What's It Called?
 

Given how badly the lunge towards Kiev went in the opening weeks of the war, I don't see a major Russian attack out of Belarus going particularly well in the future. That said, it's something the Ukrainians shouldn't sleep on.

@All: Does the war have an official name yet? As far as I can remember, I haven't seen anything presented as such. I would nominate Russo-Ukrainian War. Just googled it, and Wikipedia has an entry for it under that name, but there doesn't seem to be widespread use yet.

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I personally am fine with "Russo-Ukrainian" as historically the second listed name is more likely to be the winner. When I was a very young war historian I actually thought that the names of the wars always listed the winner last (rather than being a product of media of the time). I think I thought it was similar to how the home team in a sport is listed at the bottom when showing scores (from baseball batting order)

From the below it was a reasonable suspicion when I only had partial information ("winners" in bold)
Austro-Prussian War
Franco-Prussian War
Russo-Turkish War
Sino-Japanese War
Spanish-American War
Anglo-Boer War
Russo-Japanese War
Arab-Israeli Wars

What's in a Name?
 

That's really interesting. As a fellow historian, I'm surprised that this never occurred to me, or thatI haven't seen references to this apparent unwritten naming convention elsewhere.

I knew why most American Civil War battles have two names (the Union named battles after the nearest river; the Confederacy after the nearest town), regardless of who won but yeah, that's battles, not wars.

I joke with my students each year that the French & Indian War / Seven Years War is one of the worst-named wars in the modern era, because both titles are misleading.

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Here are a couple of recent articles that may be of interest here. The first is about the UAF Marines executing their version of a "Thunder Run" along the Mokri Yaly river.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=729f2cb35fb6

The second describes two weeks on the front lines in Eastern Donbass with the UAF.

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2...ont-in-ukraine

It's an illuminating piece but, in it, the author talks about a vehicle he calls a B.R.M. that has "...tracks and a cannon but was too lightly armored to qualify as a tank, and its inability to withstand direct fire had earned it a grim epithet: the Iron Casket."

It's not a BMP because, a little later on in the article, the author (an embedded journalist) describes a resupply operation involves BMP (clearly identified as such). Any idea what this "B.R.M" is?

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Could it simply be a recon variant of the BMP? The BRM-1 is a thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...reconnaissance

That's a likely suspect. I doubt a journalist could differentiate between a BMP and a BRM, but he's probably just going by what the soldiers are telling him.

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That's what I thought as well. Though at one point in the article he mentions firing rockets? It's hard to tell if he's talking about some other vehicle entirely, or if it's a BRM with some kind of franken-launcher added on, or even if the author is calling the cannon ammunition "rockets".

Ukraine has fitted some BRM with the turret from a 2S9 Nona, which can fire RAP mortar shells. It wouldn't surprise me at all if some other BRM have been fitted with rocket artillery tubes.

The BRM is fitted with the 2A28 Grom 73mm smoothbore which uses rockets as ammunition, which is also used by the SPG-9. This further confuses the issue.

Unprecedented
 

That must be what the author was referencing. Thanks.

The very brief article linked below succinctly describes the challenges the UAF is facing during its Spring-Summer counteroffensive.

https://cepa.org/article/twitter-bub...nteroffensive/

The last paragraph really drives the point home:

Also, the NYT reports that the destruction of the Kakhova Dam was likely perpetrated by the Russians by detonating explosives placed in an internal passageway, as "Nova Kakhovka dam on Dnipro river was designed to withstand almost any attack imaginable – from the outside."

War Zone reports that the Ukrainians might be taking advantage of one possibly unanticipated consequence of the dam's destruction- the lowering of the water level of the reservoir behind it- by staging landings on the left bank of the Dnipro.

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I've been following along with the war updates fairly closely - one of the tidbits that I've seen pop up a few times is that Ukraine has only committed two of it's nine new brigades to the counteroffensive thus far. If true, why do you all think they're holding so much in reserve?

