"Most" ships, true. But the link that was posted proves what I said about the US having it on some ships (5) prior to the US being attacked. And as early as 1938 on two ships. The Japanese, OTOH, had been on a war footing for years prior to PH and had not made any appreciable implementation of radar into their fleet. Despite having access to German technology, and knowing that radar was widespread in the British navy.


Appropriate to ignore the UK Royal Navy, which had the most widespread usage of radar at the time Japan declared war on the UK and the US?

The Japanese had had access to German radar technology. They chose not to do much with it.

The real point is that 95th Rifleman asserted that the Japanese had the most "modern" fleet in the world. They had the newest ships, but using the term "modern" is subject to some serious dispute, as it very much depends on what factors one chooses when defining "modern".

Yep, all true.

How many of those radar battlewagons where sunk at pearl?

Arguably radar was the ONLY advantage the Americans had during the first half of the war. Japan had superior carriers, superior carrier aircraft and their battlewagons where bigger and superior to anything the American fleet could boast. their cruisers where also superior, the only real advantage America had was in her escorts. US submarines where nothing less than a joke in the early stages of the war as they didn't have any torpedos worth a damn.

In an open battlewagon to battlewagon engagement the American fleet would never of stood a chance. Ironicly by sinking the big guns at pearl, Japan removed her best chance of winning a decisive engagement against the US fleet in open water. carrirs where only beginning to be understood and developed by the US admiralty, losing their battleships forced American admirals to rely on their carriers and develp them into war winning weapons later in the campaighn.

There is no way to get out of the fact that it was numerical superiority in carriers and aircraft that beat the Japanese, not quality.

On the subject of carriers, it was a bloody miracle that the Germans never really got into the idea. German carrier fleets couldof decimated the Royal navy and would of blockaded the UK ina way that the U-boats could never of acheived.

Most.

That, and having broken the Japanese naval ciphers. Both of which led directly to the Japanese losing at Midway to the inferior American ships.

Not really. They just a lot more of them.

All true. See my point above regarding Midway.

This is not an accurate reflection of what happened. The US was kicking Japanese butt long before the US achieved numerical superiority. Numerical superiority allowed the US to shorten the war, but the Japanese would have lost it even had the US fleet never surpassed the Japanese fleet in numbers. The simple fact is that the Japanese did not have the logistics to maintain their fleet and the US developed superior aircraft in 1942, which even in inferior numbers would have been enough to crush the Japanese fleet. The Japanese couldn't replace their losses at the rate they were suffering them, even before the US swamped them with numbers.

The Japanese weren't facing anything like the best the UK had to offer what with the UK itself struggling to survive back in Europe. Post Singapore, the UK no longer had any significant ability to penetrate into the Pacific either - that ocean was effectively controlled by the Japanese.
Given that Singapore fell VERY soon after the declaration of war (only about 2 months), it is definitely worth discounting the UK naval forces when discussing Japanese naval capabilities - Japan just wasn't likely to meet the UK in battle.
The Germans themselves didn't really see how much of a game changer it could be. Why would the Japanese have been any different given that they were effectively uncontested rulers of pretty much half the world?
Yes it is. The Japanese ships were modern by the standards of the time. A few short years later at the end of the war though and they were hopelessly outclassed. But that's not just technology, but in crew quality, especially aircrew. By the latter stages of the war, they'd been reduced from an extremely professional and capable force to having to resort to suicide attacks by pilots who barely knew how to take off (landing in many cases was not taught at all).

Anyway, getting back to the topic, China, should it so wish, could have a naval force at least the equal of any other on the planet in relatively short order and there's really not much anyone can do about it. At the moment however they don't appear to be all that interested in projecting power much beyond their borders so it's unlikely we'll be seeing any US style super carriers any time soon - there's just no real requirement/justification for them.

That highlighted bit is a myth, BTW.

If the Germans didn't see how much of a game changer radar was, then how do you explain why the Bismark had both sea and air search radars, and a better integrated fire control system than those on the Brit battlewagons it faced off against, allowing for both a more accurate and higher rate of fire?

