If It Ain't Broke
 

During the Falklands Islands War, the British found out the danger of overreliance on SAMS for ground-based air defense. Apparently, though, this lesson did not influence NATO ADA doctrine. It's somewhat mind-boggling.

The other thing that AAA has going for it, is that AAA can be used against ground targets. For example, M3-mounted quad .50s saved the day again and again in Korea and Vietnam. You can't engage ground targets with most SAM systems (the only ones that come to mind that can are the Bofors RBS 70 MANPADS and ADATS the latter which, AFAIK, was only adopted by the Canadian military).

I have a feeling that US Army AAA fell victim to the belief that newer, higher-tech = better.

-

This stood out to me reading the article. “There’s really no comparison to anything I’ve operated in my career,” Army Sergeant Andrew Veres, a member of 5-4th Air Defense Artillery said in an official interview. "Everything in these systems is an improvement – the survivability, mobility, dependability, off road ability – it gives us the ability to stay in the fight longer."

This shows just how low the bar has been set over the years. The Striker's survivability sucks, in my time as EOD in Iraq I never saw or heard of one surviving any serious hit, the armor did not even need to be penetrated, they caught fire like they were made out of TP, now this is not saying that none of them ever did survive, but just that I have no knowledge of it happening if they were hit. The striker mobility is fine for a wheeled vehicle, but any tracked vehicle is going to be much better off road (where I think you would be spending most of your time in full out combat, not anti-insurgent warfare) so on road sure, off nope. Dependability, very likely is going to be much better than a track, they do need more maintenance. And then back to mobility, this time specificley off road, what is he comparing it to, saying it is an improvement?

I saw that on a YouTube channel (IIRC, Lockheed Martin's channel). The video showed the turret mounted on a variety of AFV platforms, such as the M113, M1117, Bradley, LAV-25, and a few others. The video also showed a variant turret armed with four Stingers and four Hellfires, along with the 30mm autocannon.

If he's an E-5, presumably his only prior experience was with the HMMWV Avenger. The last Bradley Linebackers were withdrawn in, what, 2006?

A Stryker may well be an improvement in terms of survivability compared to an M1097 chassis. The Stryker is likely to be newer than the donor HMMWV, too, so... yeah, in game terms, Wear 1 versus Wear 7 is going to be more dependable.

As far as maneuverability, I can't imagine that the ground pressure is any better, given the Stryker's vastly greater weight. Perhaps the center of gravity is lower than that of the Avenger? That thing always looks like it's going to roll over at the next speed bump or stiff breeze.

Not gonna lie, now I want to see that on an M60 hull as a rough BMPT equivalent.

- C.

When were M163s pulled out of service? Who used them last? Where did they go?

It is interesting that many other nations have more than enough seen the value of SPAAG -- and on the original topic, MBT-hull based AAA. Finland operates a number of these now with twin Oerlikons on Leopard 2A4 hulls. I'm sure their reasons for doing so are largely terrain-based, but from that sense the US military (expected to operate on just about every terrain in the world) would also conceivably see the same benefits? Britain experimented with the same thing but AFAIK didn't put any into service.

AAA is just flat-out useful in any number of roles, even if aircraft aren't around -- and anyone from WW2 to Syria today could tell you that. SAMs (and even AAMs) can certainly in some cases be used against ground targets but... that's a rare occurrence and of pretty limited effect.

In a T2K sense, what happens to all the SAM launchers? The missiles are probably all but gone, the targets are certainly gone... do units just abandon or convert their Rapiers and their Avengers and Strelas? That's an interesting question.

On the other hand, the continued universal usefulness of a Shilka is more than obvious.

Per Wikipedia, the last VADS were withdrawn from service by 1994 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M163_V...nd_replacement).

It's been a while since I did any deep reading on this, but I seem to recall that post-Desert Storm, the Army's assumption was that the USAF would so roughly handle any adversary that American forces would never lack air superiority again. Open to correction from better-informed correspondents.