A common theory that's been posited is that Ukraine is attempting to force Russia to commit its own reserves first and make Russian repositioning difficult before committing the bulk of their own forces in order to prevent the counteroffensive from getting flanked and cut off.

The 2A28's ammunition is based on the SPG-9's, but isn't exactly the same -- the ammunition isn't interchangeable.

Russian Rebellion?
 

Thanks, Vespers and Paul. Paul, did you see that piece about the Cold War era experimental Polish assault rifle I posted in the Best That Never Was thread?

In other news, I bet Putin is really wishing he'd kept his dog, Wagner, on a much shorter leash.

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-w...ff7db5b1bded34

First stop on Wagner's 2023 Mutiny Tour: Rostov

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-w...ff7db5b1bded34

Slava Ukraini!

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Sounds interesting, if unfinished.

I'm on the Golo diet now. I have more energy now, and have already lost a little weight. I may work on that.

I just finished a major update to the F-15 Eagle. It's not posted yet, though.

Lamest. Mutiny. Ever.
 

Glad to hear that you're feeling more energetic, Paul.

In mutiny news, just like that, it ended almost as soon as it began. The poll had been up all of 15 minutes when news broke that Prigozhin had ordered his troops to cease fire and turn back short of Moscow.

One really has to wonder what Prigozhin was thinking. Did he really think he could overthrow Putin? Did he believe, going in, that he could force Putin to the bargaining table? Wagner hadn't yet suffered a big defeat at the hand of Loyalist forces, so why did he decide to call it off?

This BBC article does a really good job explaining why this all most likely happened.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66013532

After all of this drama, I suspect that Prigozhin will not be dying of natural causes or old age.

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I agree that Prigozhin is a dead man walking. He might live longer if he gets out of Russia fast (and not to Belarus), perhaps to some Wagner safe haven, but probably not. Russia is quite adept at going out of country to assassinate people, even to the US and UK.

GEN Petreus seems to think that Prigozhin lost his nerve/came to his senses way too late.

Prigozhin was never going to "bring the Defence Ministry to justice" let alone topple Putin, but that doesn't matter. Putin has been shown to be weak, bordering on pathetic. These events have been hugely embarrassing for Putin. History may show this to be the beginning of the end for him.

Completely agreed. The mafia lieutenant just made the don look like a weak old fool - it's not going to go well for anyone involved. Also Targan, your Machiavelli quote signature is particularly apt for a number of reasons on this one. :D

Prigozhin and Wagner Group.
 

Quite correct in my view. Even in Byelorussia, Prigozhin should avoid walking by open windows, riding on escalators or eating anything lest he suffer a dreadful "accident" like so many former Kremlin plutocrats have recently.

Ukraine Recaptures Territory Held by Russia Since 2014
 

Re Prig, he's probably a dead man walking. There's still a chance that Putin gives Prig an opportunity to redeem himself by allowing him to continue to direct Wagner forces from Belarus. That way, both parties can have their cake and eat it too.

It's really hard to see Putin keeping Prig around indefinitely, though. One article I read yesterday suggested that Prig might try to run as a candidate in the next presidential election. If Putin plans to run for reelection again (and I've seen nothing to suggest that he won't), I can't see him allowing that to happen.

Now, here's some good news:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...bef42633&ei=17

Hopefully, this is the first of much more to come.

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Cluster F'd
 

I'm pleased to see the US finally acquiesce to sending DPCIM shells to Ukraine. The timing could have been a lot better, though. DPCIMs are more effective against trench systems than conventional artillery rounds; some versions are deadly for masses of armored vehicles in the open. If the Ukrainians had those thousands of pledged DPCIM rounds 1-2 months ago, I suspect their summer offensive would have made even more progress by now, with fewer UAF casualties. Better late than never, I guess.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...ster-munitions

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I think i'm against Ukraine using cluster munitions.

Yes, they help in the short term. But i worry that after the war, Ukraine is left with unexploded devices in their own yard. Causing civilian deaths or maimings for years to come.

I would generally agree except that the Ukrainians are going to dump those cluster munitions into Russian defensive lines that are already filled with unmarked minefields and UXO... that land is already going to have to be cleared before civilians enter it, whether or not there are unexploded bomblets in it.

