Great work, Paul. Thanks for putting in the time and effort. Without refuting any of the observations so far, I’d like to add a couple of notes.
[Paul, you mention a 36-round capacity for the design but a 20-round capacity for the autoloader. Does this mean that the autoloader carries 20 rounds while 16 more rounds are carried in elsewhere in the hull, or is 20 the maximum number of rounds the design can carry because of the autoloader?] Paul, you answered this while I was working. Thanks.
What is the impact of the (possible) new hull on the manufacturing process? What is the impact of the new hull, if any, on the other components? Commonality is a virtue, as is making the most of the existing assembly lines. I have no idea how difficult it would be to resize the hull, but I think the decision-makers at the top would make this an important consideration.
I agree with others that the crews are going to want as much ammunition as possible. How great a weight the Pentagon attaches to crew preferences is an open question. An encouraging point, however, is that with increasing use of computers in designing AFV, the engineers have been increasingly inclined to bring in crews to provide feedback even before the first models are constructed. If the A4 is being designed in late 1995, crew feedback may play a major role. By this point, it shouldn’t be too hard to round up a few disabled Chinese veterans and some American crews.
As for the intended role of the Ridgway (I’m throwing my voice behind this moniker), the US Army Vehicle Guide (v1) tells us that the original LAV-75 was organized into light tank/assault gun battalions. Light tanks might be used for reconnaissance, but assault guns are definitely not intended for that role. Traditionally, light tanks play a tank destroyer role (albeit a light tank destroyer in most cases) and a fire support role. By definition, assault guns are infantry support weapons first, anti-tank weapons second. Obviously, troops will use the Ridgway in whatever capacity it can serve. However, it’s the big brass who set specifications and create TO&E. We should look as well at the formations that have been issued the LAV-75 in the TO&E: five light divisions (one battalion each), an airborne division (one battalion), and a motorized division (two battalions). If we see the light divisions operating in roughly parallel modes to the heavier infantry divisions of the National Guard (42nd and 43rd being good examples), then we might see the LAV-75 filling the role of the divisional tank battalion for a motorized (not mechanized) infantry division. Yes, I know this is a bit of a stretch. Still, the basic idea is that a tank battalion offers the division commander a heavy-hitting force in case he finds himself up against a mechanized opponent or just needs some muscle to tip the scales. Pack this thinking aboard aircraft, and you have a possible interpretation for the LAV-75 role.
Although speed is not typically a value associated with assault guns or tank destroyers, we might see the Pentagon wanting an agile light tank in that single divisional tank battalion. A fast AFV with the firepower to tackle everything but the very best Bloc tanks can be moved from place to place on the battlefield very rapidly. Alternatively, a fast assault gun quickly can be moved from place to place across a two-brigade light infantry advance.
Therefore, it seems to me that the Pentagon would prioritize agility over increasing the 36-round capacity. If the Ridgway is operating in close coordination with the infantry, resupply will be a lot easier than if the Ridgway is supposed to be out in front.
9th ID is a bit of a mystery to me. It may be that there are two battalions so that one can remain under divisional control, while another is split up among the brigades. Or there might be another reason entirely. I’m at a bit of a loss, so I’ll stick to what I understand and opine that the A4 is supposed to act like an air-transportable tank within the light divisions.
Of course, the Pentagon is going to be influenced by how things have been working out for the Chinese. If the motorized/light infantry divisions with a single tank battalion are seen to have been cost-effective in the Far East, the whole concept will be much more attractive than if the Chinese equivalent of the 25th ID has been used in a fashion that is doctrinally similar but has been waxed anyway. Lots of variables here. Mind, it’s probably not possible to do anything about the TO&E of US Army formations in the time allotted anyway. The Pentagon isn’t likely to want to be caught flat-footed by an unexpected escalation of the Sino-Soviet War; a significant reorganization might not be in the cards.
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