![]() |
Reminds of early in WWII where some British merchant ships were fitted with a catapult-launched Hurricane for use against German Fw 200 Condors acting as spotters for U-boats. The Hurricanes were usually successful in driving off the Condors, but later finding the convoy so the pilot could ditch nearby (the ships had no way of recovering the aircraft) was a bit tricky ...
|
I have been told part of the Cabot debacle was because the museum's board hired a goofball to command the ship with a made up resume as a retired navy Captain. By the time they realized he was a nut case and had no idea what he was doing A LOT of damage due to his incompetent neglect and bungled repairs/maintenance/conversion work had been inflicted on the ship. They were never able to crawl out of the hole he left in the budget to get her in any kind of shape for museum tours.
I understand the Navy was extremely pissed, because they had recommended several officers for the job that the board ignored for the guy they selected, who apparently had some political pull with someone on the board. There may have been a lawsuit filed by some of the investors...not sure. |
Shipborne Containerized Air Defense Systems
3 Attachment(s)
Shipborne Containerized Air Defense Systems
|
Quote:
Quote:
|
The American equivalent was ARAPAHO, which looked to outfit containers with ASW electronics and load 6 to 8 helicopters or Harriers on board, taking up about 30% of the cargo space of (then-current) container ships to convert them to ASW carriers/convoy escorts. When tested (by the Royal Navy) on RFA Reliant off Lebanon in 1984, the lack of watertightness proved to be a problem; helicopters had to be washed down twice daily to prevent salt corrosion, and despite being in the (relatively calm) Mediterranean, the hangar was often awash in 2-3 inches of salt water from spray and rolling.
|
Quote:
The differences are 1. It be installed in less than twenty-four hours and included all components necessary for V/STOL aircraft operations: flight deck, hangar, fuel, and crew accommodations. 2. ARAPAHO was designed be taken off a ship, and moved shore, to be set up as a complete self-sustaining facility to do Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM), Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM), and selected depot work. https://www.globalsecurity.org/milit...ip/arapaho.htm |
https://www.globalsecurity.org/milit...ip/arapaho.htm
Copied from the above link in case you can't get it to work ARAPAHO Army Pre-positioned Sustainment Maintenance Facility In the Arapaho program, the Naval Air Systems Command developed a portable, modularized aviation facility intended for installation aboard container ships. It can be installed in less than twenty-four hours and included all components necessary for V/STOL aircraft operations: flight deck, hangar, fuel, and crew accommodations. It was estimated to cost less than $20 million per set. ARAPAHO was a research and development project to demonstrate the feasibility of equipping merchant ships with emergency aviation support in wartime and of operating ASW helicopters and other combatant aircraft from these vessels. ARAPAHO at-sea testing was completed 07 October 1982 at the Norfolk International Terminal, Norfolk, Va., when the 18,000-ton container ship Export Leader - configured with a portable modular aviation facility - returned to port after having logged 178 day and 45 night helicopter landings. The history of the floating maintenance facility goes back to World War II. There was a big fight between the Army Air Force and the Navy over the need for a floating aircraft repair facility. After a great deal of debating among themselves, they came up with three ships. These ships were used in the Pacific when the Americans were island hopping. Before troops could get a facility ashore, they were going to another island. So they put these repair facilities aboard these small ships that were converted for it and they would island hop with the invasion force and were very successful. After the end of World War II, there was no need for them and they were all dismantled and done away with because no one saw the need for that type of thing in the future. In Korea, there was not a need for them; or if there was, it had such a low priority that no one ever resurrected the concept. In the early 1960s the AV-5 Albemarle, a WWII seaplane tender, was taken out of the James River Fleet off of Fort Eustis and taken down to Charleston. She was converted and renamed ARVH-1 Corpus Christi Bay [ARVH = Aircraft Repair Ship, Helicopter]. Then there was a plan in the late 1960s and early 1970s for a floating aircraft maintenance facility which would have consisted of a small aircraft carrier [an escort carrier] with a hanger built on the flight deck. That was considered to be cost prohibitive at the time and the idea was dropped. By the mid-1980s there was a plan to resurrect this capability with the project Arapaho, building a modular facility aboard a container ship. The