Japan fielded some intresting designs for her cruisers during the war.

The two light cruisers of the Tenryu class were Japan's first "modern" designs when they were launched in 1918. Very comparable to the British C-class cruisers they provided good service during the inter war years. By the start of WWII, they were too old for modernization. Tenryu was sunk in 1942. Tatsuta was sunk in 1944. Armed with four single mount 5.5-inch rifles

Starting in 1919, 5 light cruisers of the Kuma class were developed from experience gained from the Tenryu. They started the war with seven single mount 5.5-inch guns and two quad mount 24-inch torpedo tubes. Heavily modernized during the war, two, Oi and Kitakami were armed with four 5.5-inch and ten quad mounted 24-inch torpedo tubes (20 Long Lance torpedoes on the broadside!!!!!). Later modified to carry eight Kaiten suicide submarines. Four of the class were sunk in 1944, the Kitakami survived the war, damaged, and was scrapped in 1947.

The Nagara class of six light cruisers was laid down in 1921. They served as the flagships of destroyer squadrons. They started the war with seven single mount 5.5-inch guns and two quad mount 24-inch torpedo tubes.

As an experiment to mount the heaviest possible armament (two twin and two single mount 5.5-inchers and two twin 24-inch torpedo tubes) the Yubari only displaced 2,890 tons (compared to Nagara's 5,170 tons). Modernized during the war, Yubari was lost in 1944.

The last group of 5,000 ton light cruisers, the three Sendai class ships filled the same role as the Nagaras. They carried the same armament of seven single mount 5.5-inch rifles and two quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. All were lost in 1943/44.

The two Furutake class heavy cruisers took the lessons of the Yubari and applied them to a larger vessel. They mounted three twin 8in rifles and two quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. Both were lost in 1942.

An improved version of the Furutake, the two Aoba class cruisers entered service in 1926. Armed with three twin 8-inch and two quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. They operated with the Furutake class for many years. Kinugasa was lost in 1942 and the Aoba in 1945.

The Myoko class was the first of the 10,000 ton heavy cruisers and set the standard for the following classes. They mounted five twin 8-inch guns and four quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. One were lost in 1944 to US forces, and two were lost in 1945 to the British, the last, Myoko was heavily damaged in 1944 and was scuttled by the British in 1946.

An improved version of the Myokos, the four Takao class ships mounted five twin 8-inch guns and four quad 24-inch torpedo tubes. Made extensive use of light alloys and welding to control their weight. Three were lost in 1944 and the fourth, Takao, was severely damaged in Singapore harbor by the British midget submarines XE-1 and XE-3.

Originally laid down as light cruisers and mounting five triple 6.1-inch guns (in answer to the US Brooklyn class). The four Mogami-class were modified in 1939-1940 into heavy cruisers, mounting five twin 8-inch rifles and four triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. One was sunk in 1942 and the remaining three in 1944.

The two Tone class cruisers were modified Mogamis. Built to carry a larger number of floatplanes and act as fleet scouts. They mounted their four twin 8-inch guns forward of the bridge, they also carried four triple 24-inch torpedo tubes and five floatplanes. The Chikuma was lost in 1944 and the Tone was sunk in Kure harbor and scrapped after the war.

Designed as training ships, the three Katori class light cruisers became destroyer squadron flagships following the start of the war. They mounted two twin 5.5-inch rifles and two twin 24-inch torpedo tubes. One was lost in 1944, another in 1945 and the third, Kashima, survived the war, to be scrapped in 1947.

Designed as replacements for the older Nagaras, the four Agano class cruisers mounted three twin 6.1-inch rifles and two quad-mounted 24-inch torpedo tubes. Two were lost in 1944, a third, Yahagi, was sunk in the Last Sortie with Yamato and the fourth Sakawa, survived the war to be sunk in the Bikini nuclear test.

The last cruiser, the single Oyodo was a modified Agano. Armed with two triple 6.1-inch rifles, she was intended as a flagship for attack groups. In this role she carried six floatplanes. She was sunk in 1945.

Japanese heavy cruisers were powerful designs, built in excess of the pre war naval treaties. Their main armament was laid out in twin turrets, one of which could only fire to port or starboard, restricting their forward firing weapons to four rifles (compared to six on USN cruisers). They also mounted at least two 24-inch torpedo tubes with the deadly Type 93 Long Lance torpedo. In the fighting off Guadalcanal, they were deadly foes.

Their light cruisers were, for the most part, 1919-1920 designs and poorly suited for modern warfare. But they also carried the Long Lance torpedo, giving them the edge in surface actions.

And what a terrible ending to an intresting series!

In the early war years, US submarines often found themselves with dream shots, only to have their torpedoes fail.

Consider the USS Growler at the Battle of Midway, the only US sub to attack a Japanese warship in the battle, she was able to get close enough to put four torpedoes into one of the carriers, hit the carrier with all four shots, only to have all of them fail to explode! To add insult to injury, the air flask from one of the torpedoes floated to the service and was used by several Japanese sailors as a floatation device....its no wonder that US submariners wanted to travel to the east coast and commit barbarous acts upon the persons of certain officers working with Weapons Development!

What finally conviced the lab rats was a submarine that set up and fired twelve torpedoes (he reloaded!!!) at a stationary target, at the recommended range, using the recommended settings and got to watch all twelve torpedoes hit the target and fail to go off.

It doesn't get much worse than that!

And don't forget the San Jacinto affair in which a US warship bordered a British flagged merchant vessel and removed two Confederate diplomats. The US position that the Confederates were not diplomats but rebels was weak at beast. But even more damning was that the merchant was in international waters. It was only the personal intervention of Prince Albert that prevented hot heads from ordering the Royal Navy to teach the Americans a lesson.

So yes, I can see such an incident putting the Royal Navy in the position of smashing the blockade, and considering that most of the USN warships were smaller gunboats, the odds were excellent that the RN would succeed in their mission. With one or more Southern ports open to export cotton and tobacco and import military supplies.......

