[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

It wasn't all bad though. The German III Army had effectively opened the door to the Soviets. They'd left their positions, strengthened and fortified over the previous year or two and were now exposed. One might even compare it to WWI - the intial stages of WWIII were mobile as in 1914, then as fuel ran out everyone dug in, just like in 1915-18. The III German Army's move can be equated with leaving the trenches and, although in the attack, exposing themselves (it's not an exact analogy but you get the idea).

I think your analogy is quite good.

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

After reading your post Web, I'm left wondering just what condition the Ukraine is in mid 2000. Could the Soviets afford to ignore what was apparently going on for another year, or could Ukrainan industry move quickly enough to effectively re-equip and supply "loyal" troops enough so that the Soviets would be unable to crish them? A lot appears to rest on this ability to recover quickly.

However, Poland as we know is the most heavily nuked region in the world - the Ukraine is right next door. Nato units were on Soviet soil when nukes were first used in the west, so it's not unreasonable to think a number of tactical warheads struck the Ukraine. Furthermore, as Nato were driven back in 1997, they became more than a little desperate. It is probable that transportation hubs, industry, etc were targeted by them, in addition to troop concentrations, in an attempt to disrupt and slow the westward juggernaut that was the Pact.

Therefore I imagine the Ukraine to be in a similar state as central and eastern Germany - not as bad as most of Poland, but not all that far behind either. This assessment leans me more towards the thought that crushing Ukrainan revolt could wait.

We know from the published "USSR Hit List" that the major nuclear targets in the Ukraine include Kiev, Lvov, Mukachevo, Sevastopol, Nikolayev, Pervomaysk. The missile complex in Pervomaysk in south central Ukraine was hit by two one-megaton ground bursts, Sevastopol got a one-megger, as did the shipyards in Nikolayev west of the lower Dnepr. Lvov received three 200kt warheads, while Mukachevo was dealt a single 250kt warhead. Except for Pervomaysk, all of the major nuclear strikes on the Ukraine were airbursts.

Of course, the major nuclear strikes aren’t the whole story. As Legbreaker points out, during the tactical nuclear exchange there would have been much smaller weapons (10kt-25kt) used against communications hubs, airfields, supply dumps, command-and-control nodes, and other nuclear weapons and launch systems. It’s difficult to say how many would have been directed against targets in the western Ukraine. However, given the proximity of the Ukraine to Poland, it’s probably safe to say that several dozen might have been used over the course of the tactical exchange, along with, perhaps, chemical weapons. The Ukraine within one hundred miles of Poland might be in very tough shape.

Worse, prevailing winds will carry fallout from Europe across the Ukraine. How much fallout blows across the Ukraine will depend on how many ground bursts there were, since air bursts don’t tend to generate much fallout compared to ground bursts.

All in all, it appears that the western Ukraine is in pretty tough shape. How far east from the Polish border the beaten zone extends is hard to say. We should bear in mind, though, that the front did not stay at the Soviet border for very long. NATO probably would have attacked a combined arms army in the Lvov area with a strike package of tactical nuclear weapons in July, 1997. Whether a formation in the Zhitomir area would receive a strike package in another matter. I strongly doubt a package would have been deployed against an army in Kiev, as this might have been seen by the Soviets as crossing the line from tactical use against troops to use of tactical weapons against strategic targets. By the time the exchange escalated to a more strategic level, the front had moved west. Tactical nuclear weapons might have continued to be used, but the Pact targets would be in Poland or Czechoslovakia.

I can agree, then, that west of Rivne the place is pretty much like Poland. East of Zhitomir, though, there is still plenty of Ukraine that hasn’t been hit by strategic nukes and probably hasn’t been hit by tactical nukes. The level of fallout contamination is hard to estimate. Clearly, though, multiple parties consider the Ukraine worth fighting over. "USSR 2000" paints a picture of a turbulent but potentially resurgent Ukraine. It’s worth noting that in April, 2000 the leading Ukrainian rebels declare a new republic, which the neighboring Soviets consider too strong to tackle. (If so, this might “free” Fourth Guards Tank Army for action against the West.)