On a practical side, DP-ICM are much more effective than HE rounds. Given that the supply of howitzer barrels is running out in the West, the cluster munitions allow the Ukrainians to keep their artillery going longer before their guns are shot out.

Just my opinion...

I felt that way for a bit as well, but I have to keep reminding myself that Russia's aims still haven't shifted from "total subjugation and absorption of Ukraine and her people". The way I see it, Ukraine has to weigh the risk of future injury to her population, vs. Ukraine simply not existing as an independent, sovereign nation. On top of that, Russia has shown numerous times so far in the war that they're more than happy to waste Ukrainian civilians themselves, and no doubt Ukraine is already going to have to spend many year de-mining their country after this is all over.

The ugliest of calculus here breaks down to "How many lives will be lost to future UXO explosions vs. how many lives might be saved by speeding up the end of this conflict through the use of cluster munitions?"

I have a professional contact who's worked with demining and UXO teams in Syria. His analysis was much the same - any use of cluster munitions by Ukraine will be a minor incremental addition to the work already ahead.

- C.

I was thinking the long view success would be not to use them, but happy to defer to those more in the know. Its still a case of rock and hard place!

Ukrainian pilots will start training on the F-16 in Romania next month. Come March next year when F-16s tear into the Russian Air Force, the Russians are going to need to issue a whole lot of brown trousers.

The bridge over the Kerch has come under attack again. Currently, automotive traffic in both directions is down, due to the bridge having collapsed. The railtracks seem to hold, so far.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe...or-2023-07-17/

https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1680796880551178240

Counter-counter Offensive?
 

When I first saw the headlines, I assumed that something like Storm Shadow ASMs had been used to strike the bridge but apparently it was drone boats.

In other news, Ukrainian intel reports a build up of Russian forces (100k troops, hundreds of AFVs) near Kharkiv. This could be bad for Ukraine, as it threatens the flanks of some of their current offensive operations, and it will probably require the UAF to shift forces earmarked for, or already committed to said in order to meet the new threat. On the other hand, it might a positive for the Ukrainians as it will get a substantial number of Russians out of their fixed defensive positions and out into the open (where US cluster munitions could have a really big impact). At this point, I would bet on the Ukrainians to gain the upper hand in maneuver warfare.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...p-near-kharkiv

WARNING:
If you scroll down through the article, there are links to two video clips of Anti-Russian Chechen fighters, allegedly operating in Belgorod Oblast, ambushing a lone Russian military truck. They blur out the gore (thank goodness), but it doesn't leave a whole lot to the imagination, and some viewers may find it disturbing. I only mention it here because every T2k game I've ever been involved with (as player, Ref, reader, writer, etc.) has featured at least one ambush of a "Russian" convoy of some sort.

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Good single vehicle pickoff. There’s some extended footage of the patrol moving up, presumabley before passage of lines or leaving an harbor area, and movement to the ambush position. I got a rough count of 16, with 2x PKM, an RPG launcher, a radio, and a three or more guys with LAW or RPG18/22 type weapons. Looks like an overnight at least based on the assault packs everyone was carrying and the foam mats, etc.. Understandably not a lot of detail on establishing the ambush, but it did show the go-pro guy prepping a LAW; I think he set it down again when they saw the truck and ended up engaging with his rifle. Lots of fire on the truck, but it looks like it made it some ways through the kill zone before it was stopped.

For all the good of accomplishing the presumptive mission, if your PCs walk the roads, bunch up and lollygaggle when “assaulting” across the kill zone of their linear ambush, fail to secure the far side before they start searching, or aren’t moving expeditiously back to the ORP it’s a good opportunity for the ambushed to rally, counterattack, and teach them a lesson. It did look like there was a man on the road able to look down the curve in the direction the truck came from. Not sure if that was PKM man, LAW guy, or if the flank security man/element had collapsed already. If they don’t have flank security, anything can roll up on them.

Nice link and an interesting read.

