War Industries & Mobilization for Total War in T2k
 

Raytheon recently reported that there will be a delay in producing any new Stinger MANPADS (IIRC, the final Stinger was delivered to the US Army 18 years ago) for Ukraine. The reason sited is the lack of availability of components due, in part, to the "global supply chain crisis".

T2k posits a "missile drought" after the TDM, as nations are no longer capable of producing high tech weapons. Real Life seems to suggest that such a missile drought would probably start earlier, as the war disrupts international trade. Also, the sheer scale of WW3 would result in increased consumption. If Ukraine has used 5,000 Javelins since the war started a few months ago, imagine how many TOW IIs, Hellfires, and Milans would be used in the first few months of global, total war.

It's not just supply chain issues. The complexity of high tech modern weapons means large-scale, mass production of same is difficult and problematic. I've long held that "modern" weapons (c. 1980-today) would be near impossible to produce on the same scale as they were during WW2. For example, an F-117 Nighthawk is orders of magnitude more complicated than a P-47 Lightening. This is true in spite of advances in manufacturing (more automation) since WW2.

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In 1990 the US was still producing 37% of the world's computer chips; it's less than 12% now. So for the T2K timeline where we have a bit of artistic licence, international supply chain issues in the early stages of the Twilight War might not bite quite as hard as we've seen IRL in recent years.

also in T2K the war took a few years to draw the US into it. that build up would both be good and bad. it would draw down the stocks of older ammunition (being sent to China) but it also would get what is refereed to as long lead items into production. you could get a new chip factory built in three or four years. but you could expand your production lines alto quicker. maybe 12 to 18 months.

Another thing to remember is the US and presumably NATO maintained higher levels of stockage during the Cold War. Much if this stick was either demilled, used in OIF/OEF, given as aid, or expended in training. Anecdotally, an acquaintance of mine told me his anti-armor company used to be able to draw a trainload (?) of older ITOW missiles and shoot them at live fires on the Fort Bliss/White Sands ranges during the mid and late 90s. Apparently the missiles were going to be destroyed anyway, so they were free to units to consume in training.

Good points, guys.

re Cold War-era stockpiles, I wonder how much relatively high tech weaponry would still be functional/effective after many years in storage. I wish I'd linked it when I first saw it, but I recall seeing an article about how stock of old, former WTO MANPADs being sent to Ukraine in the first couple of weeks of the war might not be effective because of age-related degradation of seeker heads and rocket engines.

Re increasing production of high-tech weapons, this article might provide some helpful insights.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...-almost-double

From the piece:

"Speaking to CBS News yesterday, James Taiclet, the chairman, president, and CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation, said that the company aims to boost production of the Javelin from the current 2,100 missiles per year to 4,000 per year, a process that could take up to “a couple of years” to achieve. One of the sites where the missiles are manufactured is in Troy, Alabama. Overall, production is shared as a collaboration between Lockheed and Raytheon Technologies."

So, doubling production rates could take "a couple of years". That seems to suggest that expenditure would quickly outstrip production in a full-blown WWIII scenario.

In a couple of ways, the situation today with NATO and Ukraine could apply to the T2k situation between the West and the PRC. Like what we're seeing today in Ukraine, the West would initially send older and/or obsolescent weapon systems to the Chinese (e.g. Dragon ATGMs and Redeye MANPADs), whilst ramping up production of current gen systems to replace depleted stockpiles.

In a v1 timeline, the Soviet adventure in China would probably prompt an increase in weapons production, both to supply China and to the strengthen the US military for the contingency of a wider war. However, this uptick in production would likely fall well short of "total war" levels.

Lastly, the more advanced the tech, the longer, I reckon, it would take to increase/expand its production. In WW2, one of my grandfathers worked as a salesman for a regional cannery. The US government asked the company to produce torpedoes instead of canned food. It took some doing to convert production lines for the task, but they did it. I'm not sure that sort of conversion would, by the 1990s, be possible on the scale it was in the 1940s. It's one thing to switch from tin cans to torpedoes, but it seems like quite another to switch from making clock radios to making laser-guided missiles. Also, by the 1990s, a lot of our electronics components were imported from abroad. A war in China would likely prove disruptive to that particular pipeline.

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I have the F-19 Ghostrider being so rare and in demand (and still classified) that they are ferried around in C-141s and C-5s. What would happen to their use after all the C-5s and C-141s are shot down, who knows. Might not be any F-19s by that point either.

This reminded me of a thread I came across a week or two back on Twitter about missile stocks and storage capabilities (please excuse references to what's happening today in Ukraine, though some of it is undoubtedly relevant).

