I didn't include prisoner of war figures for either front. But if I was in the German Army on the Eastern front in 1945 I think I'd be making my way as far west as I could get as soon as possible!

Which I believe is exactly what happened, particularly in the last weeks and especially days of the war. Nobody wanted to be captured by the Russians!

I think it's fair to point out the British weren't generally superior to the American tanks. British cruiser tanks were underarmed and underarmored, while the infantry tanks were undrrgunned snd maddeningly slow. Most of the cruiser tanks had reliability issues. It wasn't until the Centurion (which abandoned the ctuiser/infantry distinction) that the British had a really good tamk.

While the British 6-pdr was a better AT weapon than the Sherman's 75mm, it was less useful for everything else.

Regarding economic conditions inside the Soviet Union, I suggest a read from the late 1960’s: Workers’ Paradise Lost by Eugene Lyons. Remarkably prescient. This work has figured strongly into my efforts to build a v1 chronology that connects 1989 with the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet War in 1995.

In the line, no less! Good God, where would we have been without our crushingly superior industrial capacity? How many [expletive deleted] green infantrymen did we sacrifice on the altar of our impatience? Even today, I wonder what would happen if we needed to replace thousands of infantry in short order.

This, by the way, is why I advocate for a National Guard three times the size of the current National Guard with few infantry units but lots of MPs and engineers. When there is a massive requirement for infantry replacements, the junior enlisted guys and the buck sergeants can be run through a 90-day infantry school with better results than one would get with raw recruits. Raw recruits then either replace the Guardsmen or go through a 6-month infantry school, including at least one JRTC rotation, so they actually know [expletive deleted] something before being required to hit the lines.

When will we ever learn from the Germans?

Not going to happen I'm afraid. That would mean applying some common sense to the situation.... :(

Although I have a different opinion on the detail, I'm with you on the preference for some sort of national service. Doesn't have to be military (although that would be preferred), could be simply joining an emergency service such as Rural Fire Service (RFS), State Emergency Service (SES) or something similar. Put idle young hands to use, perhaps assisting farmers with manual labour, cleaning up rubbish from highways, or something else productive. Throw in some discipline and maybe a bit of drill and you'll end up with people willing to listen and obey chains of command - could cut a few weeks off training times in case of wartime emergency.

The Germans who only sent out replacement soldiers at the end of the month? Who had to combine companies nearly every week to have even half-strength battalions in some regiments? Who regularly scraped up whatever soldiers were nearby, such as transients or hospital dischargees, and sent them willy-nilly into combat as "replacement" platoons, with little or no integration into the command structure or unit?

When the American army could make attacks, take casualties and have units at full strength again in two days? That's what the system was designed for, and as far as that goes, it worked. Where it fell down was in our small army in the ETO. There weren't enough divisions to allow any unit to pull back long enough to absorb replacement soldiers.

With as few formations as Ike had, even with the slower replacement system the Germans had, we would have been forced to throw the raw replacements into the line, in ad hoc replacement companies and platoons, just like the Germans did. I doubt the results would have been any better.

I don't see the replacement system itself as the limiting factor, but perhaps the underestimation at the regiment/battalion level on how long infantry small units needed to absorb and assimilate new men. I've read in places that it got better as the divisions and regiments accumulated experience, and took their time to rotate units more often.

The Germans did not have an ideal solution. We know this because they didn't win. Every army throws together scratch teams as required by circumstances. The strategic and operational realities imposed on the German Army by the lunacy of the senior leadership compelled them to do things like mentioned above, despite the fact that the Germans understood the value of having replacements absorbed in an orderly fashion.

We were not so desperate. We behaved like we were desperate, but that's not the same as actually being desperate. There's a world of difference between combining companies of veterans and fleshing out a company of veterans with new arrivals.

Ike may not have had overwhelming numerical superiority, but he wasn't at a numerical disadvantage, either. We made the numbers picture much worse than it had to be by making awful choices, like attacking through the Hertgen Forest to no good end. Or continuing the offensive up the Italian boot. This is not to say, of course, that the Germans weren't saddled by awful decisions coming down from the top.