That's one hell of a broadside. Scary. A single ship that can throw an entire squadron's worth of torps in a salvo.

Picture Oi at 2nd Guadalcanal, with South Dakota in her sights!!!!

Japanese cruisers and most destroyers carried reload torpedoes....haven't found any mention of them being available on Oi and her sister....but wouldn't that be a nightmare scenario for a Task Group commander.

The unbelievable part would have been getting Parliament to agree with the war; especially after the War of 1812 had led to a stable, mutually-acceptable peace and the longest undefended land border in the world.
Now, if the Confederacy had followed Longstreet's advice (in The Killer Angels anyway) and freed the slaves before attacking Fort Sumter; then I suspect British support would have been forthcoming...

It's no secret that the British was ready and willing to assist the Confederacy, we had observors on the ground watching how things played out and reporting back on a regular basis.

Slavery was the only thing that kept us out of the war. Politicaly and strategicly a divided North America was in the best interests of the British Empire but as mentioned we could not support a slave-nation, it just wouldn't wash with parliment and at the time we held the position of "good guys" in the same way America does today, it was inportant to maintain a moral high ground.

Had the south freed the slaves I doubt very much that the Union could of prevailed and we';d have a very different history. The long reaching effects of two American states on world history is a fascinating concept when you look at the 20th century.

Yes, it is. One has to wonder how WW1 would have turned out if there had been no American intervention. Had there been a negotiated peace there would never have been a Nazi Germany to feed off of the resentment of what the Allies forced upon Germany. Without a Nazi Germany how would Europe have fared once Stalin finished screwing up Russia? Would he have attacked westwards without having a hated target like Nazi Germany to focus upon? Japan would likely not have needed to resort to attacking the USA or CSA. Would Stalin, free to devote all his attention to Japan, have left Japan alone to wage war on China? Doubtful.

And that's why Turtledove's work holds my attention. It's a well reasoned, carefully thoughout might-have-been.

America's involvement in WW1 has always been over-estimated. By the time America entered the war, Germany had shot her bolt. America helped make the Germans realise this but even without the Americans WW1 would not of lasted past 1919 at best.

However the concept of a negotiated peace is interesting. Without America to drive the final nail into Germany's coffin they may of been able to negotiate, considering they had already finished their war on the Eastern front. Hitler could not of risen to power without the humiliation of Germany, a negotiated peace without the crippling war indemnity that came from the post-war treaty may of turned Germany into a post-war democracy similar to France and the UK.

WW2 may well of been an alliance of Germany, France and the Uk against Stalin. Without a Japanese attack to push either American state into armed conflict they probably wouldn't bother getting involved at all, taking a wait and see approach to the continent.

America's military contribution wasn't so great. Its keeping England from going bankrupt, however, should not be underestimated.

I see that there is something that you and I can agree upon.

Its often been said that American submarines succeeded in doing to Japanese shipping in the Pacific, to what Germany's submarines failed to do to Allied shipping in the Atlantic. In fact Allied shipping losses from the end of 1941-45 were more then twice in tonnage to what the Japanese lost in the Pacific, and in 1942 Allied shipping losses were six times greater in tonnage in the Atlantic alone to Japanese losses in the Pacific.

Japan actually produced as many submarines as Britain in WW2 (167), although this pales in comparison to Germany who producing twice as much as the rest of the world combined. German submarine technology and tactics progressed rapidly throughout the war.

They were the first to fit the Dutch Snorkel design into their submarines. The Germans also made rapid progress in the development of battery capacity, sonars, homing torpedoes, and fitted hydraulic torpedo loaders onto the Type XXI which gave them the ability to fire 18 torpedoes in under 20 minutes. The Type XXI was considered revolutionary, being able to remain submerged almost all of the time and also faster than all previous designs worldwide, due to the improved streamlining of their shape, batteries with larger capacity and the snorkel, which allowed diesel engines to be used while submerged. Streamlined and hydrodynamically clean hull design allowed later war German submarines to have high submerged speed, being able to outrun many surface ships while submerged, combined with improved dive times, making it much harder to chase and destroy. Yet they lost 785 submarines.

The reason being the Allies, the British in particular, recognised from the outset the danger of the submarine to not only naval shipping but commerce. In addition to the convoy and escort system, Allied anti-submarine weapons and counter-measures kept pace with and even surpassed German submarine developments and tactics, to the point that Allied shipping losses in the Atlantic declined from 6.1 million tonnes in 1942, to 500,000 tonnes in 1944. Geman submarine losses rose from 87 in 1942 to 242 in 1944.

Unlike Britain the Japanese failed to make provisions to protect their shipping until it was way too late, and it was far to little to stop American submarines from choking Japanese imports and resupply to outlying bases and garrisons. Initially it was probably out of arrogance due to their early successes, but they were hoplessely outclassed by Allied technology as the war progressed. Japan also failed to properly utilise its large submarine fleet from the start of the war. They had 63 operational submarines in December 1941 which were as good as what the US Navy had, with better torpedoes. Yet until later in the war when they were on the retreat they largely ignored Allied shipping and went looking for warships. In 1942 Japan lost a million tons of shipping and sunk 7 American submarines. In 1944 Japan lost nearly 4 million tons of shipping and sank 20 American submarines, and lost 56 of her own submarines.

Debate enough subjects, long enough and common ground is reached sooner or later.

We already had a taste of what subs could do back in WW1. While often slow to learn, this was an education we took to heart when WW2 broke out. Even so, it took us a while to get our shit together and run convoys. During the early stage of the Atlantic war it was open season on merchant shipping.

Oddly enough, and very fortunate for the UK (and the rest of the world), Germany failed to learn the lesson of their own success with U-boats in WW1.

