; 19,990lbs; 90; disappearing; 14,600yds; 4rpm
M-1905; 21,148lbs; 33; disappearing; 14,600yds; 4rpm
M-1908; 12,500lbs; 6 ; pedestal; 17,000yds; 6rpm
M-1; 20,550lbs; 143; high-angle barbette; 27,500yds; 8rpm
10-inch Gun M-1895, M-1888, M-1900 on disappearing carriages
Limited Standard
As part of the reforms of the Endicott Board, a massive construction program of new breech-loading cannons, mortars and submarine mines was implemented between 1885 and 1905. Initially, the 10-inch M-1895 guns were mounted on pedestals, this was later changed to disappearing carriages, where the gun was loaded and aimed in the lowered position and then raised to fire. For the most part the 10-inch guns were deployed to the Philippines, sold via Lend-Lease or scrapped 1943-44.
Weight in firing order (disappearing): 67,200lbs. Elevation and depression (disappearing) 0 degrees to +12 degrees. Traverse (disappearing): 170 degrees (varies per installation. Maximum range is 14,700 yards. Rate of fire: 2-3rpm.
12-inch Coast Defense Mortar
Substitute Standard
One of the Endicott Board findings was to place the primary reliance on seacoast defense on “mortars” rather than guns. Over the years, some 476 of these mortars were deployed.
The M-1890M1 was one of the most powerful pieces of its era and was the most common type emplaced to guard U.S. harbors. This mortar and other models, the M-1886, M-1908, and M-1912, usually fired deck-piercing (also called armor-piercing) shells. These weighed from 700 to 1,046 pounds and had heavy, hardened steel caps, designed to pierce a ship's deck armor before the shell exploded. These mortars, firing the half-ton shells at an elevation of 45 degrees, had a range of 12,019 yards when firing the 1,046lbs shell and up to 14,610 yards when firing the 700lb shell. In addition, what was first called a “torpedo” shell (HE shell) weighing between 800 to 1,000 pounds was available. These were thin-walled shells roughly 5 feet in length that carried explosive charges of about 130 pounds and were meant to detonate upon contact with the deck of a ship, scattering fragments among the crew.
Coast defense mortars were never intended to be fired in the direct mode, they were not even actually mortars, rather being extremely short barreled howitzers. Their ranges depended on two factors, first was, of course, the elevation of the weapon. The second was the size of the powder charge loaded into its breech. The desired range was specified in terms of “zones”.
The smallest zone (shortest range) was Zone 1, and the largest (longest range) was Zone 9. With the so-called "aliquot charge", up to 9 equal-sized, disk-shaped bags of powder (each about 2 inches thick and containing 6.3 pounds of powder) could be attached to a 10th (or "base") bag, by means of cloth binding straps that were sewn to the base bag. Often the base bag was painted red, indicating that the powder assembly was to be loaded into the breech "red end last," so that it bumped up against the closing breech block. The red base bag also contained a small charge of black powder as an igniter. When the breech was closed, a detonator was inserted through the breech block and contacted the igniter, ready to set off the full powder charge.
The earliest coast defense mortar batteries were designed as so-called “Abbot Quads” (after its developer). Abbot Quads were rectangular configurations of four rectangular mortar pits, with each pit designed to mount four of the huge mortars.
The idea behind the Abbot Quad was to have all 16 mortars in the four pits fire at once, producing a shotgun-like salvo of plunging shells optimally dispersed to destroy an enemy ship. It was argued that targeting each mortar individually would not produce many more hits than salvo firing, since early fire control procedures and equipment were often error-prone. Furthermore, proponents of salvo firing pointed out that it made for easier command and control (particularly under battle conditions), since all mortars in all pits of a battery could be given the same firing data. One key problem of the Abbot Quad was that it placed four of these massive weapons in a very small pit, this resulted in often only having two tubes manned instead of all four due to the cramped conditions. As a result, partially due to the crowded conditions as well as improvements in fire control, the emphasis was switched to individually firing each tube, this resulted in mortar batteries being built into two four-tube firing bays
Weight in firing order: 157,000lbs. Elevation and depression: 0 degrees to +40-+70 for firing. Traverse: 360 degrees. Maximum range: 14,610 yards. Rate of fire: 1 rpm.
12-inch Gun, M-1895A2, M-1895A3, M-1895M1A2 and M-1895M1A3 on disappearing and barbette carriages.
Substitute Standard
These weapons were large coastal artillery pieces installed in fixed positions to defend major seaports between 1895-1945. Most were installed on disappearing carriages, with early installations on low-angle barbette mountings. From 1919, 19 long-range two-gun batteries were built using the M1895 on an M-1917 long-range barbette carriage.
