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As a session at ROTC Advanced Camp will demonstrate, getting a prospective second lieutenant to understand how the rifleman using the rifle is to be deployed is far more difficult than teaching that prospective second lieutenant to use a rifle. Officers aren't supposed to be riflemen per se, although the best lieutenants have been satisfactory riflemen. If the platoon leader is actively engaged in the firefight, the situation has deteriorated badly. His job is to lead his platoon, not personally put rounds downrange. This is where officers from outside the Infantry Corps will run into trouble: they may be able to use their personal weapons adequately, but they may have no ability to lead or manage riflemen before, during, or after combat. Twilight: 2000 will take the Army's focus on everybody else and recenter it squarely on the infantry. (Where it belongs)

I also agree wholeheartedly with Raellus about the ratio of support troops to combat troops by mid-2000. Most of the jobs associated with supporting formations in 2000 can be done by anybody. Why take a rifleman (or potential rifleman) and have him run a still when an old man can do the job with the support of an able child? Yes, formations will still require support on the move, but in Europe 1999 and the first half of 2000 are marked by infiltration raids, not mechanized movement. By 2000, then, I think almost everybody who wears a uniform will be in the combat arms, on a staff, or operating in very close support of the troops. CSS jobs will belong to civilians, although leadership of the group of civilians might be a good job for some of the excess officers we've been talking about.

It's true that USAF and USN personnel have specialized skills that go to waste behind a machine gun. However, many of those specialized skills simply won't have an application in the Army of 2000. Radar will have gone by the wayside to a degree that radar operators, technicians, and intel folks will be redundant. Air defense types from the USMC or the US Army will only have jobs if they operate guns. Missiles won't have targets. With so many vehicles down for lack of spare parts, the number of mechanics required will shrink dramatically. We could come up with a host of skills used to maintain a large mechanized army, modern air force, or world power navy that won't be necessary in 2000. A few skilled and senior technicians will still be needed to operate what sophisticated machinery is still available. The junior people will be redundant in their technical MOS. However, those troops who are generally young and fit still have a use in an area that never has enough warm bodies: slinging a rifle.

In World War Two, the Germans experienced the phenomenon of too few riflemen and too many Army support troops and idled troops of the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. The rear areas were regularly combed for support personnel who weren't fully occupied, who were turned into riflemen. Whole divisions of Luftwaffe troops were fielded. This was a horrible idea that worked out horribly, by the way. The (German) Army hated having separate Air Force divisions that were made up of people with little or no experience in ground warfare but who nevertheless held commands commensurate with their rank. They were useless in the field against Red Army formations. Hitler insisted on it because Goring insisted on it. Yet another example of politics and correctness hamstringing combat effectiveness. If we learn anything from the Germans, it should be that every uniformed service member is a rifleman. As a rifleman, his rank should be based entirely on his ability and experience in the infantry. Of course, the reality is that armies everywhere tend to treat officers like a member of an aristocracy. I acknowledge this by having Huachuca assign excess officers roles in leading civilians rather than stripping them of their commissions, putting a single chevron on their shoulders, and advising them to learn quickly. I do believe, though, that soldiers, airmen, and seamen whose jobs have been overtaken by the deterioration of the armies in Europe and elsewhere will be viewed by their commands as infantry replacements. It's a pattern with strong historical precedent.

Some time ago, I created a chart with unit strengths for the 111th Brigade and other formations associated with Fort Huachuca. I'm going to have to adjust those units strengths. Very few admin and CSS functions require soldiers when the unit is in its cantonment. I'll put lieutenants, captains, and warrants with no talent for command or staff work into those slots, along with soldiers whose disabilities keep them out of combat or training roles. This should have the effect of reducing my previously published head count.

A friend in Iraq who also played Twilight: 2000 at one point came up with the idea of the GS1. The GS1 is a civilian who does grunt work in return for government rations and a government bed. There will be lots of these people in post-TDM America. It will be easy to find civilians to haul things, dig holes, and do other manual labor for a meal and a place to sleep. There's no need to have soldiers do any of that, unless the need for labor is incredibly acute. (It will be, in certain locations) By the same token, teaching a civilian mechanic to repair Army vehicles and equipment within the confines of the cantonment may enable the Army to put someone fit to fight into a line unit. Teaching a civilian technician to service Army electronics--what few items of electronics remain--may serve the same function. If the mechanic and the technician are not fit for service, then the real economy has been in using the bodies available to generate the most combat power. The GS1 can take care of a lot of the menial tasks, so long as the GS1 can actually be fed and sheltered.

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