When World War II started, Germany only had 65 U-boats, with just 21 of those at sea, ready for war. During the war the Germans sank 5,150 allied ships displacing 21.57 million tons. Of this, the U-boats were responsible for 2828 ships of 14.69 million tons. To place this in perspective, the Germans sank the equivalent of the entire British merchant fleet at the start of the war. Additionally, submarines destroyed 187 warships, including 6 aircraft carriers and 2 battleships.

WW2 U-boat production:

1935 (14)
1936 (21)
1937 (1)
1938 (9)
1939 (18)
1940 (50)
1941 (199)
1942 (237)
1943 (284)
1944 (229)
1945 (91)

Total: 1153

Imagine what would have happened if Germany had used a different Z-plan, one in which resource-intensive dinosaurs like the cruisers and battleships whose keels were laid down prior to the outbreak of war had been deferred to later in the plan in favor of truly massive U-boat construction. How many U-boats could Germany have built in place of the Bismark and Tirpitz? As it was, Germany came close to bringing England to its knees, even with a late start at ramping up U-boat production. Let's suppose that Germany had built 200 U-boats in 1939 and another 200 in 1940. (That's moving the historical production ahead by just 2 years, which is not unreasonable.) Germany succeeds in forcing England to sue for peace by the Spring of 1941. With no threat in the Mediterranean from England, Germany has no need to intervene on Italy's behalf in Greece. The west flank is secure and Operation Barbarossa can begin on its original schedule and with more power as Germany no longer needs to tie up large numbers of men, tanks, and planes in the west. Six weeks more time allows Germany to take Moscow long before the fall rains turn everything into a muddy morass. Leningrad falls soon thereafter. Even if Stalin doesn't sue for peace (which is unlikely, and it's equally unlikely that Hitler would have accepted even if Stalin offered), by the time the Siberians arrive they'd find the Germans already hunkered down in Moscow and Leningrad. Their counteroffensive would have limited effect. With reduced winter losses, and starting positions further east, Germany is more likely to succeed in the Caucasus operations of 1942. If they capture the oilfields (likely in this alternate history), that's pretty much it for any chances of the Soviets ever being able to throw the Germans back on the defensive. Best case for the Russians is that things settle into years of bloody stalemate on the Eastern front. Worst case? Japan attacks a fatally weakened Russia in late 1942 and it's the Russians that have to fight a two-front war, and do so without any lend-lease from the UK or the US.

And speaking of the US, with England at peace with Germany, the Germans never declare war on the US. The French are FUBAR. There will never be a "second front". The US concentrates all its might on Japan. The Pacific war probably ends in late 1944 or early 1945, and without atomic weapons, which are not fast-tracked into development because the US is never threatened by Germany. The invasion of Japan is horrendously bloody.

Germany completes the Final Solution. Germany also, eventually, either gets Turkey to join the Axis, or conquers it. After which Germany sweeps through the Middle East, swallowing up Arabia and Persia.

Two superpowers arise from WW2: the US and Germany, with the Third Reich as the largest empire the world has ever known, having conquered nearly all of Europe, and a substantial portion of Asia.

In particular, it was the doctrine of the IJA for submarines to go after surface warships first, merchant shipping second. With the exception of aircraft carriers, this was a backwards strategy. Sinking a battleship doesn't harm the enemy as much as an equivalent tonnage of freighters and tankers.

This is one of the obvious historical changes in my weird WWII campaign, the result of Russia attacking Germany in 1941 and getting crushed (a major factor in Turkey not joining the Axis was fear of being attacked by Russia; with Russia out of the way, Turkey's neutrality becomes less certain).

Oh, and the Russian invasion was partly the PCs fault. In December 1940 they made sure the Russians knew the Nazis were in Switzerland trying to recruit the dragons there burn down Moscow, among other places ...

On December 7, 1941, the USN had 171 destroyers in commission.

One third of these were of World War One vintage, the famous "Liberty" or "flush-deck class of which 272 had been built. Between the wars 12 had been lost and 93 had been scrapped under the terms of the London Naval Disarmament Treaty of 1930. An additional 46 were serving in subsidary duties and 50 had been traded to the Royal Navy in 1940. Leaving 71 in service.

The remaining ships were all built after 1932.

One feature of US destroyers was that they were built for a Pacific War. The scarcity of land bases meant that some means of overcoming the vast distances involved had to be found. One solution was the development of the fleet train that allowed the USN to strike anywhere in the Pacific. Another was building extended ranges into their ships. For example, a contemporary British F-class destroyer had a range of 6,000 miles at 15 knots. The US Craven-class destroyer had a range of 9,000 miles at the same speed. All US destroyers were equipped to refuel at sea.

Allen-class. Sole survivor of the pre-flush deck destroyers. Spent the war at Pearl Harbor as a training vessel and scrapped in 1946.

Clemson-class; also known as the Liberty or Flush-Deck class. Displacement ranged from 1,090 to 1,190 tons. Armed with four 4-inch/50 rifles and a single 3-inch/23 AA gun and four triple torpedo mounts. Spent most of the war as convoy escorts or modified into fast landing ships or minesweepers. During 1941-42, they fought against terrible odds in the Philippines and Java. One, the USS Stewart was captured in dry dock and served the war with the IJN. Recovered after the war, she was sunk as a target in 1946. Eighteen were sunk.

Farragut-class. A group of 8 built in 1934. Displacement of 1,395 tons. Introduced the 5-inch/38 DP gun and quad mounted tubes. Initially mounted five 5-inch/38s and two quad mount torpedos. One 5-incher was removed to make room (and weight) for increased AA armament. Three were sunk during the war.

Porter-class. A class of 8 built in 1935 and designed as squadron leaders. Introduced the twin 5-ich/38 mount. Fitted with 4 twin gun mounts and two quad mount torpedoes. Displaced 1,850 tons. Later modified with one twin 5-inch being replaced with a single mount and increased AA armament. One was lost.