There was a question earlier about how good the PRC's ASW capability is. It is primarily based on older Soviet-era sonar systems as well as a high percentage of western systems, primarily French.

The sub-driver in my office is of the opinion that the older systems can be easily defeated. Its the newer systems that concern him. Or as he stated, "its even money."

Its true the Bismarck was a fine battleship, probably the most powerful in the world at the time of its sinking in 1941, but whereas Britain and America had abided by the terms of the naval washington Treaty before and up to WW2, Germany and Japan had consistantly cheated, giving their capitol ships and even cruisers some advantage over them two main Western naval powers Britain and America.

Bismarck did indeed have radars, 3 x FuMo23 and FuMO21 radars, and German rangefinders, and gunnery control in general, was highly regarded. However her main armor deck was too low in the ship, leaving her vital communications and fire control systems vulnerable, and her fire control systems were knocked out early in her final battle against British heavy units. While German machinery tended to be too complex, and unreliable throughout the war. There are also questions about how effective her armour was, as its intersting to note that the British Rodney was instrumental in her sinking, despite being built in the 1920's and being considerably slower. Rodney quickly overwhelmed Bismarck with her accurate 16in gunfire, and pretty much pounding her into a flaming junk with some help from King George V, while Bismarck never hit Rodney at all.

The Japanese battleline in WWII was not the most modern in the world...

The IJN had 4 Kongo-class battleships launched in 1912/13 and refitted in 1936. They were the fastest of the IJN's BB at 30.5 knots. They weighed in at 31,720 tons and were armed with 4 twin mounted 14-inch guns, 14 single mounted 6-inch guns (later lowered to 8), 4 twin 5-inch DP guns (increased to 6 twin mounts) and 20 25mm AA guns (increased to 94).

Two Fuso-class battleships launched in 1914/15 and displacing 34,700 tons and with a speed of 24.75 knots. Armed with 6 twin 14-inch guns, 14 single mount 6-inch guns, 4 twin mount 5-inch DP guns and 16 25mm AA guns (later increased to 37) The IJN modernizied them in 1932 but considered them to be too slow for front line use.

Two Ise-class battleships launched in 1916/17 and displacing 36,000 tons and with a speed of 25.25 knots. Initially armed with 6 twin 14-inch guns, 16 single mount 5.5-inch guns, 4 twin 5-inch AA guns and 20 25mm AA guns. After the disaster at Midway, the IJN converted these two into hybrid battleship-seaplane carriers. The armament was changed to 4 twin 14-inch, 8 twin 5-inch DP guns and 57 25mm AA guns as well as 22 seaplanes.

Two Nagato-class battleships launched in 1919/1920 and displacing 39,130 tons and with a speed of 25 knots. Armed with 4 twin 16-inch guns, 18 single 5.5-inch guns (lowered to 16), 4 twin 5-inch DP guns and 20 25mm AA guns (increased to 98).

And finally the two Yamato-class battleships, launched in 1940 and displacing 71,659 tons and with a speed of 27.5 knots. Armed with 3 triple 18-inch guns, 4 triple 6.1-inch guns (reduced to two mounts), 6 twin 5-inch DP guns (increased to 12 twin mounts) and 24 25mm AA guns (increased to 146 25mm).

Unlike the USN, the IJN fought the war with older battleships, most of whom were modernized in the 1930s and later had refits with radar and increased numbers of light AA guns. Of the twelve BBs they started the war with; 2 were sunk in 1942; 1 in 1943; 4 in 1944; 4 in 1945; 1 in 1946. Ten were sunk by US forces, one by an accidental magazine explosion and one survived the war, only to be a target at the Bikini nuclear bomb test.

There were also a lot of concerns about Bismarck's underwater protection as well as her vulnerable rudder design, not mention the difficultly she had in using her engines to steer.

Have to disagree here, to be certain the US started mounting radars after Pearl Harbor, but it took the murderous fighting off Guadalcanal to teach the USN how to effectively use radars.

The USN started out with a serious case of severe overconfidence in the capability of radar. In many of the naval battles, the IJN, using lookouts with the old Mark I Eyeball spotted US ships long before they were visible on radar!