ISW has reported on the build up (though they haven't cited a number regarding personnel AFAIK), and have reported that at least some of it is penal battalions that don't have the experience, morale, or the cohesion to actually pull anything off other than light skirmishes. No matter the case, surely Russia is eager to try to regain the initiative here. It'll be interesting to see what happens.

https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...t-july-17-2023

Sobering Assessment
 

This sobering, first-hand assessment of the Ukrainian military pulls no punches.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...from-the-front

The short of it is that the Ukrainian military currently isn't as good as their propaganda makes it out to be- it's just better than the Russians (and not by a very wide margin, at that).

The author of the report gives 16 reasons why the UAF's counteroffensive has not manage to achieve a major breakthrough, including, perhaps the most significant,

"2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress."

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That's a good read. I think the multiple mentions of minefields teases a lede that's a little buried. Whatever other problems the Ukrainians have, the Russians basically mined the whole front. Even in the best cases it makes maneuver difficult and all advances will be measured in meters at a time. Artillery can only make so much progress if infantry can't take and hold the ground artillery just cleared out.

Massed assaults are constrained because minefields limit mobility and even a Mobik can figure out how to aim where the enemy if forced to bunch up.

I think one of the biggest lessons is air power has been a game changer in the century since it debuted. If you don't have air superiority, including clearing out ADA, you're stuck on the ground getting bombed to shit. Air superiority alone won't win a war but if you're going to "win" a war you need to at some point enjoy air superiority.

Sea Change
 

A lot of potentially big news coming out of Ukraine the last couple of days. We'll start with the bad news first.

Russia has backed out of the Ukraine grain deal, started targeting grain silos with missile strikes, and threatened to impose a naval blockade in the Black Sea. Putin's essentially trying to hold the world hostage by potentially causing famine. Furthermore, Putin's been laying the groundwork for framing the Ukrainian navy for the sinking of any neutral ships in the Black Sea.

Putin is rattling his saber at Poland, accusing her of preparing to attack Belarus. Check out this revisionist history from the Russian dictator:

"I would also like to remind you what Poland’s aggressive policy led to," he said during a meeting Friday of the Russian Security Council. "It led to the national tragedy of 1939, when Poland’s Western allies threw it to the German wolf, the German miliary machine. Poland actually lost its independence and statehood, which were only restored thanks in a large measure to the Soviet Union. It was also thanks to the Soviet Union and thanks to Stalin’s position that Poland acquired substantial territory in the west, German territory."

Nowhere does Putin mention the Soviet Union's complicity in Poland's "national tragedy of 1939" (i.e. the Soviet invasion and occupation of the eastern half of the country), the murder of hundreds of Polish army officers, Soviet refusal to aid the Polish Home Army's uprising in Warsaw in 1944, or the USSR's interference in Polish affairs for the next fifty years.

Ukraine has started to use US cluster artillery munitions to good effect. According to Forbes, they are properly implementing the tactic of using an HE round to determine the height of the targeted ground so that the DP-ICMs can be set to distribute the sub-munitions at the ideal height above the target. The Russians, however, are already learning what a single round of HE presages.

The US has shifted its policy on the exporting of F-16s to Ukraine from its NATO allies, saying they are going to "push as fast as possible" and that the fighters should start to arrive in Ukraine "before the end of the year".

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There has not been a declaration of war made by Russia, so any threat to target civilian shipping in the Black Sea is straight-up illegal. And I've said right from the start, Russia isn't going to launch nukes (not unless NATO tanks roll across the Russian border). Putin may be an A-grade dickhead and a megalomaniacal narcissist, but his generals aren't suicidal.

NATO needs to grow some nuts and (assuming Turkey didn't close the straits) escort grain freighters right through to Ukrainian ports. Dare the Russians to do anything about it.

UAF
 

I believe it. It took the Red Army a good three years to master combined arms during World War II and even with massive Lend-Lease aid there were still logistical problems sustaining offensives. The Ukrainian learning curve will probably be much quicker but with a terrible cost in casualties.