With regards to the SAM launcher platforms, a vehicle is still a vehicle. High-Wear chassis were probably cannibalized for parts for vehicles of the same family. Low-Wear chassis would probably have the SAM hardware and electronics unbolted/torched off and be converted to battle taxi, gun truck, or general utility use, depending on suitability. Could make for an interesting encounter.

- C.

Would probably make prime candidates for conversion to rocket-pod artillery carriers.

Throwing the baby out with the bathwater
 

It seems that sometimes the US Army has a very short-term institutional memory. It often seems to focus on just the most recent experience, and use that almost exclusively to anticipate future needs/contingencies. Desert Storm may have proved instructive in many ways, but the Iraqis were not the Soviets, and the previous large-scale conflict, which necessitated next to no AAA requirement (being as enemy aircraft posed no realistic threat to US and Allied ground forces), still showed the use of AAA on the modern battlefield. There were numerous instances in the Vietnam War when US Army AAA still came in handy. For example, during the fighting for Hue in 1968, US Army M42 Duster 40mm SPAGs provided much needed direct fire support, and proved quite useful in MOUT.

I reckon that the US Army also probably doesn't look very hard at other nations' experiences when assessing its own current and near future needs. For example, it seems to have ignored the Russian's successful use of ZU-23-4 Shilkas in the ground-support role in Chechnya- again, a conflict where enemy aircraft posed no threat to the Russians- especially in MOUT.

Even if one doesn't expect enemy aircraft to be a major threat on future battlefields, it seems really myopic to eliminate a weapon system that can be used against that threat (just in case), and in a very useful secondary capacity (direct fire infantry support), from US Army TOEs.

-

This has been an ongoing debate since the end of the major combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

I know the US Army bought some of the older CIWS systems that the USN was taking out of service and made the C-RAM which is a system that could be mounted on HMETT that can be used against rockets and mortar shells. Which it has effectively in the last few years.

After the ballistic missile attack against the base in Iraq, there have been questions about where the US Army ADA units are. The reality is there are only so many of them and the requirements are huge if you look at it. From Iraq and Afghanistan, to Korea, Japan, Guam and on over to places like Europe where there is a need. The US Army has chosen, like it has for a number of other important missions like EW, to divest itself of that mission because of costs to buy or maintain platforms that already exist. Let alone the RDT&E for things like advance helicopters, advances firearms, uniforms, or even meals. All of which has sucked up budget line and with the every decreasing military budgets from the heyday of the 1960s. There are decisions being made based less on what could happen historically and more on what hope and pray.

For historical context the last major offensive by Opposing force air units against the US Military was the Korean War when the Korean People's Air Force was able in the opening months of the war to get in some attacks on forward operating bases where the USAF was based. That was approximately 1950. Since then the US has enjoyed control of the air during all major offensives. The only thing that has stymied them was ballistic and cruise missiles, with near misses during the Gulf War in 1991 and a direct hit, then again in 2003 when the Iraqis tried to use some HY-2 Silkworms against bases in Kuwait. Where the engagement of those Silkworms happened to be real close. Short of those threats, the only other thing has been 122mm rockets and mortar shells from very mobile platoons of men that are hard to target with counter battery fire since they have typically set up to shoot using only basic local tools and then immediately leave once the round of fire is complete. If not already left as in some weather conditions have allowed them to use things like the snow to have a mortar tube or a rocket tube already to fire allowing the melting of the snow to light the fuze or even drop the round down the tube to be fired.

We have a handful of those Leopard Marksman SPAAGs in service to provide "short range anti-aircraft coverage" for the main armoured units. The only reason we have those in service is that we had the marksman turrets in storage and we had Leopards to spare for the modification. You know, "we already have the components, so why not"-type of situation.

