OT: All-Out in the Falklands
 

I read a piece about the Falklands War recently. I started thinking. What if the Argentines had gone all-in in 1982? After the initial naval encounter in which HMS Conqueror (I think) sank an Argentine destroyer, the Argentines backed off and let the Royal Navy control the waters around the Falklands, albeit under air attack. What if the Argentines had gone all-in and had initiated a winner-take-all naval battle for control over the sea around the Falkland Islands? I don’t a very good read on this, not being a naval man. Opinions? Preferably with some substance?

The British would have probably lost about 30% of their force, the Argentinians something on the order of 50% to 70%. The British would have had to have split their forces, and pulled what little naval power they'd left in the North Atlantic south; while these reinforcements were on the way Argentinian sorties would have further atritted British naval power, sinking more cargo ships and outer cruisers, eventually hitting the Invincible (this is incumbent on how many Exocet missiles the Argentinian navy or air-force had left in stock, but I can see them going all in to bag that carrier). Invincible is what the Argentinians thought they'd bagged when they hit Atlantic Conveyer.

IIRC, the General Belgrano was a cruiser. After losing it, the Argies decided not to risk their carrier and the rest of their surface combatants and most of them spent the balance of the war safely in port.

An all-out naval battle would most likely have favored the Brits. Considering how much damage just one British SSN did to Argentine naval pride/confidence, the Argentines probably would have lost most of their naval force had they chosen to sortie in force. On average, British ships had more effective sensor suites and weapons systems. As a result, they would likely have detected the Argentines first, and would have been able to seize the initiative. They could have then chosen the ground (or water) on which to engage the Argentines and, with their superior training and weapons platforms, the British could have beaten them quite handily.

All of the damage done to British ships during the actual war was caused by land-based air. In a full-scale naval engagement scenario, if the Argentines could have supplement their naval air with land-based air cover/strike packages, they might have been able to deal the Brits a serious blow. But, the Brits would have wisely avoided an engagement in an area where the Argies could do that (see seizing the initiative above). On the other hand, if the Argentines had been able to base some of their Mirages, Skyhawks, and Super Etendards on the islands prior to the arrival of the British TF, the war could have turned out very differently.

I'd forgotten the Argentinians had a carrier. That definitely changes things; I do agree they'd have gotten the worse of a naval battle but as history shows they didn't just roll over and die. They had competent pilots and sailors, and but for luck the British didn't lose a couple of the ships the Argentine AF hit with iron bombs.

If the British had taken a severe beating (loss of a carrier, loss of another surface combatant, loss of more shipping) I wonder if the US would have been pulled in.

I recall from somewhere that the Argentine Forces had 7-9 Exocet missiles. Had they been able to get more, the outcome would have been very different. As well. the two goalkeepers on the Argentine side would have been the Hercules and the Santissima Trinidad, both Type 42 pattern destroyers using the Sea Dart. Reloads would be forthcoming for these to say the least.
I agree with the other post regarding the runway on the Falklands. Were this usable, and a CAP could be run around the clock, the Pucaras may very well have been able to administer the coup de grace once the escorts and Harriers were dealt with.

In the thread Falkland Islands, RN7 posted a link to an interesting article on Britain's attempts to prevent the Argentines getting more Exocets during the Falklands War: http://www.eliteukforces.info/articl...us-exocets.php .

I'm no Naval expert, but I think Raellus' summary seems like a pretty reasonable estimation of how things might have turned out.



I doubt that very, very, very much. if the Task Force has failed Thatcher's Government would almost certainly have fallen (it wasn't that popular before the War) and there's no doubt the UK today would be a completely different country from the one I currently live in, but from what I understand of the situation I don't think there's any scenario that would have prompted US involvement (I am assuming you mean as an active participant, presumably on the side of the UK?).

What is perhaps more likely is that the US would have attempted to broker some sort of a cease fire that would have allowed both sides to extracate themselves with honour as it wasn't in US interests to see either Government totally humiliated (Reagan did actually call Thatcher a few days before the Argentines surrendered urging the British to accept a negotiated cease fire to avoid humiliating the Argentines - http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110526).