Mahan-class. Entering service in 1935, this class of 18 was initially armed with 5 single mount 5-inchers and three quad mounted torpedoes. Later modified with the removal of one 5-incher and two torpedo mounts to allow for increased AA armament. Displaced 1,500 tons. Five were sunk.

Somers-class. Built in 1937, this class of 5 were improved Porters. Displaced 1,850 tons. Started with four twin 5-inch mounts and three quad torpedoe tubes. Later lost one quad mount in favor of increased AA armament. One was lost.

Craven-class, also known as the Gridley-class. Entering service in 1936, this was a class of 22. Displaced 1,500 tons. Armed with four 5-inch single mounts and four quad torpedo tubes. Little changed during the war, although two torpedo mounts were replaced with AA guns. Four were sunk.

Sims-class. Entered service in 1938 as a class of 12 ships. Improved Benham-class armed with five single mount 5-inch/38s and three quad mounted torpedo tubes. Later lost one torpedo mount in favor of AA guns. Displaced 1,570 tons. Five were sunk during the war.

Benson-Livermore-class. Entered service starting in 1939, these two classes totaled 96 vessels (32 Benson and 64 Livermore). Bensons displaced 1,620 tons and Livermores displaced 1,630 tons. Differed only in minor details. Armed with four single 5-inchers and one quintuple torpedo mount. Some were built with two torpedo mounts, but this was quickly removed. Fourteen were lost in the war.

Fletcher-class. This class of 179 started entering service in 1942. The mainstay of the US Pacific Fleet for most of the war. Displaced 2,050 tons and armed with five single mount 5-inch/38s and two quituple torpedo mounts. Towards the end of the war, one torpedo mount was removed in favor of increased AA armament. Twenty were sunk.

Allen M. Summers-class. Entering service in 1943 as a class of 58. These were improved Fletchers armed with three twin 5-inch/38s and two quintuple torpedo mounts. Later lost a torpedo mount, replaced with additional AA guns. Displaced 2,200 tons. Not consider to be successful due to weight problems. Four were sunk.

Gearing-class. Entered service in 1945 as a class of 105. Displaced 2,425 tons. Armed with three twin 5-inch/38s and two quintuple torpedo mounts, later reduced to one torpedo mount and additional AA guns. None were lost.

US destroyers were powerfully armed with dual purpose guns and a strong torpedo armament. As the war progressed, torpedoes were replaced with larger numbers of 40mm and 20mm mounts. They were also noted for an excellent ASW capability with one of the best sonars of the war as well as a heavy depth charge (and later Hedgehog) armament.

All-in-all, well capable of fighting the Pacific War.

Japanese destroyers in WWII earned a reputation for being deadly anti-ship platforms, due to their heavy torpedo armament, especially the Type 93 Long Lance, arguably the best torpedo of the war. Another, little known capability, was the detroyers carriage of reload torpedoes (not just 1 or 2, but enough to reload all of their tubes) and the provision of rapid reloading gear. A IJN destroyer could fire all of its torpedoes in one salvo and have its tubes reloaded within six minutes. This capability was a deadly surprise to the USN during the battles off Guadacanal.

Momi-class. In service from 1919. Displacing 770 tons. The first IJN destroyers built that did not show the influence of British design. 25 were built. One was lost to a pre-collision, 3 were scrapped, 9 were reclassied and rearmed as patrol boats, 5 became training ships and 7 remained as destroyers. Armed with three single mount 4.7-inch rifles and two twin 21-inch torpedeo tubes. Three were sunk, two were removed in 1939 and one was scrapped in 1947.

Minekaze-class. A class of 13 that entered service in the 1920s. Displaced 1,215 tons and were armed with four single mount 4.7-inch rifles and three twin 21-inch torpedo tubes. 8 were sunk during the war, 3 were scrapped in 1947/48, one was scuttled in 1947 and one was turned over to China in 1947.

Wakatake-class. A class of 6 that entered service in the 1920s. Displaced 820 tons and armed with three single 4.7-inch and two twin 21-inch torpedo mounts. One sank in 1932 and five were sunk during the war.

Kamikaze-class. Entering service in 1922, this class of 9 displaced 1,270 tons. Armed with four single mount 4.7-inchers and three twin 21-inch torpedo tubes. Seven were sunk and two were scrapped in 1947.

Mutsuki-class. A class of 12 that entered service in 1926. Displacing 1,313 tons and armed with four single 4.7in rifles and two triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. All twelve were sunk during the war.

Fubuki-class. Entered service in 1930 with 20 ships.. The first modern IJN destroyers, they displaced 2,090 tons and were armed with three twin 5-inch/50 rifles and three triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. During the war, they lost one 5-inch mount, replaced by additional AA guns. Nineteen were sunk during the war and one was scrapped in 1947.

Akatsuki-class. A class of 4 that service in 1932. Displacing 2,090 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50 and three triple 24-inch torpedo mounts. Later lost one 5-inch mount in favor of additional AA guns. Three were sunk and one went to Russia in 1947.

Hatsuharu-class. A class of 6, entering service in 1934. Displaced 1,715 tons and armed with two twin and one single 5-inch/50 and two triple 24-inch torpedo mounts. The single gun mount was replaced with AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Shiratsuyu-class. Entered service in 1935 as a class of 10. Displaced 1,580 tons and armed with two twin and one single 5-inch/50 and two quadruple 24-inch mounts. Like the Hatsuharu, the single gun mount was replaced by AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Asahio-class. A class of 10 that entered service in 1937. Displaced 1,961 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadrule 24-inch torpedo mounts. Like other destroyers, one gun mount was replaced with AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Kagero-class. A class of 18 that entered service in 1939. Considered to be the ultimate in IJN destroyer design, all subsequent classes differed only in minor details. Displaced 2,033 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadruple torpedo mounts. Later had one gun mount replaced with extra AA guns. Seventeen were lost during the war and one went to CHina in 1947.