Japan's biggest naval advantage over British and American forces at the beginning of the war were the quality of its aircrew and carrier capable aircraft, which were noticeably superior to their British and American counterparts, and its government was far more ruthless. With the exception of the two giant Yamato Class battleships Japanese battleships were no better than British or American battleships, in fact their fleet may have been on average older than the two main allied navies, and most would consider the later war Iowa Class a better and arguably more powerfull battleship than the Yamato Class.

The Japanese fleet was smaller than both the American and British fleets at the start of the war, although it was concentrated in the Western Pacific. Japan did had more operational carriers than either Britain or America, and some cheating went on about their dimensions during their construction as Japan was still bound to the terms of the Washington Treaty. But Japanese carriers werent superior to allied carriers at the start of the war, in fact the best might have been the British carriers which had armoured flights decks.

As to who had the better carrier, many people forget that the primary mission of the carrier is to project power; this is executed by the carrier's airgroup (both in size and capability). By this standard, the British did not have the finest carriers of the war, they had the most surviveable carriers, but their protection was paid for by smaller airgroups and above all, less storage space for avgas and munitions.

The Japanese carriers started the war with a small, hand-picked group of pilots. The primary failure of the IJN aviation is that they had no means of expanding or replacing the loss of the pre-war pilots. Many people consider the Battle of Midway to be the critical turning point, it wasn't. The key turning point for the IJN was the brutal fighting in the Soloman Islands were many of their most experienced pilots died, the IJN never recovered and their losses in the 1944-45 battles reflects this.

The American carriers stumbled in the early war but as more decks and additional air groups entered the war, they quickly became the major factor in the Allied advances in the Pacific.

where's Matt Wiser? He usually chimes in on naval matters.

I think survivability in the Pacific was highly important in a war which became dominated by air power more than anywhere else. Most British carriers up until the two Implacable Class ships and the Indomitable Class were built within the confines of ship design and the Second London Naval Treaty to which they complied, unlike the Japanese who had withdrawn from it. America was able to produce the pre-war Lexington's as they were originally to be battlecruisers, but they were cancelled after work had begun under the terms of the Washington Treaty and the tonnage was allowed for aircraft carriers instead. Once the war started America could build whatever it liked to what size it wanted hense the rapid production of the Essex Class, which neither Britain or Japan could match in numbers for industrial reasons, and Britain also had different naval ship buiding priorities. British heavy units and carriers were pretty much absent from the Pacific after early 1942, and only started returning from 1944. Different design philosophies for different priorities influenced the differences between US and British carriers. Although the American carriers had bigger air wings the werent as survivable as the British units until the Midway Class.

There is no doubt that when a suicide plane was inbound, I'd rather be aboard a WWII British carrier than an Essex-class.

But the purpose of an aircraft carrier is not to survive attacks, it is to launch them. The USN made the decision to go with more hanger space as well as increased avgas storage and magazine space. Did it make US carriers more prone to damage, without a doubt! But it also allowed the USN to throw heavier airstrikes for a longer period of time than another navy in WWII. And those larger air groups allowed the carriers defense in depth. Coupled with the development of the new VT fuze, it made attacking an American carrier task force a bloody affair.

Since we are discusing carrier air groups, here are some intresting facts...

In Dec 1941

A US Fleet Carrier deployed with 18 fighters, 36 dive/scout bombers and 18 torpedo bombers.

A Japanese Fleet Carrier deployed with 18 fighters, 18 dive bombers and 18-27 torpedo bombers.

A British Carrier (Feb 42) deployed with 21 fighters and 24 torpedo bombers.

In Sept 1943

A US Fleet Carrier deployed with 38 fighters, 28 dive bombers and 18 torpedo bombers.

A Japanese Fleet Carrier deployed with 18-27 fighters, 20-27 dive bombers and 10-23 torpedo bombers.

A British Fleet Carrier deployed with 36 fighters and 12 dive bombers.

In Dec 1944

A US Fleet Carrier deployed with 71 fighters, 15 dive bombers and 15 torpedo bombers.