Actually, they did try to go all-in. I've read a lot on the Falklands, just none of it recently. I definitely remember some of this from Adm. Woodward's memoir.

The Belgrano and 2 DDs (IIRC), some with Exocet, were approaching the British TF from the south, while the CV and escorts came from the north. HMS Conqueror sank the CL, while the carrier was something of a bluff-- I think her catapults weren't working?

I'll look further into this, but the short form is that the Navy tried and the British broke it up.

There was a programme on TV about the sinking of the Belgrano not so long ago - wish I'd paid more attention but I was only half watching it. It rings a bell with me that the Task Force commanders knew that the carrier (Veinticinco de Mayo, 25th of May) was not in a position to pose an immediate threat - the Belgrano was deemed to be the bigger danger at the time so was sunk, at which point the 25th of May headed straight to port, where it stayed. You could well be right about the catapults - there's something in the back of my head about maybe the seas being too rough to launch aircraft, something like that.

I can't see US involvement being overt, however information was fed to the British, AIM9L Sidewinders supplied (these were one of the main reasons for UK air success as they were the only all aspect air to air missiles used by either side) and some stingers were used by 22SAS (well before Us use was widespread - one SAS guy recalls being sent to the US on a course on them post war and stunning the instructors by having used one in anger to shoot down an Argentine aircraft).

Given the loss of a UK carrier could the war have continued - perhaps but it would have been nastier and harder.

More worryingly was the loss of more logistics support as this would have crippled the task force.

If they gave up after losing only one unit of this force (a WWII-era light cruiser), then, IMHO, they weren't really trying that hard.

IMPO, the Argentinians lost the war because they didn't go all out- they were clearly hedging their bets. In many ways, the entire war was a ploy to distract the Argentinian public from the harsh junta rule at home, rousing nationalistic sentiment by giving them a foreign foe to focus their ire upon. As such, the Argentinians didn't risk a whole lot. To do so would potentially have left the junta too weak to control its own citizens. Instead, they sent limited forces to defend the newly-won Malvinas islands. They paid for this strategic blunder by losing the war and the junta fell not long after.

IF the Argentinians had sent more [quality] troops (and supplied them properly), more modern AA assets, expanded/built an airfeld capable of handling its more modern fighters and attack aircraft (and based a good number there), and deployed stronger naval forces within striking range of the islands, they may have been able to turn back the Brits and keep hold of the islands. They would have lost more, but they could have kept the Brits from gaining a sustainable foothold on the islands.

I think that it would make a really interesting scenario to war game out. I don't want to come across as cocky, but I think that, given full access/control of Argentinian military assets, I could pull off a strategic victory over the forces sent by the U.K. IRL.

The problem with gaming this war is that we have too much hindsight. Looking back it is obvious that nobody expected a military reaction - it is just so unlikely (even the British Ministry of Defence considered the task impossible). No gamer would make the POLITICAL decisions that lead to the main decisive points.

The best summing up of how implausible the events were is this excellent article written somewhat tongue in cheek:

http://www.changingthetimes.net/samp...te_history.htm

Next time we complain T2K is implausible just remember this...

Another forum I read states that the carrier had an engine failure and could not get up enough speed in the calm weather and low winds to launch the aircraft).

Are you saying that the Argentinians didn't expect a military reaction? I suppose they thought it highly unlikely, but in military intelligence, one must look at enemy capabilities instead of trying to divine enemy intentions. The British had the capability of sending a military task force to retake the Falklands and the Argies knew this. Failing to take the possibility seriously was a colossal mistake. My argument is that, if they'd taken the possibility seriously, they could have prepared a welcome that would have stood a very good chance of securing a strategic victory.

I contend that the Argentinians were taking a gamble, hoping and praying that the British would not be willing to expend the blood and treasure necessary to win back a strategically insignificant imperial afterthought. Clearly, they miscalculated badly. But, the possibility of a British military response was an obvious possibility. It didn't/doesn't take hindsight to come to that conclusion.