Yugumo-class. A class of 20 that entered service in 1941. Displaced 2,077 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadruple torpedo mounts. Later had one gun mount replaced with extra AA guns. All were lost during the war.

Akitsuki-class. A class of 12 that entered service in 1941. Designed to meet the need for AA screening vessles for the carriers. Displaced 2,701 tons and armed with four twin 3.9-inch/70 rifles and one quadruple 24-inch torpedo mount. Six were sunk, one went to Russia, another to China and four were scrapped in 1947/48.

Shimakaze. A single ship that entered service in 1942. Displaced 2,567 tons and armed with three twin 5-inch/50s and two quadruple torpedo mounts. Later had one gun mount replaced with extra AA guns. SUnk in 1944.

Matsu-class. A class of 41 that entered service in 1944. Displaced 1,262 tons and armed with one twin and one single 5-inch mount and one quadruple 24-inch torpedo mount. Designed as ASW ships. Nine were sunk, three to China, four to Russia and the remainder scrapped in 1947.

Japanese destroyers were initially designed for the anti-ship role. As Allied airpower became more threatening, they were heavily modified for AA use. IJN DDs were considered to be poor ASW platforms.

The Fubukis were probably the most formidable destroyers in the world when they first entered service and by 1941 were still quite capable. Their big flaw, like most pre-WWII destroyers of all nations, was a poor AAA armament.

Yup! They certainly gave the USN nightmares during the Solomon Islands fighting. The Kageros were the ultimate in the design however and all of their follow-up designs were variations on the basic Kagero.

Talking about poor AAA armament during WWII...

The two worst systems had to be the USN 1.1-inch/75 quad mount and the Japanese 25mm/60 gun in any mounting.

The 1.1-inch or Chicago Piano as it was nicknamed in the fleet, well, the gun crew had a sailor whose job was to carry a sledge hammer and a chisel. His sole function was to pry loose jammed shell casings when they happened. This is one of the things that is very bad for a AAA gun when you are firing at attacking torpedo planes!

The 25mm/60 was a copy of a Hotchkiss design with a limited magazine capacity, typical twelve rounds, and an even more limited engagement zone. To add to the puzzle, the IJN had access to the British 2-pounder and the Bofors 40mm/60 designs, neither of which ever entered service with them. Instead, the IJN simply added more and more 25mm mounts.

Considering that as the war progressed, the Allies realized that the 20mm Oerklions were not effective weapons and that even the quad 40mm mounts didn't have the aircraft destruction capacity to stop Kamikazes.......one wonders just what the IJN was thinking.

In any discussion of the Pacific War, sooner or later it turns into a discussion of just what might have happened had the largest Japanese battleship, HIJMS Yamato had met the largest USN battleship, USS Iowa in a toe-to-toe fight.

First, the basic stats:

Yamato had a full load displacement of 69,888 tons (she was the largest warship ever launched until the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise in the 1960s). Her length at the waterline was 839'11" with an overall length of 862'9". Beam was 121'1" and she had a draft of 34'1".

Iowa's full load displacement was 57,540 tons. Her length at the waterline was 860" with an overall length of 887"3". She had a beam of 108'2" and a draft of 36'3".

The key features here are the beam and draft measurements, typically a wide-beamed ship with deep draft is a steadier gunnery platform. Yamato being wider and Iowa being deeper, both balance out in the long run. Iowa had a better layour of rudders vs Yamato and actually had a smaller tactical diameter (this is the minimum diameter necessary to make a full circle), thus making her more maneuverable.

Machinery wise, Yamato had twelve boilers and four sets of turbines giving her a max shaft horsepower of 150,000 and a maximum speed of 27 knots. The Iowa had eight boilers and four sets of turbines which turned out 212,000 shaft horsepower with a sustained speed of 32.5 knots (the Iowas were able to reach 35 knots during trials for short periods).

Iowa's higher sustained speed gave her the advantage in closing the range and her ability to kick up to 35 knots whould have given Yamato problems in tracking.

Yamato's armor protection was: Her main belt was 16.1"; her deck armor was 9"; her barbettes (turret bases) was 21.5"; the turret faces had 25.6"; and her conning tower had 19.7" of protection. Iowa had a belt 12.9" thick; deck armor 8.1"; barbette: 17.3"; turret faces of 19.7" and conning tower of 17.5".

On paper, at least Yamato had the advantage, but this is rather deceptive. Thickness of plate also has to make an allowance for quality. In the years prior to WWII, the USN had made considerable strides in armor technology, as a result, the protection offered by its new armor plate was equivalent to about 25% more thickness than the old type of armor used by Yamato. Iowa also appears to have been much better constructed than Yamato. On December 25, 1944, Yamato took a single torpedo hit that demonstrated that the jointing in between her armor belt and her hull was faulty. To correct the fault, the IJN concluded that it would have to add an additional 5,000 tons worth of bracing and armor to the ship's displacement. The IJN simply repaired the hole and pretended that there was no problem.

Armament wise, the Yamato mounted three triple turrets mounting 18.11-inch/45 rifles (two forward and one aft), a secondary armament of two triple 6.1-inch/60 rifles (one each fore and aft), and a dual purpose armament of twelve twin 5-inch/40 rifles. Iowa mounted three triple turrets mounting 16-inch/50 rifles and a dual purpose armament of ten twin 5-inch/38 rifles.

So just how good were the main armament? The 18.11-inch naval rifle had a muzzle velocity of 2,550fps. It could fire one round per gun per minute. The 16-inch rifle had a muzzle velocity of 2,560fps and a rate of fire of two rounds per gun per minute.

At first glance, the 18-inch gun fires a shell weighing some 20% more than the 16-inch, and has a 7% greater range.

But the American advantage is a bit more subtle. The 16-inch had a longer barrel length than the 18-inch, this gives the shell more stability in flight, giving it greater range.