The ability to use SPAAGs against ground targets is a "better than nothing" solution when you already have them in your TOE. Most of the "use scenarios" are based on "we had nothing else" or "those things had nothing else to do"-situations. I would recommend against using resources for getting new SPAAG-type systems for ground targets only.

The "modern threats" - UAVs, loitering munitions, etc - will most likely require new capabilities for armoured forces, in a form of mobile CIWS/C-RAM-type weapon system. I'm curious to see what kind of solutions for these challenges there will be in the future.

Bonus: link for a video of Leopard Marksman shooting
https://twitter.com/Maavoimat/status...918287360?s=20

Always a Need
 

Back in the day...

I'm just surprised that the US Army didn't see a need for a fast-moving*, mobile AAA platform during the last few years of the Cold War. At that time, the Soviets were spinning up their new Mi-28 Havok and Ka-50 Hokum attack helicopters, both of which posed a threat to US armor (especially when it was on the attack). This would have been the perfect excuse for the US Army to request a new SPAAG. Perhaps the expensive boondoggle of the Sgt. York program soured all involved on SPAAGs.

I think this was the rationale behind the M691 Diana SPAAG in the v1 US Army Vehicle Guide. I used to think it was silly, and probably prohibitively expensive given the pricey M1 chassis, but now I'm not so sure. It had to be speedy enough to keep up with Abrams on the run. I think my main gripe now is that it's armament of twin 20mm canon seems too light. If you're going to use an MBT chassis, load it up! I think 40mm or 30mm would have been a lot better (longer-legged and heavier hitting)- or 25mm at the minimum.

Today...

Drones are becoming a pervasive feature of the modern battlefield, and are already in use as improvised AT weapons (either in suicide attack mode or dropping bombs on AFVs' thinner top armor). In my mind, this brings back the need for SPAAGs. I imagine a Vulcan canon would make short work of most low-flying drones. However, once drone swarms start arriving over the battlefield...

-

US Air Defense Vehicles by James Langham
 

Just stumbled across this by accident while looking for a prototype AT jet marketed during the late '80s (I still haven't found it). IIRC, this doc was shared here on the forum before, but I can remember when or where.

https://thetwilightwar.weebly.com/up...s_02-01-12.pdf

The creator is James Langham, a member of this forum. I think he's consulting on Free League's v4 as well.

-

There's only so much money Big Army can throw at any system and each dime was fought tooth and nail at the Pentagram. Succeed and the colonels
get stars and then cushy gigs w/ the various beltway bandits that masquerade as defense contractors. Fail... well they work for contractors so it's all good :D

If we decide that Big Army decided to get its head out of their proverbial ass and recite the ADA holy mantra of having a gun/missile mix and SHORAD is not the destruction but to preserve the assets of the brigades and battalions from enemy air attack. In which case even damaging enemy fixed wing and rotary platforms or making said individuals piss off for greener pastures is just as good as turning them into fireballs and greasy stains (virtual attrition is a thing but Congresspeople do not understand that)

Keep in mind the sensors we have today did what folks wanted to do back in the 80s and 90s? Air cooled? Sure. Doppler tracking? You can do it w/ raspberry pi kit. Integrated into a network and able to share data w/ multiple platforms no matter if it's in the air or it floats? Yeah, we can do that sez Raytheon, Northrup Grumman, and Lockmart.

Even a cheap gun type system like the Blazer (in retrospect the mil designation would have been something M10xx but GDW didn't know that or thought Big Army would have gone back to cover the M700 series) fitted w/ those tiny dinner plate AESA radars would have given tracking coverage at least out to 10 plus klicks/5 nautical miles depending on terrain and weather. And something like the ADATS w/ a 3D AESA radar while overkill against certain UAVs may end up as a limited coverage against tactical ballistic missiles given software and rocket motor mods.