What we really should have learned from the Germans is a proper investment in training up front. New officers trained for a year before going into the line. NCOs trained for six months or more. I can't remember off the top of my head how long infantry privates trained. I know that number changed over the course of the war. Nonetheless, German infantry and infantry leadership arrived at the front better trained than our guys did. The qualitative problems led to an ongoing need on our part to throw yet more raw troops into the front and yet more after that because the poor SOBs kept getting themselves killed in few days' time. The Germans eventually reached the point at which they were obliged to send poorly-trained units to the front, but only after attrition had taken its toll on everybody. Warfare by the numbers is cruel, and we could have done much better given our numerical advantage overall.

Till late 43 the scheduled training time for a German tanker was 22 months from induction off of civie street to when he is assigned to a field unit. And that's not officers: the time spent in training was for all ranks including the privates.

Oh the Marines in the Pacific and shortly thereafter among the US Army in Africa that there's a way to use that to your advantage in some circumstances.

While you're in the rear, find a couple of small pieces of metal. Drop them on each other, to test whether they sound like an M1 Garand that is out of ammo.

Then, in battle, have one of your buddies fire up to seven rounds (enough so that you're not out of ammo). Then, drop your magic piece of metal. Your squad then looks for what enemy dummy sticks his head up, and they promptly fill enemy dummy with lead.

That trick worked great with enemy snipers or sharpshooters, and enemy machinegun teams.

The Germans' lack of uranium was one of the reasons they invaded the USSR. The bigwigs were actually hoping to get to the Urals, parts of which had large amounts of uranium ore.

This is true, however my point was that the M1 was about the only semi automatic rifle issued as standard to any nation in WWII. Virtually everyone else, including the US Marines in the beginning, were equipped with WWI or earlier bolt action rifles, or weapons which were only a "modernised" version of them.

Personally, I'd have preferred a semi auto over bolt action, and automatic over semi, however that's just me. I know of soldiers who could accurately fire a bolt action rifle faster than could be imagined - around 100+ rpm! (ignoring reloading) My own grandfather was one of them, and he wasn't even infantry.

Despite having a number of advantages over the traditional bolt action rifle, the M1 still has that flaw which, although could be turned to advantage on occasion, was still a significant drawback most of the time when compared with more modern designs.

Bren vs MG42
 

No question, as a tripod mount or emplaced weapon the MG42 is better than the Bren- however, as a squad support weapon the Bren was without peer at the time. Lightweight (for the time, anyway) reliable (just don't put 30 rounds in the magazine) and accurate, usable by one man at a pinch, fairly weatherproof (one of its last frontline uses was with the Royal Marines for Arctic service)- and iconic in appearance.
It is interesting that, after decades of not using LMGs (the MAG/GPMG covering both the LMG and MMG roles) the British Army decided to go back to having a squad support weapon, the L86- not only at the squad level, but issued one per 4-man fireteam. Standard ammo load initially was 6 thirty round mags per rifleman- but 2 of those were reserved for the LSW gunner.

Wait, I'm confused. Where's the bashing? That the USMC developed their own helmet is a statement of fact. Did I miss the post where someone disparaged the efficacy of the USMC's helmet?

I've read a lot of books about the USMC in WWII (& Korea and Vietnam) over the last couple of years and, overall, I am really impressed with its performance. They fought in some of the fiercest, no-quarter combat of the war (Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Peleilu, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, to name a few) and despite often taking heavy casualties, they almost always prevailed.

The Japanese, although tough and determined enemies, were cursed with some of the worst tech of the war. Pretty much all of their weapons systems were inferior to the Western equivalent. The Zero was king for a while, but as soon as allied pilots figured out not to get into a turning/climbing fight with it, it lost a lot of its mystique. Later Allied designs like the Hellcat and Corsair were superior. The Yamato super battleship was impressive and would have been superior in most respects in the age of the battle line, but in the era of naval air, it was a dinosaur.