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/sta...01885534498816

The author makes the case that the US learned some valuable lessons in the first Gulf War about the transportation and storage of valuable equipment in less-than-ideal climates, and the new technology that's been implemented as a result of those learnings. Perhaps some of the users here had some first-hand interactions with these kinds of equipment failures back then?

In any case, this all makes help the case that advanced missile stocks would likely be depleted rather quickly either through usage, or through poor storage/logistics by many nations around the globe.

edit: Here's some old documentation from the thread:

https://www.liberatedmanuals.com/TM-...5-470-15-1.pdf

This is EXACTLY why my war history is stated as being a "come as you are war." My war starts as a "police action" against Russian-backed separatist groups in Poland by the UK, US, & Germany at the request of the Polish government (once they learn those rebels have a lot of Spetnaz in their ranks) in 1997. A major conflict erupts from that police action in 1998 and things ramp up too quickly for the participating nations to get their economies on a "war footing." I have The Exchange occurring in 1999. As a result, the participating nations are forced to dig into their mothballs and the darkest recesses of their armories to fill the urgent need for weapons (much like Ukraine did) as units activate. The hurried nature of the conflict also leaves both military and civilian leaders scrambling which only adds to the chaos. It is that chaos which triggers the Exchange in my timeline.

Ramping Up
 

Although no baseline starting point is given, the data below could give us a better sense of how long it might take to mobilize the USA's industry to a total war footing. The quotes are from this 3/30/23 War Zone article.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...top-us-general

"The U.S., meanwhile, will double monthly production of 155mm artillery shells to 24,000 by year’s end and increase it sixfold within five years, Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said Tuesday, according to Defense One.

Production of Javelin missiles will more than double to 330 a month, and production of launchers will double to 41 a month, Camarillo said, according to Defense One. It will cost $349 million to add factory lines, purchase equipment, and hire second shifts, he said. The Army is also upping monthly GMLRS production from 566 missiles to 1,110 by 2026, Camarillo said."

If it takes at least 8 months to double 155mm ammunition production, imagine how long it would take to double the production of more complex ammunition types (e.g. TOW II ATGMs)!

Granted, in the T2k continua, the USA would be starting at a more advanced baseline start point, because post-Cold War drawdowns wouldn't have occurred, and production probably would have already increased somewhat to supply the PRC after the Soviet invasion.

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Well, I think the T2K timeline, the US military was less dependent on foreign sourced components. We've had a good 35 years outsourcing global and domestic industrial production to China since T2K was authored.

Additionally, the US military-industrial complex was simply just better prepared for war. Production assemblies weren't sitting idle or mostly idle like they are now.

Furthermore, there's lots of ways to increase production that probably aren't happening domestically right now. Run multiple shifts, loosen QC standards, re-purpose other factories / plants, break ground on new facilities, etc.

Lead time for clean rooms probably makes breaking new ground dubious for electronics, but a lathe is a lathe. If ISIS can churn out thousands of mortar bombs a month in backyard factories using cast scrap iron, lathes, and shotgun shells for primers, I bet the US could probably do better than going from 12,000 155mm shells a month to 24,000 if we were sufficiently motivated. At least, I think we could have in 1995.

We've gotten awfully inefficient at building things these days though.

The excerpt below is from a 4/26/23 piece on The War Zone (emphasis- italics and bolding- added):

"Yesterday, we wrote about the more than four million howitzer shells, rockets, mortars and other munitions the U.S. has provided Ukraine. Today, The Wall Street Journal took a deep dive into concerns about this nation's supply chain, especially with lingering problems from a 2021 explosion at a Louisiana factory that was "the sole domestic source of an explosive the Department of Defense relies on to produce bullets, mortar shells, artillery rounds and Tomahawk missiles."

"The ramshackle facility makes the original form of gunpowder, known today as black powder, a highly combustible material with hundreds of military applications," the newspaper reported. "The product, for which there is no substitute, is used in small quantities in munitions to ignite more powerful explosives."

The factory remains offline, highlighting the precarious nature of the U.S. weapons supply chain for items like Stingers, howitzers, anti-armor systems and artillery ammunition.

"Stocks are low in both the U.S. and its NATO allies, especially in 155mm howitzer shells, an ammunition that has been crucial to pushing back Russian forces."

“Can you imagine what would happen to these supply chains if the U.S. were in an actual state of active war, or NATO was?” said Jeff Rhoads, executive director of the Purdue Institute for National Security, a defense-research institute at Purdue University. “They could be in trouble very quickly.”

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Was this facility the only of its kind in the USA prior to the end of the Cold War? I can't imagine the country putting all of its eggs in one basket like that. But, if so, damage inflicted by Spetsnaz saboteurs or submarine-launched TLAM's could have had a disastrous effect on long-term sustainment of high intensity combat operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Korea in the T2kU.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...r-lack-of-ammo

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