Weight in firing order: 115,000lbs (disappearing), 406,700lbs (barbette). Elevation and depression: 0 degrees to +20 degrees (disappearing); 0 degrees to +35 degrees (barbette). Traverse: 170 degrees (disappearing, varies per installation); 360 degrees (barbette). Maximum range: 18,400 yards (disappearing); 30,100 yards (barbette). Rate of fire: 1 1/3 rpm.
16-inch Mark 2 Gun on Barbette Carriage
Standard
The 16"/50 caliber Mark 2 gun and the near-identical Mark 3 were guns originally designed and built for the United States Navy as the main armament for the South Dakota-class battleships and Lexington-class battlecruisers. At the time, they were among the heaviest guns built for use as naval artillery.
As part of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, both of these ship classes were cancelled part way through construction, leaving a surplus of about 70 examples of the 16-inch/50 which had already been built. Twenty were released to the US Army, between 1922–1924, for use by the Coast Artillery Corps, the rest were kept in storage for future naval use. Only ten of the twenty available guns were deployed (in five two-gun batteries) prior to 1940.
In January 1941 all but three of the remaining fifty Mark 2 and Mark 3 guns were released to the Army. They were the primary armament of 21 two-gun batteries built in the United States and its territories during World War II.
Weight in firing order: 1,172,500lbs. Elevation and depression: 0 degrees to +46 degrees. Traverse: 145 degrees. Maximum range: 45,100 yards. Rate of Fire: 2rpm.
dragoon500ly
02-05-2019, 04:43 PM
Multiple Machine Gun Carriage, M-51
Standard
This weapon is the M-45 MMGM from the M-16 MMGC mounted on a large twin-axle trailer. Intended to provide antiaircraft protection for truck convoys. It consisted of four M-2HB machineguns mounted on an armored turret. It is a power-driven, mount with a self-contained power unit. It can be traversed through 360 degrees and can be elevated from -10 degrees to +90 degrees. Traverse/elevation speed is 60 degrees per second.
Maximum ceiling is 15,583ft. Maximum ground range is 7,403yds.
Multiple Machine Gun Trailer, M-55
Standard
This is the M-45 MMGM stripped of its armor shield and mounted on a light two-wheeled trailer. It is issued to airborne units. It consisted of four M-2HB machineguns mounted on an armored turret. It is a power-driven, mount with a self-contained power unit. It can be traversed through 360 degrees and can be elevated from -10 degrees to +90 degrees. Traverse/elevation speed is 60 degrees per second. Maximum ceiling is 15,583ft. Maximum ground range is 7,403yds.
37mm Antiaircraft Gun M-1A2 on Carriage M-3A1
Substitute Standard
Developed in 1939, this was the U.S. Army’s light antiaircraft cannon. Some 7,278 were produced in towed and a further 2,332 in SP mounts. This SP mount consisted of a single 37mm gun and two M-2HB machineguns on the M-2/M-3 halftrack, resulting in the T28/T28E1/M15/M15A1 series of multiple gun motor carriages. The towed versions were soon replaced by the 40mm Bofors M-1 gun while the SP mount served in self-propelled antiaircraft battalions.
Weight in firing order: 6,124lbs. Elevation and depression: -5 degrees to +90 degrees. Traverse is 360 degrees. Maximum ceiling is 18,600ft. Maximum horizontal range is 8,875yds. Rate of Fire is 120rpm.
40mm Antiaircraft Gun M-1 on Carriages M-2 or M-2A1
Standard
Originally developed in 1934 by the AB Bofors Company of Sweden, the 40mm was soon in widespread service in European armies. American interest in the weapon began with the U.S. Navy in 1938 and the U.S. Army in 1940. After testing of British supplied Bofors, approval was given for U.S. manufacture with a license agreement with the Bofors Company in 1941.
The 40mm M-1 is essentially the original Bofors design, but with dimensions, clearances and threads modified to U.S. standards. It is a recoil-operated automatic weapon using a vertical sliding wedge breech-block. Ammunition is supplied in four round clips. A clip is placed into the clip guides and the first round is manually loaded into the breech. Upon firing, the empty case is ejected down a chute to the front of the weapon while the next round is automatically loaded. If the foot pedal trigger is held down, the weapon will fire and repeat as long as the clip guide is supplied with ammunition.
The Carriage M-2/M-2A1 is a modified form of the original Bofors carriage. This mount allowed the gun to be fired from the carriage with no setup required, although with limited accuracy. If time was available for setup, the gunners used the tow-bar and muzzle lock as levers, raising the wheels off the ground and thereby lowering the gun onto supporting pads. Two additional legs folded out to the sides, and the platform was then leveled with hand cranks. The entire setup process could be completed in under a minute.
