POMCUS and aviation assets.

[kato13]

I recently saw an article about Poland buying 96 Apache helicopters, and the comments were talking about how this was a HUGE investment in defense for the Poles. I do not deny that, but I thought about how people looking at the current state of of the world armed forces have very little concept of how large the 1989 forces were.

My thought was wow they think 96 is impressive when the US would have kept 150+ waiting in POMCUS warehouses (with duplicates where the units train). That got me thinking about how aviation assets might be stored differently from the regular mechanized equipment (due to much higher maintenance requirements even when not is use.)

I also might be totally mistaken in how POMCUS and aviation assets worked. Maybe given how quickly they could be moved forward they were not in the standard warehouses? Does anyone know the details of how POMCUS and helicopter units was handled?

[Homer]

Hi- Short answer, other than stores, spares, and ground support equipment aviation wasn’t a big POMCUS player. Rotary wing was to be brought across by USAF strategic airlift (OH-58, UH-1, AH-1, AH/MH/OH-6) as a high priority part of REFORGER, cocooned and loaded on fast sealift starting at M+4, or self deployed by ferry where capable (CH-47, UH-60, AH-64). Fixed wing (RC-12, OV-1) would self deploy by ferry.

Longer answer, the U.S. Army did a staff study in 1981 on the feasibility of prepositioning rotary wing aircraft to support REFORGER. The study developed three options: first, preposition aircraft in POMCUS; second, overstrength Europe based aviation units with extra airframes in peacetime with the intent of them be cross-leveled to CONUS based deployers in a contingency; and third, pursue increased fielding of self deployable aircraft and advocate for additional purchase of strategic airlift to support non-self deployable airframes.

The POMCUS option was the subject of a test in 1982-83. Two AH-1 companies were positioned in POMCUS and drawn for REFORGER. The test met with limited success, as the readiness requirement of POMCUS required semiannual test flights and regular inspections which the Combat Equipment Battalions (units that owned POMCUS) didn’t have the personnel to support. Additionally, The cost of maintaining two sets of aircraft with updates, etc was considered to be prohibitive.

The overstrength option did not make it past staff study once it was determined that the assignment of extra aircraft required accompanying personnel assignments to maintain the required operational tempo. In addition to equipment cost considerations, the personnel cost was considered prohibitive. Finally, the overstrength option required ramp and hangar space that was not available at current European facilities.

The final and recommended option was to use a combination of strat air, fast sealift, and self deployment. This option had been tested in previous REFORGER, with select aircraft going by strat air while the remainder were cocooned and put in sealift. In addition, CH-47s had validated self deployment (including a 1979 transatlantic) using supplemental tanks. It was envisioned that the concept would evolve as the force structure of the 80s and 90s came on line, with reliance on fast sealift and strat air to get to Europe eventually giving way to self deployment with internal or external tanks (UH-60 ESSS or AH-64 aux tanks) and usage of the increased strat air provided by the C-17 buy to wean III Corps and the A/C CONUS REFORGER reinforcement units for V and VII Corps off fast sealift. Fast sealift and strat air would then be trickled down to support other deployments in priority (CENTCOM, AFNON, AFSOUTH, etc).

Would it have worked? I don’t personally think it would have worked fast. We would have been flying the wings off of strat air to get it done, and probably still ended up needing fast sealift. Army rotary wing in CONUS rehearsed deployments by flying cross country to NTC or JRTC, a far different prospect than overwater between Greenland and Iceland. Maybe by 1996/97 in the T2K V1 timeframe, with a continuing Cold War and attendant expenditures the concept would have been feasible and relatively fast(er). Although, it’s also a point that the REFORGER units in T2K start flowing ahead of the start of hostilities. One of the mitigating factors in the REFORGER planning was the assumption of sufficient I&W to allow at least week or so of force flow before expected hostilities, REFORGER being seen as one of the final deterrent steps.

Hope this helps!

[kato13]

Very detailed and super helpful. Thanks.

[Homer]

You bet. There’s two other details that may be of value. First, the CEG-E history mentions that a “dual fielding” concept was used during the 80s to ensure equipment compatibility in POMCUS. This effectively meant every Unjt Set Fielding of a CONUS REFORGER unit triggers an accompanying USF in the appropriate European site. This was acknowledged as costly, and curtailed to generic sets in the post cold era while some POMCUS equipment was issued out to bring the force to a more or less common standard (M1/Brad, etc) or equipment was put on prepo afloat. Second, ammo and pyrotechnics, including aviation ordnance and countermeasures was not stored at the POMCUS sites. Instead, they were maintained in Corps Ammo Supply Points. The III Corps site at Coevorden is probably the best known. Part of the prep sequence for REFORGER involved tasking/coordinating and sequencing logistics and property units early in force flow to prepare for ammo upload.

Units would likely fly with home station force protection ammo for small arms (TAT), but host nations planned extensively to secure REFORGER and UK reinforcing units in the COMMZ until they were prepared for combat.