Mad Mikec

ADATS was supposed to lead to that. It was a dual-purpose SAM/ATGM with a top speed of Mach 3, a 10 kilometer range, and semi-active laser homing (jamming was more of an issue than dazzling when it started development). An 8-missile turret would be placed on top of a Bradley, along with a 25mm Bushmaster. There was also talk of developing an M1-derived Air Ground Defense System with a pair of six-cell ADATS launchers and twin 35mm Bushmasters working in teams of six to engage up to 20 targets simultaneously, per the July-August 1996 issue of Armor. The missiles never reached the required milestones for reliability, MTBF, or serviceability.

The M1 AGDS concept had been around earlier as the Thomson-CSF/LTV Liberty series of proposals for the LOS-Forward-Heavy AAA system, as described here:
Liberty - AMX-30 chassis, 6 Shahine (Crotale) missiles
Liberty I - M1 chassis, 2 12.7mm MGs, 6 Shahine or 12 VT-1 (Crotale NG) missiles
Liberty II - M1 chassis, 2 25mm Bushmaster, 12 VT-1 missiles
Martin Marietta and Oerlikon won the competition with ADATS, which then flopped even worse than the Sgt. York.

Pardon my typing, I haven't gotten home to get my poor ailing computer yet, so I'm typing this on my old S7 smartphone. The touchscreen keyboard leaves a lot to be desired.
I don't have it in the truck with me but there is a book printed by the Army every year that they give to Congress. It is a "wish list" of weapon systems they are seeking funding for. Skyhorse Publishing usually puts out the declassified versions. I have one from 2016 and the Army was seeking funding for two AAA systems to test.

The first was a self-contained module like the CROWS (common remotely operated weapon system) with a millimeter wave radar and an optical tracker paired to a GAU 19 50 Caliber gatling gun and TWO 4-round Stinger Missile modules. It had 2k rounds on the mount and was designed as a swarm drone defense system with a secondary ground attack capability. The unit would be mounted to either a Hummer or a JLTV with the crew firing the mount remotely from inside the uparmored vehicle. Unit weight was listed as around 2 metric tons fully armed with remote fire control station. This is only slightly heavier than a Navy MK38 25mm gun mount.

The other unit (fully experimental) caught my eye because it would fill the gap between the PATRIOT and SHORAD. The proposal was an M109 chasiss fitted with a tall turret containing an AESA radar, IR Tracker, IR optical sensor and Laser ranger/Designator. The weapon system consisted of either a 3 or 4 round box launcher trainable in elevation on either side of the turret for Rolling Airframe Missiles AND a center-mounted 57mm MK110 Cannon (with a pretty long barrel). The canon was equipped with a dual feeding mechanism on either side of the cannon containing 10 rounds in a vertically feed hopper and ejected its spent casings forward over the barrel and towards the right of the hull deck (to avoid the driver). 40 additional rounds would be stored in the turret bustle for 60 rounds on the mount. The listed Crew is driver, gunner, commander, and two loaders for the 57mm (one on either side of the cannon). I don't know if any more RAM Missiles were carried. The radar folded down for transport just like most modern SPAAGs can do. It looked about as tall as an M109A6 with an equally large turret and turret bustle (the back of the turret where ammo is stored). The drawing had access doors on the back of the turret (presumably to speed up reloading the ammo). Effective engagement range was touted as 10km with a 6km slant range for the cannon. The IR Optical tracking allows for NOE aircraft engagement and operations in a radar-denied environment. IDK if any actual prototypes are running around yet but the Marines new hybrid LAV turret's Stinger weapons mount looks suspiciously like the SHORAD mount's box launchers.

I think, the bigger picture is important here. SPAAG projects died with the Peace Dividend for obvious reasons. Germany was lucky to have one of the best systems in the world (if not the best, at least in the west) and kept the Gepard running until 2011. Combined with Roland on its Marder IFV chassis, that was a very solid protection level.