The M-5 (Airborne) Carriage is a modified version of the M-2A1. It is a smaller platform that can be transported by C-46/C-47 aircraft. It can be easily unload from the plane and be moved on its two wheel carriage for short distances by manpower. It can also be hooked to any prime mover, although care should be taken to insure that the two speed is less than five miles per hour, in order not to damage the smaller wheels and suspension. Weight of the Weapon and carriage in firing order is 4,495lbs.
Weight in firing order: 5,549lbs. Elevation and depression: -11 degrees to +90 degrees. Traverse is 360 degrees. Maximum ceiling is 23,490 feet. Maximum horizontal range is 10,850 yards. Rate of fire is 120rpm.
3-inch Antiaircraft Gun M-1 and M-3 on Mounts M-1A1, M-1A2, M-2A1 and
M-2A2
Standard
The development of medium caliber mobile antiaircraft artillery for the U.S. Army started when a 75mm Gun, M1916 was placed on a truck during the First World War. Shortly thereafter, the caliber of the antiaircraft gun was fixed at 3-inches.
The first mobile antiaircraft gun and mount of the new caliber to be designed and manufactured was the 3-inch Gun, M1918 and the Mount M1918. This was soon replaced in the postwar period by the Mount M2. Postwar development continued, focussing on increasing the muzzle velocity and rate of fire, improving road performance, the stability of the firing platform as well as producing a more efficient fire control system. By 1928, the new 3-inch Gun M-1 entered service. Further development of a removeable liner for the barrel saw the 3-inch Gun M-3 entering service.
Weight in firing order: 16,800lbs. Elevation and depression: -1 degree to +80 degrees. Traverse is 360 degrees. Maximum ceiling is 31,200 feet. Maximum horizontal range is 14,780 yards. Rate of fire is 25-30rpm.
90mm Antiaircraft Gun M-1 and M-1A1 on Mount M-1A1
Substitute Standard
Aviation progress, especially in the field of high-altitude bombing, demanded reconsideration of requirements for mobile antiaircraft artillery. In order to cop with rapidly maneuvering bombers, flying at modern speeds at extreme heights, it was essential to develop weapons with longer range, greater muzzle velocity and a larger effective shell-burst area than the older 3-inch gun was capable of delivering. Introduced into service in 1938, the 90mm gun was the U.S. Army’s primary heavy anti-aircraft gun, So well did the new 90mm weapon perform that is was also deployed as a coast defense gun and as a anti-tank and later as tank armament.
Weight in firing order: 19,000lbs. Elevation and depression: 0 degrees to 80 degrees. Traverse is 360 degrees. Maximum ceiling is 43,500 feet. Maximum horizontal range 18,960 yards. Rate of fire: 32rpm.
90mm Antiaircraft Gun M-2 on Mount M-2
Standard
By July of 1941, it was decided that all mobile antiaircraft guns should be dual-purpose weapons capable of engaging both aerial and ground targets when the mount was on wheels. This was impossible with the M-1A1 mount, since it was necessary to remove the wheeled bogie and emplace the mount on its pedestal base with outriggers extended before opening fire. The redesigned carriage entered service as the M-2. Modifications to the gun included an armored shield to protect the gun crew. Another feature was the fitting of a combination fuse setter-rammer to increase the rate of fire in the antiaircraft role.
Weight in firing order: 32,300lbs. Elevation and depression: -10 degrees to +80 degrees. Traverse is 360 degrees. Maximum ceiling is 58,860 feet. Maximum horizontal range is 19,500 yards. Rate of fire: 37rpm.
120mm Antiaircraft Gun M-1 on Mount M-1
Standard
The 120 mm Gun M1 was the United States Army's standard super-heavy anti-aircraft gun during World War II., complementing the smaller and more mobile M2 90 mm gun in service.
The Army first worked on a 120 mm gun after the end of World War I, with a prototype being presented in 1924. The system was considered far too heavy and expensive to be useful, and the project slowed down, although it was never canceled outright.
In 1938, the Army reviewed its needs for newer AA systems and decided to order new systems for both the heavy and super-heavy role. The former was filled by the new M1 90 mm gun, which replaced the earlier M3 3-inch gun then in use. For the super-heavy role, the 120 mm gun design was dusted off and mated to a new eight-wheel carriage, designated 4.7-inch M1 when it was accepted in 1940. The 120mm M-1 entered service in 1944.
