Could the USSR have won a prolonged Hot War in Europe?

[aspqrz]

Back in the day, I would have said no, though I also would have said the war would inevitably go nuclear when one side or the other felt they were losing.

Since then we have had the shortcomings of the NATO, US, Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces increasingly brought to light, many of which ordinary punters had little way of sussing out back then.

So, purely as a mater of interest, and assuming that the Soviet planners' fantasy on being on the banks of the Rhine at D+5 (or whatever it was) was, indeed, a fantasy ... and that the NATO planners' fantasy of stopping the Soviets more or less dead in their tracks was, indeed, also a fantasy ... I am asking the following ...

Could the USSR have won a prolonged and entirely conventional war primarily fought in Europe and its peripheries?

Feel free to parse your answers/opinions/arguments by decade - 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s - but base them on what we know now, not what we thought we knew back then.

Note: I really don't have an axe to grind here ... my suspicion is that the Soviets couldn't have sustained a long duration war, and didn't have a high probability of achieving the quick victory they seemed to have planned for, but I'm not wedded to the idea.

I suppose a corollary to the basic question is ...

Could a conventional war primarily fought in Europe and its peripheries have avoided going nuclear, and for how long?

('peripheries' implies the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, Middle East etc. but feel free to parse it with any limits or expansions you feel realistic and/or inevitable)

As a child of the era, I don't believe it could have been avoided ... and there is evidence to suggest the Soviets didn't, either (though it probably isn't, and probably can't be, conclusive with the information at hand here and now) ... though I felt there was a possibility (of unspecified level of probability, but significantly greater than zero) that it may not have devolved into 'War Games' like 'Global Thermonuclear War.'

Ideas? Opinions?

Phil

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Are we waving a magic wand and completely removing N/B/C weapons from the battlefield? First of all, let me address this from the 1980s/90s perspective:

There's a lot of evidence to suggest we'd have had them. They would have wound up fuel-starved (and I'm not saying that based on the scenario presented in Red Storm Rising, I think tac air would have broken their supply lines) in a lot of cases. Based on things I've heard and actual Polish people I have spoken to, an attempt to "motivate" their socialist brethren in Poland to fight NATO would have fallen flat. There'd have been a lot of mutinies in Soviet-led Polish units. Again, that's based on discussions I've had with folks from Poland, so make of it what you will. That creates an enormous strategic problem for the Soviets - crossing hostile territory to even get to the battle area.

So say that's...seven divisions pinned down in Poland keeping them in line, assuming the Poles are just being passive-aggressive and not actively siding with NATO or declaring outright neutrality.

In the scenario, what's France doing? Are they honoring NATO commitments or sitting it out? That makes a big difference because if they are in on NATO's side obviously and directly, that's...what, eight, ten divisions? Couple armored and as many infantry.

I don't think anyone ISN'T aware of how tough ReForGer is going to be: the 3rd Battle of the Atlantic is going to be very difficult for NATO.

Oh, is this a surprise scenario? Did the Reds catch us off guard? Or was it a slow creep up in which deteriorating political situations allowed units to be moved into key positions? If it's a surprise, conventional air strikes with cruise missiles on G/I/UK stations may allow the Soviets free reign in the North Atlantic for weeks before the gaps can be plugged.

What about the Far East? What's China doing? Are they hanging back or putting pressure on the US PACFLT and PacRim concerns? If we can move all but a token force out of the far east, one wing to cover Japan with the Japanese, and a token division consisting of two fwd armored brigades and one Infantry back in Korea, that helps.

Assuming the following scenario of:

- no nukes, no chemical, no bio at ANY level (battlefield, theater or strategic)
- slow build-up, both sides are ready to go
- China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea sit it out
- Poland tells the USSR to get fucked
...then I think the whole Soviet drive gets about halfway into Germany, gets chopped up, Category B units told that they're fighting the Fascist Oppressors threatening Glorious Mother Russia come forward and see untold acres of air-destroyed T72's and T80's, morale starts to drop, and the whole thing goes to hell.

The Soviet Army arrests whomever signed off on this excursion back at the Politburo, some show trials happen, a few executions, and they sue to withdraw back to Iron Curtain lines and try to keep Poland and possibly Bulgaria and East Germany from murderfucking them, with a possible concession of freeing East Berlin and an entire land corridor (which they can shut at any time, oh and also no civilian towns or individual structures will inhabit) from W. Germany to Berlin, but try to keep the Pact together to save face.

