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Originally Posted by Mohoender
I have read a lot of interesting point in all your posts but I wanted to point out a few points in the defense of the AT gun (in a T2K setting)....
IMO the twilight war compare more to the Russian revolution or Chinese revolution (may be American Indian wars) than to any other modern conflict (you just have a number of slightly more modern equipments). Your unit has been reorganized to live off the land and the opponents is making the best use he can of its own equipments. Sure AT guns lack mobility but you don't have the mobility to turn that position anyway. As a result, a single AT gun in a well prepared position can definitely stop you (IMO of course). At least, it will slow you for a long time and it has a good chance to destroy your last survivng M1 Abrams (which is in bad shape already).
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Bear in mind the context of the original post, Mo. The author wants to explore the fact that by the 1980's NATO had virually eliminated the AT gun from its collective arsenal, while the Pact forces maintained significant numbers of them. If you re-read the original post, the author doesn't even address AT guns in Twilight: 2000, other than to imply that the pre-war arsenals are the foundation of the post-Exchange arsenals.
That much said, I agree heartily with most of what you have written in defense of the AT gun in the Y2k setting. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, context matters. In the context of North Central Europe of 1999 or 2000, the AT gun has almost overwhelming advantages over the ATGM--many of which you have named. I'll offer a couple more:
Following the 1998 campaign season in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, the fighting winds down to a virtual standstill. Fuel shortages and lack of spare parts dramatically reduce the ability of both sides to conduct a mobile defense. By the same token, fuel shortages and lack of spare parts dramatically reduce the need for a mobile defense. Both sides now have the luxury of time to site their guns and prepare optimal defensive positions. Although there will be great demands on manpower, it still should be possible to create camouflaged firing positions for the AT guns. Depending on the initiative of the local commanders and the resources available, it should be entirely plausible for the AT guns to enjoy overhead protection, a ready supply of ammunition under cover, and perhaps even an alternate firing position or two. Additionally, it’s entirely reasonable to expect that cantonments will have extensive obstacle belts covered by AT guns, preregistered artillery and mortar zones, and machine guns firing from fixed and camouflaged firing positions. Now we find the AT gun coming into its own. Woe betide the IFV that ventures onto this battlefield.
At this point, the relative ease of manufacture of the AT gun ammunition versus the ATGM becomes a commandingly decisive factor. ATGM will still be in use, to whatever degree they are still available.
NATO will have a substantial body of AT guns available at this point, having captured Pact materiel during the offensives across East Germany, Poland, and western Czechoslovakia. The value of the AT gun in static defenses of great depth will have become abundantly clear during the operation in Poland. (No doubt, the PLA will have tried to pass on their wisdom following their own defensive triumph in Manchuria in 1996. No doubt, the West will fail to take note.) It might even be possible that NATO will see fit to protect its southern flank in (former) East Germany with extensive obstacle belts and captured AT guns. Of course, I could be giving NATO too much credit.
All of this leads me to ask an uncomfortable question: is the set-up for “Escape from Kalisz” even plausible? 5th ID jumps off from its positions in northwestern Poland for a cavalry raid into central Poland. Where are the static defenses? The remnants of the defenses constructed in 1997 should be everywhere. These defenses should have been enhanced between 1998 and 2000. What’s the story?
I should clarify what I mean by static defenses. Minefields backed by machine guns, artillery, and AT guns are at the heart of such defenses. These kinds of minefields are not FASCAM. I’m talking complex minefields with a mix of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Covering them would be whatever direct fire and indirect fire weapons were available. Any unit staying in one place for any length of time will improve on the defenses already in place. Bunkers will be constructed of whatever materials are available and sited so that they can cover their obstacles with overlapping fields of fire. Given time, communication trenches will be constructed, covered, and concealed. The trenches will be made at least semi-permanent by having their walls reinforced with wood. The floor of the trenches might have a raised portion to keep soldiers out of the mud during the rainy season. Wire commo will be laid. Backup communications will be established. Command posts will be dug in and fortified. All of this is very low-tech and requires little in the way of electronics or sophisticated tools. If you have the time, some shovels and axes, and the manpower, you can create a very extensive and formidable set of earthworks. (This is me going back to my 12B roots) Time and manpower can be substituted for each other.
Other types of obstacles we should expect to find used extensively in Poland in 2000 include wire obstacles, which are often combined with minefields, and water obstacles. Abatis probably have been used as much as they can be used back in 1997. By 1998, the roads probably have been cleared of all of those downed trees. Crib-style obstacles probably have been used, but they don’t wear well. If I were planning defensive obstacles in post-Exchange Europe (or anywhere, really), I wouldn’t use many crib-style devices. They have their uses, but the real money lies in minefields, wire obstacles, and water obstacles—preferably in combination.
So where are these kinds of defenses when 5th ID jumps off from its starting point?
Webstral