There is a greater problem here in my view. To really make Putin or Russia pay attention, a defender would need to inflict the same levels of casualties as the Finns 1939-40. Something on the order of 10:1 or thereabouts. The UAF have fought valiantly and won deserved admiration from much of the world. However there is simply not enough damage being done to the Russian military.

We don't have a clear picture of casualties on either side to be fair-but it's nowhere near the level to make the Russians come to the table or back off. Bear in mind I'm not criticizing the UAF nor am I in a position to criticize them.
Just my 2 cents.

Escorting flagged freighters.
 

It's an interesting thought and brings back images of Kuwaiti tankers being escorted during the Iran-Iraq War. I believe there there is less than a 10% chance of NATO implementing such a program even for the best of purposes-bringing grain to a hungry world.

NATO's navies have suffered tremendously from Post-Cold War penury-our old Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates would have been ideal for this role. They are long gone. NATO, I suspect, would be loathe to strip STANAVFORATLANT to send them into the Black Sea on escort missions even if the political will existed.

I doubt Turkey would close the Straits-although I do see Erdogan notifying NATO that in the event of an attack on NATO forces as a result of their actions in the Black Sea-Turkey would sit it out.

Romania and Bulgaria would probably not risk their limited assets in such an operation leaving the other much larger maritime powers to try to send their slender resources into the Black Sea-which again, I don't think will happen. We'll see. Again, just my 2 cents worth.

I don't disagree with you but it's interesting to note that Turkey is still a user of the OHP class frigate. Their modernized version is known as the G-Class frigate and there are 8 of them in service with the Turkish navy.

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Perry Class
 

That's true-Poland/ORP has a couple as well now I think? Australia built several as well if my memory serves me correctly.

Landmines and Counter-mine Warfare
 

Russian minefields have contributed greatly to slowing Ukraine's offensive operations this summer. From the articles I've read, it sounds like the UAF's main tactics to overcome the obstacle presented by AT mines is to rely on mine roller-equipped tanks or ARVs, or MICLICs, to clear lanes through minefields during an assault. According to a Ukrainian tanker interviewed by the BBC, a mine roller can usually handle, one at a time, up to four mines before it needs replacement, However, knowing this, the Russians have adapted by stacking multiple AT mines, thereby destroying rollers with one massive explosion. The Ukrainians are losing AFVs to mines at a pretty high rate- even their more advanced, better protected Western models- and have seemingly given up on attempts at a major mechanized breakthrough. They've largely reverted to smaller, more incremental (and slower) attacks led by relatively small formations of infantry. The Russians have even started to mine their own trench lines and remotely detonate them once they've been taken and occupied by UAF forces.

What I haven't read a single mention of in this current conflict is the UAF using combat engineers to prep attack lanes through mine belts by moving across minefields on foot, probing for AT mines, and removing them manually prior to a planned assault. I'm both surprised and not surprised by this. I'm not surprised because this procedure is slow and very dangerous to the mine clearing teams. Minefields, to be truly effective, need to be observed by the defending force and covered by fires (direct and indirect) to prevent what I just described. It sounds like, most of the time, the Russians are employing tactics that increase the effectiveness of their minefields.

On the other hand, I am surprised because pretty much every book I've read about major WW2 ground offensives describe the attacker- both Axis and Allied- using the tactic of manual mine detection/removal (almost always at night) in the lead up to a big assault. This is especially true of the Eastern Front. In quite a few cases, this tactic was very successful in getting the attacking force through the first line of defense with much fewer tank losses to AT mines.

I'm not advocating that UAF troops risk their lives by adopting this dangerous but potentially successful tactic. It's easy for me to sit here and suggest they give it a try. I'm just wondering why, AFAIK, they haven't. I suppose that improvements in and the proliferation of NODs and battlefield surveillance tech in the current era make manual demining in a combat area a lot more dangerous than it already was in earlier wars.

Anyway, that was a bit rambling. I just wanted to share my thoughts and wonder if any of you have wondered the same thing or read/seen anything illuminating on the topic.

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