In an alternate history where the USSR remains a larger thread than Russia during the 1990s was, even in a T2K v. 4 variant, where a short Peace Dividend seems to have been the case, SPAAG systems would have probably been a thing for most NATO armies. So, the usual question is, what to buy. There is DIY and OTS. All do-it-yourself projects are costly and can fail (cf. the M247 Sergeant York), but gains to national knowledge and economy are a clear pro. OTS solutions were available back in the day with the Gepard an obvious solution and the Marksman system a less known one. Still, the US Armed Forces usually had problems buying these things from abroad, even from their allies, with Roland being a notable exception.

Solutions from within the USA were available though and either failed historically mostly because of the changing political climate (ADATS on M113 or Bradley) or were bought in only small numbers. The M6 linebacker and the M998 HMMWV Avenger as well as the M1097 Heavy HMMWV Avenger respectively were bought, but did not perform as well as other solutions, if I am correctly informed. M163 VADS always was only a stop-gap solution.

Buying Marksman could have been a solution, though. Buying British instead of German might have been politically easier, especially if one would have used older M48 or M60 Patton tanks as a chassis. The former was offered as a solution for Marksman by Marconi Electronic Systems from ca. 1994 onwards, the latter was never offered, but I do not see, why it could not have worked.

While keeping the M48 chassis alive for another 10-20 years might not seem like a good idea, Marksman would have been a cheap solution that could offer first tier results (in the mid-1990s). The M48 chassis is well suited for the job, thousands were available readily, since the M48 was becoming clearly obsolete as an MBT, even with all upgrades available (L7 105 mm gun, MOLF laser range finder, thermal sights, modular applique armor or even ERA and a new MTU power pack). As a SPAAG a new power pack and the Marksman turret would have been more than sufficient, though. In an alternate history, where the USSR remains a real, though diminished threat, it is likely that the Detroit Arsenal would have remained fully operational as a tank factory, allowing for a swift modification process during the 1990s.

Thanks, Ursus. I don't recall reading about the Marksman system before. It looks pretty promising. Although ostensibly British, its multinational nature might make it less palatable to the Pentagon than a single-country source like Gepard.

Do you know if the M48 chassis (or M60) could have supported the Gepard turret? I can see the Pentagon making a deal to produce said turret here in the states and fit it to an all-American MBT chassis. The resulting SPAAG wouldn't quite be able to keep up with the M1/M2 on the trot, but it would be better than no AAA system at the front line.

-

An M48 with a slightly modified Gepard turret (different radar and computer) was Raytheon's proposal for the DIVAD competition that gave us the Sgt. York.

Interesting. Any idea why it was rejected (or why the Sgt. York got further along in the process)?

-

I had some articles I found on the DIVAD competition a while back. Ill see if I cant dig em up and post them.

May I say that I never actually understood the M247 Sergeant York? I mean, the US was already well underway with the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley, two of the most modern and best pieces of hardware at the turn of the decade into the 80s. And then they devise something so ugly, patched together and insanely ad-hoc like the M247 and cannot even make it work?

I mean, look at that thing: The chassis of the Gepard was not new, it's based on the Leopard 1, but the M247 is based on the M48 and the turret is so boxy that it looks like a WW2 tank missing a couple of rivets.

There were good contenders, Raytheon's Dutch Gepard turret could have been mated with an M48 chassis, General Dynamics mated the 35 mm Oerlion guns used by the Gepard with CIWS systems using what looks like a M48 chassis as well. And finally General Electric wanted to use the 30 mm GAU-8 Avenger. Probably an outlier solution, unless T-72s were known to grow wings.

My understanding that a major contributing factor toward cancelling the M247 was the M48 hull. It was too slow. So any viable alternate solution needed a Abrams or Bradley hull.

The truth of the matter is that the US has not really put any priority on unit level AA. The Army seemingly has decided on primarily relying the USAF and Patriot SAM and I guess the Stinger MANPADS. Sooner or later, the US military is going to pay a hefty price by ignoring tactical, unit level air defense.

