I'm of the same mind that "gasoline", as it was used by the scenario writers, was a catch-all term for fossil fuels (like folks that call all carbonated beverages "Coke"). If 4th GTA had some T-80s, perhaps some of the fuel was indeed gasoline, but being that the majority of Soviet vehicles (pre-TDM) ran on diesel, that's probably what it was.
I still think that "gasoline" is too valuable a resource to allocate to a mobile reserve strike force. It's a strategic resource and local counterattacks are either a tactical or operational level task. It seems to me that the regional, WTO-controlled cantonments could have brewed up plenty of methanol (or whatever) for such a contingency. The "gas" was a trump card and I imagine the Soviets had a bold, strategic level plan for its use.
I don't advocate a general offensive into Germany. Even though the Soviets had superior numbers in the Berlin region, as has been pointed out, the area had already suffered heavily from nuclear strikes and conventional fighting. It would, however, act as a good jumping-off point being as there are so few NATO units in the vicinity.
I agree that the Soviets, by 2000, were in a very tenuous position, considering the uprising in Ukraine and some of the other Soviet republics. They were starting to have serious problems just holding on to what they had. The only strategic benefit in a land grab during the summer of 2000 is that the lands seized (in Germany) could be used as a bargaining chip if and when negotiations between the warring parties began again.
I think the Soviets had a more limited offensive in mind- one that would hinder NATO's ability to threaten Soviet/WTO controlled territory in Poland. That would allow the Soviets to stabilize the situation in Poland, and deal with the various mutinies, without the threat of a major NATO offensive hanging over their heads.
An envelopment operation to trap and destroy German 3rd Army in northern Poland fits this bill quite nicely.
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