Weight in firing order: 61,500lbs. Elevation and depression: -5 degrees to +80 degrees. Traverse is 360 degrees. Maximum ceiling is 57,500 feet. Maximum horizontal range is 27,300 yards. Rate of fire: 10rpm.
dragoon500ly
02-07-2019, 04:39 AM
M-1 Combat Car and Light Tank M-2 Series
The National Defense Act of 1920 set tanks as the responsibility of the infantry and the general staff defined the purpose of tanks as the support of infantry units. Light tanks were defined as weighing five tons or less – so they could be carried by trucks – and medium tanks no greater than 15 tons to meet bridge weight limits. With very tight restrictions on spending, tank development in the U.S. was limited to a couple of test vehicles a year. The mechanization of the army was promoted by General Douglas MacArthur (Chief of Staff of the US Army) who believed that the cavalry should have tanks for an exploiting role rather than acting in support of the infantry. To allow U.S. Army cavalry units to be equipped with armored fighting vehicles, the tanks developed for the cavalry were designated "combat cars"
In the mid-1930s, the Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) built three protype models of the M-2 light tank, based on the British Vickers 6-ton tank. At the same time RIA also built a version for the U.S. Cavalry called the T-5 Combat Car. The only major difference between the two was that the T-5 used vertical volute suspension (VVSS) while the T-2 had leaf springs as on the Vickers. The T-5 was developed further and the T5E2 was accepted for production as the "M-1 Combat Car".
The M-1 Combat Car saw only limited production from 1937-1939. All told only 113 were produced. They remained in U.S. Army service until 1943 as training vehicles.
This led to a second prototype of the T-2, the T-2E1 in April 1934, adopting VVSS from the T-5. The T-2E1 was armed with one .30 caliber and one .50 caliber Browning machine gun mounted in a fixed turret; another .30 caliber Browning was mounted on the hull front. The T-2E1 was selected for production in 1935 as the M-2, which mounted only the M-2 Browning in a small one-man turret, and the .30 caliber in the hull. A total of seventeen were produced.
After only 10 units were delivered, the Infantry Branch decided to switch to a twin turret configuration in the M-2A2, with a .30-caliber machine gun in a second turret. While the twin turret design was inefficient, it was a common design feature of many tanks in the 1930s. Further refinements to the M-2A2 produced the M-2A3 model, which incorporated a modified suspension system that reduced the tank's ground pressure. The weight increased to 10 tons. A total of 239 M-2A2 and 72 M-2A3 were produced.
Lessons learned from the Spanish Civil War made the U.S. Army realize that, in addition to machineguns, tanks would need to be armed with a cannon as well. The Cavalry had chosen to equip its Combat Cars with a single, larger turret so in 1938, the Infantry ordered a single M-2A3 too be modified with heavier armor and weapons. The new M-2A4 Light Tank was equipped with the M-5 37mm cannon, 25mm thick armor and seven-cylinder Continental R-670-9A radial gasoline engine. Other upgrades would include improved suspension, improved transmission, and better engine cooling. Production of the M-2A4 began in May of 1940 and ended in April 1942 with a total production run of 375.
By Pearl Harbor, the M-2A1, M-2A2 and M-2A4 were training vehicles, a role they would maintain until 1942. The U.S. Marine Corps, equipping its new tank battalions, chose the new M-3 Light Tank, but until production caught up, it took over 36 M-2A4s. Many of these tanks were assigned to A Company, 1st Tank Battalion where they took part in the invasion of Guadalcanal.
Light Tank M-3 “Stuart” Series
With the changing situation in Europe, the Army realized that its Light Tank M-2 series were obsolete and started designed its replacement. The New Light Tank M-3, with thicker armor, a modified suspension system and a new gun recoil system started production in March, 1941 until October 1943. It was armed with the same M-5 37mm cannon as on the M-2A4 and carried a total of five .30-caliber machineguns (coaxial, a antiaircraft mount on the turret top, in a ball mount on the hull front and two fixed in sponsons). The sponson machineguns would later be deleted, and the M-6 37mm cannon (with a longer barrel) would replace the M-5.
Combat weight of the M-3 was 13.7 tons. Armor protection for the hull front ranged from 16mm to 38mm; Hull sides from 16mm to 25mm; Hull top: 9mm; Hull bottom: 9mm to 13mm. Turret Front: 38mm. Turret Sides and rear: 32mm and Turret Top: 13mm. Crew consisted of four men (tank commander/loader, gunner, driver and assistant driver/bow gunner).
The M-3 used the same gasoline-fueled 7-cylinder Continental W-670 radial engine that powered the M-2A4. This gave a Road Speed of 36mph and a Cruising Range of 70 miles with 56 gallons of fuel.
The M-3 carried 103 rounds of 37mm and 8,270 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition.