All of the DIVAD entrants were based on the M48 hull (it was a proposal requirement), so that might have been a problem regardless of who won. I say might because I'm not sure the other entrants added as much weight as the M247 did (17 tons heavier than a normal M48). The Gepard's turret only adds 5 tonnes to a Leopard 1, and the driver trainer version of the Leopard 1 uses an 8.5 tonne weight to compensate for the lack of a turret. I don't know for sure what the M48's turret weight was, but I'm guessing around 3 tons since I've seen claims the M247 turret was 20 tons and it added 17 tons to the vehicle's weight. If the Gepard turret was 13.5 tonnes, that would make it approximately 15 tons, so it would add 12 tons to vehicle weight. It's certainly not a lightweight, but shaving 5 tons off the mass the M48's expected to haul around should help at least somewhat with the speed issue.

However, the M247 had plenty of other problems:
Electronics failures if it was wet
Hydraulic leaks if it was cold
Radar tracking degraded if it was warm
Too slow to engage (10-11s against hovering helicopters, 11-19s against moving targets, when the requirement was to engage within 8s)
Turret too slow to track fast targets
Lack of radar discrimination against ground clutter (most famously locking onto a latrine fan because the moving blades distracted it)
At high angles the gun barrels blocked the radar
Easily jammed
Gun range was half the range of the missiles carried by the helicopters it was supposed to engage


The range issue isn't really the design's fault, it's a failure of the requester to anticipate future technologies, but the development of longer-ranged anti-tank helicopter missiles meant that even if development had gone perfectly the utility of the design would have plummeted. It would still be useful against anything that blundered into its range, but the vehicles it was supposed to protect (not to mention the M247 itself) could be destroyed by a helicopter from well outside its own engagement range if it spotted them first. That range issue was why the Army shifted to missile-based AA for its next attempt at a fill-in-the-gap air defense vehicle (which turned out to be ADATS).

I do not remember where I found it, and will have to see if I can find it again, but I found an article written by a USAF pilot who was part of the testing of the SGt York. Not saying that it did not have issues (lots and lots of them), but from his prospective it worked, every time he tired to "attack" it shot him down, if I remember right it was 100% effective in the tests that he was part of. Could they have ever made it really work? I do not think so, as to much was stacked against it from the get go, but in a TW2000 type world I could see maybe making some and saying what the heck it is better than nothing.

I'm pretty sure that was discussed in a previous thread, and I still hold the opinion that needing to hang four radar reflectors on a drone so the M247 could see it (as documented in reports on its shortcomings) suggests that either the pilot had extraordinarily bad luck in dealing with it, it had wildly variable performance, or the F-16 radar they kitbashed onto the M48 chassis was good at picking up high and fast aerial targets and sucked at NOE/pop-up target acquisition.

I think this might be the Hummvee Avenger replacement since the Hummvee is on its way out as a frontline tactical platform. Other than being on the newer vehicle w/ updated comms I'm not so sure what real advantages mounting a Stinger pod on a CROWs would bring. Maybe newer/better optics?


That's less of SHORADS and more like a corps level ADA battalion paired w/ Hawks, Patriots, ground based AMRRAAMs to provide in close in/lower altitude coverage against leakers and low flying aircraft, cruise missiles, etc. And there are plenty of towed AA gun systems w/ accompanying fire control systems that can be made to work with missiles and if they can't be integrated at brigade level and below then the guns can do their own thing of shooting anything down that missiles cannot reach provided one is willing to sacrifice a certain amount of friendly a/c and the occasional casualty from rounds landing on peoples' heads :D

Which brings us back to this. Remember, the US Roland system was supposed to be a corps based asset and the guns and MANPADs were divisional, The problem was US Roland was axed at only 24 or 25 launchers plus developmental systems and several hundred rounds (including developmental, proof of concept, engineering/demo and/or prototypes). It got to the point where the US paid Britain and the Luftwaffe to raise more troops for the RAF Regiment and Flugabwehtraketentruppen or more accurately the Rapier and Roland launchers and rounds to provide coverage of USAF bases in England and Germoney.