Its when the penetration capability of the two guns is compared that it becomes intresting: At a range of 0 yards, the 18-incher has a pen of 34", compared to 32.62" for the 16-inch. At a range of 20,000 yards, the 18-inch will penetrate about 20.4"; at the same range the 16-inch will penetrate 20.04". Open the range to 30,000 yards and the 18-inch will penetrate about 14.7" and the 16-inch will penetrate 14.97".

But it all boils down to the fact that extended range gunnery duels did not happen. The longest-range deliberate hit by any battleship in either the First World War or in the Second was made by HMS Warspite when it scored a hot at 26,000 yards.

There is also one other factor to consider. The USN's gunnery was supported by superior fire control radar as well as better ballistic computers.

There is no doubt that in a one for one engagement, the Iowa would have emerged bloody, but victorious.

The Battle of Midway is called the most decisive naval battle of WWII, the turning point of the naval war, and a host of other platitudes. Its the classis David-vs-Goliath battle. The heavily outnumber USN ambushes the superior IJN and nails four carriers and a heavy cruiser and losing only one carrier and a destroyer. The so-called incredible victory.

Or was it?

Certainly when you sit down and flip over the orders of battle, the IJN put committed almost its entire fleet against a handful of USN warships. But when it comes right down to it, just how badly outnumbered was the USN.

The primary strike force for the IJN was the "Kido Butai", the First Carrier Striking Force .

The Kido Butai consisted of the following:
Carrier Division One
CV Akagi: with an air group of 18 A6M2 Zero fighters, 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers and 19 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers. Also carrying 6 Zero fighters for the Midway Garrision and available for CAP.
CV Kaga: with an air group of 18 A6M2 Zero fighters, 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers and 27 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers as well as 9 Zero fighters intended for the Midway Garrison and available for CAP.
Carrier Division Two
CV Hiryu: her air group consisted of 18 A6M2 Zeros, 18 D3A1 Vals and 18
B5N2 Kates as well as 3 additional Zeros intended for Midway.
CV Soryu: her air group consisted of 18 A6M2 Zeros, 19 D3A1 Vals, 18 B5N2 Kates and 2 D4Y1 Judy recon bombers as well as an additional 3 Zeros intended for Midway.
Escorting the carriers were the battleships Haruna and Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the light cruiser Nagara and 11 destroyers.

The combined air groups totaled 93 A6M2 Zero fighters; 73 D3A1 Val dive bombers; 2 D4Y1 Judy recon bombers; 82 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers.

The US committed:
Task Force 17:
USS Yorktown: with an air group of 27 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters, 37 SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers and 15 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers.
She was escorted by 2 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers.

Task Force 16:
USS Enterprise: her air group comprised 27 F4F-4 Wildcats, 37 SBD-3 Dauntless and 14 TBD-1 Devastators.
USS Hornet: her air group comprised 27 F4F-4 Wildcats, 35 SBD-3 Dauntless and 15 TBD-1 Devastators.
Their escorts consisted of 5 heavy and 1 light cruisers and 9 destroyers.

The fleet deployed 81 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters; 109 SBD-3 dive bombers and 44 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers.

An often under appricated member of the fight is the US Garrision on Midway. Their air group consisted of 25 PBY-5 Catalinas in a search role; 5 PBY-5A Catalinas in a strike role; 6 TBF-1 Avengers; 21 F2A-3 Buffalo fighters; 7 F4F-3 Wildcat fighters; 19 SBD-2 Dauntless dive bombers; 21
SB2U-3 Vindicator dive bombers; 1 B-17D photo recon; 15 B-17E heavy bombers; and 4 B-26 medium bombers (carrying torpedoes).

In the course of the battle, the Japanese Invasion Force was attacked by a single Catalina carrying torpedoes as well as B-17 bombers, that damaged one tanker, slightly (by a US torpedo that actually exploded!).

The Kido Butai launched a single air strike on Midway, that damaged many of the installations, but did not damage her AA or coastal defense guns. In the course of the air strike, almost all of the defending fighters were shot down (this would be the last combat action for the Buffalo in US service). The real impact of Midway was in the multiple air strikes that were launched against the Kido Butai that kept the Japanese occuiped with dodging ordnance and disrupted the Japanese CAP. The need to land, refuel and rearm their CAP fighters played a major part in delaying a follow-up strike on Midway.

Due to the relative rawness of the US air groups the three squadrons of torpedo bombers attacked individually and unsupported. This continued the disruption of the Japanese CAP and helped open a window in which the Yorktown and Enterprise dive bombers were able to hit three of the carriers and damage them so severely that they later sank. The final IJN carrier Hiryu was able to launch two separate attacks that first damaged Yorktown and then later so crippled her that she had to be abanded and later sunk by a IJN submarine. Hiryu later fell victim to Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers.

With the loss of the fleet carriers of the Kido Butai, the Japanese were forced to withdraw. In the process of withdraw, two Japanese heavy cruisers collided and one was later sunk by US dive bombers.

The simple version, I know.

But Midway was not the Incredible Victory that many western authors paint it to be. It was a notable victory for the USN and certainly hurt the IJN, badly. But was it a decisive victory? Was it the turning point of the war?

The IJN still enjoyed numerical superiority over the USN. They were still protected by a ring of island bases that allowed them to control the seas around their islands and still were capable of offensive actions. While they had lost all of the carrier aircraft, a large number of their veteran pilots were rescued and were available for latter operations.

IMHO, the decisive battle of the Pacific War was the Battle for Guadalcanal. Here the cream of Japanese Naval Avation died fighting. Here the US took its first major offensive step forward on the long road that would end off an little known island called Okinawa.

In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

On what grounds?

In a nutshell:
Two things. The first and most obvious bit being that the Germans announced that they had reason to believe that it had in it's holds war cargo, and that they would attempt to sink it if it sailed.
Second, as it turns out it did indeed have such cargo, and there for a legit sinking- if tragic.