advantage of the Arapaho over the floating aircraft maintenance facility such as the Corpus Christi Bay is that it could be taken off the ship, moved shore, and set up as a complete self-sustaining facility to do Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM), Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM), and selected depot work. The ability to support the planned force development in all of its potential roles was essential to accomplishment of the Army's missions under the National Security and National Military Strategies. During 1992 the Army took several steps to improve its ability to support its forces in combat and in operations other than war. These covered a wide spectrum of logistical issues such as war reserves; repair parts; tactical water; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; and the industrial base. In the process, the Army leadership had to balance considerations of force structure design, mobility, and personnel end strength with the available resources to properly sustain its forces. To provide non divisional Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) and limited depot support in an operational area, the Army established its Pre-positioned Sustainment Maintenance Facility (ARAPAHO) program. Operating as either a sea-based or land-based facility, ARAPAHO consisted of a designated non divisional AVIM unit's personnel with equipment installed in shelters. Logisticians designed the unit for loading on board a C-5 Seawitch class or larger container ship within twenty-four to thirty-six hours of receiving movement orders, and they envisioned deployment at sea within six days. The unit can use on-board Operational Ready Float (ORF) and Forward Repair Activities (FRA) and will use extended prescribed load list/authorized stockage list (PLL/ASL). ARAPAHO's ability to deploy rapidly would hopefully save forces from waiting sixty days for a ground-based AVIM unit. As a self-transportable unit, ARAPAHO can also quickly redeploy after completing its initial mission. |
Other Ideas
Here is a link for pictures and stats for RFA Reliance (A131), already talked about there is a really good picture here too
http://www.navypedia.org/ships/uk/br...astronomer.htm Other examples of ships like this are: RFA Argus (A135) of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which began her career as container ship. The ship was requisitioned in 1982 for service in the Falklands War and purchased outright in 1984 for use as an Aviation Training Ship RFA Engadine (K08) was a helicopter support ship of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The need for Engadine was seen in the mid-1960s as more and more helicopters were deployed from Royal Navy aircraft carriers and surface combatants. She was decommissioned in 1989 and sold to new owners in Greece and left the UK in 1990. Broken up in India in 1996 |
Now, there's an interesting possibility -
Sale of the Cabot, operational if disarmed, into private hands, who turn out to be New America, who load up say 500 well-armed troops, half a dozen helicopters, and go William Walker on Jamaica in 1998/9, in order to provide a safe secure home base... It isn't going far, and some refill fuel an be raided from the Dutch ABC islands... Uncle Ted |
Quote:
|
Per canon, as in, printed by GDW, how much of the US Navy is left as fleet-in-being?
Matt Weiser wrote a pretty good "fanon" writeup in GLYOYO #1; just wondering where the GDW pubs outline what ships are left. USS City of Corpus Christi, SSGN-981 an Ohio-class SSBN (The Last Sub) USS John Hancock, DD981, Spruance class (Going Home) USS Nashville, LPD-13, Austin-class transport dock (The RDF Sourcebook) USS Bellau Wood, LHA-3, Tarawa-class (The RDF Sourcebook) USS Clark, FFG-11, Oliver Hazard Perry class (The RDF Sourcebook) USS Boone, FFG-25*, Oliver Hazard Perry class (The RDF Sourcebook) USS Copeland, FFG-28*, Oliver Hazard Perry class (The RDF Sourcebook) USS Salem, CA-139**, Des Moines class heavy cruiser (The RDF Sourcebook) USS Yorktown, CG-45, Ticonderoga class (The RDF Sourcebook) ... *=the ship registry numbers are flipped, Boone is FFG-28 and Copeland is FFG-25. ** = now, this is interesting. Salem was decomissioned in 1954. Per Wikipeida: Quote:
|
Quote:
Uncle Ted |
Quote:
Jacksonville and Mayport are separated by several miles so that near miss may have devastated the areas along the coast but may have spared a lot of Jacksonville itself - also was the miss in a direct line to Mayport or was it also the south - if that is where it hit then Jacksonville Beach and places like that could have been nailed but must of the city could have been spared and not sure if the nuke was a surface detonation or airburst FYI - the idea that a nuke could have caused a wave effect is faulty - https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...s__107709.html - if it was a surface burst you can get lots of water and mud shot up in the air but not a wave - it takes a hell of a lot more energy than one megaton to create any kind of appreciable wave |