A total of 4,526 M-3s were built.
The M-3A1 replaced the gasoline engine with a Guiberson T1020-4 9-cylinder diesel radial engine, as well as deleting the two sponson machineguns. Combat weight increased to 14.25 tons. Ammunition storage changed to 116 rounds of 37mm and 6,400 rounds of .30-caliber. A total of 1,285 were produced.
Modifications continued on the M-3 Light Tank as lessons learned from combat operations started its way back to the design boards. In August of 1942, The M-3A3 entered service with an improved turret with a bulge for the radio added to the rear. The hull was streamlined and was now welded. The front armor plate was extended forward and reinforced, providing great protection for the driver and assistant. The driver’s hatches were relocated from the front plate and were moved to the top plate.
The sponsons were lengthened to the rear of the vehicle and now contained additional gas tanks as well as ammunition storage. Other improvements include an easier steering mechanism, improved fire protection and ventilation, relocation of the battery, switch and instruments and provision of detachable headlights.
Combat weight of the vehicle climbed to 15.9 tons. Ammo stowage now included 174 rounds of 37mm and 7,500 rounds of .30-caliber.
A total of 3,427 of the M-3A3 were produced.
Light Tank M-5 “Stuart” Series
One of the quirks of the M-3 series was its reliance on a powerful, lightweight engine that, at the time, could only be resolved by using an aircraft radial engine. As the war progressed, demand for these radial engines to be used only by the aviation industry resulted in the development of a new engine by Cadillac. The Series 42 was a 16-cylinder Dual V-8, fitted with a twin Hydra-Matic transmission. This resulted in a powerplant quieter, cooler and roomier; as a bonus, the automatic transmission simplified crew training.
The hull is basically that of the M-3A3, but with a raised deck over the engine compartment. The turret was similar to that of the M-3A1, but with the lower drive-shaft tunnel required by use of the new engine, it was possible to relocate the turret traversing mechanism and much of the gyro-stabilizer under the turret basket, providing more space in the turret.
Armor protection was slightly improved with the Hull front ranging from 29mm to 64mm. Hull sides and rear from 25mm to 29mm. Hull top: 13mm and Hull bottom: 9mm to 13mm. Turret front was now 48mm. Turret sides was 33mm. Turret Top was 13mm.
Combat weight was 16.5tons. Maximum road speed was 36mph and it had a cruising range of 100 miles. Crew consisted of four men (tank commander/loader, gunner, driver and assistant driver/bow gunner).
Armament consisted of a M-6 37mm gun and three M-1919A4 Browning machine guns (coaxial, hull front and an antiaircraft mount). Ammunition storage consisted of 123 rounds of 37mm and 6,250 rounds of .30-caliber.
In September, 1942, the Light Tank M-5A1 entered production. The principal change was an improved turret, similar to that of the M-3A3. This lead to an increase in the combat weight to 16.9 tons. Ammunition stowage was improved and now 147 rounds 37mm and 6,500 rounds of .30-caliber were carried.
The M-5/M-5A1 remained in production through 1944 with a total run of 8,885 vehicles.
Total production run of the M-3 and M-5 series was 22,744 vehicles.
Light Tank (Airborne) M-22 “Locust”
In 1941, the British requested the development of a airborne light tank that could be delivered by glider to a landing zone. The Light Tank Mark VII Tetrach served this purpose for British Airborne, but it had not been designed for this purpose. The War Office then requested the War Department to develop and produce this design. The prototype was designated the Light Tank T-9 (Airborne) and was designed to be slung underneath the C-54 Skymaster transport and its dimensions also allowed it to be carried within the Hamilcar glider.
Design issues delayed production until late 1943 with a production run of 830 vehicles ending in early 1944. By this time, the design was considered to be obsolete and it was used as a training tank in the U.S., however, 260 were supplied to Britain under Lend-Lease. There it was considered to be not as reliable as the Tetrach and it was used as a training tank. In October 1944, the M-22 was issued to the 6th Airborne Armoured reconnaissance Regiment and eight took part in Operation Varsity in March 1945. It did not perform well in action. Five were damaged during landing, one was destroyed by a German self-propelled gun and only two went into action. The M-22 never saw use with the British Army after that.
Combat weight was 8 tons. Power plant was a Lycoming 0-435-T 6-cylinder inline gasoline engine. Road speed was 35mph and cruising range was 110 miles. Crew consisted of three men (tank commander/loader, gunner and driver).
Armor protection was very thin. Hull front 25mm. Hull sides ranged from 9 to 13mm. Hull Rear was 13mm; Hull top was 9mm and Hull bottom was 13mm. Turret front was 25mm; turret sides and rear was 13mm.