I'm arguing that if the Argies had played smarter, they could have won the war. The Argies still had two weeks or so to prepare for a possible British invasion after the Thatcher government decided on a military response. I can't recall the name of the liner the Brits used to transport some of their troops to the Falklands, but its sendoff was a big public spectacle. It's not like the invasion was marshalled and launched in secret. We could start the wargame from the point the British TF left England and I think I still could have come up with a way to secure a strategic victory for the Argentinians.

From Wikipedia..

" Argentina's original intention was to mount a quick, symbolic occupation, followed rapidly by a withdrawal, leaving only a small garrison to support the new military governor. This strategy was based on the Argentinian assumption that the British would never respond militarily. Argentine assault units were indeed withdrawn to the mainland in the days following the invasion, but strong popular support and the rapid British reaction forced the Junta to change their objectives and reinforce the islands, since they could not politically afford to lose the islands once the British came out to fight. The junta misjudged the political climate in Britain, believing that democracies were weak, indecisive and averse to risk, and did not anticipate that the British would move their fleet halfway across the globe."

True, but the British had given some indication of their intentions. The lone warship down there, HMS Endurance, was due for retirement later in 1982. One or both of their carriers was nearly sold to India (or was it Australia?). There was a negotiating team in place to talk about transfer of the islands. Unfortunately, there was some dust-up between some scrappers, and Argentinian sub, and some Marines on South Georgia-- I forget the details, but it spooked the Argentinians into jumping the gun and launching the invasion.

A better way to "win" would have been to wait 6-12 months, and then walk in when the British couldn't have done a darn thing about it. If they had timed it closer to the Antarctic winter, they would have had the weather to support them. The Royal Navy was very anxious to avoid operations in the winter, as hard on ships and planes.

[quote] I contend that the Argentinians were taking a gamble, hoping and praying that the British would not be willing to expend the blood and treasure necessary to win back a strategically insignificant imperial afterthought. Clearly, they miscalculated badly. But, the possibility of a British military response was an obvious possibility. It didn't/doesn't take hindsight to come to that conclusion. [\quote]

Agreed.

Agreed.

One was to be sold to Australia. The Invincible I think.
The Melbourne had been retired a short time before because of the intended purchase and if it had been known it would fall through, the Melbourne may have been retained for a few more years.

And so it was that ever since Australia's naval aviation has been restricted to helicopters. And the Melbourne ended up assisting China's carrier-based pilot training. How stupid.

Ethell & Price, Air war South Atlantic, confirms that the wind was too low on May 1 and May 2 for the 25 de Mayo to launch fully-loaded jets.

And it was early on May 1 when the first Vulcan strike cratered the runway at Pt. Stanley, which meant it could not be used for staging jets. (Which begs the question, why didn't they send engineers to make sure the runway stayed open?)

A professor of mine pointed out that machismo may have had something to do with it, too. A woman wasn't going to fight, right? I'm presuming the junta had never seen the interplay of the House of Commons.

Margaret Thatcher wasn't called the Iron Lady for no reason!

The Argentines had a number of combat aircraft. A coordinated effort involving an all-out air assault at the schwerpunkt might have swamped British defenses. Obviously, the Brits knew this and would have taken measures to prevent the Argentines from getting their forces into position to launch such an attack. The conditions under which the decisive battle would have been fought would have been determined by the foresight of the respective senior commands and the capabilities of the screening forces. Also, I really have no idea whether the Argentines could have coordinated an air-surface attack involving all or almost all of their assets. These things are much easier said than done.

It seems in the end that the Argentines just didn't have a Plan B. Once their assumptions about the way things were supposed to go didn’t pan out, they had no idea what to do next. Under those circumstances, the Royal Navy had a clear advantage because they had a clear idea of what they wanted to accomplish. Also, the Royal Navy does a good job of allowing its leaders to take the initiative within the overall scope of the mission. Very important.

Duh, I made a connection
 

Oh, yeah, it's May 2012, isn't it? That would make this month the 30th anniversary of most of this fighting, wouldn't it?

Web, I think operations-tempo and refuelling assets were a big limiting factor for the Argentinian efforts.