In a sense Midway was not the victory it has been made out to be because even if the Japanese hadn't lost four aircraft carriers they still would have been beaten, it just would have taken a while longer. However in another sense it was a sensational vistory as the IJN got a hammering, in fact it was the greatest naval defeat that Japan had ever suffered up to that date, and it totaly exploded the short lived myth that they were invincible.

Guadacanal had a similar senationalism to Midway, but it was on land. It was the first time that the Japanese Army was stopped and thoroughly defeated, although the Soviet would argue that they did the same in the lesser known battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol in 1938 and 1939, and its impact was just a great to Allied soldiers and Marines fighting the Japanese in the Pacific and Asia as Midway was to the navy.

Coral Sea was a turning point in the Pacific War for a number of reasons. Firstly it was the first time that the Japanese navy was effectively challenged in the Pacific. Secondly it demonstrated to Japan that Allied resistance or/and offensives would be better organised and more formidable than they previously had been. Thirdly it confirmed to Japan that New Guinea was the absolute outer limit of what it could hope to conquer, and that an invasion of Australia was beyond its capabilities. The fact that Japan actually invaded New Guinea has always puzzled me as it it had few exploitable resources at that time, and only limited logistical capabilities from which to attack Australia. It has always seemed to me to have been a waste of Japanese resources, and I can only think that they went there to disrupt and delay any build up of Allied forces in Australia which would threaten their forces in South East Asia and the Pacific.

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

I've always wondered what might have been built if it the war had started a year later, or if the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the most important warship had been delayed a few years. If it had the Yamato would not have been the largest battleships affoat. Consider the opponents.

1) The British Lion Class: The Lions were the most restrained of the planned super battleships, and would have looked very much like the King George V class and were designed for a new pattern 16in triple gun mount that was never produced. 4 ships were planned and 2 were laid down before building was halted in 1940, and was cancelled in 1942.

Displacement: 40,550t standard; 46,300t deep load
Dimensions: 740ft pp, 785ft oa x 104ft x 30ft
Machinery: 4-shaft Parsons geared turbines, 8 Admiralty 3-drum boilers, 130,000shp = 30kts. Oil 3720t
Armor: Belt 15in-5.5in, bulkheads 13in-4in, barbettes 15in-12in, turrets 15in-6in, CT 4.5in-2in, main deck 6in-5in
Armament: 9-16in/45 (3x3), 16-5.25in/50 DP (8x2), 48-2pdr AA (6x8), 2 aircraft

The protection scheme of these ships was similar to the King George V, but with larger guns. These ships would have been formidable, not too different from the American North Carolina class but better protected and faster, and in fact better protected than the American Iowas, but with less range than both. There was also plans to build two later Lion Class in 1946 with a 50,000t standard displacement (56,500 full load). This version would have carried 9-16in guns (3x3) of a newer type with a firing interval of only 20 seconds. The secondary battery would have been 24-4.5in DP (12x2), and the AA battery was to be 60-40mm Bofors (10x6). Speed was intended to be about 29kts. The increased beam would have allowed better underwater protection than and the armor protection included a 14in belt and 4in-6in deck.

An even larger Super Lion was also planned of 59,100t standard, and 69,140 full load, but still retained the same basic armament with more AA guns. The area of ship protected by armor would have been increased, and fuel oil capacity was increased for greatly increased range. The Lion Class would have contested their ground with a Yamato, although maybe not beaten it. But the later Lion Class versions would certainly have.

2) German H Class: The H class were a part of Germany's Z plan to build a balanced fleet and challenge British supremacy at sea. The first two ships were laid down in 1939, but were canceled shortly after. It was planned to build six of these ships.

Displacement: 55,453t standard; 62,497 deep load
Dimensions: 872ft wl, 911ft 5in oa x 122ft x 33ft 6in
Machinery: 3-shafts, 12 MAN double-acting 2-stroke 9cyl diesels, 165,000shp = 30kts
Armor: belt 11.75in-7in, deck3.25in-2in, armored deck 4.75in-4in,
torpedo bulkhead 1.75in,armored bulkheads 8.75in, main turrets 15.25-5in, secondary turrets 4in-1.5in, CT 15.25in
Armament: 8-16in/47 (4x2), 12-5.9in/55 (6x2), 16-4.1in/65 DP (8x2),
16-37mm/83 AA (8x2), 24-20mm AA (6x4), 6-21in TT (submerged), 4 aircraft

Considered to have been enlarged versions of the Bismarck Class. They had improved diesel machinery and 16in guns, but also some of Bismarcks faults with single purpose secondary guns, and poorly distributed armor, and the placement of the armored deck too low in the ship to protect her vital fire control and communications. They also had underwater torpedo tubes that compromises a ship's watertight integrity. However they also had internal subdivision which made them so difficult to sink, excellent fire control, a steady gun platform and excellent anti-torpedo protection. Hitler in one of his mad moments wanted to radically change later versions of this ship with 20in guns and a dispacement of over 100,000t. The H Class would have been formidable ships but not as good as the Lion Class.

3) Soviet Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class: Four ships was authorized in 1938, and three were actually laid down. Construction was halted in 1940 after two were 75% complete. All three hulls were broken up in later 1940's.

Displacement: 59,150t standard; 65,150t deep load
Dimensions: 889ft 1in oa x 127ft 7in x 33ft 6in
Machinery: 3-shaft turbo-electric drive, 231,000shp = 28kts
Armor: Belt 16.75in, deck 8.75in, turret faces 19.5in
Armament: 9-16in/50 (3x3), 12-6in/50 (6x2), 8-4in/56 DP (4x2),
32-37mm/67 AA (8x4), 8-.50in MG, 4 aircraft

The Sovyetskiy Soyuz class would have been formidable opponents, although they sacrificed some speed and retained only a 9 gun main battery. With their huge beams they would have been very steady gun platforms, and their armor protection approached the Yamato class. However their fire control systems and rangefinder would likely have been inferior to both German and Japanese opponents. The Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class was the nearest of the super battleships to have been actually built, and statisticaly would have been a match for the German H Class although maybe not a Yamato.