Armament consisted of a M-6 37mm gun and a coaxial .30-caliber machine gun. Provision for 50 rounds of 37mm and 2,500 rounds of .30-caliber were made.
Light Tank M-24 “Chaffee”
British combat experience in North Africa with the M-3 Stuart showed several shortcomings to the American design. Besides issues with limited range and poor crew conditions, the most serious was the poor performance of the 37mm gun. While to fire a HE shell, its antiarmor performance, especially against the later models of the Panzer Mark III and Mark IV indicated a need to seriously upgun.
Experiments proved that the basic M-3 chassis could fit a 75mm howitzer and this was later to enter service as the M-7 Howitzer Motor Carriage. But the 75mm lacked the antiarmor performance that was needed.
In April 1943, the Ordnance Corps, together with Cadillac (who manufactured the M5), started work on the new project, designated Light Tank T-24. The powerplant and transmission of the M5 were used together with some aspects of the experimental T-7. Efforts were made to keep the weight of the vehicle under 20 tons. The armor was kept light, with the glacis plate only 25 mm thick but sloped to maximize effectiveness. A new lightweight 75 mm gun was developed, a derivative of the gun used in the B-25H Mitchell bomber. The gun had the same ballistics as the 75 mm M3 in use by American tanks but used a thinly walled barrel and different recoil mechanism. The design featured 16 in (41 cm) tracks and torsion bar suspension, similar to the slightly earlier M-18 Hellcat tank destroyer, which itself started in production in July 1943. The torsion bar system was to give a smoother ride than the vertical volute suspension used on most US armored vehicles. At the same time, the chassis was expected to be a standard used for other vehicles, such as self-propelled guns, and specialist vehicles; known together as the "Light Combat Team". It had a relatively low silhouette and a three-man turret.
There is no turret basket, with the turret crew being provided with seats suspended from the turret base ring. The 75mm ammunition is stored on the floor of the vehicle in water-protected containers.
The first production M-24 rolled off the production line in October, 1943 and proved to be a success. Production orders totaling 4,731 quickly followed. Production ended in August, 1945.
Combat weight is 19.4 tons. Power plant is a Cadillac, Series 42 16-cylinder Dual V-8 (the same unit fitted to the M-5 series). Road speed is 35mph and the vehicle has a cruising range of 175 miles. The crew consists of four men (tank commander/loader, gunner, driver and assistant driver/bow gunner).
Armor protection consists of: Hull armor: 25mm; Hull sides ranging from 19mm to 25mm. Hull rear is 19mm. Hull top is 13mm and Hull bottom ranges from 13mm to 19mm. Turret front, sides and rear are 25mm. Turret top is 13mm. Gun shield is 38mm.
Armament consists of a M-6 75mm Gun, a M-2HB .50-caliber machine gun for antiaircraft protection, two M-1919A4 .30-caliber machine guns (coaxial and bow) and M-3 2-inch smoke mortar. Ammunition stowage consists of 48 rounds of 75mm, 440 rounds of .50-caliber, 3,750 rounds of .30-caliber and 14 rounds of 2-inch smoke bombs.
dragoon500ly
02-08-2019, 04:37 AM
In 1939, the Medium Tank M-2 entered service at the Rock Island Arsenal, with a total production run of 18 vehicles and 94 slightly improved M-2A1 tanks. With the outbreak of War in Europe, it rapidly became apparent that the new medium tanks were obsolete, as a result, the M-2 series never saw combat service and was used stateside as training vehicles.
The M-2 design featured a large number of machine guns, bullet deflector plates and a sloped glacis plate on the hull front. It was a development of the Light Tank M-2 Series and featured the vertical volute spring suspension (VVSS) and twin-wheeled bogies and a rubber-bushed and rubber-shod track, features that would be used on the future Medium Tanks M-3 and M-4. The power plant was a Wright R975 radial gasoline engine (originally designed for aircraft).
The M-2 had a high superstructure, with a sponson-mounted machine gun in each corner. Additional machine guns were fixed in the glacis plate and were fired by the driver. On top of the superstructure was a turret mounting a 37mm M-5 cannon with a coaxial machinegun and two additional machine guns were mounted on either side of the turret for antiaircraft protection.
The crew consisted of six men (tank commander/loader, driver and four gunners). Ammunition stowage consisted of 200 rounds of 37mm and 12,250 rounds of .30-caliber.
Maximum road speed was 26mph with a cruising range of 130 miles. Combat weight was 20.5 tons.