Quote:
|
I think you are right there - if I remember right the list actually said surface when it was a surface burst - i.e. that part at least it didnt leave to chance
Keep in mind however that the list in Howling Wilderness DID NOT exactly match the actual attacks - and before I get the usual rap in the mouth for saying that I mean that the details of the actual attacks varied from the simple list in HW versus for instance Urban Guerilla Pointed that out last night in another thread - i.e. the attack on Cape Canaveral wasnt a simple one megaton surface burst attack - it was a series of ten 0.1MT surface bursts that added up to one megaton - but if all you had was HW you would think it was a single one megaton bomb |
That "10 hits" thing is ridiculous overkill. I mean, it's canon, so whatcha gonna do, but seriously that's just beyond silly. It's like shooting a lego building eight times with a .22 :P
Anyway, for myself, I'd take the strike list, dial it into Nukemap, and get your best estimate effects from there (but this is wandering far afield, my apologies). Back to carriers...I could swear to God there was another one mentioned as being in the Gulf, stuck in port (in Kuwait?) due to damage...grr what WAS it...I've discussed the very thing myself. |
Matt mentioned the carrier stuck in the Gulf - but it wasnt canon - but the canon really didnt mention ships very much - and it would make sense that there are ships stuck in various ports all over the world due to damage of various types - that is why the Korean Sourcebook and the East African one actually started detailing out more of what is left of the USN in those areas
and I agree its overkill - I used to work at NASA - and there is no way in hell you need 10 0.1MT nukes to take the place out - heck one was on the VAB building itself - the building is big but you dont need that much of a bomb to take it out - and nuking the pads themselves is MASSIVE OVERKILL - I can see hitting the air force base that way because its so spread out and there are so many targets there - but NASA can be taken out pretty easily with one or two nukes - you dont need ten spread out all over the place - hell just an EMP bomb would have done the job - not going to be doing much if you fry the shuttles and the launch computers |
Well, there are shelters between the SSPF and ONC buildings. I'm sure the Soviets would've tried to fry anyone in those, too. But yeah 10 100kt warheads is massive overkill.
It does lend some credence to the idea that the reason the TDM wasn't as bad as it might have been was because we had a working SDI/Missile Shield, and coming from launches at the Cape, the Soviets might've been making sure there'd be no future missions from there (spiteful, but, eh.) EDIT: Anyway, to bring this back around, yes, there's a light aircraft carrier in the USN inventory, along with the aircraft, the fuel to fly them, the personnel to man them, etc. as outlined in the RDF Sourcebook, and it's keeping POL flowing to the US (well, trickling) as the flagship in a protective convoy... |
Quote:
|
Quote:
Now that doesnt mean she isnt still around - but I always look at that resource as being one for that version of the game |
Yorktown was CG-48...GDW didn't correct the mistake in RDF Sourcebook. CG-42-46 were not used, though CGN-42 was an unbuilt Virginia class CGN with AEGIS, and canceled without being named or laid down.
There is a Challenge Magazine article which covers the New Jersey Coast, and it mentions two Forrest Sherman class DDs operating out of Cape May USCG base. |
Part of the treasure haul I'm slowly liberating from a comic/game store 'round these parts (I only have so much allowance per week ;) ) includes a stack of Challenge magazines, which I may already have in .pdf format, I'll have to check. But if, unlike in the case of AD&D where Dragon (and Dungeon) magazines were decidedly not rules canon (until or unless they were made part of the rules by publication in an official rulebook vis Unearthed Arcana), Challenge is canon, then there might be a bolstering of US Naval strength noted in the magazine, with the 2 Forrest Sherman DDs in use being an example.
|
FYI per Marc Miller some of Challenge is canon - the articles written by GDW staff definitely were canon - but he said some of the material submitted by non-GDW wasnt unless a canon author later referred to it or used it
|
Well there's some good article-fodder right there: a definitive index of what T2k articles in Challenge are, in fact, canon.
|
Quote:
although some are obvious - i.e. some of what went in Challenge eventually went into the V2 and V2.2 - i.e. most of the new vehicles for instance |
Quote:
|
Bringing back an old thread from the dead about the Oklahoma City and the Cabot - I think the question on those two ships is really what was more important to the USN if they did try to bring either back - both would need parts so it may be a question of does the navy want a light cruiser or a helicopter carrier?