Mad Mikec

Again, the problem was the DIVADS was still at the developmental stage and the solution to get Captain Insane-o slew to cue, elevation and traverse, whiplash speeds was to replace the turret hydraulics w/ 5000 psi systems from aircraft. Of course then you're going to have to engineer the hydraulics to be field serviceable- doable. And then a ten or so years later people would develop some really cray cray brushless type drive motors.

Also note the APG-66 used by DIVADS was air cooled, again which was a first for a fighter which previous used liquid cooled often some sort CFC refrigerant pumped into a heat exchanger. W/ software and hardware hacks both the rotating bar and illuminator would have matured into something useable or at least everybody cognizant of limitations

And that's the thing ADA as a branch not only ignored it own mantras but forgot about them. Gus and missiles are complementary and when you cancel one system (Roland) that was supposed to work w/ another DIVADS/Sgt York you aren't going to get coverage, engagement speeds, mobility, and/or number of systems per battalion.

Twilight 2k is about or should be about armies having both high and low tech systems at all levels because this was it. Nuclear war where a significant portion of homo sapiens was reduced to radioactive ash

Mad Mikec

Both of these are being fielded to the Company and Battalion level and are designed to combat DRONES and LOITERING MUNITIONS. I think the Army is watching both the Russian and Israeli loitering munitions being used in Syria. In addition, Iran has had a lot of success with drone strikes against Saudi Arabia. That is why they are testing these.

The new SHORAD has millimeter wave radar, an IRST sight, and 3-barreled GAU 19 .50 caliber gatling gun with a 2000 round ROF. It is clearly designed to shoot a lot of rounds at fast moving targets.

The new M109 hulled ADA only has a range of 10km for it's weapons systems. The typical aircraft-launched AT missile (like a Maverick) can hit from up to 25km away. It is clearly being considered for a "CLOSE PROTECTION" role for armored vehicles or other assets and is stated as being for drone suppression.

I believe the SLAMRAAM is for medium range engagements.

Possibly on sale late 1990s
 

WED, JUL 01, 1998 10:23 CET
Bofors Weapon Systems, a Celsius Group business unit, has received an order from the Swedish Materiel Administration (FMV) for TriKA the new air defence system destined for the Swedish Coastal Artillery. The TriKA fire unit, a variant of Tridon, is modular, vehicle mounted and is based on existing 40 mm guns with the new electric laying system and integrated fire control. The system is intended for protecting mobile combat units in the battle zone. As TriKA is modular future upgrading can be easily carried out. According to Magnus Ingesson, president of Bofors Weapon Systems, the order is important as it forms a part of the ongoing 40 mm air defence gun upgrading programme. It can also lead to other countries becoming interested in the concept as the Bofors 40 mm gun is to be found in many countries throughout the world.


TRIDON
The TRIDON Air Defence Gun System is a 40 mm VSHORAD development concept in several configurations. TRIDON can also be a cost-effective upgrading alternative and has been configured to meet and destroy the air threat wherever it appears. It is a high fire-power, highly mobile autonomous 40 mm gun system mounted on a 6x6 all-terrain chassis. The system concept gives short reaction time, high firing endurance and deployment in less than 60 seconds.
Everyting required to combat the enemy, from command and control to ammunition and spares is carried on mount. And with Bofors 40 mm 3P ammunition it can take on almost any threat and defeat lightly armoured vehicles, surface targets, concealed troops and attack helicopers. For the Swedich costal defence forces a version called TriKA is under development. A prototype with optronic fire control system was tested during 1998 and was fitted with IR-search system for trial during 1999.

Probably not on sale.
 