Armor protection was thin, measuring from 13mm to 51mm. An unusual design feature was the fitting of deflector plates on the rear fenders, the idea being that as the tank crossed a trench, the rear sponson machineguns could fire on these plates and the rounds would then be deflected down into the trench or into the area behind the tank. Sadly, this feature did not work.
dragoon500ly
02-08-2019, 04:41 AM
The events in Europe in the late Spring of 1940 emphasized the urgent necessity to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces. The success of the German “Blitzkrieg” underlined the requirement that the new forces be reorganized, but they must be armed with equipment second to none. The first move towards this reorganization was the formation of the separate Armored Force combining the tank elements that previously belonged to the Cavalry and the Infantry. A key item in its equipment was the Medium Tank M-2A1 but reports from observers in Europe indicated that its 37mm gun and light armor was already inadequate for a modern medium tank. The success of the 75mm short barreled cannon of the Panzer Mark IV clearly showed the need for a weapon at least as powerful for the new medium tank.
In June of 1940, new requirements was issued by the Ordnance Corps. This was standardized in July 1940 as the Medium Tank M-3. So urgent was the world situation that it was standardized and ordered into production long before the design was complete.
at Dunkirk. There was now a vital need to equip its armored units as quickly as possible. A British Tank Mission was dispatched to the U.S. to arrange for the purchase of armored vehicles. At first, it was hoped that the production of British designs in American factories would be possible. It was quickly realized that this would cause a dispersion of effort and an inefficient use of the available resources. The British were informed that only designs acceptable to the U.S. would be produced, but some modifications would be permitted on vehicles under British contracts. On this understanding, the British placed orders for the new M-3 with a modified crew compartment and a new turret.
During the summer of 1940, a great deal of change took place in the design of the M-3. The original concept was to thicken the armor and install a 75mm gun in the right front sponson on the M-2A1. A meeting of the various manufacturers along with representatives of the Armored Force met in Aberdeen Proving Grounds in August, 1940 to view a full size wooden mockup of the new tanks hull.
This initial version of the M-3 attempted to retain the heavy machinegun armament of the M-2A1. With the placement of the 75mm, a new auxiliary turret was mounted on the left sponson (with two .30-caliber machine guns). Armor thickness was increased to 51mm on the hull front and 38mm on the hull sides and rear.
Observing the shortcomings of the design, it was initially planned to limit total production to only 360 vehicles and to push the development of a tank that mounted the 75mm gun in a turret. But the urgent need for large numbers of new tanks by the British for the Middle East would not permit the limited production run.
The decision was made to delete the sponson machine guns and install pistol ports to cover these areas. The radio set was moved into the space vacated by the auxiliary turret. Fuel capacity was increased and the turret floor was lowered to give more head room in the turret.
In the meantime, the British designed a new turret with more room for the crew and a radio set carried in the extended turret bustle. The cupola was replaced by a circular hatch fitted with a rotating split hatch cover. The British named their version the General Grant I and the U.S. model was referred to as the General Lee I, both would be used in the North Africa fighting. Total production of the M-3 came to 4,924 tanks.
Combat Weight was 30.7 tons. Powerplant was a Wright-Continental R975 EC2 9-cylinder radial engine. This allowed the M-3 a maximum road speed of 24mph and a cruising range of 120 miles.
Armor protection comprised: Hull Front: ranging from38mm to 51mm; Hull sides of 38mm; Hull rear of 38mm, Hull top of 13mm; Hull bottom ranging from 13mm to 25mm. Turret Front, sides and rear of 51mm; Turret top of 22mm.
Armament comprised a 75mm Gun M-2 or M-3 (with 50 rounds of ammo); a 37mm Gun M-5 or M-6 (with 178 rounds of ammo) and three .30-caliber machineguns (coaxial, cupola antiaircraft and fixed glacis plate mount, fired by the driver) (total of 9,200 rounds of .30-caliber).
The Cruiser Tank Grant I was very similar, with a combat weight of 31 tons. The turret front armor was increased to 76.2mm.
Armament comprised a 75mm Gun M-2 (with 65 rounds of ammo), a 37mm Gun M-5 or M-6 (with 128 rounds of ammo), three .30-caliber machineguns (coaxial and two fixed in the glacis plate and provided with 4,084 rounds of ammo).
The M-3A1
One of the dangers of the M-3 was its riveted construction. The M-3A1 was made with cast armor upper hull. Production began in February 1942 and ended that August after a total run of 300 vehicles. Vehicle stats are the same as for the M-3, with a combat weight of 31.5 tons.
The M-3A2
The primary feature of this version was that upper hull was welded. Production began in January 1942 but ended after only 12 vehicles were completed.