Between the two ships and the Little Rock which is anchored at Buffalo there would be enough parts to possibly get one or both of them back up and running. Of the two Cabot is in the better condition as she was in commission as recent as 1989 whereas Oklahoma City has been in reserve since 1979. Cabot cant operate modern jet planes that take off and land conventionally but she could operate helicopters or jump jets. Oklahoma City still has her old guns so in an era where missiles are in short supply she still has formidable fire power so she can reach out and touch someone who only has 5 inch guns. Both of their hulls and engines were in good shape Thus either of them being brought back to the Navy is real possibility - the question is more which of the two would give the best bang for the Navy I would think the biggest point that supports Cabot is her ability to be an aircraft transport - and given the losses the USN took in carriers she could be a way to get helos back home from Europe if she was still around by the end of the war |
Quote:
Anyway, if she did end up back in US service, I can see the Cabot or her afore-mentioned sister ships as being useful earlier in the war as a convoy escort, flying ASW helicopters (probably Sea Kings and/or Sea Sprites taken out of mothballs). - |
Quote:
The rest of the CVL's were long gone by either timeline - but given the losses to carriers the US took it would be very tempting to get her back into service at the very least to be an ASW or assault carrier - or even an aircraft transport. |
The Cabot could have also have been used as an aircraft ferry ala USNS Card during the Vietnam war.
|
Quote:
And her engines were old WWII engines and the fuel she burns is a lot more available than using a crap load of jet fuel to fly them down a couple at a time. Let alone the wear and tear on the air frames of the transports. |
As far as the CLG-9 is concerned I don't see it being viable to reactivate. No other ships use 6" guns. So you're either going to have to start an assembly line for just 6' ammo for a single ship or replace that turret with other armaments. Lets not forget about the thing that makes it a CLG the Talos missile launcher. The last time a Talos missile was fired was by the OKC herself 18 years before. So that system needs to be replaced. Let alone that you need to replace some of the bofors with phalanx to give it some kind of close in defense.
|
Quote:
They would have had whatever was on her when they decommissioned her in 1979- but would the USN have held onto any remaining stores? The only other countries that would have had ammunition would have been the few countries still operating the old Brooklyn class CL's - but got me what Argentina, Brazil and Chile still have in stock for 6 inch ammo since even their ships were out of commission by the time of the Twilight War |
1 Attachment(s)
Another Idea
|
Quote:
|
Quote:
Another thing to think about did CGN-9 Long Beach go through with its scheduled AEGIS upgrade. Did other CGNs get the upgrade as well? |
Quote:
|
Quote:
Just search for: swaghauler's "The Navy in V2.2" in the threads search. |
Quote:
Quote:
I see one last issue no one has addressed. The next USS Oklahoma City SSN-723 is already in service. What do we call CLG-9 then? |
Quote:
To quote MARAD directly "the National Defense Reserve Fleet consists of "mothballed" ships, mostly merchant vessels, that can be activated within 20 to 120 days to provide shipping for the United States of America during national emergencies, either military or non-military, such as commercial shipping crises." The US Navy counterpart "A Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF) is a facility owned by the United States Navy as a holding facility for decommissioned naval vessels, pending determination of their final fate. All ships in these facilities are inactive, but some are still on the Naval Vessel Register (NVR), while others have been struck from that Register. The ships that have been stricken from the NVR are disposed of by one of several means, including foreign military sale transfer, ship donation as a museum or memorial, domestic dismantling and recycling, artificial reefing, or use as a target vessel. Others are retention assets for possible future reactivation, which have been laid up for long-term preservation and are maintained with minimal maintenance (humidity control, corrosion control, flood/fire watch) should they need to be recalled to active duty." according to the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan to Congress for Fiscal Year 2016, The Navy has been reducing the number of inactive ships, which numbered as many as 195 in 1997, but was down to 49 by the end of 2014. |
All times are GMT -6. The time now is 05:08 AM. |
Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.8.6
Copyright ©2000 - 2025, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.