After reading your post Web, I'm left wondering just what condition the Ukraine is in mid 2000. Could the Soviets afford to ignore what was apparently going on for another year, or could Ukrainan industry move quickly enough to effectively re-equip and supply "loyal" troops enough so that the Soviets would be unable to crish them? A lot appears to rest on this ability to recover quickly.
However, Poland as we know is the most heavily nuked region in the world - the Ukraine is right next door. Nato units were on Soviet soil when nukes were first used in the west, so it's not unreasonable to think a number of tactical warheads struck the Ukraine. Furthermore, as Nato were driven back in 1997, they became more than a little desperate. It is probable that transportation hubs, industry, etc were targeted by them, in addition to troop concentrations, in an attempt to disrupt and slow the westward juggernaut that was the Pact.
Therefore I imagine the Ukraine to be in a similar state as central and eastern Germany - not as bad as most of Poland, but not all that far behind either. This assessment leans me more towards the thought that crushing Ukrainan revolt could wait.
It is also possible that the 4th GTA could have been sitting on their fuel supply for months, suppressing revolution just by being there and ready for a rapid westward move. If this is the case though, it's unreasonable not to assume the black market in the area didn't see an increase in supply of petroleum fuels and the 4th's supplies dwindle from theft. Also, the longer those fuel stockpiles were there, the greater the risk knowledge of it's existance would reach unfriendly hands. I would therefore "cap" the time the 4th had this stockpile to just a few months with the first significant deliveries arriving early to mid spring (a much smaller and limited flow of a few dozen barrels a month may have been in place all along, just to keep the absolutely VITAL equipment running). This further reinforces the probability the 4th GTA were intended to head west in support of an offensive.
If the stockpile was delivered earlier and Nato (or anyone not CLOSELY aligned with the Soviets) heard about it, you can guarentee something would have been tried to destroy it. It may have been a strike by the last few operating and fueled aircraft, perhaps a missile or two, or maybe a very long range SF team, maybe even an Op by the DIA. Leaving such a valuable and seriously dangerous resource in the hands of the enemy would be potentially almost as bad as cutting your own throat. In my opinion, a hundred thousand litres of diesel fuel in the hands of an enemy army is more deadly than half a dozen deliverable nukes.
Even Soviet allies might have been sorely tempted to destroy the stockpile, after all, the Soviets have had a tendancy to brutally crush any of their client states showing even the slightest degree of independance. Elimination of the stockpile and making it look like it was Nato (or some other 3rd party) would go a long way towards securing one's own position...
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