Regarding reserves, I think it's useful to distinguish between pre-war and post-nuke reserves. I agree with all my comrades who have opined that virtually all Reserves of every stripe (National Guard, Reserves, Territorials, etc.) in the combatant nations would have been called up by 1998. Given the disruption to international trade, probably every nation with reserves will need to call them up to deal with civil disorder in the wake of shortages, economic disintegration, and so forth.
After the nukes, though, reserves are quite likely to reappear. The need for fighting men, or simply for warm bodies to do work for the government, will exceed the local economy's ability to support full-time troops. Reserves will reappear in the form of militias that train for a given number of days a month but otherwise engage in some sort of productive activity until marauders make their appearance. The quality of training these people have in their assigned roles will range from tolerable to deplorable.
By way of example, I created the Granite Brigade as the centerpiece of the armed forces of the State of New Hampshire, which by early 2001 is really only the City of Manchester and its hinterland. The Graniteers dispose four infantry battalions, but only one of them (1st Battalion, 1st New Hampshire Regiment, Infantry) is a regular, standing force. The other three battalions (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, 2nd New Hampshire Regiment, Infantry) are reservists who serve one week in every four. Even this level of service is quite disruptive to local industry and is tolerable only because there is little better option. The troops of the 2nd New Hampshire spend most of their drill time manning static defenses and reinforcing their basic training. By the v1 system, virtually all of the privates and specialists in the 2nd New Hampshire are Novice NPCs, while most of the remaining troops are Experienced NPCs. A few Veteran NPCs are found here and there, but the need for seasoned (and skilled) troops in 1-1 IN is so great that 1-2 IN, 2-2 IN, and 3-2 IN that the 2nd New Hampshire Regiment has to make do with what it can get.
Much the same situation exists along the Maine coast in First District, USCG. The need for experienced troops in the main force units, 701st and 702nd Maritime Rifle Regiments (each with two line battalions and a support battalion), has left the supporting militias with a kernel of seasoned veterans in senior leadership roles and training cadres and a lot of modestly-trained part-time riflemen. Here, too, the militiamen are used to man static defenses, conduct interior patrols, and generally slow the bad guys up until the real fighters can arrive.
The United Communities of Southern Vermont (UCSV) is an even more extreme case. The Black Watch, with its 300 fighting men and women, has no effective back-up. The economy of the UCSV is insufficient to support much in the way of reserves. On paper, a number of citizens are armed and can be deputized. In reality, the potential combatants who do not actively serve in the Watch have almost no training. The Watch leadership made the decision to use their very limited resources to keep the active personnel in constant training and readiness at the expense of having a significant reserve. It's a policy fraught with hazard for the long-term prospects of the UCSV, but it has enabled the Watch to field a small but surprisingly high-quality force. Were the so-called reserves of the UCSV to be called into service, they would put in a very poor performance.
By the same token, the Shogun in Nevada has no real reserves for his army, the Gunryo. Volunteers and draftees are trained on an as-needed basis, which means the warlord cannot quickly made good on any substantial losses. Reserves would be totally impractical for his motorized marauders, since any reservists would live and work in the communities the Shogun has under his thumb. Training and arming the people he is repressing is not, in the mind of the Shogun, the way to long-term power. Better to keep casualties low and train only volunteers and captured marauders whose loyalty can be acquired through re-training.
At the other end of the spectrum, Colorado must have a comparatively massive reserve system. The 6000 or so troops listed in Howling Wilderness as belonging to Colorado Springs couldn't possibly be enough to maintain internal order and protect the cantonment from outside threats. There must be a separate police system and a reserve system of some sort. certainly, MilGov would have access to excellent training facilities and a good cadre of veterans for training.
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