If NATO demands a full surrender and dissolution of the Pact, they'll turn the war machine back on and keep killing until they are literally physically exhausted in men and materiel.

HOWEVER

If they catch NATO at, say, Christmastime, full surprise attack, pants around our ankles, it'll make the Norks driving Ridgeway to the Pusan Perimeter look like turning around to go back and get your wallet halfway to the grocery store. First thing is the Berlin Brigade will be annihilated (maybe even by "irregulars", e.g., spetznaz), they'll push 50 divisions of motor rifle through the Fulda and be a few KM from Brussels in about two weeks, demanding a surrender or they'll drown the city in artillery and airstrikes.

And again, since N/B/C weapons aren't in play, all the west could do is shrug, sign and leave, unless they were willing to sacrifice just about every soldier in the US, UK, Canada, etc. to try and push the now emplaced Soviet divisions out.

If Nuclear weapons are in play, and it's a Red Surprise, they'll soften up with chemical strikes on various bases, nuke hardened sites, the US will respond, and everything's fucked in about 48-72 hours because at that point the strategic birds are flying.

...

Now, briefly:

1950s, Maybe. However we were in full on must defend against the red hordes. The T34/85 and T54 and M47 and M48 were about par (if that matters). I think it's almost a coin toss.

1960s, Probably. US was spread out in SE Asia

1970s, probably. Post-Vietnam the US military was in a shambles. New systems weren't online yet or were in so few quantities that we didn't have enough to make a difference. Carter's sick joke of "Hollow Force" barely made sense on paper and wouldn't have worked in practice. By the time troops were called up and in place to use those stored weapons and flesh out divisions we'd be signing a surrender treaty outside the smoking ruins of DC.

[aspqrz]

Interesting data on the possibilities of non-compliance by the Warsaw Pact allies. Like a lot of people, I suspect, I always wondered how reliable the ordinary Warsaw Pact grunt (as opposed to Officers) would have been, especially if they ever saw the Soviet attack ... derailed.

As for the rest, I am assuming that we are after the initial stages of the war, regardless of whomever attacked first (though I'd assume a Soviet attack was more likely, if not likely overall), and that the staff plans on both sides have proved to be overly optimistic ... so, D+45 or so, I'd guess.

The Sovs haven't won, NATO hasn't lost, but hasn't thrown the Sovs back (or not all the way) and it's settling down for a long war ...

Can the Soviets win such a long war without resorting to use of WMDs?

(I'm assuming the US would regard use of CB weapons on any scale enough to be useful as a trigger for using nukes, as that seems to be long standing US policy).

From what I understand of the Soviet economic and political organisation, I think that the Red Army had a lot in common with the German WW2 army - designed to fight short, sharp, speedily victorious, campaigns. So I suspect they would have, to say the least, serious problems if it became a long term war.

It's just that I am not sure that NATO and the US would be all that much better off in the medium term.

Phil

[aspqrz]

1950s, Maybe. However we were in full on must defend against the red hordes. The T34/85 and T54 and M47 and M48 were about par (if that matters). I think it's almost a coin toss.

That's an interesting analysis. From what I have read, the reliability of the T-34/85 was even worse than that of the T-44 and T-54 (that is, they all had a short MTBF and were disposable after around 500 klicks or so ... if they lasted that long) ... I know US WW2 tanks and Allied postwar tanks were much more reliable (longer MTBF), but, of course, there were fewer of them.

I suspect it would come down to who had the better support services, including TacAir ... what was the state of the USAF at the time?

Phil

[Legbreaker]

I suspect it would come down to who had the better support services, including TacAir ... what was the state of the USAF at the time?

If it was anything like the marines, not good. I recall reading (can't remember where) that the US only had a handful of landing craft available for the amphibious landings at Inchon in Korea as they'd sold them all off at the end of WWII. I think it was just six still in service (out of how many thousands?) so there was a rush to beg/borrow/steal them back from their new owners for the offensive.

[dragoon500ly]

When I was stationed in Germany in 77-80 and 82-85, it was accepted that any Soviet attack would most likely start with chemical attacks on, at least the REFORGER sites and the airfields with massive Spetsnaz attacks on headquarters and communications sites.