4) American Montana Class: Five Montana's were authorized in 1940 but construction was suspended in 1942, and canceled in 1943.

Displacement: 60,500t standard; 70,500t full load
Dimensions: 890ft wl, 925ft oa x 121ft x 36ft 8in full load
Machinery: 4-shaft turbines, 8 boilers, 172,000shp = 28kts full load. Oil 7300t, range 15,000nm at 15kts
Armor: Belt 16.1in-10.2in on 1in STS, internal belt 7.2in-1in, armor deck 6in-7.35in with 2.25 in weather deck and. 62-.75in splinter deck, bulkheads 15.3in, barbettes 18in-21.3in, turrets 22.5in face, 9.15in roof, 10in side, 12in rear, CT 18in with 7.25in roof
Armament: 12-16in/50 (4x3), 20-5in/54 DP (10x2), 32-40mm AA (8x4), 20-20mm AA (20x1), 3 aircraft

The Montana's were the best American battlehips ever designed, and their 16in/50 gun was probably the best battleship gun ever produced. It threw the super heavy 2700lb armor piercing shell 42,345 yards. For comparison, the Japanese 18.1in/45 gun threw a 3200lb armor piercing shell 45,960 yards. The American gun weighed less, allowing the Montana's to carry 12 of them, for a broadside weight of 32,400lbs. The Yamatos could only carry nine of the 18.1in guns on a similar size hull with similar armor and speed. Yamato's broadside weight was 28,800lbs. Montana's new 5in/54 DP secondary guns were superior in range and striking power to the older 5in/38. Her AA battery was well laid out with good arcs of fire for the guns. And the 40mm Bofors was better than anything the Japanese Navy had, and her light battery was superior to Yamato's. Montana and Yamato were protected to similar standards, but the quality of American armor was considered to be of a higher standard. Also Montana's were protected against their own 2700 lb shells between 18,000 and 31,000 yards. Montana's great beam and a reversion to a scheme similar to the North Carolinas gave it protection against torpedo attack. U.S. fire control with radar control, outclassed any German or Japanese battleship, although the 15 meter rangefinders of the Yamato class ws still the best optical design. The Montana was the best of all the super-battleships designed or built, and would have proven too great of an opponent for the Yamato. The only battleship that might have realy taken it on was one of the later British Lion Class.

It's been over 25 years, but basically, it boiled down to the Germans sinking a ship flying a flag of an enemy country sailing in a declared war zone and carrying a suspected war cargo.

I also pointed out that earlier in the war, against merchant shipping U-boats would often surface, fire a bow shot to get the merchant ship to stop, allow the crew to get into lifeboats, then torpedo the merchant ship. The British then began arming merchants with concealed deck guns to fire on the submarines as soon as they surfaced. The Germans then started sinking merchants without warning, which of course led to incredulous British outrage. No one knows if the Lusitania actually had any hidden deck guns, but the U-boat captain had to assume so.

From a moral point, I blame the British more than the Germans, since the British were using human shields to protect war materials.

Now, from a more practical political perspective, the whatever war cargo was on the Lusitania was not worth the risk to Germany (although, as it turned out, it still took nearly two years for the US to get upset enough to get involved int he war).

Actually, Guadalcanal was very much a land, air and sea battle. Partly because it being fought in all three arenas, it was one of the longer battles of the war.

Actually, Guadalcanal was a campaign with many battles.

The Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo in August 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 was a naval battle.
The Battle of Tenaru in August 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942 was a naval battle with air power.
The Battle over Henderson Field from August to December 1942 was an air battle.
The Battle involving the strenthening of the Luga defenses from August to September 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Edson's Ridge in September 1942 was a land battle.
The Action along the Matinkau from Septembet to October 1942 was a land battle with air and naval support.
The Battle of Cape Esperance in October 1942 was a naval battle.
The bombardement and Battle for Henderson Field in October 1942 was a land battle with naval support.
The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942 was a naval battle with air power.
The Matanikau Offensive in November 1942 was a land battle.
The Koli Point Action in November 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Carlson's Patrol in November to December 1942 was a land battle.
The First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942 was a naval battle.
The Second Naval Battle of Guadalanal in November 1942 was a naval battle.
The Battle of Tassafaronga in November 1942 was a naval battle
The First Battle of Mount Austin in December 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Galloping Horse in January 1943 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Sea Horse in January 1943 was a land battle.
The Second Battle of Mount Austin in January 1943 was a land battle.
Operation Ke in January to February 1943 was a naval battle with air support.
The Battle of Rennell Island in January 1943 was a naval battle with air support.

Overall it cost America over 7,000 deaths, 29 ships and 615 aircraft. Japanese casualties were 31,000 deaths, 38 ships and over 800 aircraft.

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners?

No, but the Russians did in WW2. :(

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

Not that I'm aware of, no, but that's largely the result of Germany's surface ships rarely going to sea after the war started and the British navy not taking subs seriously enough at the start of the war (I mean, dear God, they built nearly 20 steam powered subs).

I have never seen any evidence that the Lusitania was carrying war materials; the onboard explosions which made her sinking so rapid can best be accounted for by the initial impact filling her largely empty coal bunkers with coal dust; when the coal dust in turn exploded the mixture was like a primitive Fuel-Air Explosive.
While not perhaps a war crime, the sinking of the Lusitania was an act of terrorism in that it was declared as a specific target, in an effort to deter passengers.
The unrestricted submarine warfare seemed to bring on a new level of unpleasantness; it is understandable to try and sink ships from ambush if they may be armed, but to capture and execute a ship's captain for attempting to sink the submarine which is shooting at him is not.
http://southernlife.org.uk/fryatt.htm