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

It is also possible that the 4th GTA could have been sitting on their fuel supply for months, suppressing revolution just by being there and ready for a rapid westward move. If this is the case though, it's unreasonable not to assume the black market in the area didn't see an increase in supply of petroleum fuels and the 4th's supplies dwindle from theft. Also, the longer those fuel stockpiles were there, the greater the risk knowledge of it's existance would reach unfriendly hands. I would therefore "cap" the time the 4th had this stockpile to just a few months with the first significant deliveries arriving early to mid spring (a much smaller and limited flow of a few dozen barrels a month may have been in place all along, just to keep the absolutely VITAL equipment running). This further reinforces the probability the 4th GTA were intended to head west in support of an offensive.

It’s certainly possible that Fourth Guards Tank Army was in possession of their fuel stocks for a period of time. I agree that corruption and profiteering would have seen fuel siphoned off. I’m not sure I agree that the presence of the fuel or the possibility that NATO might get wind of the fuel possessed by Fourth Guards Tank Army necessitates the tank army being used for a westward offensive.

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

If the stockpile was delivered earlier and Nato (or anyone not CLOSELY aligned with the Soviets) heard about it, you can guarentee something would have been tried to destroy it. It may have been a strike by the last few operating and fueled aircraft, perhaps a missile or two, or maybe a very long range SF team, maybe even an Op by the DIA. Leaving such a valuable and seriously dangerous resource in the hands of the enemy would be potentially almost as bad as cutting your own throat. In my opinion, a hundred thousand litres of diesel fuel in the hands of an enemy army is more deadly than half a dozen deliverable nukes.

I certainly agree that if NATO intelligence had become aware of the stockpile they would have liked to do something about it. But what? I find it unlikely that Fourth Guards Tank Army would not go to great lengths to protect their fuel by means of dispersal, camouflage, and sheltering. The idea that a small group of individuals, however highly motivated, would be able to tackle or even meaningfully diminish a stockpile of millions of gallons of fuel more valuable than gold is iffy at best. A one-megaton strike might not even do the trick if the fuel were dispersed and protected in covered revetments, though I’m sure NATO would have tried it. I can’t imagine what a handful of strike aircraft would have been able to accomplish that would have been meaningful. We must bear in mind that we’re not talking about disrupting the fuel supplies of a Soviet force moving in the open. Before it starts to move, Fourth Guards Tank Army has the advantage of using a variety of protective measures to safeguard the invaluable fuel resource.

Originally Posted by Raellus

Had the Soviets known much about German 3rd Army's offensive, I think it would have dealt with it more decisively. What canon describes seems more like a drunken brawl than a planned operation.

I liken what happened between U.S. 5th ID and the Soviet 4th GTA to two boxers, each throwing a blind left hook. When their fists collide, the boxer with more mass is left standing- in pain but still standing- while the other is left with a broken hand.

As I pointed out, the Soviets have two Guards Armies in Byelorussia that they can use as a strategic reserve to either...

respond to a major NATO offensive,

support a major Soviet offensive (already planned),

or respond to the insurrection in the Ukraine.

This frees up 4th GTD to focus on conducting offensive operations in Poland and/or Germany.

A lot of fights look like barroom brawls on the ground. No plan survives contact with reality. The Americans were taken by surprise by the rapid movement of Fourth Guards Tank Army. The Soviets simply didn’t do very well. As the Soviets repeatedly discovered in WWII, it’s all well and good to have a solid map plan. Getting the units to execute that plan reliably is a whole different kettle of fish. In Escape from Kalisz, someone points out that the leaders of Fourth Guards Tank Army had spent too much time chasing peasants in ox carts and didn’t understand how tough the Americans were.

As for other tank armies in Belarus, certainly the remaining concentration of armor has a value. But it’s the fuel in combination with the armor that is at the heart of the (friendly) debate over what was intended for Fourth Guards Tank Army. If the fuel goes west, then the remaining armor is no more mobile than Fourth Guards Tank Army would have been without receiving any fuel in the first place.

Overall, reading "USSR 2000" further compels me to believe that Fourth Guards Tank Army was used as it was intended: as a mobile counterstrike force. The disintegrating state of the Soviet Union from mid-1999 onwards makes the idea of a renewed offensive in Germany seem like folly. As I have said before, though, I’m not Russian. A Russian senior leader might have given action against Germany a priority I can’t imagine.

Webstral