A Japanese Fleet Carrier deployed with 26-27 fighters, 25-26 dive bombers and 17 torpedo bombers.

A British Fleet Carrier deployed with 60 fighters and 18 dive bombers.

Here's an intresting tidbit....the all time record for most enemy aircraft confirmed shot down in a single action goes to the USS South Dakota.

During the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, on October 26, 1942, she was attacked by a force of over 65 dive and torpedo bombers. In a wild melee in which she suffered three bomb hits and a near miss, she shot down 26 of her attackers. A record that has remained unbroken to this day.

And probably never will be broken given that an average plane today is probably worth an entire WWII wing+.

The German Navy did understand the potential of aircraft carriers. Hitler just didn't keep to the timetable. He invaded Poland nine years too early for a German Navy with carriers.

Webstral

The plan was called Plan Z. The biggest drawback to it was it made mo allowances for the Royal Navy to react to the programme, oh and the war started early...

Technology is a combat multiplier, like troop quality. A bankrupt strategy is a bankrupt strategy. Assuming a halfway decent strategy, the key is that the leaders and troops using the technology know what to do with it. I suspect the tankers of VII US Corps would argue that technology gave them a decisive edge in western Kuwait in early 1991. The Japanese Navy trained hard for night actions and really took it to the US Navy around Guadalcanal in 1942. As the USN learned what to do with their radar, night actions at sea became less successful for the Japanese.

Unfortunately, I agree that Americans are inclined to learn the wrong lessons from Vietnam, etc. There are some good reasons for this. Hardware looks handsome and brings revenues into Congressman Jones' district. Well-trained troops cost money but don't employ factory workers; and on the parade ground it's nearly impossible to tell the proficient killers from the professional boot polishers. Also, we cling fervently to the idea that all around the world people are, deep down, Americans: democratic, enterprising, and all the other nice ideas. Therefore, we believe in the "tipping point" thesis, in which just a little more effort (money, technology, firepower) will set off a chain of events in which the people will come together, the war will be won, representative government will spontaneously erupt, and the rats we had to get into bed with will be swept away in the new dawn of Vietnamese, Iraqi, and Afghani democracy. Then we'll all have pie (make mine apple, please). Machines, therefore, are more comfortable to believe in than cold-eyed killers and pragmatists who say things we'd rather not hear about what it will take to achieve victory--whatever that means.

Webstral

The problem, the very scary problem, is it will take a massive and bloody defeat on American soil to change this attitude. While America fights conflicts in the gardens of other nations, there will never be enough incentive to change doctrine.

Look at internatonal terrorism, for decades the Americans never took it seriously enough, in fact they supported many terrorist groups operating in Soviet-controlled nations. It's also a big bone of contention over here that Americans in New York and Boston where fund raising for the IRA.

It took 9/11 to really shake America and make the American people and government realise how dangerous terrorism really is and why supporting it, even in hostile nations, is a recipe for disaster. Afterall, it was the American-supported individuals who fought the Russians that masterminded 9/11.

Aye, it always gets me how people do not realise the "other side" of my fathers exact comment when I got home from school that day and said "what the hell is going on", he replied "The bastards finally got what they need".

Part of that IS because the US paid for terrorism against Communism, but also, large areas of the Eastern Seaboard in the US paid, supplied and even hides IRA people, who in my fathers eyes, as he was 1 Ulster Defence Regiment of the British Army, born in Northern Ireland, are terrorists.

But I think we are going a little off topic from Carriers, but yes, its interesting to see what overtures are going on in Taiwan and China, and that it does appears since some news I heard yesterday, that China has an interest in a "Coastal Defence Force" and using fighters launching Exocets at long ranges.

Owning a carrier is one thing, operating one and carrier strike group, is something completely different, by the time China can operate a carrier strike group, the US will have left that field and moved onto something far more flexible and unmanned

Which could be America's downfall.

Operating cheaper UCAVs that don't risk pilot's lives and have longer loiter times in zone is worse for America than operating expensive and very complex jet fighters that risk pilots to imprisonment, torture, and/or death?

Remember that thing about over-reliance on technology?