Being stationed on the border, I can still remember watching the massive artillery park across from the Fulda Gap, and wondering when those 152mm pieces were going to make my patrol "interesting".

The intelligence we had access to had the front line divisions at high readiness with the combat units reinforced (extra platoon in the company, extra company in the battalion), and supplies for up to 72 hours of operations. The greatest fear for us was a sudden attack, in winter, straight from the barracks.

As more and more intelligent was released to us after the studies done on the Yom Kippur War, our training included more anti-Sagger drills as well as better intelligence on the T-62 tank, the attitude was more of that we can take them in a straight up attack, the question was would they start with chemicals and would we nuke back...

This is why I always had problems with t2ks limited strikes, the intention always was, since the U.S. no longer was producing chemical weapons and was destroying the older stockpiles, AND since we considered chemical and biological weapons as equal to nukes, as weapons of mass destruction and with the policy of immediate retaliation on weapons of mass destruction, World War III would of gotten far hotter, far earlier than GDW had planned. Loads of fun to think about when your unit was doing the nuke attack training!!!

[aspqrz]

Yes. Indeed. 'Interesting times.'

ISTR reading somewhere a while ago, probably post 89, that one Soviet VIP made a comment along the lines of 'only idiots in ivory towers believe that a limited nuclear war is possible' and then went on to vitriolically condemn US Think Tanks ... and, only slightly less vitriolically, the equivalent Russian Think Tanks.

The way I read it at the time, and I probably wasn't alone, was that the Russians were more likely to start a war, but only if they found themselves pushed into an untenable corner ... or what they believed to be such based on their particular world view.

I didn't see them as being opportunists, but as fearful ... and the only way they would attack was if they became fearful that their situation was so bad the only chance they had of survival was to attack first.

(I don't doubt that there were other possible triggers, but it seemed to me then, and still does, that they were no more fanatical warmongers than they accused the US of being)

Attacking from a position of weakness, in effect.

If the attack failed, or looked like it was failing, then the chance of them using nukes simply because they would feel they had nothing left to lose was ... high.

If the attack looked like it was going to be successful, then the temptation for the US (or Brits, or French ... hell, or even the Israelis, depending on when and where) to use nukes 'defensively' would be irresistable.

And, yes, once the Tactical weapons were used ... bang, literally ... that would have been that.

So, in a sense, you only use nukes under two circumstances ...

* When the target cannot retaliate in kind

or

* When you believe you have already lost.

Despite what Think Tank geniuses might have posited.

Phil

[Raellus]

The Soviet military of the mid-'80s were in a much better starting position, in terms of manpower and materiel, than NATO was. In that regard, at least, the Soviets were better prepared to win a long, drawn-out, conventional war of attrition.

Economically speaking, things weren't nearly as rosy for the U.S.S.R. By the late '80s, it's peacetime economy was in a shambles, with shortages of basic consumer goods. It simply couldn't continue to support a massive military and produce adequate quantities of basic necessities for public consumption.

That said, a command economy might be better suited to war than a capitalist one. I really don't understand how the Soviet economy during WWII was able to produce such massive quantities of war materiel after the devastating losses of 1941-'42, and the turbulent prewar years of forced collectivization and industrialization. Would it have been possible for the Soviet Union of the late Cold War period to have pulled off a similar feat in a European war with NATO?

A lot of this has been discussed before here:

http://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=897

To save y'all some time, my position is that the Soviet military could have defeated NATO in a conventional WWIII. I don't believe that this would have been likely, but I do firmly believe that it would have been possible.

[.45cultist]

Their assessment studies said "yes" prior to 1985, afterwards it was "no".

[rcaf_777]

I think The Battle of 73 Easting in Iraq durring the frist gulf war offers a lot of insight into how the soviets would have done in the war.

I mean the Iraqi army had soviet equipment and were train to a degree by the Red Army in Soviet Tactics.

[Raellus]

I think The Battle of 73 Easting in Iraq durring the frist gulf war offers a lot of insight into how the soviets would have done in the war.

I mean the Iraqi army had soviet equipment and were train to a degree by the Red Army in Soviet Tactics.

If you'd care to read a rebuttal to your argument, follow the thread link that I posted in the message preceding yours. I address your point at length.