Japanese infantry weapons were generally crap, across the board. The only major exception was their little "knee" mortars, which could generate impressive close-in indirect fire support. They never had enough artillery, their tanks were crap, and most Japanese infantrymen fought with long, unwieldly bolt-action rifles.

It kind of makes one wonder how the Japanese would have fared with better weapons systems and better leadership.

By the end of the war, yes. At the start, no.

The German policy in 1939 was to ;et a unit drop to a certain level due to attrition, then pull it out of combat for a period of time. New soldiers then joined the unit and were integrated/indoctrinated while the veterans were resting. Then, after a period of time, the unit was sent back into action.

This system probably worked well until the first half of 1943, with Stalingrad, Kursk and the fall of North Africa, and continued to deteriorate the rest of the war.

The US, OTOH, just threw new soldiers arriving at the front into units in combat. Many veterans didn't bother to learn the new guys' names, since they expected them to be dead in 2-3 days. Some wouldn't bother to get to know a replacement until he had survived a couple of weeks.

More accurately, the US did have enough riflemen in the war. Other troop types were generally available in adequate (in some cases abundant) numbers.

For example, if doctrine had allowed the Sherman to be armed so it could hunt and kill other tanks, there really would have been no need for all the independent tank destroyer battalions.

The much-maligned P-40 was actually a good match against the Zero as long as the Allied pilot didn't engage in a low-speed turning dogfight or try to out-climb the Zero.

(At high speeds, the P-40 could actually out-turn the Zero)

Despite looking like an antique, the Japanese 70mm battalion infantry gun was quite effective.

While their tanks had thing armor and weak guns, they were reliable and had good cross-country performance. The main problem was that fighting the Chinese had taught the Japanese the wrong lessons about tank warfare.

IIRC, each infantry rifle was stamped with the Imperial chrysanthemum: this marked the weapon as the Emperor's property, which the soldier was allowed to use on his behalf.

Additionally, the long bayonets the Japanese used were "stand ins" for the katana.

Let's remember other German bits of tech that didn't work right:

(1) The FG 42 tried to pack too much power into too small a package, resulting in terrible recoil in automatic fire. Additionally, the cost to produce one was outrageous.

(2) The Me 163 Komet, a rocket fighter tat killed more of it's own pilots than Allied planes did. And that doesn't include ground crew killed by the toxic fuel.

All sides of the war tried different ideas out which failed spectacularly. That's just the price of developing new and wonderful ways of killing the enemy... ;)

I'm reminded of that American bloke who tried to attach incendiary devices to bats.

Or the British idea to detect U-boats by training seabirds to dive on them.

Or the Type 99 machine gun the Japanese had that featured a bayonet lug.

The Japanese loved bayonets more thanthan the USMC did ;)

Or the incidiary-carrying balloons the Japanese unleased against the U.S. west coast.

Those actually worked in tests, in one case blowing up the car of a general observing the test ...

That idea would have worked if it hadn't proved possible to cut out the middle man (bat) and deliver incendiaries straight from the bomb bay to the target.

There was an idea ahead of its time. If the fuel problem could have been solved in early 1944, the Komet would have the been the ultimate interceptor of its day.

Nah the only sentient lifeform that loves bayonets more than the USMC is that crazed species known as the Scottish Highlander.

Or the Australian infantryman. Worse, an Australian infantryman in a kilt! :p
Attachment 1825

mg 42
 

the mg 42 and its ante decessors - the mg 3 etc are - in my humble opinion - far superior to the mag fed Bren. The Bren - or its Czech predecessor the VZ or LK 26 ( or was it 28 ) was the best there was in the early 1930s. I would say that the MG 42 had better versatility and a more credible sustained fire ability. ( Considering squad mobile automatic fire was only starting to be introduced as a concept in those days.)

Thats not to say that the Bren wasnt any good.