The M-3A3 and M-3A5
By the Summer of 1941 it was rapidly becoming apparent that the limiting factor in armored vehicle production was the lack of suitable engines. The air-cooled radials of the Light Tank M-3 and the early versions of the Medium Tank M-3 were required for use in training aircraft, thus restricting the production of future tanks. Starting in August of 1941 contracts were let for the development of new tank engines. One of the first was a General Motors unit that consisted of a pair of standard 6-71 diesel truck engines. A noted feature of this design was its symmetrical engine block, allowing accessories to be mounted on either side of the blocks, placing them on the outside of the power plant. Another advantage of this power plant was that if one engine failed, the other could still be used to operate the tank.
A disadvantage was that the new engine was larger than the radial engine it replaced, requiring modifications to the engine compartment. To protect the radiators installed at the rear, the side and rear armor plates were extended down to the level of the tracks and the rear plate was sloped about 10 degrees from the vertical. The engine compartment doors of the M-3 was replaced by a single lower plate and a dust deflector was installed.
Because of the larger engine compartment, fuel tankage was reduced from 175 gallons to 148 gallons, but the superior performance of the diesel engines actually increased the cruising range to 160 miles.
This new vehicle, with its welded hull was standardized as the M-3A3 and a total of 322 were produced between January thru December 1942.
The same power plant was installed in the riveted hull version and this was standardized as the M-3A5, total production run during the same period was 591 vehicles.
The M-3A4
The final production version of the Medium Tank M-3 was the M-3A4, like the A3/A5 it also used an alternative powerplant, in this case the Chrysler A57 30-cylinder multibank engine. This was five 6-cylinder automobile engines, mounted in a star configuration and geared to operate as a single unit.
The large power plant required modifications to the standard M-3 hull. The engine compartment was lengthened by 11 inches and the hull upper rear armor plates were moved back 15 inches. A 4.25-inch blister in the hull floor was provided to give clearance for the cooling fan. Another bulge on the top of the rear deck covered the single radiator assembly which cooled the entire power plant. It also forced the removal of the two vertical fuel tanks in the engine compartment, but this was compensated by the enlargement of the two sponson fuel tanks.
The longer hull also required modifications to the suspension system, The center and rear bogie assemblies were moved to the rear, increasing the space between each set of bogies by 6 inches.
Combat weight was increased to 32 tons. There was no change to the armament or armor protection. The production run lasted from June 1942 to August 1942 when it was changed over to the new Medium Tank M-4. Total run was 109 vehicles.
Medium Tanks Ram I and Ram II
No discussion of the Medium Tank M-3 would be complete with adding the Canadian versions. The Medium Tanks Ram I and Ram II. The Grant I was always considered to be a interim version until the new Medium Tank M-4 entered service. Concerned over the shortcomings of the M-3 design, the British Tank Mission in collaboration with the Canadian General Staff designed a modified M-3 for production in Canada. This tank would use the standard M-3 power train and running gear, but with a redesigned upper hull and turret.
The Ram I featured a low silhouette cast turret mounting a British 2-pounder gun with a coaxial M-1919A4 machine gun. An additional .30-caliber machine gun was mounted on the turret roof for antiaircraft protection. The upper hull was a single large casting with the driver located on the right front and a small auxiliary turret on the left, mounting a .30-caliber machine gun. Hull doors on each side provided access to the interior. The Ram I entered production in January 1942 and consisted of a run of 50 vehicles before supplies of the new British 6-pounder arrived.
Combat weight was 32 tons. Armor protection comprised: Hull front: from 44mm to 76.2mm. Hull sides: from 44mm to 64mm. Hull rear: 44mm. Hull top 25mm to 44mm. Hull bottom: 13mm to 25mm. Turret front was 76.2mm. Turret Sides ran from 64mm to 76.2mm. Turret top was 25mm.'
Armament comprised a 2-pounder Gun Mark IX or Mark X (with 171 rounds of amm) and three .30-caliber machine guns (coaxial, antiaircraft and bow turret with 4,715 rounds of ammo). Crew consisted of 5 men (tank commander, gunner, loader, driver and assistant driver).
Power planet was the Wright-Continental R974 EC2 9-cylinder radial engine. Maximum road speed was 24mph. cruising range was 120 miles.
A total of 1,899 Ram II tanks through September 1943. Major modifications included the replacement of the auxiliary turret with a ball mounting and the removal of the hull side doors mid-way through the production run.
Combat weight was increased to 33 tons. There was no change to vehicle performance or armor protection.
Armament comprised a 6-pounder Gun Mark III or mark IV (with 92 rounds of ammo) and three .30-caliber machine guns (coaxial, antiaircraft and bow with 4,440 rounds of .30-caliber ammo).
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