Swedish Army operates around 30 Lvkv 90 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns



Country of origin Sweden
Entered service Mid 1990s
Crew 3 men
Dimensions and weight
Weight 22.8 t
Length (gun forward) 6.55 m
Hull length 6.47 m
Width 3.17 m
Height 3.45 m
Armament
Main gun 1 x 40 mm
Machine guns 1 x 7.62 mm
Projectile weight 0.96 kg
Maximum slant range 4 km
Maximum firing range 12.5 km
Rate of fire 300 rpm
Elevation range - 8 to + 50 degrees
Traverse range 360 degrees
Ammunition load
Main gun 240 rounds
Machine guns 500 rounds
Mobility
Engine SAAB-Scania DS14 diesel
Engine power 550 hp
Maximum road speed 70 km/h
Range 320 km
Maneuverability
Gradient 60%
Side slope 30%
Vertical step 1.2 m
Trench 2.9 m
Fording ~ 1.2 m
Fording (with preparation) Amphibious


The Luftvärnskanonvagn 90 or LvKv 90 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun was developed in early 90s. This vehicle is also referred as the CV 9040 AA. Around 30 of these vehicles are in service with the Swedish Army.

The LvKv 90 is armed with the Bofors L70B 40 mm gun. This gun is fed from box-shaped magazines, containing 24 rounds each. Magazine is reloaded manually within 20 seconds. The LvKv 90 fires programmable proximity fused fragmentation rounds against air targets and HE-FRAG and AP rounds against ground targets. Maximum effective range against air targets is 4 km.

Secondary armament consists of coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun. It is used for self-defense against enemy infantry.

The LvKv 90 is fitted with modern fire control system. Vehicle radar has maximum detection range of 14 km. The LvKv has a friend-or-foe identification system and can track up to 6 targets simultaneously.

Front armor of the LvKv 90 provides protection against armor-piercing rounds fired from small caliber cannons. All-round protection is against small arms fire and artillery shell splinters. Vehicle is fitted with NBC protection and automatic fire suppression systems.

The LvKv 90 is based on the CV 90 IFV chassis. Vehicle is powered by the SAAB-Scania DS14 diesel engine, developing 550 horsepower. The LvKv 90 is fully amphibious after fitting a floatation kit. On water it is propelled by its tracks.



Variants



LvKv 90 TD, technology demonstrator to prepare for upgrades to the existing fleet. It has a number of improvements and is capable of firing on the move.

LvKv 90 C, uparmored variant, intended for international peacekeeping operations.

The thing with SHORAD, and even more so with VSHORAD, is that you want similar levels of mobility and protection than the maneuver element you are guarding against airborne threats. That is why the Bundeswehr had Gepard SPAAGs and Roland mobile SAM-launchers on armored chassis for their brigades, divisions and corps, but the Luftwaffe used Roland on MAN 8×8 trucks for the protection of air-bases.

Puttin a gun on a truck is not the same, even if said truck is somewhat armored and has gut mobility cross-country. The levels of protection and mobility will always be different and that is a problem for near-peer engagements, since your SPAAGs and SHORAD SAMs will be within striking distance of direct fire by the enemy. That is even more true today than it was during the later Cold War: back then, tank guns and ATGMs reached out 3-5 km beyond the forward line of enemy troops (FLET); or forward edge of battle area (FEBA), respectively, depending upon you perspective. Back then, battlefield ground-surveillance radars had a range of 20 km, today that's a distance easily overcome by beyond-line-of-sight missiles like Spike NLOS (quad-mountedable on pick-up trucks).

With the ever increasing threat by small to medium-sized drones, non-hardened (V)SHORAD-solutions are simply not going to survive long enough. Drone can now (or in the very near future) use swarm attacks to saturate SPAAGs or make them give away their positions for long-range artillery or NLOS ATAGMs to strike them from afar. A guntruck with a radar mounted is simply not going to cut it against near-peer opponents, especially since these have invested highly into drones.